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ie Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 82/ Number 2058 

January 1982 

Department of State 


Volume 82 / Number 2058 / January 1982 

Cover Photo: 

Secretary Haig listens intently 
to the translation of a speech during 
the OAS General Assembly meeting. 
■(UPI photo) 

The Department of State Bulletin , 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the pubbc, the Congress, and 
government agencies with information 
on developments in U.S. foreign 
relations and the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; 
special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press 
releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission 
to the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 


Secretary of State 


Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 



Office of Public Communication 


Chief, Editorial Division 




Assistant Editor 

The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is 
necessary in the transaction of the public 
business required by law of this 
Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the 
Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget through January 31, 1986- 

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the 
Department of State Bulletin as the 
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is 
indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical 

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1 OAS General Assembly Meets in St. Lucia (Secretary Haig's Address, 
Department Announcement, Texts of Resolutions) 

ie President 

News Conference of November 10 

News Conference of December 17 


ie Vice President 

Visit to Latin America (Remarks, 
Dinner Toasts, Departure State- 

ie Secretary 

Overview of Recent Foreign 


Liberia: The Road to Recovery 

(William Lacy Swing) 
U.S. Interests in Africa (Chester 

A. Crocker) 
Internal Situation in Zimbabwe 

(President Reagan's Letter to the 

Libyan Involvement in Sudan and 

Chad (Princeton Lyman) 

ms Control 

INF Negotiations Open in Geneva 
(Secretary Haig) 

U.S. Consults With Allies on INF 
Negotiating Position (Richard 
R. Burt, Lawrence S. Eagle- 

U.S.-Soviet INF Systems: A Re- 
sponse to Soviet Claims 


Canadian Investment Policy and 
U.S. Responses (Ernest B. 
Johnston, Jr.) 


Voluntary International Guide- 
lines on Antitrust (William F. 
Baxter, Robert D. Hormats, 
Davis R. Robinson) 


36 Preserving Western Independence 
and Security (Lawrence S. 

40 The Situation in Poland (Secretary 
Haig, Department Statements) 

43 Fourth Report on Cyprus (Presi- 
dent Reagan's Message to the 

43 Visit of Spanish King Juan Carlos 
I (President Reagan, King Juan 
Carlos I) 

Middle East 






U.S., Israel Agree on Strategic 
Cooperation (Joint Press State- 
ment, Memorandum of Under- 

President Asks Americans to 
Leave Libya (William P. Clark) 

U.S. and Israel Review MFO 
Participation (U.S. -Israel State- 

Pursuing Peace and Security in 
the Middle East (Nicholas A. 

Claims Against Iran 

Visit of Jordanian King Hussein 
(King Hussein I, President 

Military Affairs 

52 Use of Chemical Weapons in 
Asia (Richard R. Burt) 


55 The Impact of International 
Terrorism (Frank H. Perez) 

United Nations 

57 Afghan Situation and Implications 
for Peace (Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, 
Text of Resolution, Department 






Security Council Votes on Golan 
Heights Situation (Text of 
Resolution, Department State- 

Libya: A Source of International 
Terrorism (Kenneth Adelman) 

U.N. Conference on New and 
Renewable Sources of Energy 
(Stanton D. Anderson, Presi- 
dent's Letter, Program of Ac- 

The Situation in Kampuchea 
(Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Text of 

Ethiopia (Jeane J. Kirkpatrick) 

U.N. Conference on Least De- 
veloped Countries (M. Peter 

Western Hemisphere 



U.S. Ratines Protocol I of Treaty 
of Tlatelolco (Secretary Haig, 
Text of Protocol, Senate Under- 

Visit of Venezuelan President 
(Luis Herrera Campins, Presi- 
dent Reagan) 


89 Current Actions 


92 November 1981 

Press Releases 

93 Department of State 

94 U.S.U.N. 


94 Department of State 


Members of the 11th OAS General Assembly meet in the conference room at Hotel La Toe. 

Secretary Haig with St. Lucian Prime 
Minister Winston Cenac (center) and 
Alejandro Orfila, Secretary General of the 
OAS (right). 

Hotel La Toe complex in Castries, site of the 1981 OAS General Assembly. 


OAS General Assembly 

OAS General Assembly 
Meets in St. Lucia 

The 11th regular session of the General Assembly 

of the Organization of American States (OAS) met in 

Castries, St. Lucia, December 2-11, 1981. Secretary 

Haig headed the U.S. delegation during his presence 

Dec. 2-lf. Following are the Secretary's address before 

the OAS on December If, a Department announcement of 

December 9 on the El Salvador resolution, and texts of 

resolutions adopted by the Assembly on December 10. 

Dec. 4, 1981 1 

At the dawn of the inter-American era, 
Simon Bolivar wrote that it was ex- 
tremely difficult "to foresee the future 
fate of the New World, to set down its 
political principles, or to prophesy what 
manner of government it will adopt." 
The history of the Americas since his 
time has shown that liberty was to be 
the basis of the New World's political 
principles and democracy its preferred 
manner of government. The nations of 
this hemisphere, despite their diverse 
cultures, drew strength from their 
historic mission to offer man the oppor- 
tunity for self-development in freedom. 

Today, the Americas are confronted 
by new obstacles to the achievement of 
this mission. Democracy is being ques- 
tioned. Economic progress is uncertain. 
And the prospects for peaceful change 
are threatened by a pattern of violent 

• If we have learned anything this 
century, it is that respect for the in- 
dividual, democracy, and the rule of law 

are essential to progress. Yet under the 
stresses and strains of change, voices 
are heard again advocating that freedom 
be sacrificed, individual rights be cur- 
tailed, and that government should 
dominate the productive process. Is the 
hemisphere going to be plagued again by 
totalitarian experiments that destroy 
liberty and also fail to deliver pros- 

• This region's rich natural 
resources, productive agriculture, and 
increasingly sophisticated technology 
should offer a bright future. But the sus- 
tained economic growth of the past two 
decades seems to have slowed or halted. 
The terms of trade have turned sharply 
against many countries. Can we use this 
period of adjustment to forge the basis 
for a resumption of stable growth? 

• Experience has taught us that the 
search for economic progress, social 
justice, and human dignity can succeed 
only in the context of peace and tran- 
quility. Precious resources and energies 
necessary for development cannot be 
squandered on conflict. Yet today we 
are faced by a trend toward violent 
change, including so-called wars of 
national liberation and foreign inter- 
vention. Can we allow force to become 

the decisive arbiter of national destiny 
without jeopardizing our own prospects 
for peace and prosperity? It will not be 
easy to answer these questions. But if 
we are to advance at all, we must draw 
on our collective strengths to create an 
agenda for cooperation. 

This agenda should focus on three 
objectives: first, to reaffirm and promote 
democracy; second, to create new 
economic opportunity; and third, most 
urgently, to oppose interventionism by 
strengthening the principles of non- 
intervention and collective security. 

Asserting Democratic Values 

First, we must assert the enduring 
value of democracy. The nations of this 
hemisphere are strongly dedicated to the 
democratic tradition. This tradition is 
based upon the idea of man as a creative 
and responsible individual. We believe 
that respect for the rights of the in- 
dividual — including freedom of expres- 
sion, freedom of religion, and freedom 
of choice— is fundamental to a humane 

It is not surprising that pluralistic 
societies respectful of such rights have 
created unparalleled opportunities in this 
hemisphere for their citizens. The revo- 
lutionary proposal that the just powers 
of government derive from the consent 
of the governed provides the best 
framework for human development. And 
democracy alone, among the world's 
political systems, has proven to be most 
protective of individual rights. The 
United States opposes human rights 
abuses regardless of the source. Our 
judgment of events must be fair, and we 
must not allow ourselves a double stand- 
ard. We should not be more tolerant of 
the infractions of those who reject 
democratic values and peaceful change 
yet more critical of the lapses of those 
searching for democracy and social 

Clearly, a nation cannot be liberated 
when its people are deprived of liberty. 
A civilization cannot be creative when 
its poets and philosophers are in jail or 
in exile. A state cannot be free when its 
independence is subordinated to a 

Secretary Haig addresses the OAS General 

foreign power. And a government can- 
not be democratic if it refuses to submit 
to the test of a free election. The OAS, 
true to its democratic tradition, should 
express its support for prompt, free, and 
open elections as the best course for 
ending civil violence and keeping social 
peace. Specifically, we hope that the 
countries of this hemisphere will support 
the Government of El Salvador as it 
leads its people through the electoral 
process toward a political solution of the 
conflict there. 

The OAS can also play a more active 
role in strengthening democracy 
throughout the region. If requested, this 
organization should be able to offer both 
technical services and good offices for 

the observation of elections. But we 
should go further. The nations of the 
Americas have already established mz 
institutions for economic, social, and 
military cooperation. Surely the time 
come for us to create a permanent 
forum that will foster democratic leac 
ship and the democratic process. 
An institute for the study of 
democracy in the Americas, under 01 
auspices, would provide a regular ex- 
change of ideas and experiences amoi 
democratic leaders. By making the 
Secretary General its director, we wc 
insure a cooperative effort. And by 
naming the institute in honor of one 
our greatest democratic leaders, Ron 
Betancourt, we would signify our hig 
purpose. ( 

Creating Economic Opportunities 

Second, we can act together to crej 
new economic opportunity. Econom 
growth can be revived if opportunity 
productive enterprise is encouraged. 
Cooperation for development is needi 
to strengthen incentives for private i: 
vestment in new ventures and to ope 
new markets for trade. Clearly, ine- 
qualities in the distribution of income 
cannot be ignored. But a more equite 
distribution of income can only be 
achieved in a climate of economic 

In this spirit, President Reagan < 
mitted the United States at Cancun 
the search for progress through cooj 
tion. He urged that we direct our atl 
tion to practical issues: how to devel 
energy and food resources; how to n 
productivity through better educatio: 
i health, and nutrition; how to improv 
the climate for investment and trade 
We have already begun to coope 
together on a program for the econo 
development of the Caribbean Basin. 
This program reflects the spirit of 
Cancun. It is based on a clear under- 
standing that the serious economic 
decline of many countries in the Car 
bean and Central America can be re- 
versed only by bold action. For our j 
President Reagan is preparing a 

Department of State Bui 


iprehensive economic package for the 
ons of the Caribbean Basin. The 
kage includes: 

• New legislative authority to offer 
countries in the Caribbean Basin 

or trading opportunities — including 
sible one-way free trade arrange- 
its — in the U.S. market. We have 
er offered such a preference before 
.ny region; 

• Specific investment incentives and 
sr measures to spur private invest- 

lt in private ventures; and 

• An increase in U.S. financial 
stance to deal with acute liquidity 
es and to help countries achieve 
•e flexible, diversified economies. 

The three parts of this plan — trade, 
jstment, and assistance — form an 
:grated program. The preferential 
le treatment will provide wider ac- 
3 to large markets, encouraging new 
ductive investment and structural 
istments in national economies. In- 
tment incentives will stimulate 
ital formation. And assistance will 
e the liquidity crisis enabling coun- 
s to restore their credit standing in 
•Id capital markets and to restructure 
ir economies. 

We believe that the Congress of the 
ted States will see the wisdom of 
h an integrated approach and ap- 
ve these initiatives. And we hope 
t other countries working with us to 
viate the plight of our Caribbean 
jhbors will also offer meaningful pro- 

The Caribbean Basin effort is only 
1 aspect of a cooperative strategy to 
"ease economic opportunities. 

• The existing world trading system 
serve our interests more effectively. 

President Reagan said at Cancun, we 
e yet to unleash the full potential for 
wth in a world of open markets. We 
I make a strong effort in the GATT 
neral Agreement on Tariffs and 
ide] negotiations next year to reduce 
riers restricting trade opportunities. 

• As Secretary General Orfila has 
posed, we should consult among OAS 
mbers on the multilateral trading 
tern in preparation for the November 

1982 GATT meetings. The most useful 
way to conduct such a consultation 
might be a conference of our trade 

• Another of the priority areas iden- 
tified at Cancun was agriculture. The 
actions of this hemisphere take on 
special importance because we have be- 
tween us much of the world's capacity to 
export food. We should explore together 
how to use our agricultural potential, 
perhaps convening for that purpose a 
meeting of our agricultural ministers. 

These issues and others have been 
proposed for the agenda of a special 
OAS General Assembly on cooperation 
for development. The United States sup- 

ports such a general assembly. It could 
address our objectives over the next two 
decades for agriculture, energy, trade, 
and other areas. It could debate how to 
achieve those goals. This regional 
meeting, like those proposed for trade 
and agriculture, is intended not to 
displace but to reinforce the inter- 
national dialogue begun at Cancun. 

Strengthening Security 

Third, we must act to strengthen the 
principles of both nonintervention and 
collective security. The nations of the 
Western Hemisphere have long under- 
stood that the search for a better life 

U.S. Ambassador to the OAS 

J. William Middendorf II was born in 
Baltimore, Md., on September 22, 1924. He 
received a Bachelor of Naval Science degree 
from Holy Cross College (1945) and a B.A. 
from Harvard (1947). In 1954 he received an 

N.B.A. from New York University Graduate 
School of Business Administration. 

Ambassador Middendorf has had a long 
career in investment banking which 
culminated in 1962 with the formation of his 
own partnership which he left in 1969 to 
enter government service. He recently was 
President and Chief Executive Officer of 
Financial General Bankshares, Inc. 

He served as Ambassador to the 
Netherlands (1969-73) and then as Under 
Secretary and Secretary of the Navy 
(1973-77). He was Chairman of the Finance 
Committee of the Presidential Inaugural Com- 
mittee. During the 1980 presidential cam- 
paign, he was coordinator of the Interna- 
tional Economic Advisory Committee and the 
Naval Advisory Committee. He was also a 
member of the Strategic Minerals Task 

He has been active in the Republican Par- 
ty, serving as Treasurer of the Republican 
National Committee, a delegate or alternate 
to three Republican national conventions, and 
Treasurer of the 1968 Transition Committee. 
He is the author of numerous articles, a fre- 
quent lecturer on major international security 
and economic issues, and is a member of 
several national and international organiza- 
tions concerned with defense, trade, and 
monetary questions. 

Ambassador Middendorf was sworn in as 
Permanent Representative of the United 
States to the Organization of American 
States on July 1, 1981. ■ 

uary 1982 

depends not only on commerce, credit, 
and trade but also on security. Born 
ourselves of revolutions, we have sought 
peaceful change as a basic objective of 
the inter-American system. And the 
principle of nonintervention has been 
regarded as fundamental to peace and 

History has shown, however, that 
the pledge of nonintervention by itself 
cannot prevent conflict. That task is 
beyond the power of any single nation. 
The Americas can be safe only if we 
work together, through collective secu- 
rity, to deal with threats to peace. 

The Rio treaty reminds us that this 
mutual responsibility is essentially 
related to our democratic ideals. Our 
obligation to resist aggression is all the 
more important when an outside power 
seeks to impose a totalitarian ideology 
or when the purpose of insurgency is to 
destroy any possibility of freedom and 

We must all face up to the fact that 
the principle of nonintervention is being 
violated today. Since 1978, Cuba, with 
the support of the Soviet Union, has 
embarked on a systematic campaign of 
increasing interference against its 
neighbors. It no longer makes any 
pretense of respecting the sovereignty 
of other countries. Instead, Havana calls 
the leaders of violent opposition groups 
together, forges unity pacts among 
them, trains their men, provides their 
arms, and sends them back to mount a 
violent challenge to legitimate govern- 
ments. Terror for the innocent has been 
the result. We are witnessing this pat- 
tern in El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
now in Colombia. All around the 
hemisphere, democratic governments 
have had to downgrade or break rela- 
tions with Cuba. 

There is also cause for worry in 
Nicaragua today. Despite commitments 
made to the OAS, pluralism is in danger 
of repression. The possibility of 
economic progress for the Nicaraguan 
people is being undermined by militariza- 

The Sandinista regime already sup- 
ports an army three times greater than 
that of the government it replaced. Now 
it is working to establish the largest 

Organization of American States 


Policy-making bodies 

Executive organs 



Advisory Defense 
I Council 

Autonomous advisory 

Organs that meet only 
when convoked, in 
> case ot emergency, or 
to fix or execute 

— Functional relations 
_ Advisory relations 

Department of State Bulk 


\S— A Profile 

ideal of unity among nations of the 
tern Hemisphere found its first expres- 
in the Treaty of Perpetual Union, 
rue, and Confederation signed in 1826. In 
), 20 Latin American nations and the 
;ed States held the first International 
ference of American States at which they 
ided the International Union of American 
,es. The union was served by a Commer- 
Bureau in Washington, D.C., which col- 
jd information on commerce and trade 
ul to the member states. The Commercial 
eau grew in importance, and in 1910 it 
tme the Pan American Union. In 1948 at 
Ninth International Conference of 
srican States, the republics of the 
dsphere adopted a charter and renamed 
r association the Organization of 
erican States (OAS). 


ichieve an order of peace and justice; pro- 
e solidarity; strengthen collaboration; and 
md the sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
independence of member states. 


:re are 28 members of the OAS— Argen- 
l, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colom- 

Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican 
mblic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, 
itemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mex- 

Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. 
:ia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, 
ited States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. By 
ision of the eighth Meeting of Consulta- 
l of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (1962), 

present Cuban Government was excluded 
m participation in the inter-American 
tern. However, Cuba, as a national entity, 
till considered a member state. 


ch member appoints representatives to the 
icialized bodies of the OAS and an am- 
isador to the Permanent Council located in 


OAS main building, Washington, D.C. 

Washington, D.C, the headquarters of the 
OAS and its General Secretariat. Council 
representatives often serve concurrently as 
their country's ambassador to the United 

Juridical Equality 

Each nation has only one vote, and no veto 
power exists. 

Secretary General 

Alejandro Orfila of Argentina. 

Official Languages 

English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish. 

Principal Organs 

General Assembly; Meeting of Consultation 
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; the three 

councils— Permanent Council, Inter-American 
Economic and Social Council (CIES), and 
Inter-American Council for Education, 
Science, and Culture (CIECC); Inter- 
American Juridical Committee; Inter- 
American Commission on Human Rights; 
General Secretariat; and specialized con- 
ferences and organizations. 


Approximately $73 million (regular assessed 
fund of about $49 million plus voluntary con- 
tributions to four special multinational funds, 
1980). The U.S. share is $47 million (60%). 

The OAS is financed by obligatory 
assessments and voluntary contributions by 
member states as determined by a scale of 
quotas. These quotas follow a modified for- 
mula similar to the U.N. quota system based 
on the countries' population and size with the 
reservation that no one state's quota may 
represent more than 66% of the total. ■ 




--— -~ 

force in Central American history— with 
the assistance of at least 1,500 military 
and security advisers from Cuba. 
Nicaragua's arsenal already includes 
tanks and other heavy offensive 
weapons never deployed before in Cen- 
tral America. Pilots are being trained 
and facilities readied for modern jet 
fighters. Meanwhile, the principle of 
nonintervention is being violated as 
arms, ammunition, and other military 
supplies flow from Nicaragua to the 
Salvadoran insurgents. The people of 
Nicaragua must be wondering about the 
purpose of these armaments. How can 
such a costly military array advance the 
cause of social justice? Whose interests 
are served by support of insurrection in 
El Salvador? The other nations of Cen- 
tral America must also be asking about 
the meaning of these militant activities. 
They fear— and we must all fear— that 
the future may hold a costly arms race 
at the expense of economic development 
and social progress. They fear— and we 
must all fear— that the militarization of 
Nicaraguans is but a prelude to a wid- 
ening war on Central America. The 
tragedy of an uncontrolled arms race 
and war itself must be prevented. Is 
there nothing that we can do together to 
allay insecurity? 

For our part, the United States is 
prepared to join others in doing 
whatever is prudent and necessary to 
prevent any country in Central America 
from becoming the platform of terror 
and war in the region. The United 
States has made proposals to Nicaragua 
to normalize relations. If Nicaragua 
addresses our concerns about interven- 
tionism and militarization, we are 
prepared to address their concerns. We 
do not close the door to the search for 
proper relations. 

But, in addition, should we not be 
discussing together how to prevent the 
import of heavy offensive weapons — by 
any country in Central America? Should 
we not be searching for ways to limit 
the number of foreign military advisers 
to reasonable levels — in all countries of 
Central America? The countries of the 
region should know that the United 

States will help them resist illegal inter- 
vention from their neighbors or from the 
outside. President Reagan has made 
clear that we have no plans to send com- 
bat troops to Central America. But we 
will provide needed additional economic 
and military assistance. Small countries 
must be able to call for help when help 
is needed. And, to paraphrase Abraham 
Lincoln, when the townsmen come to 
drive the wolf away from the sheep's 
throat, the wolf should not then cry that 
his liberty is being violated. 

We must understand that this threat 
to peace in Central America is not con- 
fined only to the victims of violence and 
intervention in that region. If we fail to 
act on behalf of the principles of non- 
intervention and collective security, then 
the inter-American system will be 
jeopardized. Ultimately democracy itself 
will be imperiled. 


The agenda for cooperation that I have 
discussed today draws upon the Western 
Hemisphere's tradition of democracy, its 
record of social and economic achieve- 
ment, and its devotion to peace. These 
resources are remarkable for their 
strength and duration. They give us con- 
fidence to overcome the difficult 
obstacles that confront us. 

Let us measure our progress against 
the historic mission defined by the OAS 
Charter: ". . . to offer to man a land of 
liberty, and a favorable environment for 
the development of his personality and 
the realization of his just aspirations." 
This goal can be reached. We can rein- 
force our individual efforts by working 
together, and our example will give hope 
to others around the world. Our inter- 
dependence can be a source of strength, 
and our diversity can become a source of 

Bolivar once prophesied that the in- 
habitants of the New World would 
throw off their passivity in order to 
search for greatness, a greatness 
defined by justice, liberty, and equality. 
We have come some distance toward 
such greatness since Bolivar's time. The 
mission, indeed the vocation of our gen- 
eration, is to further advance his vision. 

Dec. 9, 1981 2 

The Department was extremely please 
by the OAS General Assembly resoluti 
on El Salvador adopted in St. Lucia. 
The resolution was sponsored by three 
Central American countries — El Salva 
dor, Costa Rica, and Honduras — whicl 
have either had, or will soon have elec 
tions of their own. Passed by 22 coun- 
tries including Brazil, Colombia, Peru, 
Ecuador, Venezuela, and the rest of tl 
Andean countries, among others, the 
resolution constitutes a hemispheric ei 
dorsement of the democratic electoral 
process in El Salvador. 

The resolution stated that the 
Government of El Salvador sees in thi 
democratic process now underway the 
political solution to the violence affect 
its country. In brief, the resolution's f 
specific points included the wish that 
people of El Salvador attain peace, 
social justice, and democracy within a 
pluralist system permitting them to e: 
ercise their inalienable rights; hope th 
peace and harmony can be achieved 
through an authentically democratic 
political process; the suggestion that 
other governments might respond to 
Government of El Salvador's invitatio 
to observe the elections, the repudiati 
of violence, terrorism, and any act coi 
travening the principle of noninterver 
tion; and a reiteration that it is up to 
Salvadoran people to solve their inter 

We see the overwhelming supporl 
for this resolution by 22 countries 
representing a wide range of Latin 
American concerns, as an important ( 
dorsement of the electoral process no 
underway in El Salvador. We see this 
collective action as a clear call by Lat 
America for the leftist guerrillas in E 
Salvador to renounce violence and en 
the political process. 

Department of State Bulle 


xts of Resolutions 


General Assembly, 

ing seen: 

The provisions of Articles 3 and 16 of the 

rter of the OAS, which refer to the prin- 

I of solidarity of the American States 

a political organization based on the real 
•rise of a representative democracy, to 
ect for the fundamental rights of the in- 
lual, and to the principle of free deter- 
ition of the peoples; 

Resolution AG/RES. 510 (X-0/80), which 
ides that the democratic system is the 
s for the establishment of a political 
sty where human values can be fully 
ized, and 

ing heard: 

The statements by the chiefs of delega- 
5 during the proceedings of the General 
smbly, and 

That the Government of El Salvador has 
■essed its intention to find, through the 
ocratic process, the political solution to 
violence affecting its country and, to that 
it has scheduled the election of a Na- 
al Constituent Assembly for March 1982; 
That the Government of El Salvador has 
Dunced that the political electoral process 

II Salvador is in progress, and 

That the Government of El Salvador has 
ted other Governments to observe the 
ing of elections, 

To express the wish that the people of El 
'ador attain peace, social justice, and 
locracy within a pluralist system that 
Dies its citizens to exercise their in- 
nable rights. 

To express the hope that all Salvadorans 
attain an atmosphere of peace and har- 
iv through an authentically democratic 
toral process. 

To suggest to the Governments that wish 
o so that they consider the possibility of 
-pting the invitation extended by the 
ernment of El Salvador to observe its 
tion proceedings. 

To repudiate violence and terrorism and 
act that constitutes a violation of the 
iciple of non-intervention. 
To reiterate that, in accordance with the 
iciple of non-intervention, it is up to the 
/adoran people alone to settle their inter- 

Annual Reports and Special Reports of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human 

The General Assembly, 
Having seen, 

The annual report of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (AG/DOC. 
1364/81), the special reports of the Commis- 
sion (AG/DOCS. 1365/81, 1366/81, 1367/81 
and 1368/81 and the replies from the govern- 
ments (AG/DOC. 1369/81), and 

That the protection and implementation 
of human rights is one of the lofty aims of 
the Organization of American States and that 
their observance is a source of solidarity 
among the member states, as well as a 
guarantee of respect for human life and the 
dignity of man; 

That the principal aim of the Inter- 
American Commission of Human Rights 
(IACHR) is to promote respect for, and the 
defense of human rights in all the member 

That the democratic structure is an 
essential factor for the establishment of a 
political society where human values can be 
fully realized; 

That the evolution underway or com- 
pleted in some countries to return to 
representative democracy is a positive fact; 

That the measures adopted in certain 
countries, which contribute significantly to 
the observance of the rights mentioned in the 
American declaration of the rights and duties 
of man and in the American Convention of 
Human Rights (Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica) 
are also a positive fact; 

That although the Commission reports 
that there has been relative progress with 
respect to compliance with human rights, it 
also makes clear that situations persist where 
restrictions on such rights have not be [been] 

That it is necessary to reiterate the im- 
portance of economic, social and cultural 
rights within the context of human rights for 
the integral development of human beings; 

1. To take note of the annual report, the 
special reports, of the Inter-American Com- 
mission on Human Rights and the recommen- 
dations and to express its appreciation for 
the work performed in the fild [field] of pro- 
tection and promotion of human rights. 

2. To take note of the observations, objec- 
tions and comments of the governments and 
of the information on the measures which 
they have taken on their own free initiative 
and will continue to take to strengthen 
human rights in their countries. 

3. To urge the governments of the 
member states that have not already done so 
to adopt and carry into effect the necessary 
measures to preserve and ensure the full ef- 
fectiveness of human rights. 

4. To recommend to the member states 
that they continue adopting and applying ap- 
propriate legislative measures and provisions 
to preserve and maintain the full effec- 
tiveness of human rights in accordance with 
the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man. 

5. To reaffirm that the effective protec- 
tion of human rights should also include 
social, economic and cultural rights; and to 
indicate, in this respect, to the governments 
of member states, the responsibility of mak- 
ing every possible effort to participate fully 
in cooperation for hemispheric development, 
inasmuch as it is a fundamental way of con- 
tributing to the integral development of the 
human person. 

6. To note with satisfaction the decision 
of the governments of the member states 
that have invited the Commission to visit 
their respective countries, and to urge the 
governments of the states that have not 
already accepted or have not set a date for 
this visit to do so as soon as possible. 

7. To invite the governments of the 
member states that have not already done so, 
to consider the advisability of acceding to or 
ratifying the American Convention on Human 
Rights (Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica). 

8. To recommend that, consistent with 
the democratic system of government, the 
member states seek to ensure that the exer- 
cise of power derive from the legitimate and 
free expression of the will of people in ac- 
cordance with the characteristics and cir- 
cumstances of each country. 

9. To affirm the need vigorously to de- 
fend and promote human rights, among 
them, the right to life, personal security and 
freedom, which will effectively contribute to 
the preservation and full observance of such 

10. To urge all the governments to con- 
tinue to provide the Commission with the 
necessary cooperation to enable it to ac- 
complish its tasks. 

'Press release 409. 

2 Read to news correspondents by acting 
Department spokesman Alan Romberg. 

3 Adopted by the Assembly at the eighth 
plenery session on Dec. 10 by a vote of 22 for 
(U.S.) with 4 against (Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Grenada), and 4 abstentions (Panama, St. 
Lucia, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago). 

4 Adopted by the Assembly at the eighth 
plenery session on Dec. 10 by consensus. ■ 

uary 1982 


News Conference of 
November 10 (Excerpts) 

Q. Your recent statements on limited 
nuclear war, State Department 
memos, interviews, have all hinted at 
possible intervention against Qadhafi, 
Castro. A high state of belligerency 
seems to personify your foreign policy, 
and people say it's in disarray. 

My question is, were you 
misunderstood on the question of 
nuclear war? Are we going to in- 
tervene in the Caribbean or anywhere 
else? Are we going to provide a 
military shield for Egypt if it goes in- 
to Libya? 

A. I have been just as disturbed as 
you are and just as confused by some of 
the things that I've been reading about 
our supposed foreign policy. 

Let me say that that statement that 
started the whole thing with regard to 
the possibility of the spread of nuclear 
war, I can't say that it was mis- 
understood. I don't think it was 
misunderstood by the editors who were 
in the room. I was having lunch with a 
group of editors, and I made a state- 
ment that I've made a number of times. 
I won't repeat it here, but it was an ex- 
planation of the whole strategic concept. 
And then, evidently hearing it second- 
hand, because it wasn't written by 
anyone who was in that room, to my 
knowledge, it appeared in an entirely 
different context. And we could go back 
and get the transcript of what was ac- 
tually said, and I would stand by that. 

We have no plans for putting 
Americans in combat any place in the 
world. And our goal is peace; it has 
always been. And at the end of this 
month, we will go into negotiations with 
the Soviet Union on what I hope will be 
reduction of the theater nuclear 
weapons in Europe to the lowest point 

Q. Are you repudiating those 
memos that have been publicized in 
connection with Libya and the Carib- 

A. We are interested, of course, in 
the Caribbean. This is why we've been 
helping El Salvador, because we believe 
that revolution has been exported to 
that area and with design. Again, as I 
say, our economic help to El Salvador is 

three times the military assistance we're 
giving. And that military assistance is 
not in the nature of combat forces of 
ours, nor do we have any plans to make 
it that way. 

But, yes, we continue our interest in 
preserving the Americas from this kind 
of exported revolution, this expansionist 
policy that is coming by way of, I think, 
the Soviets and the Cubans. 

Q. You mentioned El Salvador 
and the importance that El Salvador 
has to the United States and this 
region. Yet, the El Salvador Govern- 
ment is rapidly losing ground, and 
guerrillas already control almost one- 
fourth of the land there. How far will 
the United States go to keep the 
Durate government in power? 

A. Let me say that there's some 
disagreement — a great deal of 
disagreement — about who is mostly in 
power or what the guerrillas might con- 
trol. We have been urging, and hopefully 
cooperating with, a solution that would 
lead to an election and settle this dispute 
by peaceful means. It is true the guer- 
rillas have switched their tactics now. 
Unable to win a military victory, they 
have switched them to hit-and-run tac- 
tics against the infrastructure of in- 
dustry and the economy — trying to 
bring down the government by destroy- 
ing the economy. But I don't believe that 
we could accept without question that 
there may be something of a statement 
in the inability to bring about a quick 
military solution to this, but we would 
prefer the other. 

How far are we prepared to go? As 
I've said, we're giving economic aid. I 
think we should continue to do that. I 
don't believe this requires in any way, 
nor have we considered, aid of the kind 
of actual military intervention on our 
part. But we are hopeful, still, that with 
the help of some of the other neighbors 
in Central America which feel as we do, 
that we can bring about the idea of an 
election and a peaceful settlement. 

It is true about one thing: It cannot 
be denied, the guerrillas, with their ter- 
rorist tactics in El Salvador, have failed 
miserably in an attempt to bring the 
population over on their side. The 
populace is still in support of the govern- 

Q. In your exchange with the 
editors — I happen to have the 
transcript — I'd like to read you what 
you said. You said, "I could see," you 
said, "where you could have the ex- 
change of tactical weapons against 
troops in the field without it bringing 
either one of the major powers to 
pushing the button." Then, Secretary 
Haig last week talked of the possibili 
ty of a nuclear warning shot as part < 
NATO's contingency plans. 

I would like to ask you, first if 
you endorse still what you said to th< 
editors and, second, if you believe th; 
the nuclear warning shot should be a 
part of NATO's plans. 

A. I have not been a party to the 
contingency planning of NATO that ha 
gone on now for approximately 30 yeai 
and which, I think, has proven itself a 
deterrent to military action in Europe 
and for all this period of time. 

What you've just quoted that I said 
there, the discussion was in the area 
of — and I suppose it's hypothet- 
ical — where you're talking about is it 
possible to ever use a nuclear weapon 
without this spreading automatically to 
the exchange of the strategic weapons 
from nation to nation. And I gave as 
what I thought was something that wa 
possible, that the great difference be- 
tween theater nuclear weapons — the a; 
tillery shells and so forth that both sid< 
have — that I could see where both side 
could still be deterred from going into 
the exchange of strategic weapons if 
there had been battlefield weapons, 
troop-to-troop exchange there. 

I think there's high risk, there's no 
question of that. I think the thing we 
have to recognize and why our goal 
must be able to seek peace is what 
someone said the other day: "If war 
comes, is any nation — would the op- 
ponents, faced with inevitable defeat, 
take that defeat without turning to the 
ultimate weapon?" And this is part of 
the danger and why we're going to pui 
sue arms reductions as much as we cai 
and do what we can to insure peace. 
And I still believe that the only real in- 
surance we have with that is deterrent 

Q. Could there be a nuclear wan 
ing shot? And I take it that you do e 
dorse what you said in the context y 
said it. 

A. I endorse only that I said it wa 
offered as a possibility, and I think yoi 

Department of State Bullet 


r e to still say that that possibility 
Id take place. You could have a 
simistic outlook on it or an opti- 
itic, and I always tend to be op- 
istic. Your other question— 

Q. Nuclear warning shot? 

A. There seems to be some confu- 
i as to whether that is still a part of 
TO strategy or not, and so far I've 
I no answer to that. 

Q. I wonder if there's any portion 
the Saudi eight-point peace plan 
it could be incorporated in the 
terican peace initiative or that 
dd be added on to the Camp David 

A. One in particular. I know that 
re's also some dispute about what I'm 
ng to say between the parties con- 
ned, but I believe — and I have stated 
iviously that I believe — that it's im- 
:it in the offering of that plan, 
ognition of Israel's right to exist as a 
ion. And this has been one of the 
:king points so far, with the Arab 
rid refusing to make that acknowl- 
mient. This was why I have referred 
it as a hopeful sign that here was an 
Br of a plan, whether you agreed with 
>r not, but indicated the willingness to 
jotiate, which does imply. 

The other point in the plan is that 
i of the eight points calls for all of the 
tes of the region living together in 
ice, and I think we all endorse that. 

Q. Any other parts of it besides 
•se two? 

A. Let me answer it this way. I 
nk that the most realistic approach is 

one that we are taking, which is the 
empt to bring peace in the Middle 
st must be based on the Camp David 
ords and 242 Resolution of the 
ited Nations. 

Q. Some Members of Congress say 
it this B-l bomber you want to 
ild is a "flying Edsel." The Congres- 
nal Budget Office says that it will 
it twice as much as your people 
nk it will cost. Your own Secretary 
Defense calculates that its useful 
le — before the Soviets could keep it 
m penetrating Soviet airspace — 
uld be about 4 years. Are you going 
reconsider? Do we really need the 

A. Yes, we do. I believe that this 
and the MX are both important parts of 
strengthening our weakened triad of 
strategic nuclear power. 

The B-52, which has been hailed at 
the moment as the one that could be our 
craft for carrying missiles and pene- 
trating, was never built for that. It 
would have to be rebuilt. So, you're not 
home free by using that older plane. 
There's a cost to that. The B-l carries 
anywhere from one and a half to two 
times the payload that it carries. The 
B-l has a target on radar that's only a 
fraction of that of the B-52. And it has 
greater speed. 

But the problem that has neces- 
sitated that is a gap that remains be- 
tween what has to be the ultimate use of 
the B-52, with their age, and the 
development of the new tactical bomber. 
That is only in a state of research and 
study right now. We cannot guarantee 
the date that it will be ready. It is that 
gap when we would have nothing that 
the B-l would fill. But the very fact 
that its one mission of penetrating 
enemy airspace might be eliminated in a 
few years time, at the end of that gap 
as, hopefully, the other plane comes on 
line, does not mean that you scrap it. 
There will be other purposes and func- 
tions for which it can be used. So, it isn't 
a total loss. 

As to the figure given by Congress, 
Cap Weinberger was my finance direc- 
tor for a while in California, and I trust 
his figures better than I trust theirs. 
And I think that we go ahead, and I 
think that's a worst-case situation that 
they're taking with regard to cost. 

Q. What adjustments are you plan- 
ning in your foreign policy structure 
or in your staff to avoid situations 
such as that last week, when your 
Secretaries of Defense and State were 
making conflicting statements on 
nuclear policy and which made it 
necessary for you to call your 
Secretary of State and your National 
Security Adviser into the Oval Office 
for a private meeting? 

A. I called them in, actually, to find 
out and to urge that they, with their 
staffs just as I have with my own, insure 
that we're a little more careful. There 
seems to be too much just loose talk go- 
ing around, but it has been exaggerated 
out of all reality. There's no animus, per- 
sonal animus, and there is no bickering 

or back-stabbing going on. We're a very 
happy group. [Laughter] 

The picture that has been given of 
chaos and disarray is a disservice to the 
country and to other countries and allies 
as well. We are not in disarray with 
regard to foreign policy. I think our ac- 
complishments have been rather as- 

I have had 70 meetings — bilateral 
and multilateral — with heads of state, 
foreign secretaries, ranging from 
Southeast Asia, to Asia, to Europe, 
Africa, and certainly here within the 
Americas. We have a better rapport 
established now between the three 
North American countries than I believe 
we've ever had. We have — our allies — I 
don't think we've ever had a stronger 
relationship than we have with them in 

We were supposed to be destroyed 
at the Ottawa summit, and suddenly you 
decided that by some fluke we weren't. 
And then came Cancun, and I was not 
burned at the stake. [Laughter] 
Everything turned out just fine, and I 
had bilateral meetings there with 17 in- 
dividual heads of state that were there. 
They were very pleased with the presen- 
tation we made about how to meet some 
of their problems. 

I think in the Middle East, we've 
progressed there. I think that we've 
made great progress and rectified some 
things that had been giving the country 
problems for a time. And tied with this 
is our economic plan and our defense 
program to refurbish our defenses, so 
that I am greatly encouraged. Our 
meetings here with heads of state in 
every instance have — they have 
responded with statements to the effect 
that they have better relations than 
they've ever had before with our coun- 
try, better understanding of where we 
stand with relation to each other. 

And I think that Al Haig has done a 
remarkable job as Secretary of State. 
He is trusted and approved of in every 
country that we do business with. And 
the only thing that seems to be going 
wrong is, I think sometimes that the 
District of Columbia is one gigantic ear. 

Q. You've criticized the press for 
circulating what you've called reports 
of disarray. I'm wondering if you 
think that Mr. Haig's behavior may 
have been at play in these reports 

A. All that I meant by that — I must 

luary 1982 


say, there have been times when we've 
checked on "Is this story correct?" and 
we have been able to refute that the 
story is not correct, and then see it, still, 
appear and be made public. But all I 
would ask is — I know you've got a job to 
do and you're trying to do a job — but all 
I'd ask is all of us, I think it behooves all 
of us to recognize that every word that 
is uttered here in Washington winds up, 
by way of ambassadors and embassies, 
in all the other countries of the world. 
And we should reflect on whether it's 
going to aid in what we're trying to do 
in bringing peace to troublespots like the 
Middle East, or whether it's going to set 
us back. 

Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Nov. 16, 1981. ■ 

News Conference 
of December 17 

All the information that we have con- 
firms that the imposition of martial law 
in Poland has led to the arrest, confine- 
ment in prisons and detention camps, of 
thousands of Polish trade union leaders 
and intellectuals. 

Factories are being seized by securi- 
ty forces, workers beaten. These acts 
make plain there's been a sharp reversal 
of the movement toward a freer society 
that has been underway in Poland for 
the past year and a half. 

Coercion and violation of human 
rights, on a massive scale, have taken 
the place of negotiation and com- 
promise. All of this is in gross violation 
of the Helsinki Pact to which Poland is a 

It would be naive to think this could 
happen without the full knowledge and 
the support of the Soviet Union. We are 
not naive. We view the current situation 
in Poland in the gravest of terms — par- 
ticularly the increasing use of force 
against an unarmed population and 
violations of the basic civil rights of the 
Polish people. 

Violence invites violence and 
threatens to plunge Poland into chaos. 
We call upon all free people to join in 
urging the Government of Poland to 

reestablish conditions that will make 
constructive negotiations and com- 
promise possible. Certainly, it will be im- 
possible for us to continue trying to help 
Poland solve its economic problems 
while martial law is imposed on the peo- 
ple of Poland, thousands are imprisoned, 
and the legal rights of free trade unions 
previously granted by the government 
are now denied. 

We've always been ready to do our 
share to assist Poland in overcoming its 
economic difficulties but only if the 
Polish people are permitted to resolve 
their own problems free of internal coer- 
cion and outside intervention. 

Our nation was born in resistance to 
arbitrary power and has been repeatedly 
enriched by immigrants from Poland 
and other great nations of Europe. So, 
we feel a special kinship with the Polish 
people in their struggle against Soviet 
opposition to their reforms. 

The Polish nation, speaking through 
Solidarity, has provided one of the 
brightest, bravest moments of modern 
history. The people of Poland are giving 
us an imperishable example of courage 
and devotion to the values of freedom in 
the face of relentless opposition. 

Left to themselves, the Polish people 
would enjoy a new birth of freedom. But 
there are those who oppose the idea of 
freedom, who are intolerant of national 
independence, and hostile to the Euro- 
pean values of democracy and the rule 
of law. 

Two Decembers ago, freedom was 
lost in Afghanistan. This Christmas, it's 
at stake in Poland. But the torch of 
liberty is hot. It warms those who hold 
it high. It burns those who try to ex- 
tinguish it. 

Q. With the apparent, in your 
words, "Soviet involvement," how will 
this affect our relations both with 
Poland as a commandant and with the 
Soviet Union, including trade and 
arms talks? 

A. You're getting into the area 
there that I just don't feel I can 
discuss— the area of initiatives and op- 
tions that might be available as condi- 
tions develop that we may not be able to 
foresee, so, I just am not going to 
answer questions or discuss what those 
emissions might be or what our reaction 
might be. 

Q. Have you made it clear to the 
Soviet Union how there might be some 

A. I think not only we but the— our 
allies in Western Europe have made it 

very plain how seriously we will considei 
Russian intervention there. 

Q. There are repressions in other 
areas in the world. In recent days, th« 
newspapers have been filled with 
reports of oppressions by the Israelis 
in the occupied zones against the peo- 
ple there, even killing children, 
shooting and killing children, and an- 
nexing the Golan Heights. How can 
the American taxpayer, in good cons- 
cience, continue to support aid to 
Israel with arms and money under th< 

A. We have no information on any 
violence or anything that's taken -that's 
been happening there. We have 
registered our disagreement and the fai 
that we do deplore this unilateral actiox 
by Israel which has increased the dif- 
ficulty of seeking peace in the Middle 
East under the terms of the U.N. 
Resolutions 242 and 338. And we con- 
tinue to address them with the idea, 
hopefully, that this action can be 
ameliorated. , 

Q. Did you get any indications, 
whatsoever, from the Israelis that 
they were about to annex the Golan 
Heights before they, indeed, very 
quickly took that action? And, seconc 
ly, I was wondering what effect you 
felt this unilateral annexation will 
have on the Camp David peace proces 
and your hopes for peace in that part 
of the world? 

A. I partially answered that with 
regard to the difficulties now with 242 
and' 338. We were caught by surprise. 
This was done without any notification 
to us. But, apparently, other than a fei 
hours interruption, the peace process 1 
going forward. Egypt and Israel are 
continuing to work on the subject of 
autonomy. And we still continue to be 
optimistic about the Middle East, 
although we recognize that difficulties 
can arise. 

Q. But doesn't it make your job i 
little more difficult in trying to brinj 
the parties there together? 

A. Yes, but then I've come to the 
conclusion that there is a worldwide pi 
to make my job more difficult almost 
any day that I go to the office. 
[Laughter] Yes, it is. It introduces a f? 
tor that has complicated things. 

Q. There are reports today of kil 
ings in Poland and more violence. 


Department of State Bullel 


t do you think the people of 
nd should do? Should they ac- 
sce quietly to this martial law? 
lid they resist it? And if they 
it it, what help will the United 
es give them? 

A. Again, you're getting into the 
that I said I cannot discuss, what 
nitiatives might be, what our op- 
i might be. I don't think those 
Id be discussed in advance of any 
for it, for action. We have the 
rt also, but we have no confirma- 
as yet, with regard to today's 
nee, and we're waiting to get that 

Q. Aren't we letting the Russians 
iway with it? With each passing 
aren't they solidifying their posi- 
and, in fact, there's nothing we 
do about it? 

A. No, we're not letting them get 
! with it, and I thought that I in- 
;ed that in my remarks. But, again, 
are leading, in another way, into the 
that I just don't feel would be prop- 
er me to discuss. 

^. Jimmy Carter said that when he 
in office he also was the subject 
sreeived death threats from Libya, 
he thought it was unwise to 
uss it publicly. Can you tell us 
reasoning behind making the 
ge public? And, secondly, can you 
-can you comment on the concern 
)me people that your dialogue 
i Col. Qadhafi has resulted largely 
ihancing his stature in the world? 

V.. I haven't had any dialogue with 
Qadhafi, and we did not make it 
ic. The news, claiming leaks from 
entified sources, made it public at a 

when we had held this entire mat- 
onfidential and secret for a long 
, because we believed that we had a 
;r opportunity of apprehending any 
wrists or terrorists' squads if it was 
nade public. And, so, we're sorry 

it was. And for anyone to suggest, 
is been suggested lately, that we 
some reason for making this public, 
lon't put that shoe on. We made an 
*t, at one point, to call in some 
srs in the media and ask for their 
>eration in restraint from talk on 

and that, then, became the story in 
lews for that evening. 

Q. Do you believe that the Golan 
rhts should be returned to Syria 
n Syria's record of bombarding the 
eli farms for so many years? 

A. Now you are getting into the 
area of what is trying to be settled in 
the talks under 242 and 338, the 
peacemaking talks regarding all of the 
territory that might be held and, 
therefore, it is not proper for me to 
comment on this. This is the very matter 
that is being negotiated. 

Q. Yesterday, Senator Baker said 
that the chances of an assassination 
attempt on you by this hit squad [Lib- 
yan] have been diminished. I wonder, 
is that true and, secondly, is this hit 
squad still on the loose? 

A. I understand that words [have] 
come out from the senators office that 
he did not have any intelligence informa- 
tion that would give rise to such a state- 
ment or such an assumption. Now, 
maybe he was giving an opinion and 
believed that things are cooling down a 
little bit. I think it would be very foolish 
of us to relax any of the security 
measures. And I can only tell all of you 
that our information on this entire mat- 
ter has come from not one, but several 
widespread sources, and we have com- 
plete confidence in it and that the threat 
was real. 

Q. What prospect do you see that 
the Soviet Union could become involv- 
ed militarily in Poland and that, con- 
sequently, the United States could 
have to have some kind of military in- 
volvement too? Should we be relaxed 
about it or concerned about it? 

A. We are concerned about it and, 
beyond that, again, I can't say as to ini- 
tiatives. We have in no unmistakable 
terms, with our allies, let the Soviet 
Union know how the free world would 
view and how seriously we would take 
any overinterference or military in- 
terference in Poland. 

Q. In your statement on Poland, 
you seemed to imply that there will be 
no more food shipments or other aids 
to Poland until martial law ends. Is 
that the intent? 

A. We have suspended the 
shipments that we were going to make 
because those were intended, and we've 
had quite a record of humanitarian aid 
to the people of Poland. We'd like to 
continue that, but under the present cir- 
cumstances, we cannot go forward with 
that if it can be used by the government 
as a measure to further oppress and 
control the people of Poland. So we've 
suspended such shipments. 

Q. There's been a report, recently, 

that that so-called, "Libyan assassina- 
tion squad," was not really under the 
sponsorship of Mr. Qadhafi but that 
they were Shiite Moslems who, 
themselves, were opposed to Mr. 
Qadhafi. And, secondly, that the U.S. 
Government paid the informers, or at 
least one of them, a quarter of a 
million dollars for his information. 
Can you confirm those reports? And 
are you still determined to go ahead 
with the evacuation of American 
citizens from Libya? 

A. I cannot confirm — I know 
nothing of anything of the kind that you 
said or that they are not the terrorist 
groups that we were led to believe they 
were. As I said, I'm confident of our in- 
formation. I don't know anything about 
anyone being paid or not. — the 
American people — here, again, I regret 
very much the disrupting of their lives, 
and I know that they probably had the 
greatest relationship with the people of 
Libya, their own friends and neighbors 
that surround them, and fellow workers. 
But, also, our information was such that 
it would have been irresponsible for us 
not to think forward to a possible hazard 
for them. As this situation developed, 
we didn't have any choice. The only 
choice we had was that if we didn't do 
what we have done, there could have 
come a moment in which you all would 
have been asking me: Why were we so 

Q. During the campaign and in the 
early months in office, you used harsh, 
even strident, terms to criticize the 
Soviet Union's policies and positions 
on any number of issues. But last 
month you turned statesman in your 
message to the Russians about 
negotiating deployment missiles. And, 
last week you intentionally used 
words about the situation in Poland 
that wouldn't rouse the Russian Bear. 
Should these alterations be inter- 
preted as a change in tactics, or 
should they be interpreted as soften- 
ing in your policy toward Moscow? 

A. At the first press conference, I 
did not volunteer any information about 
the Soviet Union. I was asked a ques- 
tion, and I answered the question to the 
best of my ability. I think you will find 
that the teachings of Marxist-Leninism 
confirm what I said. At that time, what 
I spelled out was that they recognize as 
immoral only those things which would 
delay or interfere with the spread of 
socialism and that, otherwise, anything 
that furthers socialism is moral. I didn't 
set out to talk harshly about them. I just 
told the truth. 

Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Dec. 21, 1981. ■ 

iary 1982 



Vice President Bush Visits Latin America 

Vice President Bush departed 
Washington, D.C., on October 11, 1981, 
to visit Santo Domingo, Dominican 
Republic (October 11-13), Bogota, Colom- 
bia (October 13-W, and Brasilia and 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (October 1U-17). 
He returned to the United States on Oc- 
tober 18. 

Following are the Vice President's 
remarks prepared for delivery before a 
joint session of the Congress of the 
Dominican Republic on October 12, his 
dinner toasts in Colombia on October 13 
and in Brasilia on October U, and his 
departure statement from Brasilia on 
October 16. 

OCT. 12, 1981 

You do me a great honor by inviting me 
to speak before this distinguished 
assembly on this historic day. It has now 
been almost 500 years since Cristobal 
Colon made his magnificent mistake and 
dropped anchor here off this island. The 
record shows that he was overjoyed at 
the knowledge that after his long, 
perilous journey from Spain, he had 
finally arrived in China. The great ad- 
miral had not found China but a new 
world and had changed forever the 
course of history. 

From a letter he wrote to Spain, we 
know something of his first impressions 
of the island he called Espanola. Of the 
island's inhabitants, he wrote: "... they 
are honest and exceedingly liberal with 
all they have; none of them refusing 
anything he may possess when he is ask- 
ed for it, but, on the contrary, inviting 
us to ask them. They exhibit great love 
toward all others in preference to 

With these lines, Colon told us a 
great deal about the character of the 
first Dominicans. To judge from the 
warmth of my reception here, I would 
say that five centuries have done 
nothing to alter that generosity. 

I hope it is not being impolite to his 
ghost to say that he brought to this otro, 
or Nuevo Mundo, both the best and the 
worst of the Old World from which he 

had come. He brought sugar from the 
Canary Islands; horses; the rudiments of 
science and western knowledge. He 
brought word of a man who had been 
born the son of a carpenter in Nazareth 
1,500 years before. He brought another 
aspect of civilization with him too — that 
imperial extension of political power 
called colonization, a term oddly similar 
to his own name. 

It was here that the first cathedral, 
the first hospital, the first university in 
the New World were built. But Colon 
also brought the beginning of succession 
of foreign dominations — Spanish, 
French, Haitian. It was not until 
1844 — the era of Juan Pablo Duarte, 
whose name in the Dominican Republic 
is synonymous with freedom, liberty, 
and democracy— that the country was 
truly independent. If this sounds recent, 
bear in mind that my own country was 
not free from foreign domination until 
the battle of Yorktown in 1781, 200 
years ago next week. 

We are both Colon's children, our 
two countries. We share a common 
history. We also share a common 

We live in an age in which the forces 

of totalitarianism cast a long shadow 
over the world. The longest is cast b; 
the Soviet Union. When countries un 
its thrall raise their voices and cry fc 
freedom, the Soviets answer with tai 
secret police, the Gulag. In our time 
have seen those tanks roll into Hung 
Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan. We mu 
now hope they do not roll into Polan 

In Africa, Soviet influence has 
spread. It has spread to this hemispl 
It is only because of the Soviet Unioi 
that Fidel Castro still rules over Cub 
Every day, the Soviet Union has to i 
ject about $10 million into the Cubar. 
economy to keep it alive — $3 billion 
year. It amounts to 25% of Cuba's g 
national product. Of course, Castro 
misses no opportunity of proclaiming 
that he is beloved by the Cuban 
people — and yet he has not held an ( 
tion in 22 years. We in the free worl 
can draw two conclusions. The first 
that he must not trust the Cuban pe 
otherwise why not give them the rig 
to vote? The second conclusion follo\ 
from the first: He is a tyrant. He wi 
not be pleased to hear this, no doubt 
find that Mr. Castro is frequently ar 
noyed by my remarks. I must confes 

Vice President and Mrs. Bush attend dinner in honor of President Antonio Y Guzmar 
(right) of the Dominican Republic. 


Department of State Bu 


; gives me some pleasure. On the day 
el Castro holds free elections in 
>a, I will say something nice about 

Of course, that day will never come 
"uba, so long as Castro rules. It will 
er come in Libya, either, as long as 
lhafi rules there. And so it will be for 
totalitarian country. So it is with 

The particular danger we in this 
lisphere face is this: A total- 
ianism has to expand. Totalitarian 
imes cannot survive by winning 
rts and minds of the people, because 
f rule by force — by fear, not by law. 
there will always be someone — a 
Der Matos, a Solzhenitsyn, a Juan 
ilo Duarte — who will stand up to 
inny. Having nothing to offer but 
alution, these regimes must create 
sr revolutions by destabilizing, by in- 
•ating, by terrorizing. The Cubans 
e been caught doing this red-handed 
r and over in this hemisphere — in El 
/ador, in Costa Rica, in Nicaragua, in 
itemala, in Colombia. 
But we must remember that Cuba is 
jue in our hemisphere. The people of 
aragua, on the other hand, still have 
chance to throw off the chains that 
slowly being wrapped around them 
;hose 5,000 "advisers" Castro has 
t there. But they should act soon, or 
/ will find, as some other poor coun- 
s that have accepted Communist ad- 
:rs have found, that self-determina- 
l as well as the most basic human 
;doms, is never allowed. Only last 
r Jamaica had the courage and 
dom to throw out a regime that had 
ught it to the brink of ruin. 
Those who say that totalitarianism is 
the march in our hemisphere are 
d wrong. On the contrary; the cause 
reedom is on the march in our 
lisphere. The cause of democracy is 
the march in our hemisphere. And 
are one of the reasons why that is 
e. In the Dominican Republic, the 
its of the individual are based on the 
pent defenses of Montesinos and De 
Casas. You have made advances in 
cation, in health care, in public 

Your presidential election next year 
1 be an affirmation, both of the social 
1 economic progress you have made 
I of the democratic, pluralistic proc- 
by which you have made it. We look 
ward to continued good relations with 
omever the people of the Dominican 
aublic elect as their leader. I might 
I that the role of this distinguished 
ly of legislators is critical to the con- 
led good health of your government. 

If a democracy is to flourish, there must 
be that balance between the executive 
and the legislative branches. Through 
that division of power, the people are 
assured that their will can never be 
made subordinate to that of one man. 
And through that division of power, the 
president can always be assured that he 
is well-advised concerning the will of the 

Over the last 2 years alone, we have 
seen 12 elections in the Caribbean. We 
have seen new democratic governments 
in Ecuador, in Peru. We have seen aber- 
tura in Brazil. 

Next year will see elections here in 
the Dominican Republic, in Colombia, in 
El Salvador. Venezuela will have elec- 
tions in 1983. Only the week before last, 
I attended a sad occasion in 
Venezuela — the funeral of Romulo 
Betancourt, the man who was called the 
father of democracy in that country. 

We will see elections in Brazil, in 
Uruguay, Honduras, Costa Rica. I, 
myself, will be spending a lot of time on 
the campaign road in the United States 
during our congressional elections. It's 
awfully tiring, as you know. But we will 
see in all of these hemispheric elections 
the continuing triumph of pluralism. We 
will hear the will of the people. 

Next week, as you know, President 
Reagan will go to Cancun to meet with 
leaders of developed and developing na- 
tions from every continent. I think these 
meetings are going to be very positive. 
We think we're going to learn a great 
deal about the problems of and the 
challenges facing the developing nations. 

President Reagan's Caribbean Basin 
initiative is a concrete demonstration of 
his commitment to economic develop- 
ment in our hemisphere. At the same 
time it is a major step forward toward 
political stability for the region. Why? 
Because it's designed to get at the very 
roots of economic privation and frustra- 
tion that provide foreign powers with an 
excuse for interference. We've made 
significant progress so far in organizing 
the initiative with Venezuela, Mexico, 
and Canada. There was a meeting here 
in Santo Domingo last week between 
representatives of the basin states and 
the organizing nations. Together we've 
tried to come up with the right combina- 
tions of private ventures and official aid. 
We're working on proposals that will 
open up new trade and investment op- 
portunities. We will also continue to pro- 
vide significant amounts of foreign 
assistance, linked to private sector ac- 
tivities, to help countries help them- 

Right now the best way America can 
help is by putting its own economic 
house in order. There are some who say 
that the United States isn't concerned 
about Third World problems. That isn't 
true. What is true is that President 
Reagan recognizes that only if America's 
economy is healthy is it in a position to 
assist other countries. But recognizing 
this has not blinded him to the real con- 
cerns and needs of these countries. 

For too many years, we allowed 
taxes and government spending to go 
out of control, with predictable 
results — inflation skyrocketed, and our 
national debt is now approaching the 
nearly incomprehensible sum of $1 
trillion. One gropes for a way by which 
to explain the sheer magnitude of this 
sum. Let me put it this way. The annual 
interest on this debt comes out to about 
$75 billion — approximately 12 times 
your gross domestic product. And that's 
only the yearly interest. 

And so the job of restoring the 
economy to health is not easy. There is 
much to do. Interest rates are high. 
They're hurting Americans, and they're 
hurting you. Money for investment 
overseas is now very expensive. We 
understand, in the meantime, the hard- 
ships that these efforts have placed on 
you and other countries in the region. 
The price of sugar has fallen. The price 
of coffee has fallen. The cost of energy 
has jumped. We know you and other 
Caribbean states are hurting. I under- 
stand the central importance that sugar 
has in your economy. We have heard 
your words of concern on this subject. 
You can be sure that I will convey to 
President Reagan this important 
message that you have given me. But 
we think there are encouraging signs in 
our economy. Our inflation has started 
to come down. The interest rates have 
started to come down. And once we 
have won the battle and made our 
economy whole again, then not just we 
but all our trading partners will benefit. 

We believe that as democracy and 
freedom flourish, so will economic 
development. The two are tied together. 
In choosing where to invest their money 
overseas, foreign investors look for 
political stability. They look for countries 
where democratic principles guarantee 
that no one group shall oppress another, 
and where democratic principles 
guarantee that all voices will be heard. 
Once they know such conditions exist, 
and are permanent, all else follows. 

You have made such a society. Your 
democracy, your commitment to free 
elections, to pluralism does honor to 

uary 1982 



many. It honors the people of your coun- 
try; to you, their elected leaders; to the 
spirit of Juan Pablo Duarte, whose 
dream was for this land to be free; and 
it honors the spirit of Cristobal Colon, 
whose memory we celebrated today. 
When he left this country, he called it la 
tierra mas hermosa que ojos humanos 
hayan visto [the most beautiful land 
human eyes have seen]. Were he alive 
today, and with all us here in this 
Chamber, I think he would join us in 
saying viva la Republical 

OCT. 13, 1981 1 

I have greatly appreciated the oppor- 
tunity to visit the beautiful and friendly 
Republic of Colombia. My wife and I 
have enjoyed firsthand the hospitality of 
the Colombian people. Without question, 
our discussions have been cordial and 
extremely useful. 

May I say that I am impressed by 
the example that Colombia has main- 
tained as a stable, democratic country. 
The United States cares about 
safeguarding democracy, human rights, 
and open societies in the hemisphere. It 
is particularly gratifying to me that Co- 
lombia, a country that shares these same 
beliefs and values, is allied with us in 
promoting stability and self- 
determination in this hemisphere and 
peace in key areas of the world. 

Many talk about the need for peace: 
Not as many contribute to achieving it. 
Colombia does. Colombia's participating 
in an area that is critical to all mankind. 
Colombia is taking dynamic initiatives in 
the Caribbean Basin — through export 
credits to Jamaica, through your efforts 
to match Colombian products to the 
area's trade needs, through scholarships 
to Colombia's excellent technological in- 
stitutions, and through the example of 
how a stable democracy seeks to solve 
its own economic, political, and social 

Positive efforts to increase the pros- 
perity and security of the Caribbean 
Basin would be difficult enough under 
the best of circumstances. Unfortunate- 
ly, as the people of Colombia know so 
well from personal experience, Cuban ef- 
forts to export revolution — to train and 
arm guerrillas to invade other coun- 
tries — have added to tensions in this 
region. Cuban efforts are aimed at one 
thing — destroying free governments. 
We see that today in El Salvador, 
<iu;itemala, and here. 

The United States believes in the 
self-determination of peoples. It also 

The Vice President meets with President Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala of Bogata. 

believes in nonintervention. But it can- 
not and will not sit by while foreign 
powers — hostile to the principles we in 
the Americas have struggled so long 
for — intervene brutally in the interna- 
tional affairs of one of our neighbors. 

Looking back over today, I have 
greatly enjoyed the opportunities to talk 
with a great many dedicated Colombian 
leaders. It also has been a pleasure just 
to be in this wonderfully cosmopolitan 
city nestled alongside the mountains. 
I've seen around me the signs of the 
election campaign underway in Colom- 
bia. I take sustenance in seeing these 
signs of your love of democracy and 

Mr. President, I propose a toast: to 
your health, to the well-being of the Co- 
lombian people, to the success of our 
common endeavors and to democracy. 
Vive la Republical 

OCT. 14, 1981 2 

My wife and I are delighted to be with 
you this evening. We are touched by the 
warmth of our reception and excited by 
the opportunity to meet with you and 
learn more about your magnificent coun- 

To learn about Brazil, to exchange 
ideas, and strengthen our friendship 
with you are the purposes of our trip. It 
is entirely proper that we, as two of the 
largest countries in our hemisphere, 
should get together like this. We haven't 
done this enough. Let's resolve to do it 
more often in the future. 

Together with President Reagan and 
the American people, I want to say how 
much we hope that President 
Figueiredo's recovery from his recent ill- 
ness will be full and rapid. We have a 

special sympathy with you. We oursel 
recently passed through a time of anx 
ty over our own President's health. 
President Reagan deeply appreciated 
your expressions of good wishes at th; 

The long transcontinental flight 
from Bogota today 1 brought home to 
me — perhaps more than anything else, 
could — that we both are giant countri 
with the special responsibilities which;; 
size and importance bestow. But this 
not the only thing we share. We are r' 
tions of immigrants, ethnically and 
racially diverse, and from this diversil 
we have both evolved our own unique: 
national personalities. 

Our two national developments w] 
also characterized by a pushing out o| 
frontiers by strong willed, courageous 
independent men and women. Our na 
tional characters still, I think, retain 
that frontier spirit. Out of this comes 
our strong commitment to the liberty 
and integrity of the individual. 

Although I am new to Brazil, I fe' 
at home. I feel among friends and col 
leagues with whom I can speak with 
frankness and candor, confident that 
will receive the same. Out of this will 
come understanding, if not always 
agreement. North Americans, as 
Brazilians, will not compromise integi 
just for the sake of agreement, and tl 
is a source of strength in our relation 

Today I opened my talks with Vic 
President Chaves. Tomorrow I will b< 
meeting with President of the Chamb 
of Deputies Marchezan, who is our of 
ficial and most gracious host, Preside 
of the Federal Senate Passarinho, 
Minister Albuquerque [President of tl, 
Supreme Federal Tribunal], Minister 
Foreign Affairs] Guerreiro, and Minis 
Leitao de Abreu [Chief of Cabinet]. 1 


Department of State Bulk 


ch I will bring a message of friendship 
d goodwill and a willingness to discuss 

issues. I will emphasize the Reagan 
[ministration's commitment to peace 
d noninterference throughout the 
►rid. I will explain how we are meeting 
} challenge of those who do not share 
;se ideals. 

I will also explain our domestic pro- 
ims which are designed to revitalize 
r national economy and our national 
fense. We know that our high interest 
;es are adversely affecting everyone. I 
,nt to make especially sure that our 
azilian friends understand that high 
erest rates are not the policy of the 
lited States. We have high interest 
jes. It's our policy to bring them 
wn, and the signs are that they are 
irting to ease. 

The United States is committed, as 
a know, to having sufficient military 
ength to demonstrate to any potential 
rersary that there is no alternative to 
ice, that we are prepared to protect 
r interests wherever they are 

We are, all of us, attempting to deal 
th the world as it is. That world is in- 
;asingly complex. Your government is 
interested as ours in world af- 
rs — in the Middle East, in southern 
rica. And we want to work with you 
a catalyst for world peace. As far as 
ns are concerned, we don't want arms 
iitation. We want arms reduction — 
ns reduction that is verifiable. Mean- 
lile, for all the complexity of the world 
i now live in, we should not lose sight 
simple truths, of the difference be- 
een right and wrong, between social 
stems which celebrate the human 
rit and those that stifle it. 

I have not come just to explain our 
licies but to learn about yours. The 
jpect Brazil enjoys in the eyes of the 
>rld is a tribute to you. You are a 
cognized global leader, sought out for 
i wisdom and the strength you bring 
any situation. In the industrialized 
irld, you are a renowned competitor 
• export markets— skillful, aggressive, 
d imaginative. As a nation dedicated 
free enterprise and free trade, we ad- 
re these qualities. As a hemispheric 
ighbor, you are a friend and partner 
maintaining stability and— this is 
>st important — in advocating freedom 
>m outside interference. 

My talks here will occur against a 
lid background of private cooperation 
d expanded official contacts. We are 
ijor trading partners with $8 billion in 
ateral trade last year. We are Brazil's 
)st important export market, with 
er $3.7 billion in imports in 1980. At 

Vice President Bush meets with acting 
President Aureliavio Chaves in Brasilia. 

the end of the 1970s, U.S. direct invest- 
ment in Brazil amounted to over $7.5 

Our cultural and educational inter- 
change is immense. Finance Minister 
Galveas and I are both graduates of the 
same university, Yale. Brazilian films 
and films about Brazil are hits in the 
United States. And you shared a na- 
tional treasure with us, the great Pele, 
who did so much to popularize in the 
United States your national sport, 

Since President Reagan took office, 
Secretary Haig has met twice with 
Foreign Minister Guerreiro. Ambassador 
[at Large] Walters and Assistant 
Secretary [for Inter- American Affairs] 
Tom Enders visited Brazil for a week to 
meet with you. Finance Minister Galveas 
met with Treasury Secretary Regan, 
Commerce Secretary Baldrige, and me 
in Washington. Next week, Foreign 
Minister Guerreiro and President 
Reagan will join together to consult with 
other world leaders at the Cancun sum- 

And today, I had the great honor of 
extending to Vice President Chaves an 
invitation from President Reagan for 
President Figueiredo to visit the United 
States next year. We look forward with 
great anticipation and pleasure to his ar- 
rival, for the opportunity to intensify the 
dialogue we have already begun, and for 
us personally to reciprocate the many 
kindnesses and courtesies with which we 
have been received here. 

Let us toast then, this renewed 
dialogue, sustained and enhanced friend- 
ship between Brazil and the United 
States, and the health of President 



OCT. 16, 1981 

I am so glad to have had this opportuni- 
ty to visit Brasilia, to have exchanged 

views and ideas with SO many of your 
leaders. Though 2 days is a short time, 1 
had many hours of lively and timely 
discussions on bilateral, regional, and 
world issues. 

My visit to Brazil has come toward 
the end of President Reagan's first year 
in office. In that short time, I feel that 
our bilateral relations have developed in 
some fresh and positive new directions. 
Most importantly, I believe that the 
temper and tone of those relations are 
much improved. 

We have discussed issues of foreign 
affairs — issues that not only relate to 
this hemisphere but to the world. The 
current economic climate, in the United 
States and Brazil, was discussed from 
the viewpoint of two major economic 
forces in the world. While it isn't possi- 
ble to agree on every issue, recent 
negotiations and discussions show that 
friendly nations can reach mutual resolu- 
tion or agreement on sensitive subjects. 

For example, as I announced last 
evening, the United States and Brazil 
have worked out a mutually satisfactory 
resolution on the issue of the first reload 
for the Angra I nuclear reactor. Brazil 
will purchase the fuel reload elsewhere. 
After extensive consultation, and as a 
special case, the Secretary of Energy of 
the United States has made an exception 
so that the penalty clause in the nuclear 
contract with Brazil is waived for 
Brazil's purchase of its next fuel load for 
Angra I. The United States wants 
nuclear cooperation with Brazil, and 
both nations will work actively over the 
next year to resolve differences to 
establish a reliable supply relationship. 

Because of discussions during the 
past 2 years, I think that we have 
strengthened the mutual understanding 
between our two countries with this 

Let me leave with a personal obser- 
vation. I feel a bond of common ex- 
perience with Vice President Chaves in 
the common problems we faced in 
managing our governments while 
Presidents Reagan and Figueiredo were 
temporarily incapacitated. This is a 
great test of constitutional government. 
It is a credit to Vice President Chaves 
and the Brazilian people that this transi- 
tion has worked so smoothly. I applaud 
you for it and wish President Figueiredo 
a full recovery. 

'Made at Narino Palace. 
2 Made at Itamaraty Palace. 

luary 1982 



Overview of Recent Foreign Policy 

Secretary Haig's statement before the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
November 12, 198 1. 1 

These have been an eventful few months 
in U.S. foreign policy. We have received 
a steady stream of foreign visitors, in- 
cluding the leaders of Egypt, Israel, and 
Jordan. The President has traveled to 
two summits: the Ottawa meeting of our 
major partners and the Cancun summit 
of leaders from both industrialized 
democracies and developing nations. We 
participated actively at the U.N. General 
Assembly, where I also met for over 9 
hours with Soviet Foreign Minister 
Gromyko. The Middle East has been af- 
fected by several events, including 
renewed violence followed by a cessation 
of hostilities in Lebanon, the tragic 
assassination of President Sadat, and 
congressional approval of the AWACS 
[airborne warning and control system] 
package for Saudi Arabia. 

It is important that we not allow 
this rush of events to obscure the main 
lines of American policy and the pro- 
gress we have been making toward the 
achievement of our objectives. I am, 
therefore, thankful today for the oppor- 
tunity offered by this committee to give 
a brief overview of our activities. 

The President's foreign policy seeks 
to establish a world environment which 
is hospitable to fundamental American 
values — above all, the freedom and 
dignity of the individual. We believe that 
individual freedom will flourish in a 
world where necessary and desirable 
change takes place peacefully, not 
through aggression, subversion, and ter- 
rorism. Each nation should be allowed to 
shape its own future, free from coercion 
or intimidation. 

We are working toward a more 
peaceful and secure world by structuring 
our policy on four pillars: 

• The restoration of American 
economic health and military strength; 

• The renewal of our traditional 
alliances and development of new friend- 

• The promotion of peaceful pro- 
gress in developing nations; and 

• The achievement of a relationship 
with the Soviet Union based on restraint 
and reciprocity. 

We have already begun to see con- 
crete achievements in each of these 
areas. Under the President's leadership, 
the United States emerged from both 

the Cancun and Ottawa summits with 
greater prestige and influence among 
the participants. These two successful 
meetings also underlined the improved 
relationship that we now enjoy with our 
next door neighbors, Canada and Mex- 
ico. Mending our North American fences 
was one of the President's first 
priorities, and he has established a con- 
structive and cordial relationship with 
both Prime Minister Trudeau and Presi- 
dent Lopez Portillo. 

These meetings saw us working 
closely with our other traditional friends 
and allies. An excellent example is our 
continued close cooperation with our 
oldest ally — France. There were fears 
that the Reagan Administration would 
be unable to work with the new Socialist 
government, turning our oldest alliance 
into a bitter quarrel. That has not hap- 
pened. Instead, President Reagan and 
President Mitterrand celebrated our 
alliance together at Yorktown and 
worked closely together to achieve a 
conciliatory atmosphere and a produc- 
tive outcome at Cancun. Franco- 
American collaboration in the Middle 
East and Africa holds great promise. 

This is also the place to say a word 
about those European peace demonstra- 
tions. We are witnessing in Europe to- 
day a convergence of several groups. 
Some people are concerned about the 
environment while other people fear 
Soviet power. Still others are worried 
about nuclear weapons and nuclear 
energy. All of them are anxious about 
threats to peace. But this does not mean 
that our European allies are going 
"neutral" or that they are abandoning 
NATO and the policy of unity and 
strength that has preserved our 
freedom. The invasion of neutral 
Afghanistan and the violation of neutral 
Sweden's territory by a Soviet sub- 
marine should dispel the illusion that 
neutrality confers immunity. 

U.S. Role in Development 

The Cancun summit made clear our 
commitment to playing a constructive 
role in the historic drama of develop- 
ment. President Reagan clearly and 
forcefully expressed our belief that in- 
dividual initiative in a free market has 
been and remains the surest route to 
economic growth. And he showed that 
the variety of nations called "north" and 
"south" can exchange views without ran- 
cor. Cancun was marked by a spirit of 

mutual respect and pragmatic coopera 
tion. The President declared our willing 
ness to participate in future multilateral 
talks that focus on growth and make 
good use of existing institutions. 

The participants at Cancun noticed 
not only that the United States took a 
constructive attitude but that the 
Soviets stayed home. The same contras 
was evident at the U.N. General 
Assembly, where my speech was de- 
voted to development but was followed 
by a sterile polemic from the Soviet sid 

U.S. -Soviet Relations 

My meetings with Mr. Gromyko, 
however, like President Reagan's ex 
change of letters with President Brezh- 
nev, were substantive and devoid of 
polemics and posturing on either side 
The United States wants a constructive 
relationship with the Soviet Union. Sue 
a relationship must be based on a seem 
military balance, respect for the inde 
pendence of others, restraint in the us« 
of force, and reciprocity in the making 
and fulfilling of agreements. We have 
explained our objections to Soviet or 
Soviet-supported aggression and subve 1 
sion. We have made known our intentif 
to counter such activity, but we have 
also expressed our desire for coopera- i 
tion in solving problems peacefully. We 
have affirmed, too, that we want bal- 
anced and verifiable arms reductions 
that would reduce the risks of war. 

Mr. Gromyko and I made concrete' 
progress by agreeing to start the talks 
on theater nuclear forces on Novem- 
ber 30. Many Europeans are deeply co 
cerhed about this issue. The Soviets 
have deployed over 750 warheads on 
their SS-20s threatening Europe, whil< 
NATO has not yet deployed one of its 
planned 572 missiles. Despite this 
revealing fact, well-meaning people wa 
to know whether we are serious about 
negotiating limitations on theater 
nuclear forces. The answer is clear: Of 
course we are. We want a balanced 
agreement, one that would establish 
equal, global, and verifiable limits at th 
lowest possible level, ideally zero. 

Clearly, a sound agreement would 
strengthen deterrence in Europe. But i 
would be unsound and dangerous to ac 
cept an outcome, as the Soviets propos 
that would freeze us at zero and the 
Soviets at their present high level of 
warheads. And we cannot expect the 
Soviets to take balanced proposals 
seriously unless NATO firmly supports 
its own modernization plans. 

The prospects for cooperation wit 
the Soviets depend not only on clear 


Department of State Bullet 


munication but also on the credibili- 
hat comes from the successful con- 
6 of our policies elsewhere. 
.-Soviet relations have always been 
jed as much by the success of our ac- 
s at home and in other parts of the 
Id as by our bilateral contacts with 
n. The renewal of our economic and 
tary strength, the reinvigoration of 
traditional alliances, and the promo- 

of peaceful progress and new 
idships will help to make restraint 

reciprocity the most realistic options 

Idle East 

review of our recent foreign policy 
ild be complete without reference to 
Middle East. In the aftermath of 
sident Sadat's death and the 
ACS decision, it is important to 
uss briefly our policy toward that 
rial region. 

President Sadat's extraordinary 
rage and vision will be sorely missed. 
AW ACS decision was rightly 
ated in Congress, among the public, 
by our friends abroad. And the 
)rable result is clearly a significant 
tribution to our position in the area, 
our broad regional strategy can be 
her defeated by a tragic murder nor 
ipleted by a single legislative event. 
This strategy must be based on the 
ier lying realities of the Middle East. 
s Soviets and their proxies still 
3aten our vital interests; the Arab- 
leli dispute still divides our friends. 
1. leadership is still needed in both 
peace process and security coopera- 

The Middle East today is marked by 
jnsensus of strategic concern about 
threats posed by the Soviet Union 
t its allies. The increasing level of 
r iet or Soviet-sponsored intervention 
■ecent years, culminating in the inva- 
i of Afghanistan, has aroused the 
rs of our friends in the area. Many of 
m pointed to this Soviet danger 
ore we were ready to accept it. Our 
>rts to resolve regional conflicts must 
e this consensus into account. 
The elements of our policy in the 
Idle East are integrated into a 
anced strategy which recognizes that 
peace process and security coopera- 
i reinforce one another. If our friends 
more secure, they will be more will- 
to take risks for peace. And if they 
ke progress toward resolving their 
erences, they will be more willing to 
'perate with us and with each other 
linst threats to their security. 

It is essential to demonstrate that 
we can implement such a strategy, one 
that takes full account of the complex 
facts of the Middle East. That is why we 
are vigorously supporting the autonomy 
talks in partnership with Egypt and 
Israel. That is why we are moving ahead 
with security assistance to countries 
threatened by Soviet or Libyan aggres- 
sion. That is also why we are pursuing 
strategic cooperation with other friends 
in the Middle East and Africa who can 
assist our efforts in the region. 

The Reagan Administration is fully 
committed to the Camp David accords 
which have not only brought peace be- 
tween Egypt and Israel but provide the 
basis for broader participation as well. 
When the President took office, we 
found the peace process in disarray. 
Egypt and Israel disagreed over the 
character of the multilateral force and 
observers crucial to the Israeli with- 
drawal from Sinai. President Reagan's 
decision to commit U.S. forces to the 
multilateral force was essential to the 
resolution of this problem by demon- 
strating our willingness to share the risk 
of assuring the peace. We are now in 
the process of putting such a force 
together so that withdrawal from Sinai 
can take place as scheduled. 

The autonomy talks were suspended 
with profound differences separating the 
parties. The talks have now resumed 
with a businesslike work schedule and a 
promising dialogue. We have made clear 
our intention to participate as a full 
partner in these difficult negotiations. 
Our objective is to achieve tangible and 
rapid progress. And the President is 
prepared to raise the level of our repre- 
sentation whenever he feels that a con- 
structive contribution can be made. 

The United States has also worked 
to contain violence in Lebanon, which is 
critical to the wider peace process. The 
cooperation of Saudi Arabia, the 
restraint shown by Israel, and the 
efforts of the President's emissary, Am- 
bassador Habib, have brought about the 
cessation of hostilities across the Israeli- 
Lebanese border. Furthermore, the 
Lebanese Government, with the aid of 
the Bayt ad-Din quadripartite group 2 
and our strong support, is engaged in 
efforts to find political solutions to 
Lebanon's troubles. 

Turkey and Pakistan 

Much public attention has already been 
given to our cooperation with such na- 
tions in the Middle East as Egypt, 
Israel, and Saudi Arabia. But our broad 
strategic approach also recognizes the 

impact of areas adjacent to the region. 
Turkey sits astride the most vital lines 
of communications in the world. It is 
essential to have a strong Turkey, not 
only anchoring NATO's southern flank 
but supporting our presence in the east- 
ern Mediterranean. Western assistance 
to Turkey is, therefore, essential. 

Security assistance to Pakistan, 
which lies between the Soviets and the 
gulf, is also crucial. The invasion of 
Afghanistan places Pakistan in the front 
line of defense against Soviet aggres- 
sion. Pakistan not only shelters 2 million 
Afghan refugees but suffers from 
repeated raids by Soviet-supported 
Afghan forces. These pressures have not 
deterred Pakistan from courageously 
leading the condemnations of the inva- 
sion by the United Nations, the non- 
aligned movement, and the Islamic Con- 
ference. Nor have they stopped Pakistan 
from agreeing to a new relationship with 
us. Indeed, President Zia has personally 
conducted a vigorous public campaign 
for renewed U.S. ties throughout his 
country. We must show that this con- 
fidence is not misplaced. 

Southern Africa 

Southern Africa is another area where 
our diplomacy is making progress. When 
we came into office the talks on Namibia 
were stalled. South Africa's leaders lack- 
ed confidence that Namibian in- 
dependence could be compatible with 
their security. Years of sterile diatribe 
led South Africa to distance itself from 
U.N. Resolution 435 and to oppose a 
U.N. presence and involvement in the 
settlement process. 

We abhor apartheid and oppose con- 
tinued South African occupation of 
Namibia. Nonetheless, our objective has 
been to achieve results rather than to 
engage in arguments. We have attempt- 
ed to persuade the South Africans that 
their true interests lie in a peaceful 
settlement. Acting through quiet 
diplomacy with our allies, South Africa, 
Nigeria, and front-line states, we have 
shown that we are prepared to push for 
a balanced Namibian settlement. We 
have also addressed widespread concern 
about the Soviet and Cuban presence in 
Angola. Now South Africa has accepted 
435 and a U.N. presence: Pretoria has 
agreed to work on a phased approach to 
resolve the remaining issues, thus clear- 
ing the way for tangible movement in 
1982. At long last we see the prospect of 
real progress toward an independent 

luary 1982 



Carribbean and Central America 

We are also seeking to promote peaceful 
progress in the Caribbean and Central 
America. Together with Venezuela and 
our neighbors Canada and Mexico, the 
United States is developing a regional 
plan to encourage the growth of produc- 
tive enterprise and trade. But the 
obstacles to economic development and 
democratic reform also include external- 
ly supported subversion and terrorism. 
That is why in El Salvador our aid for 
peaceful reform and free elections must 
be accompanied by assistance to counter 
outside intervention. 

Throughout the world we are show- 
ing that we have a broad and practical 
program to foster respect for individual 
liberty, to preserve peace, to increase 
security, and to promote development. 
But the examples I have discussed also 
show that if we are to conduct an effec- 
tive policy directed toward these goals, 
Congress must provide the necessary 
resources. If we are denied those 
resources, we cannot hope to succeed, 
no matter how forceful and coherent our 
strategy. Without those resources, our 
policy will appear to friend and foe alike 
as nothing more than hollow rhetoric. 

These expenditures are not charity. 
They are the most economical way, 
sometimes even the only practical way, 
to defend our vital interests. By pro- 
viding our friends the confidence to de- 
fend their own interests, these expen- 
ditures clearly aid in the defense of 
American interests. 

When I first appeared before this 
committee, I noted that you have been 
instrumental in promoting nuclear non- 
proliferation, in advancing human rights, 
in enhancing NATO, and in fostering 
economic development. But your most 
difficult role is to marshal the resources 
and congressional support we need if 
American foreign policy is to succeed. 
Your task is all the greater in these 
austere times, but your success has 
never been more essential to the pros- 
pects for peace and security. We are in- 
deed grateful for your efforts. Let me 
assure you not only of our support but 
of the appreciation of our friends around 
the world. 

Liberia: The Road to Recovery 

'Press release 377. The complete 
transcripl of the hearings will be published 

he committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 

Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. 

2 The Bayt ad-Din quadripartite group is 
sponsored by the Arab League to promote 
national reconcilation in Lebanon. It is com- 
posed of the Foreign Ministers of Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, and Syria and chaired by the 
Lebanese Presidents 


by William Lacy Swing 

Address before the Liberian Ship 
Owners' Council in Houston on Octo- 
ber 28, 1981. Mr. Swing is U.S. Am- 
bassador to Liberia. 

The members of this council play an 
important part in current efforts to 
achieve economic stability and social 
development in the new Liberia, whose 
flag still flies over the world's largest 
merchant fleet. I want to speak about 
Liberian efforts and achievements since 
the 1980 revolution in the context of 
Liberia's political and economic history. 
I will also sketch U.S. Government aid 
efforts and our policy toward Liberia. 


Historical Perspective 

As you know, Liberia is Africa's oldest 
independent black republic. Liberia is 
also our oldest friend on the continent 
and only 50 years younger than the 
United States. Until April 12, 1980, it 
had also been considered among the 
most politically stable countries in 
Africa. On that date a small group of 
enlisted men from the rural areas broke 
into the presidential mansion and killed 
President William Tolbert. This first 
nonconstitutional change of government 
since 1871 brought to an end Africa's 
first republic and its oldest political 

The April 1980 coup did not just 
happen overnight. The roots leading to 
that event go back some years to the 
Tubman government and beyond. While 
it was an announced policy of Presidents 
Tubman and Tolbert to integrate more 
fully the indigenous population into the 
social, economic, and political fabric of 
the nation, the pace was apparently too 
slow to keep up with heightened expec- 
tations. The perceived concentration of 
power was made all the more evident 
and intolerable by the extreme involve- 
ment of President Tolbert's family in the 
economic life of the country— in 
manufacturing, commerce, agriculture, 
and banking. Development was largely 
confined to the capital of Monrovia and 
a few scattered port and concession 
areas. The rural poor— the vast majority 

of Liberians— benefited little from pro- ' 
grams designed to improve education, 
agriculture, health, and housing. 

It was against this background that 
the April 14, 1979, rice riots occurred, 
protesting a proposed increase in the 
price of rice, the main staple in the 
Liberian diet. More than 80 persons lost 
their lives, many others were wounded, 
while still others lost possessions in the j 
large-scale looting which took place. A ' 
committee Tolbert then appointed 
recommended reforms to open up fur- 
ther Liberian society, encourage foreign 
investment, and heal the riot wounds. 
However, the government made little 
real progress in settling the grievances 
of the Liberian majority. 

Measures were also proposed to 
overcome the deplorable state of the 
armed forces including improved mili- 
tary housing, increased pay, merit pro- 
motions, and removal or reassignment 
of corrupt officers. However, these 
measures were never fully implemented 
Additionally, in 1979 Dr. Amos Sawyer 
of the Liberia University became an in- f 
dependent mayoral candidate, challeng-. 
ing the previously unopposed ruling 
True Whig Party candidate. Fearing a 
Sawyer victory, the ruling party post- 
poned the election. This exacerbated the 
already tense situation. In early 1980 
the People's Progressive Party (PPP), 
which had been permitted to register asj 
an opposition party, called on President 
Tolbert to resign under threat of a 
general strike. The PPP leadership was 
jailed and scheduled to be brought to 
trial on April 14, the anniversary date c 
the rice riots. They were saved by that 
small band of 17 enlisted men who took 
the mansion and proclaimed the revolu- 
tion of the Liberian people against the i 
ruling elite of the True Whig Party. 
Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe, 
the leader of the revolution, was pro- 
claimed head of state, and the "country 
people" for the first time in Liberian 
history took power. 

Goals of the Revolution 

Although still being defined, the goals < 
the revolution— as the process the couj 
set in motion has come to be called— 
were stated by Head of State Doe soon 
after Tolbert's overthrow as eradicatinj 
a high rate of illiteracy; reconciling 
Liberians with their culture; developing 
an economy that can support the peopl 

Department of State Bulleti 


>eria— A Profile 


i: 43,000 sq. mi. Capital: Monrovia (pop. 
000). Other Cities: Harbel (60,000), 
mnan (25,000), Yekepa (16,000). Terrain: 
ng plateau bordered by coastal plain and 
mountains near inland borders. 


ulation: 1.9 million (July 1981). Annual 
ivth Rate: 3%. Ethnic Groups: 5% 

endants of immigrant blacks, 95% in- 
nous tribes, the largest of which are 
lie, Bassa, Gio, Kru, Grebo, Mano, Krahn, 
,, Gbandi, Loma, Kissi, Vai, and Bella. 
gions: Tribal religions 75%, Muslim 15%, 
stian 10%. Languages: English (official); 
1 20 local languages and dialects of the 
:r-Congo language group. Education: 
r-s compulsory — 11. Percentage attend- 
l — primary 40; secondary 16. 
racy— 24%. Health: Infant mortality 
-159 per 1,000 (US = 15/1,000). Life 
ctancy—A& yrs. 


e: Military. Date of Independence: 1847. 
stitution: July 26, 1847 (partially 
tended after April, 1980 coup d'etat). 
riches: Executive — Head of State, Vice 
d of State, Cabinet. Legislative — People's 
emption Council comprised of the non- 
missioned officers who staged the 1980 
>. Judicial — People's Supreme Tribunal, 
pie's Military Tribunal. Political Parties: 
lian political activity suspended indefi- 
ly. Administrative Subdivisions: 9 coun- 
and 6 territories. Central Government 
Iget: $350 million (1981). Defense: 2% of 
5 (1981 est.). 


?: $372 million at constant factor. Annual 
wth Rate: Less than 1% (adjusted for in- 
on). Per Capita Income: $196 (at con- 
it factor costs). Average Rate of Infla- 
i 1977-80: 15% per year. Natural 
ources: Iron ore, rubber, timber, dia- 
ids, gold. Agriculture: Products — rubber, 
, oil palm, cassava, coffee, cocoa. In- 
try: Types — iron, gold and diamond 
ing, rubber processing, food processing, 
ber milling. Trade (1980): 




"■"International boundary 

National capital 
~"~ Railroad 
— Road 

International airport 

25 50 Kilometers 

25 50 M.les 


Exports— $600.4 million: iron ore, rubber, 
timber, diamonds, gold. Partners— West 
Germany, U.S., Italy, Belgium. Im- 
ports— $533.9 million: machinery, petroleum 
products, transportation equipment, 
foodstuffs. Partners— U.S., Western Europe. 
Official Exchange Rate: Liberia uses U.S. 
dollars. Economic Aid Received: U.S. 
economic aid received: $58.6 million (1981). 

Membership in International 

U.N. and most of its specialized agencies, 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), 

Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), Mano River Union. 

Liberia; improving health delivery 
terns; reducing Liberia's high level of 
:mployment; and stamping out cor- 

Foreign Minister Matthews last 
nth reaffirmed these goals before the 
h session of the U.N. General 

Our people are being motivated with a 
i determination to resolve the problems 
ch beset Liberia: 90% illiteracy; cultural 

alienation; an economy which produces what 
we do not consume, while we consume what 
it does not produce; an inadequate health 
delivery system; 53% unemployment within 
the active labor force; and a pattern of cor- 
ruption which was bequeathed to the people 
by the erstwhile princes of privilege. 

Actions Taken to Implement Goals 

Doe, as Head of State and Chairman of 
the People's Redemption Council (PRC), 

made up of the soldiers who made the 
revolution, plus a 16-member cabinet 
constitute the governing bodies of the 
nation. As would be expected from an 
inexperienced team, the Doe govern- 
ment began with a rocky start. The 
transition from manipulation of power to 
effective government is not an easy one. 
The coup awakened unrealistic expecta- 
tions which have complicated the task of 
governing. The execution of 13 former 

luary 1982 



U.S. Ambassador to Liberia 

William Lacy Swing was born September 11, 
1934, in Lexington, North Carolina. He 
graduated from Catawba College and Yale 
University. In 1961 he attended postgraduate 
studies at Tuebingen University in Germany 
and was a school teacher in that country. He 
was Associate Director of the Council on 
Religion in Independent Schools (New York) 
in 1961-63. 

Ambassador Swing entered the Foreign 
Service in 1963 and attended consular and 
African area studies at the Foreign Service 
Institute. He served as Vice Consul in Port 
Elizabeth (1964-65) and, upon returning to 
the Department of State, was an interna- 
tional economist in the Bureau of Economic 
and Business Affairs (1966-67). During 
1968-72, he was posted to Hamburg, first as 
head of the Visa Section and then as Chief of 
the Consular Section. 

In 1972-74 he was the country desk of- 
ficer for West Germany in the State Depart- 
ment. He was assigned as Deputy Chief of 
Mission in Banqui in 1974 and served there 
until 1976, when he attended Harvard's 
Center for International Affairs. Ambassador 
Swing then became alternate-Director of the 
Department's Office of Central African Af- 
fairs (1977-79). 

He was named U.S. Ambassador to the 

Congo in 1979, and on July 27, 1981, he was 
sworn in as U.S. Ambassador to Liberia. ■ 

members of the Tolbert government pre- 
cipitated an exodus of capital and pro- 
fessional talent, although many key per- 
sonnel remained on the job. Some 200 
members and supporters of the old 
government were taken as political 
prisoners. In subsequent months there 
have been three reported countercoups 
resulting in the conviction and execution 
of some of those involved. 

In September, 39 political prisoners 
were freed. Shortly thereafter all travel 
restrictions on those freed were lifted. 
One of these former political detainees 
has since been named a deputy minister. 
According to our informal estimate, 
there are now no more than 20 de- 
tainees — making Liberia's political 
prisoner population one of the smallest 
in Africa. Prison conditions and prisoner 
treatment have improved since the PRC 
government came to power. 

The head of state continues to 
appeal to self-exiled Liberians to return 
home. Those who have come back have 
found the situation more normal than 
expected. Some prominent families who 
fled after the coup have returned to 
resume their business activities. One 
returnee has been made a deputy 
minister. The government's stated policy 

is to see all Liberians return home and 
help in the building of the nation. 

The Doe government has reaffirmed 
Liberia's traditional commitment to pro- 
mote and protect foreign investment. 
Besides iron ore, rubber and timber, the 
Ship Owners' Council also represents an 
important resource for Liberia and plays 
an important role in the implementation 
of Liberia's free enterprise policy. As 
professor Rodney P. Carlisle observed in 
Sovereignty for Sale, his recent study of 
the origins and evolution of the Liberian 
flag of convenience: 

One of the first actions of the new regime 
was to send assurances to the International 
Trust Company that the ship registry system 
would not be disturbed. . . The continued 
operation of the registry system demon- 
strated that, whatever domestic reforms 
might be implemented, the Government of 
Liberia was still a reliable and stable one. 

The trend in recent months is more 
positive. Several key appointments have 
been made directed at achieving more 
effective performance. These include 
new ministers of agriculture, planning 
and economic affairs, commerce, justice, 
and a new commissioner of customs. 
Together these represent an important 
step forward. 

A New Identity 

The revolution sparked off a number of 
seemingly unrelated events which taken 
together, seem to constitute a tentative 
move toward a new Liberian identity. 
There has been increased emphasis on 
African dress, names, food, and 
customs. There is an increased emphasi 
on the use of African names. Christian 
names, many of which country people i: 
voluntarily took on at the time, are 
either dropped or only the initial is usee 
with indigenous Liberian names being j 
preferred. A national dialogue on the 
symbols of Liberian nationhood has bee: 
engaged on the flag, the national 
anthem, the pledge of allegiance and, as 
mentioned, the constitution. 

Return to Civilian Rule 

In his first address to the nation on 
assuming power, Head of State Doe 
committed himself to return the countn 
to civilian rule. Although there is as yet 
no target date, Doe has commissioned a 
25-member constitutional drafting com-; 
mission and given them immunities to ,' 
facilitate the holding of hearings and i 
taking of testimony. The U.S. Govern- 
ment encourages a return to democratic 
rule and supports the work of the com- 1 
mission. ', 

While the tendency is to discard ; 
much of the old, there is also a concern. 
that Liberia reaffirm its history as 
Africa's oldest republic and that nations 
symbols should not be destroyed just be 
cause they are from the past. The de- 
bate on authenticity is still going on as j 
Liberians seek to rationalize the "col- 
onial" past with the "revolutionary" 
future. As the debate continues, the 
sense of pride which all Liberians feel ii 
their history as an old independent 
nation will serve them well and help 
bring about national reconciliation. 

The Economy 

When the Doe government came to 
power, the economy had been depresse( 
as a result of low prices for the 
country's major exports, and— like man 
other developing countries— it has been 
forced to pay ever-higher oil bills. The 
Doe government inherited an economy 
suffering from the weight of an am- 
bitious development plan instituted in 
1976 and extraordinary expenditures 
associated with hosting the 1979 con- 
ference of heads of state of the 
Organization of African Unity. These 
placed heavy burdens on the govern- 
ment's budget. 


Department of State Bullet 


With this fiscal legacy, the commit- 
>nt by the Doe government to improve 
» salaries of government employees, to 
use the army adequately, and to im- 
ave the lot of the Liberian people has 
en a near impossible task. Bilateral 
nors— including, of course, the United 
ates— and international financial 
ititutions have provided substantial 
pport to enable the government to 
;et its needs. The Liberians them- 
ves have undertaken a number of 
?lf-help" measures. 

It was in this spirit that the Govern- 
?nt of Liberia decided late last year 
it they must increase the tonnage 
tes levied on the vessels using the 
en registry. I understand that while 
me owners have found it difficult to 
;et these higher fees, the great major- 
have recognized the need to respond 
Liberia's financial difficulties, 
ipping registry fees have been supply- 
r 6%-7% of domestic revenues, a not 
;onsiderable sum for a relatively poor 
untry with few sources of income. I 
nnot overemphasize how much this 
source means to Liberia. 

Despite these official programs, 
wever, private investment will be the 
y to achieving self-sustained develop- 
mt in Liberia. One development which 
11 be of practical interest in the city of 
)uston is the completion of a serious 
rvey of the offshore oil potential, 
rich was financed by the World Bank, 
le results should be available before 
e end of the year, and interested com- 
nies will be requested to bid for 
ploration concessions early in 1982. 
e have also seen growing levels of 
iderstanding between established 
ivate investors and the Doe govern- 
ent as each becomes better acquainted 
ith the realities of the current business 

There are still many problems, to be 
re. We expect Liberia will continue to 
quire our support and that of its other 
iends for some time, but we are en- 
uraged by the efforts which Liberians 
the private sector, as well as the 
iblic sector, are making to restore con- 
lence in their country and to restore 
> image as a friendly partner of private 

A key part of this image is, of 
urse, the Liberian ship registry. That 
is is important to the new government 
Liberia is underscored by the fact 
at since Commander in Chief Doe 
.me to power, his government has rati- 
id a number of key international 
jreements designed to improve the 

Ambassador Swing and Col. Abraham 
Kollie, Secretary General of the ruling Peo- 
ple's Redemption Council. 

safety and reliability of ocean transpor- 
tation. While some of these agreements 
may have had the immediate effect of 
imposing some additional costs on ship- 
owners, I think you will agree that in 
the longer run, the benefits of these 
measures to the well-being of the world 
community are worth the effort and ex- 
pense. I am encouraged by the Govern- 
ment of Liberia's adherence to these 
internationally agreed standards of 
performance, which can only increase 
still further the growing respect being 
accorded to the Liberian flag fleet. 


The Special Relationship 

Almost from the Republic of Liberia's 
founding in 1847, the United States 
maintained close relations. This relation- 
ship has sometimes been turbulent and 
sometimes peaceful; sometimes nig- 
gardly and sometimes generous. Today, 
however, with the possible exception of 
Nigeria, no West African country is 
receiving greater attention in 
Washington than Liberia. True, this 
reflects the problems faced in the after- 
math of the 1980 coup. However, this 
high-level Washington attention also 
manifests the importance of U.S. 
national interests in Liberia. 

U.S. interests in Liberia are still 
extensive. They include: 

• A Voice of America transmitter 
that broadcasts to all of Africa, the 
Middle East, and parts of Southwest 

• A telecommunications relay sta- 
tion that transmits diplomatic traffic 
between Washington and more than 40 
embassies on the Continent of Africa; 

• An OMEGA navigational station, 
one of eight in the worldwide network 
which enables ships and aircraft to 
calculate continuously their positions. 
The OMEGA station is a joint effort be- 
tween the United States and Liberia. On 

January 15 it will be "Liberianized" and 
turned over entirely to the control of the 
Liberian Government to operate inde- 
pendently of the United States; 

• These three communications in- 
stallations — the largest concentration of 
U.S. Government assets in Africa — 
are symbols of Liberia's friendship for 
the United States. They are also a mark 
of the confidence the government and 
the American people have in Liberia. 
There are still approximately 3,500 to 
4,000 American citizens residing in 
Liberia — this number is increasing; 

• With about $0.5 billion, private 
investment from U.S. sources is still 
extensive. In fact, U.S. investment in 
Liberia is our third largest in Africa. 
This investment comes from such com- 
panies as Firestone and the Uniroyal 
rubber plantations; the major iron ore 
mine, LAMCO, in which Bethlehem 
Steel has a 25% interest; and local 
branches or affiliates of Chase Man- 
hattan and Citibank; 

• As many of you know, Liberia is a 
principal stopping point for Pan 
American Airways. A PanAm subsidiary 
also has a management contract for the 
Roberts International Airport; 

• And, last but by no means least, 
Liberia's preeminence as the world's 
largest maritime nation, as measured in 
registered tonnage, represents an impor- 
tant American interest which, again, is a 
vote of confidence in Liberia and its 

Because of these interests and our 
historically close relationship, other 
leading donors, as well as U.S. banks 
and business enterprises, look to the 
U.S. Government to take the lead in 
helping Liberia to meet its current and 
immediate financial problems. We are 
doing that. 

U.S. Assistance to Liberia 

Official U.S. Aid. Official U.S. aid 
to Liberia has increased some tenfold 
since the April 1980 coup. Liberia today 
receives the greatest per capita U.S. aid 
of any African country. In the fiscal 
year just ended, this totaled $58.6 
million. We have requested similar levels 
for the current fiscal year. Our priorities 
are direct budget support and military 

We are following a short-term and a 
long-term development strategy. The 
key problems are: the small and narrow 

inuary 1982 




The Ambassador discusses U.S. AID-World Bank agricultural project in Lofa County with 
the County superintendent, AID Mission Director Ray Garufi, Counselor for Public Af- 
fairs, David Gray, and the project director. 

productive base of the economy, the in- 
sufficient private investment because of 
inadequate political and fiscal stability, 
low agricultural productivity (especially 
food crops), and a rapid population 
growth rate and related health prob- 

The short-term strategy focuses on 
restoring economic and political stability 
in the country. To achieve this, since the 
April 12, 1980, coup the U.S. Govern- 
ment has provided three grants totaling 
$37 million. These grants, which were 
used for budgetary support of Liberia, 
helped the government overcome the 
immediate fiscal crisis. They also sig- 
naled continued U.S. government sup- 
port to future development of the coun- 

The other component of our short- 
term strategy is the PL-480, Title I 
(rice) program. PL-480, Title I author- 
izes concessional credit for sales of U.S. 
farm products to developing countries. 
The PL-480 Title I program in Liberia 
is being used to meet growing food con- 
sumption needs — keeping rice on the 
market to avoid shortages and political 
instability. Funds generated by this pro- 
gram are used to finance longer term 
agricultural development efforts in 

Our long-term AID [Agency for 
International Development] strategy is 
directed at increasing traditional farmer 
agricultural productivity and supporting 
traditional farmer needs in order for 
Liberian farmers to enter the market 
economy. In a nutshell, the areas of our 
long-term strategy are: 

• Agriculture and rural develop- 
ment, focused on increased productivity 
and dissemination of development infor- 
mation to rural communities; 

• Education and human resources 
development designed to provide basic 

education for children and to improve 
the fundamental life skills of adults. 

U.S. Peace Corps. Since 1962 
nearly 3,000 Peace Corps volunteers 
have served in Liberia. At present, there 
are more than 150 volunteers, assigned 
primarily to the rural areas. By 
February 1982, more than 200 volun- 
teers will be in active service within 
Liberia. Rural development and 
agriculture volunteers serve as water 
technicians, county project planners, 
rural road technicians, foresters, 
livestock developers, agriculture plan- 
ners, vocational agriculture instructors, 
fisheries technicians, and wildlife 

In addition to primary projects, 
volunteers also work on secondary proj- 
ects, such as adult literacy classes, 
demonstration chicken raising, demon- 
stration gardening, establishing school 
libraries or laboratories, construction of 
school facilities through the school part- 
nership program and the ambassador's 
self-help fund. 

As Liberia continues to request per- 
sonnel, the Peace Corps, in cooperation 
with the ministries, will endeavor to 
maintain its high level of commitment to 
the development of Liberia and to the 
support of its people. 

Military Assistance. The other cor- 
nerstone of our aid policy is to improve 
military housing conditions, which the 
Liberian leadership sees as a top priority 
in anticipation of the soldiers' returning 
to the barracks with the arrival of 
civilian rule. This 4-year program total- 
ing some $43.5 million is the most 
ambitious security assistance project the 

United States has ever undertaken si: 
bilateral military aid to Liberia began 

The increased military aid provid 
Liberia since the 1980 coup also 
addresses armed forces modernizatior 
including equipment, transportation, i 
communication, and training helpful t 
national development which included ; 
program for an engineer battalion. Fc 
example, the U.S. grant of $1 million 
provided 20 2V2-ton military trucks pli 
a technical quality assistance team. Tl 
was the first such aid since terminatk 
of the military assistance program to 
Liberia in the early 1970s. We look at 
the armed forces in the service sense 
but also as part of a needed nation- 
building effort. The housing helps a 
significant part of the population and 
the force modernization program 
enhances needed nation-building skills 

The international military educati 
and training (IMET) program— also a 
very important nation-building 
effort — has increased from less than 
$200,000 in 1979 to current levels of 
about $600,000. These grants bring I 
military mobile training teams to Lity 
to train the army in basic constructioi 
organization, and civic action skills. T 
grants also enable Liberia's soldiers § 
receive training at U.S. military schoi 

As a further demonstration of oui 
concern for the security of an "old 
trusted friend," 100 U.S. green berets 
conducted joint training exercises wit; 
the Armed Forces of Liberia in April; 
1981. The presence of U.S. Army troi 
in sub-Saharan Africa conducting joir, 
exercises was a first in recent history 
and was a plus in our bilateral relatio 

Finally, in sum our security assisl 
ance efforts are intended to help solv 
economic and social problems and has 
the return to civilian rule. Developme 
of the armed forces into a disciplined 
reliable national asset will upgrade th 
soldiers' image in the minds of the 
overall population. The United States 
and Liberia mutual defense treaty of 
1951 calls for consultations between < 
two countries. We take this commitm 
very seriously. 

Political Asylum. Many Liberian 
fled after the coup. Others already in 
the United States remained. More thi 
500 have sought to stay in the Unitec 
States as "political refugees." Their 
asylum applications are processed in- 
dividually in accordance with our imr 
gration and nationality act, the U.N. 


Department of State Bull* 


nvention and protocol relating to the 
itus of refugees, and our assessment 
the political and social situation in 
beria since the coup. In the latter 
^ard, there are some encouraging 
pis of normalcy in Liberia, including 
idelines on confiscated property, 
lease of political prisoners, and public 
peals by Head of State Doe encourag- 
r self-exiled Liberians to return home 
assist in the task of national develop- 

Based on information available to us, 
! are convinced that Liberians who 
ve returned to Liberia since the coup 
ve not suffered persecution and that it 
safe for most Liberians to return to 
beria without a well-founded fear of 

S. Policy 

nong our primary objectives are: 

First, we are trying to help Liberia 
bieve economic recovery. The govern- 
;nt has reached agreement with the 
ternational Monetary Fund on a 
?ear stabilization program which pro- 
les strict performance targets and ex- 
nditure controls and access to a 
bstantial fund which assists the 
:overy process. It is of the utmost 
portance to Liberia's economic 
:overy and to international support 
it Liberia meet the IMF standby per- 
"mance targets, including strict 
penditure control. 

Second, we support a return to 
rilian rule, release or fair trials for the 
maining political prisoners, and fair 
2atment for businessmen and others, 
iherence to the rule of law is crucial to 
ntinued international support and 
•rmalization of Liberia's relations with 
; neighbors and the rest of the world 
id to rebuilding foreign investor con- 
lence in the country. 

Third, we want to assure the 
>vernment of our support for its basic 
curity. The Doe government is gen- 
nely worried about possible counter- 
ups. It remains concerned that there 
ight be an external attack against 
beria. Liberia has repeatedly re- 
lested increased U.S. military assist- 
ice for purchases of weapons, trucks, 
id radios. Our provision of ongoing 
isic infantry training and construction 
housing meets the basic needs of the 
med forces in accordance with 
beria's most urgent requests. 

Fourth, we support the long-term 
development of the country. The govern- 
ment has announced its intention to pur- 
sue economic and social development 
more vigorously than the previous 
government. We hope this will be the 
case. We have continued our aid projects 
which are primarily in the areas of 
health, agriculture, and education— all 
target sectors of the new government. 
Long-term development, of course, de- 
pends on finding solutions to the imme- 
diate financial and economic problems. 


The year 1982 marks the 135th year of 
Liberia's independence. We also observe 
the 120th anniversary of the establish- 
ment of diplomatic relations between 
our republics. This is an appropriate 
time to renew our commitment to 

A joint effort between U.S. Govern- 
ment assistance and private investment 
is the best method to achieve economic 
development. Liberia, historically, has 
welcomed private participation in the 
development of its economy. In this con- 
nection, we understand the Government 
of Liberia is looking at ways to reconcile 
the critical need to comply with the IMF 
stabilization measures, while insuring 
that high taxes do not discourage 
private initiative. 

Liberia is still going through a 
critical transition period, and let us be 
under no illusions— the road to recovery 
is difficult and long. However, there has 
been some progress in recent months, 
and there is reason to be cautiously 
optimistic about the future of Liberia. 
We have been discussing Liberia not in 
terms of what the Government of the 
United States can do, but what we and 
the public and private sectors can do 
together with our Liberian friends. I 
urge you to continue and strengthen 
your support for Liberia and urge others 
in the private sector to do likewise. ■ 

U.S. Interests in Africa 

by Chester A. Crocker 

Address before the Council on 
Foreign Relations in New York City on 
October 5, 1981. Mr Crocker is Assistant 
Secretary for African Affairs. 

It is a pleasure to be with you this eve- 
ning and to have this opportunity to 
discuss U.S. interests in Africa and the 
actions we are taking in pursuit of those 
interests. I believe we are at a par- 
ticularly important juncture in our 
African policy and so welcome the 
chance to exchange ideas with a group 
so knowledgeable about foreign affairs 

U.S. interests in Africa are wide and 
varied, spanning the spectrum of invest- 
ment, trade, human liberties, political, 
security, and strategic concerns. They 
touch every corner of the African Conti- 
nent, from the largest country to the 
smallest, from the Horn to Cape Verde, 
and from the Cape of Good Hope to the 
Mideast front-line states. 

On the economic side, the countries 
of sub-Saharan Africa are the source of 
many minerals which are vital to our 
own development and defense. These na- 
tions supply the majority and, in some 
instances, virtually all of our re- 
quirements for chrome for our auto- 
mobile and defense industries, man- 
ganese for the steel industry, cobalt for 
jet engines and mining equipment, cop- 
per, industrial diamonds, and mica to 
cite but a few. 

During the oil embargo of 1973, 
Nigeria became the first and is now the 
second largest foreign supplier of oil to 
the United States. Angola and Gabon 
are also African oil exporters. Several 
other countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
are actively exploring for oil, often with 
American companies as contractors. 

The countries of sub-Saharan Africa 
bought more than $3.2 billion worth of 
commodities, technology, and equipment 
from the United States during the first 
6 months of this year and represent a 
market for greater exports. 

Our political and strategic interests 
in Africa are significant. We have 
agreements with countries in black 
Africa which permit U.S. naval and air 
access, including that needed for our 
rapid deployment force. Others grant us 
tracking station rights and house our 
Voice of America transmitters and our 

nuary 1982 



relay stations. African countries are an 
important dimension in defining our 
strategy in the Indian Ocean and the 
southern Atlantic areas. 

African Interests 

Let me now turn to Africa's interests. 
The overwhelming economic problem in 
Africa is of development. The persistent 
long-term problems of food, shelter, and 
education remain far from solved. There 
is, however, an even more urgent and 
crisis character to the economic situation 
in Africa today. 

The adverse economic impact of the 
1973 and 1979 oil price increases, record 
high debt servicing costs, galloping infla- 
tion rates, and slowed economic expan- 
sion due to the recession in the West 
have brought many African states to the 
verge of bankruptcy. Development pro- 
grams must be scaled down and major 
internal structural reforms will have to 
be carried out to weather this crisis. The 
recent meeting of the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank focused 
on these grim issues and could offer no 
easy outs, no quick fixes. 

While development is undoubtedly 
the preeminent common problem in 
Africa, it is, nevertheless, not the only 
interest of the peoples of Africa. They 
are also concerned about threats to their 
security due to internal instability and 
external adventurism. Very few African 
states have been free of such threats, 
and for some there has been continued 
internal or border struggles for decades. 

The sources of such instability are 
varied— often having roots in long- 
standing ethnic rivalries or in border 
disputes arising from unclear colonial 
agreements. Because African states are 
economically poor, they are also often 
unable to manage adequate security 
forces. This leads to outside involve- 
ment, sometimes in the form of legit- 
imate assistance but sometimes in the 
form of exploitation of these conflicts by 
outside powers. While the sources of in- 
stability usually have their roots within 
Africa, African states are worried that 
regional problems such as those in the 
Horn or in southern Africa will erupt in- 
to superpower confrontations. There is a 
saying in Africa that when elephants 
fight, it is the grass which gets 

And finally, of course, African states 
are deeply committed to removing the 
last instance of colonial rule in Africa, 
Namibia, and in seeing an end to apart- 
heid in South Africa. 


Mutual Economic Interests 

We are very much aware of these in- 
terests. I would like to focus my 
remarks today on key areas where our 
interests and those of the African states 
converge with mutually beneficial conse- 

The first great area of mutual in- 
terest is economic. There is no question, 
when all is said of international 
economic orders and North-South rela- 
tions, that the West offers Africa the 
greatest opportunity for growth and 
development, access to technology, and 
eventual graduation from the need for 
concessional assistance. Much of this 
potential, indeed the greatest part, is in 
our markets for African goods and in 
the expansion of Africa's linkages with 
our private sector. 

Just as we need access to African 
raw materials, Africa seeks expanded 
markets abroad. In 1980 our exports to 
Africa totaled $5.25 billion, while our 
imports rose to $18.7 billion. Africa is 
already a substantial market for U.S. 
technology and commodities. Its 
markets offer major growth potential 
for American exporters. Most of this 
trade is now with South Africa and 
Nigeria. But the trend in the rest of sub- 
Saharan Africa is one of rapid increase. 
From this trade, key technologies and 
skills are transferred to a continent that 
increasingly recognizes that its economic 
future is naturally intertwined with our 

When the West is in recession, 
Africa also suffers deeply, buffeted by 
high inflation and interest rates. These 
macroeconomic trends are of far greater 
significance to our African partners than 
government assistance levels. Our cur- 
rent efforts to revitalize our own 
economy are, therefore, of major impor- 
tance to the Third World as well. And 
they also contain the key to the future 
of government assistance programs. 

Notwithstanding our own budgetary 
constraints, which impact on the role we 
are able to play, the United States con- 
tinues to be a major contributor to 
bilateral and multilateral programs in 
Africa. Our assistance in all forms is 
approximately $1.2 billion annually, con- 
centrated on the poorest countries. 

As Secretary of State Alexander 
Haig noted in his address to the U.N. 
General Assembly recently: "The poorest 
developing countries require long-term 
and generous concessional aid from 
developed and other developing coun- 
tries. . . ." But he said: "Ultimately, the 
objective must be to involve them in the 
international economic system, thereby 
strengthening opportunities and incen- 
tives for self-sustaining growth." 

In this regard, the Secretary saic 
"The United States can offer what it 
knows best from its own experience, 
have seen that policies which encour? 
private initiatives will promote bettei 
resource allocation and more rapid 
economic growth." This same view is 
emphasized in a recent World Bank 
report on Africa, and— in spite of 
rhetoric to the contrary— is being 
accepted by many countries as the w 
out of the current crisis. 

One of our greatest resources is 
free market economy, and it is a 
resource which we can utilize to our 
benefit and to that of the peoples of 
Africa. U.S. private investment in sti 
Saharan Africa now approaches $6 
billion. It is contributing to our own 
economy and to development in Afri 
Whatever the rhetoric from some 
quarters, it is unmistakably clear ths 
African decisionmakers are increasir 
aware of the benefits of expanding 
African-American economic links. 

Because of our recognition of th< 
great potential for expanded econon 
ties with Africa and the benefits whi 
could be accrued from these ties, thi 
Administration has begun a concert^ 
program to encourage increased prh 
sector involvement in Africa. This ps 
gram includes discussions with bank 
and multinational lending institution 
elicit their assistance, requesting Co 
gress to remove provisions in law w 1 
inhibit U.S. investment and trade 0}! 
tunities, and discussions with indivie 
governments in an effort to improve 
foreign investment climate and to 
remove, where necessary, existing 
obstacles to U.S. investment. The 
Agency for International Developing 
reorganizing its programs to providi 
more support to the private sector. 
We are already beginning to see 
positive results from these efforts. ( 
case which illustrates the progress e 
the potential for such cooperation is 
Nigeria. I have already indicated 
Nigeria's importance to us as a sour 
oil and a major focus of U.S. invest- 
ment. Nigeria is also a country whk 
has recently returned to civilian go\ 
ment, with a constitution very simil 
our own. It is an important partner 
us both politically and economically. 
Nigeria, in spite of oil resources 
country of great poverty. Food is b( 
coming a major problem. Between ] 
and 1980, its agricultural imports r< 

Department of State Bu 


'om $123 million to more than $1.95 
illion. In 1980, in U.S. -Nigerian 
conomic consultations, we agreed to 
ie formation of a Joint Agricultural 
Consultative Committee. The unique 
mature of the committee is that the 
lembership on both sides is primarily 
-om the private sector. It is a major 
ffort to bring our agribusiness skills to 
ear on Nigeria's food problem. Prog- 
ess has been very encouraging. In 
leetings this past month, the joint com- 
mittee negotiated several specific proj- 

We also signed this year with 
figeria cooperative programs in educa- 
on and health. Substantial progress 
'as made on a trade agreement. All of 
fiese arrangements are outside of any 
id program, for we have no bilateral 
id program in Nigeria. 

I believe this is illustrative of the 
ontributions and benefits of private sec- 
3r involvement in Africa to which we 
re giving encouragement. We are hope- 
i\ that the Nigerian-U.S. efforts will ex- 
and our ties with that country and will 
rovide us with experience for develop- 
ig similar relationships with more 
ifrican countries. It is in our national 
rterest as well as in the interests of the 
eveloping countries of Africa. 

'he Search for Peace 

i second important sphere where 
Lfrican and U.S. interests intersect is in 
he search for peace and security. This 
idministration recognizes and respects 
he fact that African states have chosen 
istorically the path of nonalignment. 
'he majority of them continue to adhere 
a that course, and we in this country 
ave nothing to fear from their choice, 
laving experienced our own nationalist 
evolution, we are sensitive to the desire 
f African leaders to reduce or eliminate 
ltogether foreign intervention and 
oreign military presence. Let there be 
o mistake: The OAU [Organization of 
ifrican Unity] Charter and the foreign 
olicy principles of most African states 
o not run counter to American national 
iterests. There are three factors that 
nderscore U.S. respect for Africa's 

• We have no interest in seeing the 
eveloping world become a battleground 
f East- West rivalries. We do not aspire 
3 a military mandate in Africa. 

• Our growing economic interests in 
ifrica and in African development are 
ot well served if Africa becomes a 

lore militarized and unstable zone. The 

continent's economic growth will inevi- 
tably be hampered in such circum- 

• Our interests in a stable world 
order, especially in the developing 
world, hinge on mutual restraint be- 
tween the superpowers. Our goal— in 
Africa as elsewhere— is the establish- 
ment of rules of the game among the 
most powerful nations that limit the 
application of external force in regional 
conflicts and the exploitation of these 
conflicts for purposes of great power 

But there is another side to this coin 
which African decisionmakers are well 
aware of, even if many in the West are 
not. Africa does not exist in a vacuum. 
The state of the global balance inevitably 
affects regional security in Africa. 
Unilateral self-denial by the United 
States and our allies cannot strengthen 
the principle of African nonalignment; 
on the contrary, it can only erode the 
climate of confidence necessary for true 
independence and economic growth. It is 
a truism that most of Africa's instability 
is of regional origin. This reality is 
clearly understood and clearly reflected 
in our African policies. But it is also 
time to recognize, as we have done, that 
the solution to regional disputes does 
not lie in Western abstinence at a time 
when Libyan, Soviet, and Cuban policies 
seek actively to exploit and fuel the fires 
of instability. 

It is striking that African leaders 
are increasingly sensitive to regional 
security issues. Their concern to see the 
removal of Soviet-Cuban military 
presence is increasingly evident. Their 
desire to come to grips with Libya's 
diplomacy of violence and subversion is 
also clear, even if the tactical remedies 
appear elusive or obscure. This Admini- 
stration is committed to providing 
assistance to our friends in Africa to 
meet their legitimate security needs. It 
is no denigration of the principle of 
nonalignment when African leaders take 
heart from the fact that the United 
States and other Western nations are to- 
day prepared to do their part to bolster 
African security. 

Our security assistance programs 
are also sensitive to the interplay of 
economic and security problems. We 
know that simply adding large amounts 
of arms to the local scene will exacer- 
bate both the security situation and the 
countries' development efforts. The 
Soviet Union has been notorious in 
doing just this: providing very large 
arms shipments to selective parts of 

Africa while providing almost no 
economic assistance. Our programs are 
different. While increasing our security 
assistance to our friends in Africa, we 
still maintain a ratio of more than three 
to one of economic over military 
assistance in our bilateral aid. We have 
also asked Congress for concessional 
terms for military assistance to poor 
countries like Sudan which should not be 
asked to shoulder large new debts to 
meet a security threat, especially when 
that threat is of vital concern to us. 

At a time when security issues have 
come more to the fore, greater burdens 
are placed on African statesmanship and 
on the institutional mechanisms of the 
OAU as an instrument for regional prob- 
lem solving. It is decidedly in the U.S. 
interest for these efforts to make prog- 
ress, as OAU-sponsored initiatives on 
the Western Sahara problem appear to 
have done during the past 3 months. 
With little fanfare, the activity of the 
current OAU chairman— President Moi 
of Kenya— played a role in dampening 
border tensions between Nigeria and 
Cameroon in recent months. In the case 
of the Chadian conflict, complicated by 
the continued presence of thousands of 
Libyan troops, we have made clear U.S. 
support for OAU decisions aimed at 
restoring national unity and ending the 
Libyan presence. If it proves possible to 
organize an inter- African force to assist 
the Chadian authorities, the United 
States would look sympathetically at 
appropriate requests to support that ef- 

The case of Sudan, Africa's largest 
nation, illustrates our approach to 
African security questions. It is clearly 
in our interest to assist its moderate and 
stable government which shares our 
goals for peace in Africa and the Middle 
East. Flanked by strife-torn neighbors, 
and directly threatened by Libyan activ- 
ities, Sudan's political and economic 
health is of obvious concern to many of 
our closest Arab and African friends. It 
is our goal that Sudan weather the 
storms that surround it, having emerged 
successfully from its own prolonged civil 
war and having played involuntary host 
for years to refugees and movements 
from neighboring lands. The United 
States is currently providing a package 
of assistance to Sudan which addresses 
its economic and security needs, in- 
cluding military training, assistance in 
the purchase of needed equipment, and 
significant support through bilateral and 

inuary 1982 



multilateral channels for its troubled 

The United States and the states of 
Africa also share a strong desire for 
reduced conflict and enhanced security 
in southern Africa. These regional con- 
flicts—especially the inter-related ones 
in Namibia and Angola— inhibit 
economic development and have the 
potential for heightened East-West ten- 
sions in the area. There can be no doubt 
that the region contains within itself the 
seeds of heightened violence. Unless 
voices of compromise and coexistence 
are strengthened, a cycle of deteri- 
orating security could develop with 
potentially dangerous consequences 
going well beyond the immediate area. 

We are determined to press for an 
internationally acceptable settlement for 
the independence of Namibia. That 
settlement must be one which meets the 
vital security needs of Namibia's 
neighbors as well as permits the exercise 
of self-determination by Namibia's 
people. We believe we have made prog- 
ress toward that objective. In the next 
few weeks I will accompany represen- 
tatives of our Western partners in the 
contact group to discuss the latest pro- 
posals with the African front-line states, 
Nigeria, South Africa, and other in- 
volved parties. 

The process of negotiation on 
Namibia has been long and hard these 
past few months. In January of this 
year, when this Administration took 
office, the negotiations had come to a 
complete standstill and the implementa- 
tion of U.N. Security Council Resolution 
435 was totally stalled. We undertook to 
restore momentum to the negotiations 
through uncovering and dealing with the 
fundamental obstacles to progress. That 
could only be done through a process of 
quiet and private diplomacy, one in 
which our bona fides would be clearly 
established with South Africa, which is 
key to the solution, as well as the other 

As I have said on other occasions, 
while this leadership role is not one 
which we have sought, it is one which 
the United States is uniquely qualified to 
fill. It is the right course, the only 
course which has the possibility of suc- 

I know you have heard about a U.S. 
"tilt" to South Africa. There has been 
much other misinformation printed 
about our policy. But we have received 
encouragement not only from our allies 
in the contact group but from black 
African leaders as well. This is because 
we are actively addressing a problem of 
great concern to the Africans, and they 

know we have a unique role in bringing 
about a peaceful as well as satisfactory 

Let me speak frankly to you also of 
Angola. We have not made Cuban troop 
withdrawal a precondition of the 
Namibia settlement. The Namibia 
negotiations are proceeding on their own 
track. But the problems are empirically 
related. The presence of Cuban troops 
undoubtedly makes the Namibian inde- 
pendence process more difficult. As long 
as the Angola situation remains un- 
settled and dangerous to Angola's 
neighbors, the prospects for peace and 
stability in the region are made very 

We are not seeking the downfall of 
any African government. We have had 
useful discussions with the government 
of Angola, and we have continuing 
economic involvement there. Recently, a 
major Export-Import Bank loan was 
approved for Angola. We do recognize, 
and our African colleagues recognize, 
that the Cuban troop presence is a 
major impediment to progress on 
Namibia. It is also a situation which 
allows the Soviet Union and Cuba to 
foment disorder: to keep the pot boiling, 
to continue a dependence on Soviet 
arms, and to prevent development of 
regional cohesion. By contrast, if there 
is a solution to the Cuban troop prob- 
lem, along with that of Namibia, we 
foresee an economic development proc- 
ess across southern and central Africa 
of enormous dimension and of benefit 
not only to the people there but to 
neighboring African states. 

We have begun to contribute to that 
process through a very substantial 
economic assistance pledge to Zimbabwe 
and through assistance to the Southern 
Africa Development Coordinating Com- 
mittee of black African states in the 
region. Our private sector is increasingly 
aware of and interested in opportunities 
in the region; U.S. investment on the 
basis of mutual benefit can add to the 
area's potential. 

It is in this promise that we and the 
African states have a common set of 
basic objectives. In the coming months, I 
hope this mutuality of interests will 
come to dominate more our discussion of 
southern Africa, and of Africa generally, 
especially as we together make concrete 
progress on the issue of Namibia.H 

Internal Situation in 

NOV. 5, 1981 1 

In accordance with the provisions of Section 
720 of the International Security and 
Development Cooperation Act of 1980, I air 
submitting the following report on the inter 
nal situation in Zimbabwe. 

Zimbabwe is well into its second year o\ 
independence, and in the period which has 
elapsed since the last report to the commit- 
tees, the state of the nation can be describe 
as basically stable politically. The disarma- 
ment and integration of the two former gu« 
rilla groups continued on schedule and is ex 
pected to be completed in the very near 
future. This process represents one of this 
young nation's most significant achievemen 

Prime Minister Mugabe's position withii 
the government and within his party is still 
strong and his overall position in the counti, 
was enhanced by his skillful handling of the, 
dismissal of former Minister of Manpower, 
Planning and Development, Edgar Tekere. 
While Mr. Mugabe is still lobbying for the 
creation of a one-party state, he has stated,! 
that he will not move in this direction 
without a popular mandate. The Prime 
Minister is also becoming a more prominent 
spokesman among Front Line leaders and 
within the OAU [Organization of African U 
ty]. Of obvious concern, however, is the in-; 
creasing sensitivity Prime Minister Mugabe 
and other government officials are beginnir 
to display over what they perceive as un- 
favorable press. The government recently I 
fired the editor of the Umtali Post allegedly 
for questioning the military arrangement 
with the North Koreans. 

' In making public the government's deci 
sion to conclude a military agreement with 
North Korea, the Prime Minister stated th; 
the brigade to be trained and equipped by 1 
North Koreans would be used for internal 
security only. He also said that the accept- 
ance of military assistance has no political i 
ideological significance so far as Zimbabwe 
non-alignment policy goes, but rather this i 
tion, balancing British military aid, is an af 
firmation of that non-alignment. 

Economically, Zimbabwe appears to be 
going through a period of defining what 
government's policy and role in the econorr 
sphere should be. This could be a lengthy 
process, and it is already generating con- 
siderable concern in the private sector aboi 
its own role in the country's plans for 
economic development. Zimbabwe's econorr 
policymakers remain very realistic, howeve 
and, for the most part, seem inclined to ap 
proach structural changes in the economy 
with caution and gradualism, recognizing t 
importance of relating ideology to attainab 

The government has attempted to mail 
tain a favorable investment climate. 


Department of State Bulle 


/ever, in keeping with its commitment to 
implementation of socialist goals, the 
jrnment wants the private sector to 
>me more responsive to its development 
:erns as well as to Zimbabwe's overall 
?lopment goals. The recent decision to 
ite a minerals marketing authority to con- 
the production and marketing of the 
ltry's minerals and metals no doubt 
•esents an attempt to manifest these con- 

Although the new budget reflects a 
lerately socialist path, it contains no 
irences to drastic income redistribution 
jrams or plans for nationalization of the 
ate sector. Tax hikes called for in the 
get are high by Zimbabwe standards; they 
designed to increase government revenue 
will have the added effect of allowing the 
ernment to increase expenditures in the 
is of health services, schooling and other 
al programs. 

While there is no question that Zimbabwe 
untinuing to make economic progress and 
, the economy is growing, the rate of 
wth is slowing somewhat and inflation is 
'or both high- and low-income families. 
i factors contributing to the economic 
/-down include constraints in foreign ex- 
nge and labor and transportation prob- 
s. The emigration of whites is continuing, 
there has been no significant increase or 
rease in the numbers leaving. 
There are also indications that recent ten- 
is between South Africa and Zimbabwe 
i be having a negative impact on the 
iomy. Also, the Zimbabwe Government 
acknowledged that the country cannot 
off commercial relations with its 
jhbor. South Africa's decision to cancel 
preferential trade agreement and to 
se out Zimbabwean contract workers 
sently in the Republic will certainly ag- 
vate an already difficult foreign exchange 
ation. The reclaiming by South Africa of 
)f its railroad locomotives is also causing 
ous transport problems for Zimbabwe, 
ticularly with respect to the transport of 
■oleum products and to the movement of 
alus grain from Zimbabwe's record maize 

Land distribution is being carried out 
y cautiously and carefully, to insure that 
basic infrastructure is either in place or 
er construction before settlement takes 
:e. Present plans call for the resettlement 
8,000 families by the end of this year on 
sently unused land. 

Ronald Reagan 

'Identical letters addressed to Charles H. 
cy, chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela- 
is Committee, and Clement J. Zablocki, 
irman of the House Foreign Affairs Corn- 
tee (text from Weekly Compilation of 
sidential Documents of Nov. 9, 1981). ■ 

Libyan Involvement in 
Sudan and Chad 

by Princeton Lyman 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee on November k, 1981. Mr. 
Lyman is Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for African Affairs. ' 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify 
here today on U.S. policy concerning 
Sudan and Chad, particularly as it in- 
volves Libya. 

The United States has had and con- 
tinues to have interests in Sudan and 
Chad outside of the Libyan context. 
First and foremost, we are interested in 
seeing a stable atmosphere conducive to 
development in the region. The peoples 
of Chad and Sudan are among the 
poorest in Africa, and their economic 
needs can be most effectively addressed 
in a context void of hostility. It is also in 
our interest to assist those countries, 
such as Sudan, which have been support- 
ive of U.S. goals in Africa and the Mid- 
dle East. We also believe the internal 
reconciliation of the warring factions 
within Chad to be both in our interest 
and in that of the region. 

The actions of Col. Qadhafi and 
Libya frustrate and threaten the attain- 
ment of these goals. Not only in this 
part of Africa, where Libyan involve- 
ment against its neighbors has been so 
flagrant, but in many parts of Africa, 
Libya is acting as a force for instability 
and the overthrow of established 

Libyan Involvement in Africa 

It would appear that the Libyans have 
objectives in Africa which do not bode 
well for the region. These goals seem to 
include establishing, without regard to 
existing national boundaries, an Arab- 
Islamic bloc, including Moslems of 
Africa and the Middle East. In fact, it 
would appear Qadhafi envisions the 
elimination of these boundaries in the 
creation of a super-Libya, as it were, 
with Qadhafi as its spokesman. He also 
appears ready to work actively against 
any countries which resist his ambitions. 

The most recent example of his ef- 
fort to implement his expansionist goals 
is the treaty among Libya, Ethiopia, and 

South Yemen which was signed in 
August. The treaty contains provisions 
under which the armed forces of each of 
the signatories may, under certain cir- 
cumstances, deploy in the territory of 
the others. Specifically, there have been 
indications that units of the Ethiopian 
Armed Forces may be sent to Libya, 
and, in fact, a high-level Ethiopian 
delegation recently visited Tripoli. 

While such forces as those provided 
by the Ethiopians may be intended 
primarily to protect the Libyan regime 
against various alleged threats, there 
are also grounds for concern that they 
may participate in Qadhafi's foreign 
adventures, including efforts to 
destabilize governments in the region. 
While we have no details on when such 
an Ethiopian force might be sent to 
Libya, we do believe the subject to be 
under active discussion. 

Libya supported the regime of Idi 
Amin in Uganda and has been charged 
by the Presidents of Niger, Mali, and 

. . . in many parts 
of Africa, Libya is act- 
ing as a force for in- 
stability and the over- 
throw of established 

Sudan with attempts to overthrow their 
governments and by the Senegalese and 
The Gambians with imprisoning their na- 
tionals in Libya and putting them into 
military training against their wills. 

We have also received numerous 
reports of Libyan disinformation cam- 
paigns within African countries aimed at 
existing regimes. 

The United States is not alone in our 
concern over these activities. Senegal, 
Equatorial Guinea, and The Gambia 
broke diplomatic relations with Libya in 
1980. Mauritania, Mali, Nigeria, Ghana, 
and Niger objected to the establishment 
of "People's Bureaus" last year and ex- 
pelled the Libyan diplomats from their 
countries. Liberia, Sudan, and the Cen- 
tral African Republic followed suit this 

luary 1982 



year. The Libyan activities also played a 
role in our decision to close the Libyan 
[diplomatic] mission here earlier this 

Therefore, I would respectfully sug- 
gest that the Libyan-Sudan-Chad 
triangle of which you referred in the ti- 
tle of today's hearing would be more ac- 
curately described as a circle which en- 
compasses a number of other nations 
within Africa, including but not limited 
to those such as Niger in the immediate 
proximity of Sudan and Chad. 

Developments in Sudan 

Sudan has been supportive of many U.S. 
policy initiatives, particularly in the Mid- 
dle East where President Nimeiri has 
supported the Camp David accords, 
reestablished relations with Egypt, and 
called upon other Arab states to do so. 
The Sudan has a generally good human 
rights record and has sought to play a 
moderating role in other conflicts in the 
region, including the Horn of Africa and 
the Western Sahara. 

Several events have occurred in 
rapid succession which have heightened 
public concern about Sudan. In 
September, Libyan aircraft began fre- 
quent bombings of Sudanese villages 
located near the Sudan-Chad border. 
These raids and Sudan's inability effec- 
tively to deter them confirmed Sudan's 
defense needs, which had been previous- 
ly recognized by this Administration in 
its decision early this year to increase 
foreign military sales credits to Sudan 
from $30 million in FY 1981 to $100 
million in FY 1982 to help Sudan ac- 
complish a meaningful modernization 
program. The air attacks highlighted the 
urgency of proceeding with this pro- 
gram. And other countries, such as 
Egypt, have expressed their concern 
over Sudanese security. Recognizing 
this, when Secretary Haig met President 
Nimeiri at President Sadat's funeral, he 
announced that we would expedite 
delivery of the equipment already on 
order as well as that to be ordered with 
FY 1982 funds. We believe improving 
Sudan's defensive capabilities will con- 
tribute to stabilizing the region. 

The urgency of bolstering Sudan's 
defense capabilities has also been 
heightened by the treaty of cooperation 
among Libya, Ethiopia, and the People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen to which 
I referred earlier. This treaty threatens 

polarization of a region where Sudan 
seeks only to live in peace. The Govern- 
ment of Sudan under President Nimeiri 
maintains a policy of seeking good rela- 
tions with all of its neighbors and to be 
a moderating influence toward ending 
hostilities in Ethiopia and the Western 

At home Nimeiri has pursued a 
policy of decentralizing government to 
stimulate greater participation in the 
political process by factions throughout 
Sudan, a policy initiated in 1972 when 
he granted regional autonomy to a large 
portion of southern Sudan. Since that 
time, he has expanded this concept to 
other regions of the country. Elections 
for the five new northern regional 
assemblies were held in May of this 
year. He can be expected to continue to 
pursue these policies in the foreseeable 

However, in addition to the military 
threats along its borders, Sudan faces 
serious structural economic problems 
which could threaten the stability of the 
country. Sudan's inability to earn the 
foreign exchange required to meet basic 
popular demand has resulted in periodic 
shortages of essential goods such as 
bread, sugar, and gasoline and in long 
lines for these goods when they are 
available. Sudan has little leeway on 
either the export or import side to 
resolve this problem. In the short run, 
investment in additional productive 

In September, Libyan 
aircraft began frequent 
bombings of Sudanese 
villages located near the 
Sudan-Chad border. 

capacity, especially agriculture, is need- 
ed, but currently nearly all foreign ex- 
change earnings must be sent on con- 
sumption. If productive capacity is not 
expanded, the gap between public expec- 
tations and the ability of the system to 
meet them will widen and could well 
result in popular unrest. 

The present gap between demand 
and supply already provides fertile 
ground for the destabilizing activities of 
Libyan-trained and -paid agents. Libya 

has been infiltrating agents into Sudar 
with the intent of arousing popular 
discontent with President Nimeiri. The 
arrests in early October of roughly 
10,000 undocumented refugees and 
suspected Libyan agents demonstrated 
the Sudanese Government's current co 
cern with this type of subversion. 
However, the dissolution of parliament! 
in October — another recent developmel 
which has sometimes also been cited a; 
a sign of internal political difficulty — 
was, in fact, part of a long planned 
devolution of political power to the ne\ 
regional governments. The National 
Assembly will be reconstituted as a 
smaller body to reflect this devolution 
its authority. 

In order to correct its structural 
economic problems, Sudan will require 
scheduling of its debt service, balance-' 
payments support, and new public and 
private investment in its productive sej 
tor. Stability in Sudan can be maintain; 
in the face of Libyan aggression and I 
subversion, but it will require a con- 
certed effort on the, part of the 
Sudanese Government and Sudan's 

Thus, our policy toward the Sudan; 
one aimed at promoting stability and, f 
thus, protecting crucial interests in the 
region. It consists of substantial 
economic as well as military assistance 
Because of Sudan's serious economic 
problems, the Administration has aske 
that Sudan's legitimate defense needs 
assisted on a concessional basis in FY i 
1982. We hope Congress will approve': 
this request. 

Developments in Chad 

As this subcommittee well knows, the ' 
situation in Chad is complex and tragi< 
with roots that go back for many yean 
Basic cleavages in the Chadian society 
go back for generations — northerners 
versus southerners, nomads versus 
sedentary farmers, Moslems versus 
animists and Christians, Arabs versus 
black African groups. In the postcolon 1 
period, the country failed to maintain ; 
political consensus, and a festering civ; 
war began in 1965. Political authority 
was contested among as many as 1 1 
rival factions, all of which sought 
foreign assistance at some time. The 
most recent attempt at a coalition 
government — the National Union Trar 
sition Government (GUNT), which was 


Department of State Bullet 


med in November 1971) — has been 
set by internal struggles reflecting the 
idencies of its constituent parts, the 
mer factions, to break away. 

In March 1980, fighting broke out 
ween the forces of GUNT President 
ukouni and Defense Minister Habre 
;h the battle for N'Djamena so fierce 
! United States was forced to close its 
bassy and withdraw. The fighting 
igged on for months, until late 1980 
en President Goukouni appealed to 
>ya's Qadhafi to help him fight Habre. 
s resultant massive incursion of 
>yan troops and weapons helped turn 
i tide, and on December 15, Habre 
s forced to flee the capital. 

Libyan intervention interrupted and 
ltravened efforts by the Organization 
African Unity (OAU) to resolve the 
il war in Chad. OAU plans had en- 
aged a cease-fire, an African 
icekeeping force to keep order, and 
;ional elections. The OAU, in the 
gos accord of 1979, called for 
;hdrawal of foreign troops and early 
jloyment of the peacekeeping force to 
fill the original OAU plan. Libyan 
ces, however, have remained in Chad. 

On January 6, 1981, a joint com- 
mique was issued in Tripoli which an- 
anced the forthcoming merger of 
ad and Libya. This event caused 
jckwaves to protest throughout 
rica, and Libya backed down from its 
,n. However, there are indications — as 
e as last week — that Libya continues 
press the Chadians into such a 

At its annual summit in Nairobi 
ne 24-26, 1981, the OAU reaffirmed 
intention to create an OAU 
icekeeping force in Chad, after which 
i GUNT was expected to request a 
jyan withdrawal. Unfortunately, the 
i\] has been unable so far to organize 
d deploy this force, although the cur- 
it OAU chairman, President Moi of 
;nya, is working very actively to this 

In the meantime, Libya has rein- 
•ced its troops in Chad to a level of 
me 7,000. It has introduced tanks and 
tnor and airpower and has begun 
ilding more permanent facilities in the 
rth. The threat from Libyan troops in 
lad has been felt in many countries. 

Libyan troops are now deployed 
>ng much of Sudan's western border. 

Libyan subversive potential against 
Sudan is, thus, greatly increased. Radio 
Tripoli beams disinformation into 
western Sudan, reporting false disorders 
in Khartoum and encouraging insurrec- 
tion. Infiltration of subversives is more 
easily accomplished. In the wake of 
Sadat's assassination, Radio Tripoli — in 
addition to horribly distasteful rejoicing 
over the assassination — sought to stir 

Libyan intervention 
interrupted and con- 
travened efforts by the 
OA U to resolve the civil 
war in Chad. 

immediate uprisings in both Egypt and 
Sudan. These efforts continue. 

To the west, Qadhafi unleased 
threats on Niger, saying it was "second 
in line after Chad." In nearly all the sur- 
rounding countries — Cameroon, Nigeria, 
the Central African Republic, as well as 
Sudan, and in countries farther away 
such as Ghana, Gabon, Guinea, and 
Liberia — there was open concern over 
the implications of the Libyan military 
presence in Chad. 

It is against this background that 
events of the past few weeks should be 
viewed. Apparently, the GUNT has been 
under increasing pressure from Libya 
perhaps to agree to a merger or to delay 
the OAU peacekeeping force. In 
response, the GUNT announced it would 
not act on a merger. There were then 
rumors of a Libyan-backed coup against 
Goukouni. These rumors proved false. 
But the GUNT has now asked that Lib- 
yan forces be withdrawn immediately 
from N'Djamena and the surrounding 
provinces and be totally withdrawn by 
December 31. 

These most recent events have 
spurred intensified efforts by the OAU 
to organize the peacekeeping force. 
Several African countries have offered 

troops. The French have offered to help 
the OAU by providing financial and 
logistics support. OAU officials are ac- 
tively working out arrangements. Never- 
theless, African countries will not be 
able to deploy such a force easily, given 
their own economic constraints and the 
difficulties of organization, terrain, etc. 

The United States has expressed 
strong support for the rapid deployment 
of an OAU peacekeeping force to 
replace Libyan troops. This is, first of 
all, an African security problem and one 
which the OAU has undertaken to ad- 
dress. We also welcome the GUNT's call 
during the past few days for Libyan 
withdrawal. We hope this withdrawal 
takes place soon to relieve much of the 
tension in the surrounding area. 


Both Sudan and Chad are countries 
which need, above all, peace and 
economic development. Sudan has been 
directly threatened by Qadhafi and been 
subjected to cross-border air raids from 
Libyan forces in Chad. We need to help 
assure that Sudan is not left vulnerable 
to such actions. In the larger context, 
we must play a strong role with others 
in helping Sudan through its current 
economic crisis and back to a position of 

Chad has become so traumatized by 
the continuing cycle of violence that 
basic services are totally disrupted, the 
country cannot feed itself — although it 
is a former food exporter — and the 
economy is in shambles. Once Libyan 
troops are withdrawn, there should be 
an international program of reconstruc- 
tion assistance. 

The events of the past year have 
been deeply disturbing in this region. If 
Libya continues to be a destabilizing 
force, the countries of the Sahel — and, 
indeed, in most of Africa — will get 
caught up in the effects of its policy. 
The challenges of economic development 
is great enough in Africa. It should not 
be made more difficult by these con- 
scious efforts to exploit every facet of 
internal difference or difficulty for the 
purpose of serving Qadhafi's expan- 
sionist dreams. 

'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 

luary 1982 



INF Negotiations Open in Geneva 

On November 30, 1981, in Geneva, 
the United States and the Soviet Union 
opened formal negotiations on inter- 
mediate-range nuclear forces (INF). 
Following is a statement made by Secre- 
tin-;/ Ha ig in Washington, D.C., which 
was broadcast by satellite to Western 

Today marks the formal opening of 
negotiations between the United States 
and the Soviet Union on intermediate- 
range nuclear forces (INF). These 
negotiations are of fundamental impor- 
tance to the security of the Atlantic 
alliance and to the peace of the world. 

These negotiations are a result of 
the December 1979 decision of the 
alliance to initiate arms control involving 
intermediate-range forces while proceed- 
ing with modernization of alliance 
forces. The United States is especially 
gratified that the opportunity has ar- 
rived to reduce the Soviet nuclear threat 
to its allies through negotiations. As 
President Reagan said in his November 
18 speech, the United States views that 
threat as a threat to itself. We will 
negotiate in this spirit. 

President Reagan has proposed a 
fair and straightforward solution to this 
problem: The United States would 
cancel its plans to deploy cruise missiles 

and Pershing II missiles if the Soviet 
Union dismantled its SS-20 and retired 
its SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. Thus, if the 
Soviets are prepared to eliminate the 
problem that caused the December 1979 
modernization decision, we are prepared 
not to implement the decision. Our posi- 
tion takes into account Soviet desires 
that we not implement our moderniza- 
tion decision. We now look to the 
Soviets to show an equally forthcoming 
attitude. Ambassador Nitze [Paul H. 
Nitze, head of the U.S. delegation to the 
INF negotiations] will lay the details of 
this proposal before Soviet represen- 
tatives in the negotiations that begin to- 

The American position at these talks 
is based upon intensive and lengthy 
alliance-wide consultations. It is fully 
supported by our NATO partners. It is 
based on our common concerns about 
the threat and our common goal of 
genuine arms control. [West German] 
Chancellor Schmidt has left no doubt of 
this during his recent conversations with 
[Soviet] President Brezhnev. 

We do not approach these negotia- 
tions with a closed mind. As the Presi- 
dent stated: "We intend to negotiate in 
good faith and go to Geneva willing to 

listen to and consider the proposals of 
our Soviet counterparts." 

We note that President Brezhnev in 
dicated in Bonn that the Soviet Union 
was prepared to negotiate reductions in 
intermediate-range missiles. While we 
are dissappointed that the Soviet posi- j 
tion remains the moratorium proposal j 
they first advanced 2 years ago, we are] 
hopeful that the negotiations will bring 
more forthcoming stance. Clearly, both 
sides have a stake in reaching an 
equitable and verifiable agreement that 
improves mutual security and 

As the talks begin, we are resolved 
to pursue them with care and patience. 
Progress depends not only on the skill c 
our negotiators but on NATO's resolve \ 
to continue its preparations to deploy 
the missiles that will offset Soviet ad- 
vantages. These preparations are the in 
centive that brought the Soviets to the , 
negotiations and that will encourage 
them now to take a serious position. 
Parallel implementation of moderniza- 
tion and negotiation, as foreseen in the 
1979 NATO decision', offers the only 
hope for an agreement that will assure ! 
our security for years to come. And 
Western unity remains the best 
guarantee that the longest period of 
peace known by Europe in this century 
will endure. 

'Press release 407 of Dec. 2, 1981. 

U.S. Negotiator at INF Talks 

Paul II. Nitze was born in Amherst, Mass., 
on January 16, 1907. He graduated cum 
laucU from Harvard (1928) and subsequently 
joined the New York investment banking 

of Dillon Head and Company. In 1941 he 
left his position as Vice Presidenl of that firm 
to become financial director of the Office of 

the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. 
He was Chief of the Metals and Minerals 
Branch of the Board of Economic Warfare 
(1942-43) and then became Director of 
Foreign Procurement and Development for 
the Foreign Economic Administration. Dur- 
ing 1944-46, Mr. Nitze was vice chairman of 
the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey; Presi- 
dent Truman awarded him the Medal of 
Merit for service to the nation in this 

For the next 7 years, he served with the 
Department of State, first as Deputy Director 
of the Office of International Trade Policy 
and then as Deputy to the Assistant Secre- 
tary for Economic Affairs (1948). In August 
1949, he became Deputy Director of the 
Department's Policy Planning Staff and 
Director the following year. 

Mr. Nitze left the Federal Government in 
L953 to become President of the Foreign 

Service Educational Foundation in 
Washington, D.C. In January 1961, he was 
appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Affairs, and in 
November 1963, he became Secretary of the 
Navy. In July 1967, he assumed the position 
as Deputy Secretary of Defense. He resigned 
in January 1969 and the following spring was 
appointed the representative of the Secretary 
of Defense to the U.S. delegation to the 
SALT negotiations. He held this position un- 
til June 1974 at which time he resigned. 

Mr. Nitze was serving as Chairman of 
Policy Studies of the Committee on the Pres- 
ent Danger when President Reagan ap- 
pointed him to head the U.S. delegation to 
the intermediate-range nuclear force negotia- 
tions on September 24, 1981. The following 
November 20, he was accorded the personal 
rank of Ambassador while serving as head of 
that delegation. 


Department of State Bulletir 


.S. Consults With 
i INF Negotiating 

NATO's Special Consultative Group 
ni B>~ussels November 20, 1981, to 
suit on the development of the U.S. 
•itiating position on the U.S. -Soviet 
lear arms control talks. At the Con- 
xion of that meeting, Assistant Secre- 
jfor European Affairs Lawrence S. 
lit burger and Director of the Depart- 
it's Bureau of Politico-Military 
lirs Richard R. Burt made the follow- 


lay marks the culmination of ex- 
stive alliance preparations for the 
oming U.S. -Soviet negotiations, 
ed on the two-track decision of 
ember 1979. 

The intensity of the consultations 
:e the Rome ministerial meeting in 
f symbolizes the American commit- 
lt to allied interests, as well as the 
imon desire of the United States and 
lilies to achieve genuine arms con- 
. These consultations played an in- 
table role in developing the U.S. 
otiating position. 
That position, as set forth by the 
sident earlier this week, is that the 
ted States will agree to cancel the 
l to deploy Pershing II and ground- 
iched cruise missiles if the Soviets 
dismantle their SS-20 missiles and 
re the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles whose 
nee, as the Soviets say, has expired 
which the Soviets claim are being 
laced by the SS-20s. 
The United States believes the first 
se of negotiations should focus on 
i-based intermediate-range nuclear 
;e (INF) missiles in the interest of 
litating early agreement. Reductions 
ther nuclear systems could be sought 
subsequent phase. 
The U.S. position is based on the 
ember 1979 decision, which was 
le in the light of the Soviet buildup 
he land-based missile threat to the 
;s. If that threat is eliminated, the 
ince could forego its modernization 

With today's meeting of the Special 
isultative Group and NATO perma- 
t representatives and through con- 
ations preceding today, the United 


States will be entering the negotiations 
fully and firmly supported by its allies. 
Close consultations in the Special Con- 
sultative Group will, of course, continue 
once the negotiations commence. 

Alliance cohesion on arms control 
and alliance resolve on modernization 
have brought the Soviets to the 
negotiating table. Based on alliance con- 
sultations, President Reagan has made a 
bold and genuine offer, which, if ac- 
cepted by the Soviets, would constitute a 
historic step and enhanced stability be- 
tween East and West. 

As we have already indicated, the 
United States is disappointed by the in- 
itial Soviet press reaction but remains 
hopeful that Soviet leaders will not 
discard this important opportunity to 
further the cause of peace. The Presi- 
dent has offered the Soviets a fair and 
reasonable proposal which provides the 
basis for a far-reaching agreement. The 
United States will negotiate in good 
faith. We will, therefore, patiently ex- 

plain our position and consider the pro- 
posals of our Soviet counterparts, as 
President Reagan made clear. The 
United States is ready to reach agree- 
ment as quickly as possible. All that is 
required is that the Soviets be equally 
reasonable and forthcoming. 

Implementation of NATO's moderni- 
zation decision will proceed in parallel 
with the negotiations. The alliance will 
alter its program only in the event of a 
concrete agreement. 


The paper entitled "U.S. -Soviet INF 
Systems: A Response to Soviet Claims" 
[see accompanying article with table] is 
an effort to amplify on the remarks 
made by President Reagan earlier this 
week in his speech. It is really the first 
official response to President Brezhnev's 
claim that there is a balance in what the 
Soviets call "medium"-range systems and 
demonstrates that these claims are a 
manipulative and deceptively selective 
use of data designed to conceal the large 
and growing Soviet advantage in the 
category of INF systems. If truly com- 
parable systems are counted in an objec- 
tive and impartial manner, what 

U.S.-Soviet INF Systems: 
A Response to Soviet Claims 

In his speech on November 18, the 
President said that Soviet claims on the 
current balance of intermediate-range 
nuclear forces (INF) are wrong. The 
President stated that by any objective 
measure, the Soviet Union has an over- 
whelming advantage on the order of six 
to one. 

The six to one ratio that the Presi- 
dent used is based on a comparison of 
those U.S. systems often cited by the 
Soviets as "medium"-range systems and 
those Soviet systems which the Soviets 
identify as "medium"-range, as well as 

additional Soviet systems which have 
ranges equivalent to or greater than the 
listed U.S. systems. Of such systems, 
the United States has a total of approx- 
imately 560 aircraft and no missiles, 
while the Soviet total numbers over 
3,800 missiles and aircraft. 

As the charts used by the President 
indicated, the six to one ratio did not in- 
clude allied systems on either side. If 
such systems were included, the Soviet 
Union would still enjoy an overwhelming 
advantage in intermediate-range nuclear 
forces. ■ 



(U.S. based) 






Soviet Systems 















jary 1982 



emerges is not a balance but, as Presi- 
dent Reagan noted earlier this week, a 
Soviet advantage of about six to one. As 
you can see from our analysis, their 
alleged claim of about 1,000 systems on 
each side hides the Soviet monopoly in 
the most threatening category of 
systems — long-range systems. The table 
shows the Soviets have about 600 
SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles, with a 
total of about 1,100 warheads. NATO 
deploys no comparable missiles. 

In addition, Soviet claims that a 
balance exists date back at least to 1979. 
Since then they deployed some 350 new 
SS-20 warheads while NATO deployed 
none. Even if a balance existed in 
1979 — and it emphatically did not at 
that time — these additional deployments 
make Soviet claims completely unten- 
able. In fact, these additional 
deployments have only increased their 
preponderance in these systems. 

Several other flaws in the Soviet 
claims are worth noting and here, I 
think, the table is useful. What we have 
done in this table is essentially taken the 
Soviet definition for the United States of 
"medium"-range and applied those same 
criteria to Soviet systems and come up 
with a figure that compares comparable 
systems by range. 

For example, the Soviets include 
American carrier-based aircraft, like the 
A-6s and A-7s, but count none of their 
own sea-based systems. Nor do they 
count Soviet naval aviation aircraft 
bases in the western Soviet Union. They 
compare NATO aircraft with ranges or 
combat radii of less than 1,000 kilo- 
meters, like the U.S. F-4, with the 
4,000-kilometer radius Backfire bomber. 

The roughly 2,700 nuclear-capable 
Soviet Fencer, Flogger, and Fitter air- 
craft in Eastern Europe and the western 
Soviet Union are not counted by Presi- 
dent Brezhnev, although they have capa- 
bilities and ranges similar to the F-4. 

Looking at this one table — and there 
are other tables that can be developed 
and have been developed by the Special 
Consultative Group to examine different 
elements of the balance — the conclusion 
is that if one counts Soviet systems and 
comparable American systems, one does 
arrive at not a balance but at a highly 
lopsided situation, which President 
Reagan noted can lead to a balance of 
six to one to the Soviet's advantage. ■ 

Canadian Investment Policy 
and U.S. Responses 

by Ernest B. Johnston, Jr. 

Excerpt from a statement before the 
Subcommittees on Inter-American Af- 
fairs and International Economic Policy 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
on October 21, 1981. Mr. Johnston is Act- 
ing Assistant Secretary for Economic 
and Business Affairs. 1 

U.S. investment policy has, for many 
years, been based on the fundamental 
premise that an open international in- 
vestment system, responding to market 
forces, provides the most efficient alloca- 
tion of global resources. When capital is 
free to move without hindrance, all na- 
tions can benefit through expanding 
world output. As a corollary, U.S. 
Government policy is to minimize in- 
tervention in the private sector decision- 
making process. 

Another basic tenet, which we have 
strongly supported, particularly for ex- 
isting investment, is the principle of na- 
tional treatment— foreign investors 
should be treated no less favorably than 
domestic investors in like situations. We 
have worked bilaterally and multilateral- 
ly to gain acceptance of this principle. 
Its major international embodiment to 
date is in a declaration and related deci- 
sion adopted by the industrial 
democracies in the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) in 1976. 

The adoption of restrictive invest- 
ment and trade policies by our neighbor 
and largest trading partner is a matter 
of particular concern which poses fun- 
damental issues for the developed coun- 
try members of the OECD, particularly 
the United States. 

Our concerns center on two 
areas — the restrictive and discrim- 
inatory policies in the proposed national 
energy program and the activities of the 
existing Foreign Investment Review 
Agency (FIRA). 

National Energy Program 

Canada announced its national energy 
program about a year ago. The basic 
policy is to be implemented by two 
major pieces of legislation— Bill C-48, or 
the Canada Oil and Gas Act. Bill C-48 
may pass into law within weeks. The 
Energy Security Act is currently only in 
discussion draft form. 

Our key concern about the nationa' 
energy program is not its objective— th 
well published "Canadianization"— but i 
discriminatory and unfair treatment of 
foreign investors. The following ele- 
ments of the program are of most con- 

• The 25% crown share, or 
"back-in," in existing oil and gas 
discoveries in federal or "Canada" land 
This changes the rules of the game for 
foreign firms which have already in- 
vested in exploration and development 
of Canadian energy resources. Althoug 
the Canadian Government has now 
agreed to pay a portion of the explora- 
tion costs incurred by the companies oi 
Canada lands, the compensation now 
being considered will almost certainly 1 
inadequate to meet the expenses in- 
curred by the firms and would not, in 
our view, be compatible with interna- . 
tional standards in this regard. 

• The old system of depletion 
allowances available to all has been 
replaced by the petroleum incentives 
program. Under this program the level 
of Canadian ownership determines the; 
amount of exploration grants awarded 
to a company, with the maximum gran 
awarded to companies with Canadian - 
ownership of 65% or higher. 

• The Committee on Industrial an; 
Regional Benefits has as its objective I 
creasing the participation of Canadian 
firms in major projects and increasing 
procurement of Canadian goods and 
services in the energy sector. The oper 
tions of the committee may be in confli 
with the provisions of the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 

• The Canadian Government may 
take nationality into account in future 
natural gas export decisions. 

We have had numerous consulta- 
tions with the Canadians on the nation 
energy program — in Ottawa at the 
economic summit, here in Washington, 
last month in Grand Rapids, and last 
week when Secretary [of the Treasury 
Donald T.] Regan went to Ottawa. We 
have been joined by other nations in e> 
pressing concern over the national 
energy program in the OECD, where v 
have formally initiated discussion of 
those elements of the program which 
are regarded as derogations from 
national treatment. 


Department of State Bullet 


reign Investment Review Agency 

? Foreign Investment Review Agency 
RA) is a screening agency which 
ct'ully monitors incoming invest- 
nts. We have not challenged FIRA's 
stence of its basic premise— to review 
rard investment— although we and 
lada itself acknowledge it as an ex- 
tion to the national treatment prin- 
!e. Our problems center on its opera- 

First, in judging an application by a 
iign investor, FIRA applies a vague 
idard— whether there is significant 
efit to Canada. 

Second, because of the way FIRA 
n operates, its very existence un- 
ibtedly discourages many would-be in- 
itors. In many cases the FIRA ex- 
cts "undertakings" from prospective 
estors before approving an invest- 
nt proposal. These are legally en- 
ceable agreements, or performance 
uirements, and take the form of 
rket-distorting Canadian sourcing re- 
rements, export commitments, im- 
1 restrictions, requirements to hire 
cified levels of Canadian manage- 
nt and labor, obligations to more pro- 
:tive facilities from the United States 
Canada, obligations to transfer 
ents and know-how to Canada with- 
charge, and other commitments 
ich run counter to generally accepted 
;rnational practices. These measure- 
nts have potentially serious distorting 
icts on investment and trade flow 
ween the United States and Canada. 

Though FIRA is essentially aimed at 
v investment, it also reviews changes 
>wnership of Canadian subsidiaries of 
sign firms, even when the changes 
r e no impact on Canada. This could 
ur when two American firms merge 
tvhen an American firm wishes to sell 
Canadian subsidiary to another non- 
ladian firm. These transfers are fre- 
ntly disapproved by FIRA, even in 
lations where there is no change in 

level of Canadian ownership. This 
iA policy has the effect of depressing 

value of U.S. firms' assets in 

As with the national energy pro- 
m, we have had many discussions 

with the Canadian Government on 
FIRA. We intend to continue the con- 
sultative process and to assist those U.S. 
firms which are adversely and unfairly 
affected by FIRA's operations. 

There have been some recent re- 
ports that Ottawa is not now pressing 
earlier proposals for expanding FIRA's 
mandate to review and monitor already 
established foreign investments in 
Canada. This is certainly a positive 
development, because such an expansion 
of FIRA's mandate would have been a 
serious new derogation from interna- 
tional norms. We also understand that 
the FIRA is considering adopting a 
policy of more explicitness and openness 
in its decisionmaking process, in par- 
ticular, giving the reasons for disap- 
provals. This would also be a positive 

We are now engaged in an extensive 
effort to obtain information on in- 
dividual companies' experiences with 
FIRA. Once we have a firm basis to 
present our views to Ottawa and, 
possibly, to international organizations 
which oversee investment matters, we 
can be more specific with respect to 
FIRA. We must, of course, avoid 
jeopardizing individual companies' rela- 
tions with Canada, and thus the fact- 
finding process is very difficult. 

U.S. Response to Canadian Policies 

The rising concern in the United States 
regarding discriminatory Canadian in- 
vestment and trade policies has engen- 
dered a wide-ranging and, at times, . 
vociferous debate on how we should re- 
spond. The concerns over Canadian in- 
vestment policies expressed here in Con- 
gress and by U.S. business and labor 
groups are valid, and we share them. 
Several pieces of legislation have been 
introduced in Congress. Various pro- 
posals call for restrictions on investment 
in specific sectors, greater screening of 
foreign investment, and similar meas- 
ures which endeavor to establish 
reciprocity or to retaliate. 

There are major risks in using the 
Canadian measures as a rationale to im- 
pose restrictions on inward investment 
in the United States. We should proceed 
cautiously in adopting restrictive policies 
as retaliatory measures. 

First, such measures might adversely 
affect broader U.S. interests. We should 
not reject the jobs, new technology, and 
management skills that foreign invest- 
ment here can supply. 

Second, the United States is a large 

investor abroad and a major force in in- 
ternational trade. We have an important 
interest in maintaining maximum free- 
dom of investment and capital flows in 
the world economy. U.S. economic 
policies have a major impact on those of 
other countries, and we do not want to 
send the wrong signal to others about 
our intentions or to give others a peg on 
which to hand their own interest in 
discriminatory measures. 

Third, we want to insure that our 
response is appropriate, consistent with 
international norms, and effective. We 
are clearly being served by policies that 
strive to eliminate foreign practices that 
depart from desirable international 
norms than by policies of retaliation 
which could weaken these norms. Our 
response to date has included bilateral 
and multilateral elements. 

Bilateral Elements 

Although some elements of the national 
energy program have been implemented 
by the Canadian Government, the pro- 
gram has not yet been formally enacted. 
There remains an opportunity, there- 
fore, to continue the consultative proc- 
ess and to avoid further discrimination. 
Also, as I indicated, the Canadian Gov- 
ernment has recently not been pressing 
for an extension of FIRA's mandate. We 
need to convince the Canadian Govern- 
ment that it is in our mutual interest to 
moderate those aspects of FIRA's policy 
and operations which discriminate 
against foreign firms. 

As I mentioned earlier, we have met 
with Canadian officials on several occa- 
sions to enumerate our concerns on the 
national energy program and on FIRA. 

Multilateral Elements 

We invoked the consultation provisions 
of the OECD investment declaration in 
March 1980. In an initial discussion, a 
significant number of OECD members 
joined us in questioning Canada about 
the intent of its policies, asking 
specifically how they related to the 1976 
decision and a subsequent decision taken 
in 1979 to extend, not contract, the 
national treatment principle. Further 
discussion is scheduled in the OECD In- 
vestment Committee in December. 
Moreover, we see the Canadian 

uary 1982 



measures as part of an emerging pat- 
tern of investment restrictions, concen- 
trated largely in the newly industrial- 
izing countries but finding echoes in one 
or two OECD countries in addition to 
Canada. In order to limit this pattern, 
the United States has sought inter- 
national discussion of a number of in- 
vestment issues, notably national treat- 
ment and imposition of performance re- 
quirements similar to those required by 
FIRA in a number of organizations, in- 
cluding the World Bank, the GATT, and 
the OECD itself. Most recently, at a 
special meeting in the OECD on October 
12-13, we won the agreement of other 
participants to reinvigorate the organ- 
ization's work on investment focusing on 
the general issues I have discussed this 

Finally, we are cooperating with the 
Interior Department in their review of 
Canada's status as a reciprocal country 
under the terms of the Mineral Lands 
Leasing Act of 1920. In that review, the 
criteria and procedures must not only be 
applicable to the current policies of 
Canada but also be applicable to other 
countries, whether or not currently 
deemed reciprocal. We have recently 
given Interior our detailed views on 
how a decision on reciprocity might be 

In conclusion, I want to assure you 
that the State Department fully shares 
the repeatedly expressed view that U.S. 
investors abroad should receive the 
same fair and nondiscriminatory treat- 
ment that we accord to foreign investors 
here. For our part, we intend to work 
toward that goal and to make every ef- 
fort to achieve a balanced and mutually 
beneficial trade and investment relation- 
ship with our Canadian neighbor. We ex- 
pect to work closely with Congress to 
achieve this goal. 

Voluntary International 
Guidelines on Antitrust 

•The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 

The Conference on Restrictive 
Business Practices completed negotiation 
of a set of principles and rules for the 
control of restrictive business practices 
in April 1980, and the recommendations 
were adopted by the U.N. General 
Assembly in December 1980. In the 
following joint letter of November 9, 
1981, the Departments of State and 
Justice announced and explained these 
guidelines to American businessmen and 
other interested parties. 

On December 5, 1980, the United Nations 
General Assembly adopted the Set of Multi- 
laterally Agreed Equitable Principles and 
Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business 
Practices. The Principles and Rules are a set 
of recommendations for governments and 
enterprises to consider in dealing with re- 
strictive business practices and promoting 
competition. In the United States these sub- 
jects are dealt with under the antitrust laws. 
A copy of the text itself and interpretive "Q's 
and A's" prepared by the Department of 
State and Justice are attached for your infor- 

Several important elements of the Prin- 
ciples and Rules are summarized below: 

• The recommendations contained in the 
Principles and Rules are not legally binding 
on governments or enterprises, nor do they 
alter existing concepts of jurisdiction; 

• The Principles and Rules do not 
displace or change the U.S. antitrust laws, or 
those of any other country, unless they are 
incorporated in that country's national law; 

• The Principles and Rules apply equally 
to all enterprises, whether privately or state- 

• Governments are urged to ensure 
treatment of enterprises which is "fair, 
equitable, on the same basis to all enter- 
prises, and in accordance with established 
procedures of law," meaning that both 
foreign and domestic enterprises are to be 
treated in the same manner; 

• Except under certain circumstances, 
the Principles and Rules do not call into ques- 
tion normally legitimate intracorporate prac- 
tices, such as between parent and subsidiary 

• An Intergovernmental Group of Ex- 
perts is created which has specific functions 
involving research and multilateral consulta- 
tion on the use and implementation of the 
Principles and Rules. It is prohibited from 
acting like a tribunal or otherwise passing 
judgment on the enterprises in connection 
with specific business transactions. It will 
assist in organizing technical assistance, ad- 
visory and training programs on restrictive 

business practices, particularly for developi 

The U.S. Government participated acth 
ly in the negotiations leading to the agreed 
text. We believe that the recommendations 
contains will contribute to a freer and faire 
more open and competitive international 
trading environment. Accordingly, the U.S. 
Government commends the provisions of th 
Principles and Rules to all U.S. enterprises 
representing a multilaterally-agreed set of 
voluntary guidelines in the antitrust field. I 
should be noted that the Principles and Rul 
are not a Treaty or Executive Agreement 
and are not legally binding. 

The U.S. Government closely consulted 
with private sector representatives through 
out the negotiation of the Principles and 
Rules to ensure that they were fair and 
balanced. We continue to welcome commen, 
on the use, citation and application of the 
Principles and Rules by enterprises and 
foreign governments. 


Robert D. Hormats 
Assistant Secretary for 
Economic and Business Affair 
Department of State 

William F. Baxter 
Assistant Attorney General 
Antitrust Division 
Department of Justice 

David R. Robinson 
The Legal Adviser 
Department of State 

Questions and Answers Regarding the 
U.N. Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Set 
of Principles and Rules for the Control o 
Restrictive Business Practices 

Q. What is the set of U.N. Principles 
and Rules for the Control of Restrictive 
Business Practices? 

A. The principles and rules were negot 
ated by U.N. conferences meeting in Genev 
in 1979 and 1980; they were adopted 
unanimously as a recommendation by the 
U.N. General Assembly on December 5, 19. 
The U.S. Government participated actively 
these negotiations and endorsed their adop 
tion by the General Assembly. The principl 
and rules are intended to set forth an inter 
national consensus concerning restrictive 
business practices, which generally include, 
but are not limited to, practices prohibited 
U.S. antitrust law. In the view of the U.S. 
Government, the principles and rules are 
compatible with our own laws. 

Q. To whom are the principles and 
rules addressed? 


Department of State Bullet 


A. The principles and rules are recoin- 
ndations addressed primarily to member 
tes of the United Nations. However, they 

also addressed to the U.N. Secretariat, 
•ticularly the Secretariat of the U.N. Con- 
ence on Trade and Development 
*>ICTAD) in Geneva, which is to carry on 
litional technical work in this field. Lastly, 
y are addressed through states to all 
erprises engaged in international com- 
rce, whether state owned, privately 
ned, or hybrid. All enterprises are "encour- 
;d" to act consistently with the principles 
1 rules dealing with enterprise conduct. 

Q. What is the legal status of the prin- 
ks and rules? 

A. The principles and rules are not legal- 
)inding; that is, they are neither a treaty 
■ an Executive agreement. Rather, they 

recommendations for voluntary behavior 
Iressed to government [referred to as 
ites" in the principles and rules and here- 
sr in these questions and answers] and 
;sed on to enterprises. Of course, they may 
incorporated into national legislation, par- 
llarly by developing countries which do not 

have an antitrust law. 

Q. How does the U.S. Government 
w the principles and rules? 

A. The United States participated active- 
n the years of negotiations preceding their 
>ption by the U.N. General Assembly, 
jir broad purpose — to reduce restraints of 
de by private and state enterprises — is 
ipatible with general U.S. policy in the 
d of international trade and, thus, comple- 
nts the latest round of negotiations under 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
ich contributed toward minimizing govern- 
nt trade and tariff restrictions. 

The United States believes that the prin- 
les and rules, embodying procompetitive, 
e market concepts can help in promoting 
• competition in international trade. The 
ommendations contained in the principles 
I rules should provide a common inter- 
ional framework for enhancing the ability 
ill countries, particularly developing coun- 
ts, to deal with restrictive business prac- 


The principles and rules provide certain 
delines for states in their control of 
trictive business practices (detailed in 
eral sections which follow) which should 
^f value to U.S. businesses in their rela- 
is with foreign governments. 

Q. What are the primary recommenda- 
is for states? 

A. States are urged to adopt or 
sngthen their domestic antitrust laws; to 
perate with other states as to enforcement 
ons and the exchange of information; to 
secute offenses within their competence 
: are injurious to international trade and 
elopment; to treat all enterprises fairly, 
itably, and on the same basis; and to pro- 
. the confidentiality of trade secrets ob- 
>ed by their authorities during antitrust in- 

Q. What are the primary recommenda- 
tions which states are asked to make to 

A. States are urged to recommend that 
enterprises comply with antitrust rules and 
policies of the countries in which they 
operate. Enterprises should be willing to con- 
sult with antitrust officials in such countries 
and to provide necessary information. Enter- 
prises should avoid cartel agreements with 
rival firms (recognizing that firms under com- 
mon control are not rivals and taking into ac- 
count any acceptance of cartel practices 
under applicable national law or intergovern- 
mental agreements) in accordance with the 
provisions of Sections D(3) and B(9). They 
should also not abuse a dominant position of 
market power when the enterprise is in a 
position by itself or acting together with a 
few other enterprises to control the relevant 
market for particular goods or services in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 

Q. How do the principles and rules 
affect relations between a parent firm and 
its foreign subsidiary? 

A. Section B(3) of the principles and 
rules includes within the meaning of "enter- 
prises," ". . . their branches, subsidiaries, 
affiliates, or other entities directly or indirect- 
ly controlled by them." Sections D(3) and 
D(4), referring to vertical and horizontal 
abuses, generally allow normal intraenter- 
prise relations to be carried on without con- 
cern that such behavior might constitute 
restrictive business practices. Section D(3) 
excludes from its listing of harmful effects 
those which might arise when enterprises 
deal with each other ". . . in the context of an 
economic relationship wherein they are under 
common control. ..." Section D(4) includes 
what has been termed a "rule of reason" foot- 
note which enumerates four factors to ex- 
amine in judging whether acts or behavior 
are abusive or not. One of these, factor (a), 
provides that certain acts are generally not 
abusive if they are "appropriate in the light 
of the organizational, managerial and legal 
relationship among the enterprises con- 
cerned, such as in the context of relations 
within an economic entity and not having re- 
strictive effects outside the related enter- 
prises." The purpose of the last clause is to 
provide the additional test of effect outside of 
the parent-subsidiary relationships; that is, if 
a practice limits access to markets or other- 
wise unduly restrains competition outside of 
the related enterprises, it may fall within 
those discouraged under Section D(4). 

Q. Are foreign firms treated differently 
than domestic ones? 

A. Although transnational enterprises 
are referred to generally at several places in 
the text, Section E(3) explicitly deals with the 
subject of how states, in their control of 
restrictive business practices, should treat 
enterprises. States are called upon to ". . . en- 
sure treatment of enterprises which is fair, 
equitable, on the same basis to all enter- 
prises, and in accordance with established 
procedures of law." In addition, such "laws 

and regulations should be publicly and readily 

Section C(7) deals with the issue of 
"preferential or differential treatment for 
developing countries." The section provides 
that states, particularly developed countries, 
should take into account the development, 
financial, and trade needs of developing coun- 
tries in their control of restrictive business 

Q. Does the mode of ownership of an 
enterprise affect how it is treated under 
the principles and rules? 

A. No. The principles and rules define 
enterprises as "firms, partnerships, corpora- 
tions, companies, other associations, natural 
or juridical persons, or any combination 
thereof, irrespective of the mode of creation 
or control or ownership, private or State, 
which are engaged in commercial 
activities. . . ." (see Section B(3)). Thus, all 
commercial enterprises are covered by the 
recommendations of the principles and rules. 

Q. What future action can be expected 
by the United Nations in this field? 

A. The principles and rules establish an 
intergovernmental group of experts that will 
meet under UNCTAD auspices in Geneva 
once a year. The functions of the intergovern- 
mental group are specified in Section G(ii). 
The experts are prohibited from sitting in 
judgment on the behavior of any individual 
enterprises or governments in connection 
with a specific business transaction. 

The United Nations is to publish an an- 
nual report on antitrust developments, based 
on annual reports from all nations active in 
this field. A compendium of all antitrust laws 
in force is to be published, studies and con- 
ferences are to be arranged, and the experts 
are to help in developing a technical assist- 
ance program for developing countries. If 
asked, UNCTAD will provide conference 
facilities for nations wishing to have private 
consultations on antitrust issues of common 
concern. Lastly, the United Nations is to con- 
vene a review conference in 1985 to re- 
examine the principles and rules and their 
operation. The U.S. Government anticipates 
active participation in the review conference 
as well as the meetings of the intergovern- 
mental group of experts. 

Q. To whom in the U.S. Government 
should inquiries concerning the principles 
and rules be addressed? 

A. Inquiries, as well as information with 
regard to the use, citation and application of 
the principles and rules by enterprises and 
foreign governments, are welcome. They 
should be addressed to the Director of the 
Office of Business Practices, Bureau of 
Economic and Business Affairs, or to the 
Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic and 
Business Affairs, of the U.S. Department of 
State, Washington, D.C., 20520, 
(202)632-1486 and (202)632-0242, respective- 
ly, or to the Chief, Foreign Commerce Sec- 
tion, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of 
Justice, Washington, D.C., 20530, 
(202)633-2464. ■ 

jary 1982 



Preserving Western Independence 
and Security 

by Lawrence S. Eagleburger 

Address before the North Atlantic 
Assembly in Munich, West Germany, on 
October 15, 1981. Ambassador 
Eagleburger is Assistant Secretary for 
European Affairs. 

We Americans watch with interest 
and— let us admit it— some apprehen- 
sion, as Western Europeans increasingly 
focus on the complex and emotional 
issue of nuclear weapons and their 
deployment in Europe. We watch with a 
good deal of sympathy since there can 
be no question about the profound im- 
portance of avoiding nuclear catas- 
trophe. All previous human tragedies 
would pale by comparison with the total 
devastation a third world war would 
bring. Neither the plagues of the Middle 
Ages, nor the terrible trench warfare of 
the First World War, nor even the 40 
million deaths in World War II approach 
the death and destruction which a 
nuclear holocaust would bring in its 

Precisely because the prevention of 
nuclear war is so terribly important, we 
are concerned about pressures— some 
well intentioned, some not so well inten- 
tioned— to change a policy which has 
prevented war for over 30 years. Many 
of my countrymen wonder whether the 
debate now taking place here is a funda- 
mental challenge to the principles which 
have guided us for over 30 years or a 
discussion about tactics, accompanied by 
an acceptance of most of the traditional 
premises about Western security. 

While the debate is, as it should be, 
fundamentally between and among 
Europeans, we Americans cannot re- 
main totally aloof from it. America's 
well-being— as well as Europe's— is at 
stake. In a most profound sense, you are 
discussing the security of the United 
States. Just as Americans were inex- 
tricably caught up in the first two World 
Wars on this Continent, so, now, the sur- 
vival and well-being of over 200 million 
Americans depends on the conclusions 
you reach. 

It seems to me that despite the com- 
plexity of the issues and the diversity of 
views, the debate of which I spoke is 
basically over two fundamentally differ- 
ent paths— paths which could profoundly 

affect the course of history through the 
end of this century and beyond. 

A number of Europeans are now 
arguing vigorously for a new approach 
to security. They do so for a variety of 
reasons. However, to this observer's 
eye, at least, those who espouse a new 
approach seem to agree on certain 
fundamentals. I don't want to over- 
simplify, but the central thrust of the 
argument seems to be that the West 
should now stress arms control more 
than defense programs in the search for 
security. Many also argue that we 
should pursue this process through 
gestures of unilateral goodwill, for ex- 
ample, by canceling such defense pro- 
grams as deployment of theater nuclear 
forces (TNF). And some go further to 
urge that Europe try to find a less 
dangerous middle ground between the 
two superpowers. 

Others in Europe argue for con- 
tinuity. They believe that war can best 
be deterred and independence preserved 
through adequate defense efforts. They 
believe arms control can only yield 
serious results if we proceed from a base 
of strength and confidence, and if we in- 
sist on equality. Finally, they believe 
Europe and America's fate must be inex- 
tricably linked, strategically and 

Let me say at once that I under- 
stand the concerns of at least some of 
those who argue for a change in the 
West's approach. For 30 years— until the 
mid-1970s— most Europeans were con- 
vinced that the United States was a 
world power without peer and that it 
would, in a crunch, defend Europe be- 
cause it was in its self-interest to do so. 
U.S. inability to bring the war in Viet- 
nam to a successful conclusion, our in- 
ternal torment over Watergate and 
subsequent paralysis in Angola, 
Ethiopia, and Afghanistan, culminating 
with the year-long agony of the hostage 
crisis in Iran, have undermined that 
confidence. Thus some wonder not only 
about our military power but also 
whether, in some profound way, we 
have lost the will to withstand the 
Soviet Union even if we have the power 
to do so. 

Now, ironically, from some of the 
same sources, we see a concern that 
United States may overdo its efforts to 

restore its military power and face up 
Soviet challenges. These concerns, in 
combination, have produced a view- 
popular among some— that the United 
States would be all too ready to get ir 
a war yet bent on confining it to 
Europe. The result is a mixture of fea 
and wishful thinking. 

• Fear of the Soviet Union as an j 
gressive, imperialist power intent on i 
posing its will on Europe. Fear of an 
ratic, unpredictable United States wh\ 
might, through accident, weakness, 
overconfidence, or unnecessary confrc 
tation precipitate a nuclear war in its 
vacillating and disjointed efforts to ha' 
Soviet expansion. And finally fear tha 
both powers would share an interest i 
limiting war to Europe, thus further 
reducing the inhibitation on confronta 

• And wishful thinking that some 
how through demonstrations of goodv 
toward the Soviet Union, even if dis- 
tancing itself from the United States, 
Europe can create a more secure en- 
vironment for itself. 

The central problem with this ap-, 
proach is that it ignores critical realiti 
about both the Soviet Union and the 
United States. With regard to the So 1 ! 
Union, let us look at the record compi 
during the late 1960s and the 1970s, 
period of detente— a period in which 
there was supposed to have been mut 
restraint. , 


• The United States abolished th< 
draft, reduced the size of its armed 
forces, and decreased its real military 
spending. The Soviets increased their 
military forces by one-third— to 4.8 
million men, more than double that of 
the United States— and expanded thei 
real military spending by more than 
50%. Are those gestures of goodwill? 

• The Soviets increased their inv< 
tory of tanks to some 50,000, compar 
to just 11,000 American tanks. They 
transformed their navy from a coasta 
defense force to an open ocean fleet, i 
creasing the number of large surface 
combatants by 40%, just as the Unite 
States decreased the number of ships 
its fleet by 40%. Is that reciprocity? 

• During a period when NATO 
deployed no new long-range theater 
nuclear forces, the Soviet Union 
deployed over 750 warheads on their 
new SS-20 missiles. And the Soviets 
creased their strategic nuclear deliver 
vehicles nearly 600%. Is that restrain 

• As countries and whole confine 
were liberated from the yoke of West 


Department of State Bulle 


mialism, the Soviet Union and its 
xies moved in with new forms of im- 
ialism and intervention— Vietnam in- 
Campuchea and Laos, the Soviet 
on into Afghanistan, Cuba into 
ica and Latin America. While the 
st has endeavored to meet the real 
ds of the developing countries 
)ugh food, loans, and other economic 
stance, the Soviets have concen- 
;ed on exports of weapons and Marx- 
Leninist regimes— which in turn have 
ven disastrous failures in meeting the 
stical needs of their people. Is this a 
tribution to development and 

• As the West is swept by anti- 
jnse and antinuclear demonstrations, 
Soviet Union exposes its own people 
. massive display of military films 

propaganda and represses any 
lie expression of concern about the 
t sums devoted to a military buildup. 
:n as the Federal Republic of Ger- 
ly demonstrates its genuine goodwill 
humanitarianism throughout the 
Id, the German Democratic Republic 
iches peace in the West, seeks to 
ice inter-German contacts, directs a 
:ade of shrill propaganda against 
ralization in neighboring Poland, and 
;es its most particular export to the 
eloping countries training in the tac- 
of the secret police. Is that the spirit 

• While the West endeavors to cope 
1 the overwhelming human tragedy 
ome 10 million refugees from op- 
ssive Communist regimes in Viet- 

1, Kampuchea, Laos, Afghanistan, 

iopia, and Cuba, the Soviets and 

r allies create still more refugees and 

)lve themselves of any responsibility 

their care. Is this concern for 


Not only have the Soviets failed to 

procate the self-restraint and 

itive efforts of the West, they have 

i shown open disregard for solemn in- 

lational agreements. 

• They have failed to live up to 
er the security or human rights 
Iges of the Helsinki Final Act, even 
;sting a group trying to monitor 

iet compliance with the Helsinki ac- 

• They may well have violated the 
eva protocol and the Biological 
ipons Convention. 

• They and their proxies have used 
e in blatant contempt of the U.N. 
rter itself. 

If an approach based on fear and 
lful thinking ignores critical facts 

about the Soviet Union, is this approach 
forced on Europe because of a perma- 
nent change in the United States? Is 
Europe condemned to a policy of ap- 
peasement because of some new struc- 
tural fault in American strength and 
will? I urge you to look across the Atlan- 
tic for your answer. 

The spirit of the American people 
has revived. As President Reagan said 
in his speech at West Point in May, 
America's era of self-doubt is now 

While the West has 
endeavored to meet the 
real needs of the 

countries . . . the Soviets 
have concentrated on ex- 
ports of weapons and 
regimes. . . . 

behind us. We, too, had hoped that the 
Soviets were prepared to reciprocate our 
restraint with restraint of their own. 
Their proven unwillingness to do so has 
left us no choice but to increase substan- 
tially our defense spending to match the 
Soviet effort and to reinvigorate our 
efforts to resolve critical crises through 
peaceful means. We have the will and 
the resources to do so. 

Most fundamentally the United 
States rejects the idea that there is no 
alternative between surrender of our in- 
dependence and nuclear confrontation. 
We have a clear vision of what the 
future requires. It proceeds from the 
principles which have served the Atlan- 
tic alliance so well for over 30 years. 

During this period, we witnessed 
over 150 wars in other parts of the 
world. This was a time when Europe 
faced an ever more heavily armed 
hostile power in close proximity. We 
must ask ourselves: How was peace 
secured? How has it been maintained? 

In the middle of the 20th century 
the ever-quickening pace of conflict in 
Europe was brought to a halt by an 
alliance based on two qualities— shared 
values and a recognition that our securi- 
ty was inextricably linked. Each quality 
strengthens the other. Our commitment 

to one another's security is all the more 
real and lasting because we stand for— 
and would fight for— common values. 
Our values are all the more precious be- 
cause those who would threaten us 
display utter contempt for our concept 
of society and the individual. 

Just as Secretary Haig, in his recent 
Berlin speech, called for rededication to 
our shared values, we must also return 
to first principles with regard to our 
security. Amidst the controversies of the 
day— TNF, Poland, defense budgets, 
Southwest Asia— we all tend to lose 
sight of the foundation of our security. 
In fact, we cannot hope to overcome to- 
day's problems unless our policies are 
built firmly on that foundation. 

The Foundation of Peace 

Five principles have guaranteed peace in 
Europe over the past three decades. If 
we stand by them, they can continue to 
do so through the end of this century 
and beyond. 

First, alliance security is indivisible. 

Second, our strategy is to deter war 
at any level. 

Third, the burdens of our alliance 
must be shared. 

Fourth, we must negotiate from a 
basis of equality, confidence, and 

Fifth, our political independence re- 
quires that we sustain a military 

Let me examine each of these tradi- 
tional principles in today's context. 

Our first principle is the in- 
divisibility of alliance security. Who- 
ever threatens one of us threatens all. 
This has been and remains the source of 
our collective strength. 

Can anyone really deny that the 
strategic arsenal of the United States is 
the ultimate guarantor of European 
security? Although trends in strategic 
capabilities have favored the Soviets in 
recent years, we now are taking steps to 
maintain a versatile and viable strategic 
force that will continue to command 
Moscow's respect. That is the meaning 
of the comprehensive program an- 
nounced by President Reagan earlier 
this month. 

To form a bridge to America's 
strategic forces, the alliance must imple- 
ment the December 1979 decision to 
modernize its theater nuclear forces. 
The placement of modernized U.S. 
nuclear systems in Europe is a response 

jary 1982 



to allied concerns that the Soviet Union 
is creating the means to devastate or in- 
timidate Europe with theater nuclear 
weapons while holding the United States 
at bay with its strategic forces. TNF 
modernization will end Soviet hopes of 
regionalizing a nuclear conflict based on 
an ability to strike the European allies 
from a Russian sanctuary. 

The essential idea behind TNF 
modernization— like that behind the 
maintenance of 300,000 American 
soldiers in Europe— is to remove any 
doubt the Soviets might have about the 
U.S. strategic commitment to NATO. 
The Soviets have no higher goal than 
undoing the December 1979 decision, 
leaving themselves with an undeterred 
capability to wage or threaten nuclear 
war in Europe. While we welcome 
debate about TNF, opponents must face 
up to the fact that the strategic link that 
has helped bring peace and stability to 
Europe would be severely strained if 
they had their way. 

The Soviets neither understand nor 
accept that indivisibility of our security. 
They do not see why the United States 
is unwilling to draw a clear distinction 
between its security and that of its 
allies— the former sacred, the latter ex- 
pendable. They are surprised that 
Americans are no less alarmed than 
Europeans by the SS-20, a system 
specifically designed to threaten Europe 
but not the United States. Indeed, in re- 
cent months senior Soviet officials have 
said flatly to us that U.S. forces in 
Europe that could strike the Soviet 
Union from Europe could not be equated 
with Soviet forces than can only strike 
the European allies. We, in turn, have 
told them bluntly that the Soviet nuclear 
threat to America's allies is a threat to 
America itself. 

The second principle which has 
sustained peace for 30 years is that 
the aim of our strategy is to deter 
war. Ours is a strictly defensive alliance. 
We have everything to lose and nothing 
to gain from war. Our strategy is defen- 
sive, our equipment is defensive, our 
forces train solely to defend. In contrast, 
the Soviets train, plan, and are equipped 
to thrust into Western Europe. Their 
50,000 tanks are hardly necessary to de- 
fend against NATO forces whose only 
mission is to safeguard our own ter- 

Throughout the postwar period, 
NATO has chosen to rely on a strategy 
of flexible response to deter aggression. 
Knowing that our conventional forces 
might be insufficient to withstand an 

onslaught from larger Soviet forces, we 
have depended heavily on nuclear deter- 
rence. We have always known that the 
best way to avoid nuclear war was to 
close the gap in conventional forces. To- 
day that gap is still serious. But where 
is the support for improved conventional 
forces from those who seem so con- 
cerned about nuclear war? 

Increasingly one hears criticism in 
Europe of the so-called warfighting doc- 
trine of the United States. This criticism 
is more vocal, I might add, than that 
directed against Soviet warfighting doc- 
trine, the object of which is the very 
European territory Americans would die 
to defend. Having forces trained and 
equipped for combat hardly implies that 
the horror of war is being ignored. Hav- 
ing nuclear weapons that are secure, 
survivable, modern, and capable of 
destroying targets valued by the adver- 
sary hardly suggests that the decision to 
use such weapons would be any less 
grave. Indeed, possessing the means to 
hold Soviet territory at risk is the only 
way to convince the Soviets that war- 
fighting is fraught with danger for them. 

I hear time and again that the 
United States is increasing the stockpile 
of nuclear weapons in Europe in order 
to wage nuclear war here, while in- 
sulating the United States itself from 
nuclear holocaust. That disgusting claim 
ignores the several hundreds of thous- 
ands of American troops stationed in 
Europe who would also be victims of 
such a conflict. It also ignores some 
fundamental facts. I can understand con- 
cern with the numbers of nuclear 
weapons on this Continent. But I never 
hear reference to the fact that last year 
the United States withdrew 1,000 
nuclear weapons from Europe without 
replacement. Moreover, those that we 
are deploying as a result of the 
December 1979 TNF decision are not 
battlefield weapons at all and, in fact, 
will replace weapons now in Europe. 
The United States is thus reducing the 
number of nuclear weapons in Europe. 

Our third principle is that the 
burdens of our alliance should be 
shared. This is an inescapable con- 
sequence of the first two principles. Just 
as each ally benefits from the security 
that results from a collective commit- 
ment and from deterrence, so must each 
uphold its responsibilities to the common 
defense effort. This is a practical imper- 
ative as much as a moral duty. So great 
is the threat that we cannot safely do 

without the efforts and resources of any 
ally, no matter its size. Nor can we ask 
some nations to bear disproportionate 
risks while all expect to share in the 
benefits of credible deterrence. 

Indeed, the thought that any of us, 
on a national basis, can elude the risks 
of our dangerous world is an illusion. If 
deterrence fails, none can hope to be 
spared, least of all my own country. 
While policies differ among various allie 
on the question of peacetime deploymen 
of nuclear weapons, neither the risks w< 
face nor the shelter of deterrence make: 
such distinctions. Those who do not hav 
nuclear deterrent forces on their terri- 
tory owe their security, in large 
measure, to those who do. None could I 
escape the devastation of a nuclear war/ 
whether they have nuclear weapons on I 
their soil or not. An ally can opt out of | 
its deterrent responsibilities only at a 
cost to the security of its allies and 
itself. Sharing risks reduces risks. At 
the Rome ministerial meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council last May, alliano 
members acknowledged the danger we 
face and committed themselves to make 
available whatever it takes to restore a , 
military balance. 

The burden of defense is heavy on ( 
the shoulder of our peoples, especially ii 
these times of economic trouble. No one 
feels this weight more than my own 
countrymen— who have consistently 
devoted a higher share of their gross na 
tional product to defense than other 
NATO countries. In recent years we 
more than others but less than is 
necessary. President Reagan now has 
reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to a 
major increased effort to rebuild our 
military strength, while cutting painfull] 
into nondefense programs in order to 
restore national economic health. 

We know European leaders are well 
aware of the gap that must be filled by 
increased defense spending. We urge 
our European friends to make even 
greater efforts to generate the necessar 
funding. The underlying strength of 
your economies certainly makes this 
economically possible if there is suffi- 
cient political will. 

The serious challenge to alliance 
security in Southwest Asia has added 
another dimension to the principle of 
shared responsibilities; 51% of Europe's 
oil comes from the Persian Gulf, a 
region facing internal stresses and a 
growing Soviet threat. Even though 
only 12% of America's oil comes from 
the gulf, the United States has accepted 



Department of State Bulletir 


>ecial responsibility to meet this 
llenge and is strengthening its 
abilities to protect vital Western in- 
;sts in that region. 
There is no lack of opportunity for 
allies to join the effort: Some can in- 
ise their own deployments to the 
l] some can support the transit of 
. forces sent to Southwest Asia; and 
le can increase their assistance for 
key and others directly menaced by 

The fourth principle of our securi- 
s our desire for serious arms con- 
negotiations combined with our 
ignition that results will only come 
/e negotiate from a basis of equali- 
strength, and confidence. The 
lence for this proposition is over- 
:lming. The alliance's decision to 
lernize its theater nuclear forces 
sed the Soviets to reverse their 
isal to negotiate and for the first 
i to offer limits on their own theater 
:es. Let me repeat this. The Soviets 
lid not even agree to negotiate until 
decided to move ahead with our own 
loyments. We now face a hard and 
bably lengthy negotiation. The pros- 
ts for success depend, above all, on 
:ther the Soviets believe us when we 
that our program can be affected 
i as a result of an equal and 
Sable arms control agreement. 
Ironically, the real enemies of arms 
trol are those who often are the 
iest in its support. Those who under- 
e the common commitment to both 
:ks of TNF, in fact, are undermining 
hope of success in arms control, 
re is an inescapable logic to this posi- 
i which no amount of rhetoric can 

My government is applying to 
itegic arms limitations the same com- 
ing approach that the alliance 
pted with respect to TNF. We are in- 
mg that our strategic programs give 
i solid base from which to negotiate 
ous reductions. President Reagan is 
imitted to significant strategic arms 
uctions; we hope to be able to begin 
otiations sometime during the first 
: of next year. We don't want 
egulated competition. But the Soviets 
st be convinced— and I think are be- 
convinced— that Americans have the 
)lve to reverse the trends that have 
sred the Soviet Union for more than 
scade and to establish an overall 
The principle of negotiation from 

confidence, unity, and strength also has 
been vividly demonstrated in the Madrid 
CSCE [Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe] follow-on 
meeting. Through cohesion, firmness, 
patience, and a strong negotiating posi- 
tion, we have brought the Soviets some 
distance toward our proposals for a 
meaningful European disarmament con- 
ference and an equally significant out- 
come on human rights. For example, 
they have come closer to agreeing that 
confidence-building measures should 
apply to Soviet territory up to the Urals 
and thus to all of Europe. This would be 
a development of historic political impor- 
tance and substantial benefit to our 
security. If, in the end, the Soviets 
refuse, they will in effect be saying that 
their part of Europe should be exempt 
from the rules they would apply to the 
rest of the Continent. Since the Soviet 
Union is the threat to European securi- 
ty, the need for confidence-building 
measures is nowhere greater than on 
Soviet territory. The only way to get the 
Soviets committed to a European disar- 
mament conference genuinely aimed at 
enhancing security is to convince them 
that we won't agree to a conference 
without such a mandate nor to an out- 
come in Madrid which slights human 

The Harmel report of 1976 pro- 
claimed that military security is "the 

. . . the Soviets must be 
convinced . . . that 
Americans have the 
resolve to reverse the 
trends that have favored 
the Soviet Union for 
more than a decade and 
to establish an overall 

necessary condition for effective policies 
directed towards a greater relaxation of 
tensions." That observation was made 
when hopes were highest that the East 
could be brought to share our commit- 
ment to moderation and restraint. By 
the time of the Rome ministerial 
meeting, some 14 years after the 

Harmel report, hope had given way to 
disappointment and frustration. In the 
intervening period, growth in Soviet 
military capabilities was spectacular, 
while we in the West failed to heed 
Harmel's wise prescription. We have not 
abandoned the goal of constructive rela- 
tions with the East, but we must now 
realize that we haven't given the Soviets 
enough incentive to pursue this same 

The fifth principle which must con- 
tinue to guide us is the inextricable 
linkage between sustaining a military 
balance and our political indepen- 
dence. Deterrence has served us well, so 
well that the threat seems almost 
unreal— a receding memory for some, a 
distant abstraction for others. But it is 
worth noting that just a few months ago 
100,000 Soviet troops conducted a 
military exercise on Poland's borders at 
the very moment the Polish trade union, 
Solidarity, was meeting. The Helsinki 
Final Act forbids its signatories from 
threatening the use of force. It is clear 
that neither time nor the pledge of 
restraint has reduced the readiness of 
the Soviet leadership to use military 
power to influence political decisions. 
The 25th anniversary of the Hungarian 
revolution next week and the second an- 
niversary of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in December remind us of a 
single fact: The Soviet Union remains 
determined to dictate the destinies of 
other nations. 

As critical as the U.S. strategic com- 
mitment is for deterrence, it is no less 
important politically. The Soviet Union 
has long harbored the hope that the 
United States could be effectively re- 
moved from the European scene, leaving 
Soviet military supremacy as the 
backdrop of European politics. For 
European governments to take decisions 
under the threat of overwhelming Soviet 
military power would be paralyzing in 
peacetime, dangerous in a crisis, and 
fatal in a conflict. 

Nations which value their in- 
dependence must sustain the means to 
defend it. We cannot expect to maintain 
our freedom and democratic values 
through appeals to the goodwill of those 
who would suppress them. 

Agenda for the Future 

As I noted at the outset, we can apply 
these five principles to the future or we 
can change course in fundamental ways. 
If we decide to stay on course, our agen- 
da for the future will require effort and 
sacrifice. But it also will be full, rich, 

uary 1982 



and promising. Above all it will require 
that we move from principle to practice, 
that we take concrete steps to imple- 
ment our overall approach. Specifically it 
will mean: 

In defense, the United States must 
sustain the substantial program of con- 
ventional and nuclear force improve- 
ments we have launched. Our allies also 
must increase their defense contribution 
based on the pressing need to close ob- 
vious gaps. 

In arms control, we will begin TNF 
negotiations on November 30th, we will 
resume the CSCE discussions this 
month, and we expect to start strategic 
arms reduction talks in the first half of 
next year. By approaching this agenda 
from a basis of confidence and strength, 
we can work toward significant limita- 
tions and reductions. 

In areas of current or potential 
crisis, we can apply Western strength 
to building restraint and resolving prob- 
lems. Here too the agenda is rich: gain- 
ing independence for Namibia and 
security for an Angola free of outside 
forces, the restoration of independence 
and nonalignment for Afghanistan and 
Kampuchea, stability and growth for 
Central America, a permanent peace in 
the Middle East. We and other nations 
have made positive and practical pro- 
posals in each area, while the Soviet 
Union and its allies have encouraged in- 
transigence and tension. 

Our overall objective should be a 
new era in which all nations act with 
restraint and responsibility, in which 
change proceeds peacefully in a frame- 
work of internationally recognized 
norms and without damage to the vital 
interests of any nation. If we are wise, 
history is on our side. As the NATO 
ministers stated in their communique of 
May 5th: 

The more constructive East- West rela- 
tionship which the Allies seek requires tangi- 
ble signs that the Soviet Union is prepared to 
abandon the disturbing build-up of its mili- 
tary strength, to desist from resorting to 
force and intimidation and to cease creating 
or exploiting situations of crisis and instabili- 
ty in the Third World. 

With our balanced program designed 
to restore Western strength and to pro- 
ceed with positive arms control and 
other diplomatic initiatives, we can hope 
to bring about this greater Soviet 

The Situation in Poland 

Following is Secretary Haig's state- 
ment and question-and-answer session 
with news correspondents in Brussels, 
Belgium on December 13, 1981. 


I want to share with you today our in- 
formation on the Polish situation and ex- 
plain our approach on the evolving situa- 
tion there as we know it now. The facts 
are these: 

• Early this morning the Prime 
Minister announced that Polish security 
forces began "interning" Solidarity, dissi- 
dent and party leaders in Warsaw; we 
have reports that similar actions are be- 
ing taken in other Polish cities as well. 

• Simultaneously Polish communica- 
tions were cut within the country and 
with the outside world. 

• Polish security forces have been 
dispatched to key offices and facilities, 
including union headquarters. 

• Air traffic in and out of Poland 
has been restricted and, for the time be- 
ing, foreigners are not being permitted 
to enter the country. 

• In sum, what amounts to martial 
law has been instituted in Poland. 

Of course, we have no way of pre- 
dicting what the outcome of these 
developments will be. 

Our Charge in Warsaw has been 
assured by a senior Polish Foreign Office 
official, and there will be no return to 
the situation which existed in Poland 
prior to August 1980. That, you will 
recall, is when the Government agreed 

to accept major reforms under pressui 
from the Solidarity labor movement. C 
Charge was told by the Polish official 1 
day that reforms would continue. Thai 
of course, remains to be seen. 

Pending further information, it 
would be unwise to say too much at th 
time. Nevertheless, I must emphasize 
that we are seriously concerned about 
the decision to impose martial law; as 
we have said before, the political expe 
ment underway in Poland should be 
allowed to proceed unimpeded. The 
potential instabilities in Poland which 
could arise from the imposition of mar 
tial law are obvious to all. 

For this reason, the U.S. Govern- 
ment reiterates that the Polish people 
should find a solution to their current 
difficulties through a process of negoti 
tion and compromise among the partk 
involved. Above all, they should be pei 
mitted to do so without any outside in 


Q. Does the United States see any si 
of direct or indirect Soviet involve- 
ment in these measures? 

A. It is clear that the stridency ol 
Soviet statements in recent days with 
respect to the Solidarity movement ha 
increased quite noticeably. On the oth. 
hand, as of this moment, we do not se 
any signs of direct Soviet involvement 
the events as they've unfolded. Clearh 
the Soviets have a capability to watch 
carefully — and more carefully than w< 
do — internal developments as they 

But, if we desert the principles that 
have preserved peace for 30 years, then 
who can, with confidence, predict the 
future? The lesson we should have 
learned from the 1930s is that weak- 
ness, vacillation, and appeasement start 
a process which, more often than not, 
leads to tragedy. The aggressive govern- 
ment keeps pushing until it miscalcu- 
lates, oversteps, and compels a military 
response or capitulation. 

Those who genuinely wish to avoid 
nuclear confrontation must see that the 

only rational course is to act now— as 
have so steadily and successfully for 
almost four decades— to make clear t( 
the Soviet Union that their expansion 
policies cannot succeed. The age of 
empire has passed. Forty-three years 
ago this month, Neville Chamberlain 
traveled to this city in search of "peac 
for our time, peace with honor." With 
months Europe was once again at wa 
A combination of fear, wishful thinkir 
and misguided idealism led to disaster 
It must never happen again. ■ 


Department of State Built 


olve and, therefore, it is too early to 


Q. Has there been any buildup of 
>viet forces near Poland? 

A. Not that have been picked up by 
estern intelligence sources. I have 
en in touch with my counterparts in 
r allied Governments — those with ma- 
r concerns and especially those with 
sponsibilities for assistance levels to 
)land. None of us have ascertained any 
iviet readiness measures which would 

a source of alarm — additional 
irm— but we continue to watch the 
uation most carefully. As a matter of 
ct, I want you to know that since 3 
:lock this morning, I have been in 
uch with the foreign ministers of our 
ied governments, the Secretary- 
:neral of NATO, with President 
?agan, with Vice President Bush, of 
urse with Judge Clark, my Deputy, 
d with the National Security Council 

well. We have continued that level of 
nsultations throughout the day. 

Q. In your statement earlier that 
is read by Dean, and perhaps you 
ve reiterated now, you talked about 
process of negotiation and com- 
omise as the root for solution. Does 
at word compromise suggest a U.S. 
sire for the Polish Prime Minister 
back off from the martial law 
isture that he has introduced? 

A. The broad objective included in 
e term "compromise" should not be in- 
rpreted as any specific course of action 
at the United States would seek to im- 
se on the internal affairs of the Polish 
>vernment other than as a broad ex- 
ession of concern. 

Q. Ten Ministers of Foreign 
fairs are going to meet tomorrow in 
mdon. Do you plan to meet with 

A. The Economic Community? That 
a longstanding scheduled meeting — 
fusing on economic events within the 

Q. Will you take the opportunity 

A. No, I don't anticipate doing so. 
1 1 understand it, the political directors 
the NATO nations will convene here 
NATO headquarters tomorrow after- 
on and the United States, of course, 
II be represented at that meeting. 

Q. You expressed a desire not to 
erfere with Polish affairs. And you 

DEC. 15, 1981 3 

It was reported at 4:00 a.m. EST (10:00 
a.m. Warsaw time) that Warsaw re- 
mains outwardly calm but with heavy 
military and police presence in the 
streets. Overnight we received increas- 
ing reports of strike activities at major 
industrial installations in Poland, but 
their extent and degree of coordination 
remain unclear. While police and 
military personnel have been observed 
around striking enterprises, there have 
been no reports of violence or confronta- 
tions. Telephone and telex communica- 
tions remain out, and our Embassy has 
learned that Warsaw Airport, contrary 
to previous reports, will not reopen to- 

There are also reports that deten- 
tions are widespread and continuing. We 
had a report yesterday that [Lech] 
Walesa had been detained. AFP this 
morning reports from Stockholm that 
Walesa has been arrested for refusing to 
negotiate with the military government. 

The Military Council of National 
Salvation insisted yesterday that martial 
law was necessary to avoid civil war but 
said there would be no return to the pre- 
August 1980 system of rule. The State 
Council, meanwhile, offered clemency to 
all detainees provided they give a writ- 
ten pledge of loyalty to the regime. 


Virtually no one was on the street after 
the curfew deadline of 10:00 p.m. There 
are reports of strikes at three of the 
largest industrial plants in Warsaw. At 
the Huta Warszawa steel mill, police 
were seen peacefully escorting small 
groups of workers off the grounds Mon- 
day evening. There are reports of 
workers occupying the Ursus tractor 
factory. A sit-in strike at the FSO auto- 
mobile factory is also in progress. 

Southern Poland 

We have a report that the Katowice 
Steel Mill has been occupied by its 
workers, and Polish military units are in 
the area. There have also been reports 
of strikes and of the organization of 
strike committees that have been set up 
to coordinate strikes at coal mines in the 
Silesian region. In Krakow, workers 
have occupied the giant Lenin Steel 
Works. The plant was reportedly sur- 
rounded by police and military person- 

Baltic Coast 

A Solidarity strike committee has re- 
portedly been established in the Lenin 
shipyards in Gdansk to direct union 
operations and coordinate strikes. The 
Paris Commune shipyard is also re- 
portedly occupied. 

also said political experiment should 
be allowed to continue unimpeded. If 
the experiment, despite the assurances 
of the Charge, is not allowed to con- 
tinue unimpeded or in any way, will 
the United States accept that with 
equanimity? Would it take any action 
or make any statement about it? 

A. It is, of course, too early to say 
what actions the United States would 
take in the event that there is an inter- 
nal repression of the kind your question 
suggested. However, let me assure you 
that we have been viewing this situation 
in Poland for a number of months now, 
and we have considered a number of 
potential outcomes, both good and bad, 
and at the appropriate time, we will be 
prepared to announce it. 

Q. Can I follow up with a ques- 
tion? Did the Charge tell something to 
the Polish official as well as hearing 
from him? Did he express an American 
attitude this morning and, if so, what 
was it? 

A. No, our attitude is a longstand- 
ing one. It was the one I reiterated this 
morning in an official statement and 
have just spoken to here. I understand 
that the message conveyed to our At- 
tache was also conveyed to a number of 
foreign governments by the Polish 
Government's Foreign Office. 

Q. Did they initiate the contacts 

A. Yes. 

Q. Have you been in touch with 
the Russians in any way? 

A. I have suggested that Foreign 
Minister — Ambassador Dobrynin be ad- 
vised in Washington by the State De- 
partment of our concern and about the 
importance of nonintervention at this 

Q. What is the NATO position as 
well as the U.S. position in the event 
the Soviets do use military force, 
whether there would be any kind of 
military or some kind of economic and 
diplomatic response from the Alliance? 

luary 1982 



DEC. 16, 1981 3 

The situation in Poland remains much as 
it was yesterday and continues to be a 
matter of the gravest concern. 

We have received reports of 
numerous strikes in response to the im- 
position of martial law and the detention 
of union leaders. There have reportedly 
been outbreaks of smallscale violence, 
but we are not able to confirm them. 
The Polish military remains active, but 
we have not seen evidence of unusual 
Soviet military activities. 

In particular, we cannot confirm 
reports that Soviet transport planes 
have landed in Poland, and we have no 
evidence concerning reports of blood- 
shed or loss of life. 

It is our position that the Polish peo- 
ple should settle their current difficulties 
through a process of negotiation and 
compromise, without outside inter- 
ference. We have made these views 
known to Polish authorities and to the 
government of the Soviet Union. Soviet 
military intervention in Poland would 
have a severe and lasting effect on East- 
West relations. 

This morning, Assistant Secretary 
Eagleburger met with Polish Am- 
bassador Spasowski to reiterate our con- 
cerns about the course of events in 
Poland. The following specific topics 
were raised: 

• We are instituting the same 
restrictions on movement of Polish diplo- 
mats in the United States that have 
been established for our officials in 

• We are seriously concerned that 
large numbers of people have been "in- 
terned" and with reports that Walesa is 
not a free agent. If this is true, it will be 
hard to reconcile with the Government's 
commitment to continuation of the 
reform process and to political solutions. 

In general, we do not see how the 
martial law regime abridgments of civil 
liberties can be reconciled with the 
Polish People's Republic's commitments 
as a signatory of the Helsinki Final Act. 

Ambassador Spasowski was given a 
copy of the Senate Resolution on Poland 
which was passed by a vote of 97 to 
on the evening of December 15. 

A. I don't think it serves any useful 
purpose to characterize the nature of the 
collective Western response in the event 
of such a contingency. It is our hope, of 
course, that such an event does not take 
place, but we've reiterated repeatedly in 
the past that should it take place, the 
consequences would be very serious and 

Q. Have you changed your travel 
plans? Do you have any certainty 
about them now? 

A. I think I will make a decision 
later this evening based on develop- 
ments as they occur. Clearly, this is a 
serious situation and one that may re- 
quire my presence in Washington. 

Q. Two days ago at the NATO 
meeting, you seemed optimistic about 
the general situation. Did you know 
what has happened in Poland might 
happen now? 

A. Did we have information that the 
events that have unfolded today were 
going to occur? I would say, in general, 
that all the Washington parties were 
surprised. I know the United States 
was, in the context of immediately 
available information to us. That is not 
to suggest that we were not clearly cog- 
nizant of a growing level of tension be- 
tween Solidarity and the party which in- 
volved some active participation by the 
church as well over an extended period. 
This had caused all of us to raise our 
level of concern about the internal situa- 
tion in Poland, but we had no informa- 
tion to suggest that this sweeping im- 
position of martial law would take place 
the way it did, and I think the Foreign 
Ministers that I have spoken to today — 
and there have been a number — had no 
information either to suggest this action. 

Q. Do you think that the Polish 
Government was looking for oppor- 
tunity to impose martial law? 

A. I can't say. Clearly, the state- 
ment made by the Prime Minister this 
morning was one which suggested that, 
I think, in his own terms, Poland was on 
an abyss and that this was necessary ac- 
tion. The reassurances we've had from 
the Polish Government this afternoon, 
we are going to watch very carefully 
with the hope that they will be lived up 

Q. Is there anything that the 
United States can do in any way that 
might help diffuse the evolving crisis 
in Poland? 

A. I don't know, at this moment, 
whether there is anything we can do 

other than to express our concern aboi 
the situation, as we have done — to con 
tinue to watch it very, very carefully. 
Beyond that, I don't think it serves an; 
useful purpose. 

Q. Do you have any more inform: 
tion on what is happening in cities 
other than Warsaw and what the re 
tion of the military in Poland is? 

A. The information we have is tha 
this is a countrywide movement and th 
it involves extensive use of security 
forces and police, but that military unif 
are also involved primarily in a standb; 
status. But there has been some 
substantial readiness taken by Polish 
military forces. 

Q. In case of complete crackdow 
on Solidarity, in your opinion, which 
one should be the target of Western 
reaction— the Soviet Union or Polant 

A. Again, I don't think it serves ai 
useful purpose to get into future con- 
tingencies which we may or may not b 
faced with. Hopefully, we will not. 

Q. Do we know the whereabout? 
of Lech Walesa at this point? 

A. No. 


Q. Would you suggest introduc- 
tion of the food aid and economic aic 

DEC. 17, 1981 4 

The American Embassy in Warsaw h^ 
advised the Department of State that, 
although there have been no known in 
cidents involving U.S. citizens in Polai 
nor any evidence of hostility toward 
them, the general situation in that cou 
try is uncertain and unstable. 

The imposition of martial law and 
the disruption of communications, 
together with severe restrictions place 
by the security forces on access to the 
American Embassy and on the ability 
Embassy personnel to travel and deal 
with consular problems, make it impos 
ble for our Embassy and consulates to 
extend normal welfare and protection 
services to U.S. citizens in Poland. 

Accordingly, the Department advii 
American citizens in Poland who have 
no compelling reason to remain there 
that they may wish to leave the count] 
All American citizens who prefer to n 
main in Poland are advised to exercise 
prudence in their activities and to avo: 
unnecessary travel. 


Department of State Bulle 


at some Western countries are lean- 
g toward? 

A. Clearly, this is a matter which 
ill have to be considered very carefully 
the light of events which will unfold 
the hours ahead. 

Q. What I meant in the attitude of 
e armed forces in case of— do you 
ive any information on that point? 

A. No, I have no information. 

Q. When you said earlier in your 
tening remarks about the Polish ex- 
riment is underway and whether it 
ould be allowed to continue unim- 
ded without any outside forces, do 
u have any concern that the Poles or 
oscow will see this as American in- 
rference or meddling in Polish 

A. I think the United States and the 
est at large as a result of very careful 
ordination, from the outset of the 
ents of August of 1980, have assumed 
e posture of nonintervention which we 
ve pursued very assiduously over the 
;ervening months, and I think it would 
hard by any measure of objective 
iteria to suggest that the West and the 
lited States have been guilty of inter- 
ntion in internal Polish affairs. What 
5 have done is increasingly insist that 
tiers must not also become engaged. 

Q. You are not going to take part 
that meeting tomorrow afternoon, 
e you? 

A. No, these are Political Directors 
d we will be represented there at the 
propriate level and Ambassador 
igleburger as our Political Director. 

Q. Has any increased readiness 
en reported to you on the part of 
her Warsaw forces? 

A. No, none at all. 

Q. Would you qualify the situation 
day or the initiatives taken tonight 
an internal affair for Poland? 

A. Would I? 

Q. Would you qualify the internal 
lasures or— 

A. Thus far, it clearly involves only 
i internal forces — Polish forces. It's 
) early to say, whether it goes beyond 

Fourth Report on Cyprus 

SEPT. 23, 1981 ' 

In accordance with the provision of Public 
Law 95-384, I am submitting the following 
report on progress made during the past six- 
ty days toward reaching a negotiated settle- 
ment of the Cyprus problem. 

The intercommunal negotiations between 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot repre- 
sentatives under the chairmanship of the 
United Nations Secretary General's Special 
Representative on Cyprus, Ambassador Hugo 
Gobbi, are continuing to explore issues of 
mutual concern. Following an interrupted 
schedule earlier this year when both Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots prepared for and held 
elections, intercommunal negotiations have 
resumed on a more frequent schedule with 
weekly sessions since July 29. The 
negotiating atmosphere has remained con- 
genial and constructive. 

This period has been marked by substan- 
tive presentations in the negotiations by both 
sides. The Turkish Cypriot negotiator submit- 
ted proposals on August 5 and the Greek 
Cypriot representative on September 9. 

These proposals are comprehensive in scope 
addressing the basic constitutional and ter 
ritorial questions that lie at the core of the 
disagreements dividing Cyprus. 

We have welcomed developments of this 
nature as indicative of a continuing commit- 
ment by both communities to resolve their 
differences by peaceful negotiation and a 
spirit of compromise. We hope that during 
the period ahead the discussion under the 
aegis of United Nations Secretary General 
Waldheim will lead to a just, fair and lasting 
resolution of the Cyprus problem. The inter- 
communal negotiations have now passed the 
one-year mark, and it is time for the parties 
to reinvigorate their efforts to bring the 
hopes stimulated by their inception to frui- 


Ronald Reagan 

'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Repre- 
sentatives, and Charles H. Percy, chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Sept. 28, 1981). ■ 

Visit of Spanish King Juan Carlos I 

^ress release 422 of Dec. 14, 1981. 

2 Press release 422A of Dec. 14, 1981. 

3 Read to news correspondents by De- 
tment spokesman Dean Fischer. 

4 Made available to news correspondents 
Department spokesman Dean Fischer. ■ 

Their Majesties King Juan Carlos I 
and Queen Sophia of Spain made a State 
visit to Washington, D.C., October 12-16, 
1981. Following are remarks made at the 
welcoming ceremony on October 13 and 
remarks made to reporters following 
meetings on the same day. 1 


President Reagan 

Your Majesty, it gives me great pleasure 
to welcome you and Queen Sophia to the 
United States. We welcome you as 
monarch of Spain and as a champion of 

Yesterday, we celebrated Columbus 
Day. Some 489 years ago, three ships 
sailing under the Spanish flag and com- 
missioned by King Ferdinand and Queen 
Isabella made a discovery that irrevers- 
ibly altered the course of history and 
marked the emergence of Spain as a 
world power. It's fitting that one who 
traces his lineage to Ferdinand and 
Isabella now leads Spain into a new era 
of democracy and freedom. We applaud 
the sensible path toward political liberty 

that you've chosen and the skill and, if I 
may add, personal courage that you've 
demonstrated in reaching your goal. 

On July 1st, I met with your Foreign 
Minister, Jose Pedro Perez Llorca, and 
he emphasized that Spain is moving 
toward joining the major European in- 
stitutions. This, too, we applaud. We 
look forward to Spain's complete inte- 
gration into the Western community of 
nations. Already, the Spanish Govern- 
ment is playing a leading role in the 
struggle to combat terrorism on the 
European Continent. Such initiative is 
well appreciated here. 

Spain's growing presence cannot 
help but strengthen the bond that exists 
between our two peoples. Americans will 
never forget the all important assistance 
Spain was during our struggle for in- 
dependence and freedom. 

So now, when we offer the Spanish 
people our hands and our hearts, we do 
so out of gratitude for all that Spain has 
done for us. Those of us from the 
western United States understand 
perhaps more than other Americans the 
magnitude of Spain's contribution. 
Spaniards explored the length and 

tuary 1982 



King Juan Carlos I and Queen Sophia 

breadth of the southern and western 
United States, settling or passing 
through 16 of the present States of the 
Union. My own California is a wonderful 
example of Spain's lasting cultural gift. 
Catholic missions still stand in testimony 
to this magnificent cultural and spiritual 
contribution to the world. Spanish archi- 
tecture is everywhere, and California's 
constitution was written in two 
languages — Spanish and English. 

At my first inauguration as Gover- 
nor of California, I took the oath of 
office with my hand on a Bible brought 
to California by Father Junipero Serra, 
a Spaniard whose unselfish devotion to 
God is an inspiration to all Americans. 
Those things and our many citizens 
whose family trees are rooted in Spain 
have had a major impact on the 
American character. 

In 1883, one of our great poets, 
Walt Whitman, commented on Hispanic 
traits and the American identity. He 
said, "No stock shows a grander historic 
retrospect — grander in religiousness and 
loyalty, or for patriotism, courage, 
decorum, gravity, and honor." 

Today, we know that the traits Walt 
Whitman described a century ago well 
characterize the leadership of King Juan 
Carlos. We welcome you, Your Majes- 
ties, and are grateful for your dedication 
to your country and to your ideals. You 
have the admiration and respect of the 
American people, and you honor us with 
your visit. 


King Juan Carlos 

Mr. President, the Queen and I offer our 
sincere thanks for your very warm 
greetings. It has given us great pleasure 
to be able to accept your most kind 
invitation and to be here today in your 
great country. 

We officially begin our visit at this 
ceremony with our hearts and spirits 
working toward the pleasant task of 
bringing our peoples and our two coun- 
tries together in a felicitous and produc- 
tive cooperation based on our common 
interests and goals. 

From the vantage points afforded us 
by our respective national characteristics 
and destinies, we are witnessing an in- 
creasingly closer weave in the fabric of 
our relationship — a relationship whose 
goal is the progress and well-being of 
our people within the global context of 
the noble principles of peace, under- 
standing, freedom, and prosperity for all 

We also wish at this time to express 
to the American people the Spanish 
people's message of sincere friendship. 
For the world and for my country, you 
embody the great American democracy 
which during its two centuries of exist- 
ence, in times of peace as well as times 
of hardship, has succeeded in defending 
and upholding the timeless values of 
justice and the dignity of man. 

In this task, you will always have 
the understanding and support of my 
country, which with its new democratic 
vitality, with faith and hope, has set out 
upon the path leading to full integration 
in the Western World to which it 

Here at the portico of the White 
House, whose architecture reflects the 
austere solemnity, the traditional virtue 
of the pioneers who founded the 
American nation, the Queen and I thank 
you and Mrs. Reagan for your cordial 


President Reagan 

His Majesty Juan Carlos and I have just 
completed a stimulating and instructive 
session of talks, during which we 
touched on some of the most critical 
international issues of the day. 

We discussed the East- West situa- 
tion, the importance of forging even 
closer Western unity and cohesion in the 
face of a determined Soviet challenge. 
We spent considerable time comparing 
notes on the Middle East and the in- 
terest which our two countries share in 
promoting peace and stability in that 
troubled region, so recently shaken by 

the tragic death of Egyptian President 
Sadat. We talked about Latin America 
and the Caribbean Basin, an area where 
owing to the wealth of Hispanic culture 
and historical ties, Spanish insights are ! 
especially valuable. 

Most important, my talks with His 
Majesty merely confirmed that — what I 
and millions of my fellow Americans 
already knew — that Spain has a wise 
and courageous chief of state, whose 
leadership in developing his country's 
democratic institutions has earned the i 
world's profound respect. 

Your Majesty, I take this oppor- 
tunity to reiterate in public what I have 
expressed to you in private. The United 
States enormously admires the strides i 
which you and your countrymen have 
taken toward creating a vital and 
vibrant democracy in so short a time. In 
fully supporting that democracy, we con 
sider Spain not only a major strategic 
partner but a close friend, and we look 
forward to working, even more closely, 
with your government as Spain con- 
tinues to pursue full integration with 
Europe and the West. 

I speak for all Americans when I sa; 
that I hope you and your gracious Queei 
will soon return to our shores. You'll be; 
particularly welcome not only here in 
Washington but in those many parts of ! 
our country where Spanish culture and ; 
language have contributed so enduringlj 
to our own history and heritage. 

King Juan Carlos 

I want to thank you for those kind 
words for which I am extremely grate- j 
ful. But I want to tell you, and publicly 
to tell you, that without the help of the 
Spanish people, I would not have been 
able, in the beginning, to do what Spain 
achieved and what I achieved with them 

I want to express again to the Presi 
dent and Mrs. Reagan our gratitude for 
the invitation and for the hospitality we 
are receiving. Our visit to Washington 
couldn't have started better. I'm not 
referring to the weather, but to the 
most cordial and personal relationship 
that has developed in this, our first visit 

As the President told you, we dis- 
cussed different matters around the 
world and, above all, the relationship 
between Spain and the United States, 
that can't be in a better way and in a 
better moment. 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Oct. 19, 1981, 
which also includes dinner toasts made on 
Oct. 13, 1981. 

2 Made on the South Lawn of the W*ite 
House. ■ 

Department of State Bulletii 


J.S., Israel Agree on Strategic Cooperation 

OV. 30, 1981 

;raeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon is 
isiting the United States at the invita- 
on of Secretary of Defense Caspar W. 
Weinberger. The Secretary and the 
[inister met today to discuss security 
Nations between their two countries. 

The Secretary and the Minister, hav- 
g affirmed the common bonds of 
iendship between the United States 
id Israel and having stressed the 
iutual security relationship that exists 
itween the two countries, will sign to- 
iy a memorandum of understanding 
'tween the governments on strategic 

The agreement is designed to enable 
te two countries to act cooperatively, 
i provide each other military assistance 
i cope with threats to the security of 
le entire region caused by the U.S.S.R. 
■ Soviet-controlled forces introduced 
om outside the region into the region. 
he strategic cooperation is not directed 
any state or group of states within 
ie Middle East. 

In accordance with the memoran- 
lm of understanding, the Secretary 
id the Minister discussed the composi- 
Dn and the schedule of meetings of the 
lordinating council and the joint work- 
g groups established by the agree- 
ent, as well as the mode of implemen- 
tion of the agreement. The first 
eeting of the coordinating council is 
heduled for January 1982. 

The Governments of the United 
ates and Israel believe that this agree- 
ent on strategic cooperation reaffirms 
e common bonds of friendship between 

Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon in- 
ted Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger 
visit Israel next year, and the Secre- 
ry accepted the invitation with 

The Secretary and the Minister also 
dressed questions of U.S. military 
sistance to Israel, including measures 
make Israeli industry more competi- 
r e in bidding on U.S. contracts. 

NOV. 30, 1981 


This Memorandum of Understanding 
reaffirms the common bonds of* friendship 
between the United States and Israel and 
builds on the mutual security relationship 
that exists between the two nations. The Par- 
ties recognize the need to enhance strategic 
cooperation to deter all threats from the 
Soviet Union to the region. Noting the long- 
standing and fruitful cooperation for mutual 
security that has developed between the two 
countries, the Parties have decided to 
establish a framework for continued consulta- 
tion and cooperation to enhance their national 
security by deterring such threats to the 
whole region. 

The Parties have reached the following 
agreements in order to achieve the above 

Article I 

United States-Israeli strategic cooperation, as 
set forth in this Memorandum, is designed 
against the threat to peace and security of 
the region caused by the Soviet Union or 
Soviet-controlled forces from outside the 
region introduced into the region. It has the 
following broad purposes: 

A. To enable the Parties to act coopera- 
tively and in a timely manner to deal with the 
above mentioned threat; 

B. To provide each other with military 
assistance for operations of their forces in 
the area that may be required to cope with 
this threat; 

C. The strategic cooperation between the 
Parties is not directed at any State or group 
of States within the region. It is intended 
solely for defensive purposes against the 
above mentioned threat. 

Article II 

1. The fields in which strategic cooperation 
will be carried out to prevent the above men- 
tioned threat from endangering the security 
of the region include: 

A. Military cooperation between the Par- 
ties, as may be agreed by the Parties; 

B. Joint military exercises, including 
naval and air exercises in the eastern 
Mediterranean Sea, as agreed upon by the 

C. Cooperation for the establishment and 
maintenance of joint readiness activities, as 
agreed upon by the Parties; 

D. Other areas within the basic scope and 
purpose of this agreement, as may be jointly 

2. Details of activities within these fields 
of cooperation shall be worked out by the 
Parties in accordance with the provisions of 
Article III below. The cooperation will in- 
clude, as appropriate, planning, preparations, 
and exercises. 

Article III 

1. The Secretary of Defense and the Minister 
of Defense shall establish a Coordinating 
Council to further the purposes of this 

A. To coordinate and provide guidance to 
Joint Working Groups; 

B. To monitor the implementation of 
cooperation in the fields agreed upon by the 
Parties within the scope of this agreement; 

C. To hold periodic meetings, in Israel 
and the United States, for the purposes of 
discussing and resolving outstanding issues 
and to further the objectives set forth in this 
Memorandum. Special meetings can be held 
at the request of either Party. The Secretary 
of Defense and Minister of Defense will chair 
these meetings whenever possible. 

2. Joint Working Groups will address the 
following issues: 

A. Military cooperation between the Par- 
ties, including joint U.S. -Israeli exercises in 
the eastern Mediterranean Sea; 

B. Cooperation for the establishment of 
joint readiness activities including access to 
maintenance facilities and other infrastruc- 
ture, consistent with the basic purposes of 
this agreement; 

C. Cooperation in research and develop- 
ment, building on past cooperation in this 

D. Cooperation in defense trade; 

E. Other fieMs within the basic scope and 
purpose of this agreement, such as questions 
of prepositioning, as agreed by the Coordi- 
nating Council. 

3. The future agenda for the work of the 
Joint Working Groups, their composition, and 
procedures for reporting to the Coordinating 
Council shall be agreed upon by the Parties. 

Article IV 

This Memorandum shall enter into force upon 
exchange of notification that required pro- 
cedures have been completed by each Party. 
If either Party considers it necessary to ter- 
minate this Memorandum of Understanding, 

nuary 1982 



it may do so by notifying the other Party six 
months in advance of the effective date of 

Article V 

Nothing' in the Memorandum shall be con- 
sidered as derogating from previous agree- 
ments and understandings between the Par- 

Article VI 

The Parties share the understanding that 
nothing in this Memorandum is intended to 
or shall in any way prejudice the rights and 
obligations which devolve or may devolve 
upon either Government under the Charter of 
the United Nations or under international 
law. The Parties reaffirm their faith in the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations and their aspiration to live in 
peace with all countries in the region. 

For the Government 
of the United States: 

Caspar W. Weinberger 
Secretary of Defense 

For the Government 
of Israel: 

Ariel Sharon 
Minister of Defense ■ 

President Asks 
to Leave Libya 

The following statement was made by 
Acting Secretary William P. Clark on 
December 10, 1981. 

On behalf of the President, I met today 
with the congressional leadership and 
communicated with the chief executive 
officers of American corporations which 
have American personnel in Libya. I dis- 
cussed Libya's well-known efforts over 
the course of many years to undermine 
U.S. interests and those of our friends, 
as well as Libya's support for inter- 
national terrorism. In the past 6 months, 
Libya has broadened and accelerated its 
efforts to undermine neighboring states 
and to work against U.S. interests. As a 
consequence, the security climate for 
American citizens in Libya has 

Because of the danger which the 
Libyan regime poses to American 
citizens, the President calls upon all 
Americans to leave Libya as soon as 
possible. In light of the increased risk, 
U.S. passports are being invalidated for 
travel to Libya, effective immediately. I 
want to make clear that the President is 
prepared to take other available legal 
measures to require that Americans 
leave Libya should that become 

The United States recognizes the 
gravity of these steps but believes that 
Libyan actions oblige us to take them. 
Indeed, it would be irresponsible for the 
U.S. Government to do less. ■ 

U.S. and Israel 


MFO Participation 

DEC. 3, 1981 1 

The United States and Israel note the 
decision of the United Kingdom, France, 
Italy, and the Netherlands to contribute 
to the multinational force and observers 

(MFO) to be established in accordance 
with the Treaty of Peace Between 
Egypt and Israel. 2 

The United States and Israel re- 
viewed the participation of these four 
countries in light of the following 
clarifications which they have provided 
to the United States on November 26, 

• That they recognize that the fun<! 
tion of the MFO is as defined in the rel 
vant Egyptian-Israeli agreements and 
includes that of insuring freedom of 
navigation through the Strait of Tiran ( 
accordance with Article V of the Treat 
of Peace; and 

• That they have attached no polit: 
cal conditions, linked to Venice or othe 
wise, to their participation. 

The United States and Israel undei 
stand that the participation of the four 
and any other participating state is 
based upon the following. 

• The basis for participation in the 
MFO is the Treaty of Peace Between 
Egypt and Israel originated in the Can; 
David accords and the protocol signed ' 
between Egypt and Israel and witnesse 
by the United States on August 3, 198; 
based upon the letter from President • 
Carter to President Sadat and Prime 
Minister Begin of March 26, 1979. 

• All of the functions and respon- 
sibilities of the MFO and of its constitii 
ent elements, including any contingent' 
that may be formed through European; 
participation, are defined in the Treaty 
of Peace and protocol, and there can h 
no derogation or reservation from any; 
of them. As provided in the protocol, a 
participants in the MFO undertake to 
conduct themselves in accordance with 
the terms of the protocol under the 
direction of the Director General ap- 
pointed by Egypt and Israel. The MFO 
shall employ its best efforts to prevent 
any violation of the terms of the Treat; 
of Peace. The functions of the MFO wi 
specifically include the following in 
accordance with the Treaty of Peace ai 
the protocol: 

(a) Operation of checkpoints, re- 
connaissance patrols, and observation 
posts along the international boundary 
and Line B, and within Zone C; 

(b) Periodic verification of the im 
plementation of the provisions of Anne 
I will be carried out not less than twice 
a month unless otherwise agreed by tfo 


Department of State Bullet 


(c) Additional verifications within 
8 hours after the receipt of a request 
rom either party; and 

(d) Insuring the freedom of naviga- 
on through the Strait of Tiran in ac- 
ordance with Article V of the Treaty of 

The United States understands and 
ppreciates the concerns expressed by 
le Government of Israel regarding the 
;atements made by the four European 
jntributors in explaining their decision 
) participate in the MFO to their own 
gislatures and publics. The United 
tates recognizes that some positions set 
>rth in the statements are at variance 
ith its own positions with respect to 
le future of the peace process, as well 
3 with positions held by Israel as a par- 
i to the Treaty of Peace. The United 
tates and Israel recognize that the 
asitions held on any other aspects of 
le problem in the area by any state 
hich agrees to participate in the MFO 
3 not affect the obligation of that state 
i comply fully with the terms of the 
"otocol which was negotiated in accord- 
ice with the letter from President 
arter to President Sadat and Prime 
inister Begin of March 26, 1979, and 
hich is designed to help implement the 
reaty of Peace, which was concluded 
irsuant to the Camp David accords. 

The Treaty of Peace, in accordance 
ith which the MFO is established, 
presents the first step in a process 
freed on at Camp David whose ulti- 
ate goal is a just, comprehensive, and 
irable settlement of the Middle East 
inflict through the conclusion of peace 
eaties based on Security Council 
solutions 242 and 338. The United 
ates and Israel reiterate their commit- 
ent to the Camp David accords as the 
ily viable and ongoing negotiating 
ocess. They renew their determination 
make early meaningful progress in 
e autonomy talks. 

Pursuing Peace and Security 
in the Middle East 

'Read to news correspondents by acting 
■partment spokesman Alan Romberg. The 
nt statement was released simultaneously 

2 For text of the treaty, see Bulletin of 
iy 1979. ■ 

by Nicholas A. Veliotes 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
October 21, 1981. Mr. Veliotes is Assist- 
ant Secretary for Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs. 1 

I welcome the opportunity to come 
before you to discuss U.S. policy toward 
the Middle East and Persian Gulf area. 
In recent years, my predecessors and 
other State Department representatives 
have come before this subcommittee in 
testimony emphasizing the importance 
of events in the Middle East to a range 
of critical U.S. national interests. There 
is no question that the persistent and 
successful pursuit of comprehensive and 
balanced U.S. policy in the Middle East 
and Persian Gulf is critical: 

• To our national security through 
the preservation of a global strategic 
balance which will permit free and in- 
dependent societies to pursue their 

• To checking the spread of Soviet 
influence in this strategic region and, by 
extension, elsewhere in the world; 

• To fulfilling effectively the in- 
escapable responsibility of the United 
States to work for the resolution of 
conflicts in the region which threaten in- 
ternational security and the well-being 
of countries and peoples of the region; 

• To assuring the security and 
welfare of the State of Israel and of 
other important friendly nations in the 

• To preserving and fostering our 
critical interests in access to the region's 
oil; and 

• To supporting other major 
economic interests, including: access to 
markets for American goods and ser- 
vices, cooperation with the wealthier 
states in the region to maintain a sound 
international financial order, and assist- 
ing the orderly economic development of 
the region. 

The Search for Peace 

While the Middle East and Persian Gulf 
region poses many complexities and 

many challenges for our foreign policy 
and our national security policy— and 
our responses to a variety of tensions, 
crises, and opportunities must be varied 
yet internally consistent— there are two 
central themes of our policy approach. 
We seek peace and we seek security for 
the region, both to promote our own 
policy and to permit all its peoples to 
pursue their welfare. In this context: 

• We are pursuing a just and com- 
prehensive Middle East peace vigorously 
and with determination. We will do so 
within the framework of the Camp 
David agreements which, in turn, derive 
their validity from U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 242. In recent months, we 
have made significant progress in the 
furtherance of that process through suc- 
cessful negotiation with Egypt and 
Israel of the arrangements for final 
Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai in 
April 1982. We are completing arrange- 
ments for the multinational force of 
observers which will be a key factor in 
the implementation of that agreement. 
We are confident that both Israel and 
Egypt are firmly set on the course of 
full implementation of their treaty of 

• We have, at the same time, re- 
sumed trilateral negotiations with Egypt 
and Israel on the establishment of the 
autonomy regime for the West Bank and 
Gaza. These initial meetings in this 
phase of the autonomy negotiations have 
moved forward in a cordial and business- 
like spirit. And we are now moving to 
intensify and accelerate these negotia- 
tions, looking to early achievement of an 
agreement which will offer the basis for 
the Palestinian participation that is 
necessary for successful conclusion of an 
arrangement permitting the establish- 
ment of a transitional regime in the 
West Bank/Gaza. We regard it as impor- 
tant that we be able to demonstrate, in 
the near future, the tangible results of 
this process to those who have opposed 
or doubted its effectiveness. 

• We will continue to be engaged in 
efforts to support the Government and 
people of Lebanon, to resolve Lebanon's 
problems, and to move toward national 
reconciliation and greater security. 
Lebanon remains a potential flashpoint 

luary 1982 



in the region, and we are working vigor- 
ously to consolidate the fragile cease-fire 
arranged by Ambassador Habib [the 
President's special emissary to the Mid- 
dle East] last July and to support the 
Bayt-ad-Din process aimed at improving 
the internal situation. We attach par- 
ticular importance to this Arab- 
sponsored process which offers the best 
prospect for creating conditions for a 
phased, orderly withdrawal of Syrian 
forces to begin. We will be giving con- 
sideration to a further visit to the region 
by Ambassador Habib in the context of 

region. We fully share with friendly 
states in the region the concern about 
the threats to security posed by the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the 
chaos in Iran, the Soviet position in the 
Horn of Africa, Libyan pressures 
against neighboring states, and the re- 
cent tripartite alliance of Libya, South 
Yemen, and Ethiopia. We have taken 
steps to build the confidence of key 
states in our commitment to their securi- 
ty from Soviet and Soviet-supported ex- 
ternal threats and from Soviet exploita- 
tion of conflict and instability. 

We seek peace and we seek security for the 
region, both to promote our own policy and to per- 
mit all its peoples to pursue their welfare. 

his continuing mission for the President. 

• We will continue to support the 
resolution of the war between Iran and 
Iraq by negotiation and in a manner con- 
sistent with the principles of interna- 
tional law, including nonintervention in 
internal affairs of another state, support 
for the territorial integrity of both com- 
batants, and freedom of navigation. We 
have been and will remain impartial in 
this conflict in an effort to underline the 
importance we attach to the independ- 
ence and security of the states of the 
gulf and the interest of the international 
community in mutual respect and 
balance in relationships among them. 

As we intensify our efforts to move 
the Middle East peace process forward, 
we recognize that the parties directly 
concerned and the other Middle East na- 
tions with a profound interest in this 
critical issue face difficult decisions. A 
spirit of accommodation will be essential 
if peace is to be achieved. It is clear that 
these difficult decisions can be more easi- 
ly taken if the states concerned feel 
secure and confident in U.S. support for 
their security. 

Regional Security 

From its first days in office, this Ad- 
ministration has moved forward 
vigorously in pursuit of the second main 
thrust of our Middle East/Persian Gulf 
policy, bolstering the security of the 

At a time of budget stringencies, we 
have, with considerable sacrifice, in- 
creased the national resources for our 
own military to accelerate the develop- 
ment of their capability to better deter 
threats to the region and to respond to 
contingencies in which friendly states in 
the Middle East and the gulf might need 
and request our help. We have increased 
our military deployments to the region. 
We have at the same time significantly 
increased our security assistance to 
friendly strategic states in the region to 
better enable them to provide for their 
own defense and resist external 

We have taken decisions to provide 
military equipment which we believe 
necessary to develop adequately the 
defense capability of key critical states. 
We have continued our significant 
security relationship with Israel. We 
have increased the flow of U.S. military 
equipment and training to Egypt. In the 
context of a longstanding security 
assistance relationship and a critical 
U.S. interest in the security of gulf oil 
fields, we have proposed to the Congress 
the sale of air defense enhancement 
equipment, including AW ACS [airborne 
warning and control system], to Saudi 
Arabia. We have carried forward and, to 
the extent possible with available 
resources, intensified our military supply 
relationships with Morocco and Tunisia, 
with Jordan and with the states on the 
Arab side of the Persian Gulf. We will 

continue to be engaged with an attentiv 
to the concerns and priority needs of 
these friends. 

We believe we have strengthened 
the perception among friendly states in 
the region that the United States is 
dedicated to the area's security. We are 
and will be a strong and reliable part- 
ner. As we move forward to improve th 
security environment in the region and 
to build our security cooperation with 
key states there, we recognize that 
sound and sustained progress toward 
Middle East peace is essential if our 
strategy of enhancing the region's 
security is to be fully and effectively 
achieved, if the opportunities for 
stimulating instability and exploiting 
grievances are to be reduced and 
eliminated. Indeed, central to this Ad- 
ministration's approach to the Middle 
East is the recognition that progress 
toward Middle East peace and progress 
in building regional security are inex- 
tricably interrelated and mutually rein- 

Nowhere is this shown more clearly 
than in our relationship with Israel. We 
are earnestly seeking, through the peac 
process set in train by the historic 
agreements reached at Camp David, to 
achieve a situation in the hopefully not- 
far-distant future whereby Israel will 
finally be able to live at peace with all il 
neighbors. At the same time, we are 
committed to the security of Israel and, 
to the extent that we are able to 
demonstrate that fact, Israel will feel 
more secure in making the accommoda- 
tions necessary to any successful 
negotiation. Beyond that, during Prime 
Minister Begin's recent visit we were 
able to begin a process of discussions tc 
identify areas in which we and Israel 
may act in concert, recognizing certain 
political constraints, to enhance our 
strategic posture in meeting external 
threats to the area. I would like to em- 
phasize the President's remarks in 
receiving Prime Minister Begin when h 
said: "As we consult . . . rest assured 
that the security of Israel is a principal 
objective of this Administration and ths 
we regard Israel as an ally in our searc 
for regional stability." 

Just as the security and welfare of 
Israel are key to our pursuit of peace 
and security in the region, the strength 
and confidence of Egypt are central to 
the attainment of our priority objective 


Department of State Bullet 


1 the Middle East. In the wake of the 
-agic assassination of President Sadat, 
'e are confident that Egypt under 
resident Mubarak is moving forward in 
rder and continuity and calm and 
jnfidence to pursue Egypt's key and 
instructive role in the region. We have 
lanifested in word and deed our 
)nfidence in and support for the new 
gyptian leadership. We are sensitive to 
gypt's concerns about the threats 
hich it and its neighbors face from 
ibya and are determined to be suppor- 
ve of Egypt's measured response to 
lis challenge. We are confident that our 
;curity cooperation with Egypt will 
roceed apace in the interest of improv- 
tg the strategic environment for the en- 
re region. We are confident that Egypt 
ill proceed with us and with Israel in a 
jtermined pursuit through the Camp 
avid framework of a comprehensive 
id durable Middle East peace. 

Our policy will continue to reflect 
le important economic element in our 
^lationship with the area, which: 

• Is a critical source of oil for our 
mntry and for our allies; 

• Is an increasingly important 
arket for American goods and ser- 

• Contains wealthy oil-exporting na- 
)ns that have become an important 
rce in international finance; and 

• Contains strategically important 
it economically weak countries whose 
derly development is critical to the 
ability of the region. 

We are determined to work closely 
; th those Middle East oil exporters 
io perceive with us a common respon- 
oility of consumers and producers to 
laintain orderly oil markets. We will 
intinue to promote the transfer of 
nerican technology and the sale of 
S. goods and services to build on the 
"eady strong base of economic 
operation between the United States 
,d the Middle East. Through our 
ateral economic assistance programs 
d through our participation in interna- 
pal lending institutions, we remain 
mmitted to devoting a very substantial 
irtion of our worldwide economic 
distance to help key countries in and 

Claims Against Iran 

The U.S. agent at the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal in The Hague filed on 
November 18, 1981, with the Tribunal a 
claim against Iran on behalf of some 
3,000 American citizens and corpora- 
tions whose claims against the Govern- 
ment of Iran are in a total amount of 
less than $250,000 each. The U.S. claim 
seeks an award of "at least $180 million" 
in compensation for the losses suffered 
by these U.S. nationals. This action 
represents the initial step to protect the 
legal rights of the individual claimants 
and of the United States in the resolu- 
tion of such claims against Iran. The 
United States continues to hope that an 
early agreement can be negotiated with 
Iran to settle these claims by a lump- 
sum payment from Iran. 

As part of the negotiations which led 
to the release of the American hostages 
in Tehran in January 1981, the United 
States and Iran agreed to establish the 
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal to arbitrate 
the claims of U.S. nationals against the 
Government of Iran and of Iranian na- 
tionals against the United States. Claims 
covered by the agreement are those aris- 
ing out of debts, contracts, expropria- 
tions, or other measures affecting prop- 
erty rights. The Tribunal has been estab- 
lished at The Hague and began receiving 
statements of claim on October 20, 1981; 
all claims must be filed no later than 
January 19, 1982. A $1 billion security 
account has been established in the 

Netherlands to secure the payment of 
Tribunal awards in favor of U.S. na- 

The agreements reached in Algiers 
provide that U.S. nationals whose total 
claims amount to $250,000 or more will 
represent themselves before the 
Tribunal, while those claims of less than 
$250,000 will be presented by the 
government. Since last spring, the 
Department of State has been register- 
ing the smaller claims of U.S. nationals 
to prepare for their submission to the 
Tribunal and has provided information 
concerning the claims to the Govern- 
ment of Iran for the purpose of ini- 
tiating negotiations on a lump-sum set- 
tlement. In the absence of a response 
from Iran to date, the United States 
filed its claim on November 18, 1981, to 
insure that these U.S. claimants are ap- 
propriately protected. 

The Department will be publishing in 
the Federal Register that any U.S. na- 
tional with claims against Iran of less 
than $250,000 who have not yet 
registered their claims must do so no 
later than December 1, 1981. This dead- 
line is necessary to assure that the 
details of any additional claims can be 
put into the proper form for filing with 
the Tribunal before the January 19 

Press release 393 of Nov. 18, 1981. 

bordering on this area— Israel, Egypt, 
India, Pakistan, Sudan, and Turkey— to 
strengthen their economies and provide 
a better economic life for their peoples. 
We intend to continue working closely 
with wealthy states in the area in our 
effort to assist the needier countries of 

the region as well as working with these 
wealthy states in the broader task of 
strengthening the international financial 

'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.B 

iuary 1982 




Visit of Jordanian King Hussein 

His Majesty King Hussein I of the 
Haahemite Kingdom of Jordan made a 
state visit to the United States November 
1-12, 1981. While in Washington, D.C., 
November 1-5, he met with President 
Reagan and, other government officials. 
Following are remarks made at the 
welcoming ceremony on November 2. 1 

President Reagan 

It is a distinct pleasure and an honor to 
welcome Your Majesties to Washington. 
I've been looking forward to meeting 
King Hussein longer than I've been 
President. One of the advantages of age 
is the perspective it gives to looking 
back. I've watched King Hussein from a 
distance for many years, watched as he 
ascended the throne and accepted great 
responsibility while still in his teens. 
And in the years since, he's proved 
himself time and again a brave man and, 
I might add, a wise leader. 

Our friendship with King Hussein 
has stood the test of time. It's based on 
shared interests but also on common 
values and mutual respect. During the 
three decades that he has led Jordan, 
America has maintained an unwavering 
dedication to the search for Middle East 
peace. And over these many years, King 
Hussein has been our friend. Such loyal- 
ty is not lightly regarded by the people 
of the United States. 

Let it be understood that America 
seeks peace with honor and security for 
all the states and people of the region, 
undoubtedly a similar goal to your own. 
Yet at this moment, there's much to 
discuss about how to reach our mutual 
goal. Recent tragic events make it even 
more imperative that we work together 
if solutions are to be found. 

Today, let us achieve an understand- 
ing about ourselves and then reaffirm to 
the world that there are no differences 
between us that we cannot overcome 
and none that will lessen the friendship 
between the United States and the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 

For our part, no one should doubt 
that the preservation of Jordan's securi- 
ty, integrity, and its unique and endur- 
ing character remains a matter of 
highest importance. Your Majesty, over 
the years your concern for the well- 
being of your people, your creative 

statesmanship, and your good sense 
have enriched Jordan. Under your 
leadership, the Jordanian economy has 
yielded fruit, literally and figuratively, to 
all the citizens of Jordan. And in Jordan 
today, the private sector is thriving, and 
the standard of living is increasingly a 
model for developing nations. 

In the last two decades, the literacy 
rate rose from 32 to 70 percent. Edu- 
cated Jordanians now fill skilled jobs all 
over the Middle East. Meanwhile, unem- 
ployment has almost disappeared, and 
Jordan boasts an average annual 
economic growth rate of 9%. Your suc- 
cess offers hope that people who've 
known grievous adversity can rise above 
their conflicts to build a new life. 
Similarly, there are tremendous oppor- 
tunities for economic betterment in your 
region, while political problems work 
themselves out. 

Given freedom to do so, people who 
live in such proximity will interact to 
better themselves, even though divided 
by politics. Such peaceful interactions 
should be applauded. Furthermore, the 
United States encourages any mutually 
beneficial economic cooperation between 
nations. The problems of water and 
transportation, for example, are areas of 
potential benefit to you and your neigh- 
bors if a farsighted approach is taken. 
There are, however, other forces 
which seek to widen and exploit the divi- 
sions among the peoples of the Middle 
East. Tension and conflict both reflect 
and increase the power and influence of 
such hateful forces. When focusing on 
the internal problems of the region, we 
must never lose sight of the role of ex- 
ternal powers in aggravating those prob- 

In your book Uneasy Lies the Head, 
you proclaimed: "I fear only God." In 
your life you've demonstrated this 
courage in so many ways — as a pilot, as 
a soldier, and, most important, as a 
statesman. But the point of that state- 
ment is not alone that you are brave but 
that you are devout. It highlights your 
belief in and respect for the Supreme 
Being who's Father of us all. Americans 
admire such values. 

Years ago, your grandfather, King 
Abdullah, a giant in the Arab world, ir 
his memoirs wrote: "It is the duty of a 
Arabs to bear witness to the world the 
they possess a place and constitute an 
entity among the nations of the world 
and that they stand today at the side ( 
the democracies in the contest betweei 
fear-inspiring communism and popular 

During your reign you have demoi 
strated the wisdom of your grandfath< 
by maintaining a perspective on poten 
tial dangers while still providing leade 
ship on the immediate issues confront] 
you and your neighbors. 

The United States is concerned 
about outside threats to the Middle 
East, as well as those issues which mc 
directly affect the people of the Middh 
East. We're sincerely attempting to d' 
all that can be done to end the ongoin 
tragedy that has plagued that area of 
the world. A lasting peace is in our in 
terest, just as it is in the interest of a 
people of good will. Respecting our 
differences and knowing you as we dc 
we're confident that you share our he; 
felt desire for peace and stability. Yoi 
courage and integrity earned this trus 
and respect long ago. 

The story is told that early in you 
reign, you decided to stay the night a 
Bedouin encampment which was und< 
threat of attack. And while walking J 
the darkness, you heard the voice of j 
elder tribesman proclaim from inside 
tent: "Abdullah would be proud of his 
grandson." We think that's even true; 
today, and we want you to know that 
we, too, are proud, proud to have yoi 
a friend. 

King Hussein 

It's, indeed, a moving moment for m< 
I express my sincere gratitude for th 
warm welcome to both Noor and mys 
and to our Jordanian colleagues who 
with us today. 

It is a great pleasure for us to be 
once again in the United States of 
America in response to your kind inv 
tion and to visit with you, the leader 
this great nation. This year, indeed, 
marks the 25th anniversary of a uniq 
relationship between the United Stat 
and Jordan, unique in its length and 
durability. It is a relationship seasoni 
by time and trouble. I recognized, as 


Department of State Bui 


Jordan— A Profile 


irea (East Bank): 35,000 sq. mi. Capital: 
imman (pop. 648,000). Other Cities: Az- 
arqa (215,000), Irbid (112,000). 


opulation (East Bank): 2.2 million (1980 
ensus). Annual Growth Rate: 3.9% (1978 
it). Ethnic Groups: Mostly Arab; small 
immunities of Circassians, Armenians, and 
urds. Religions: Sunni Moslem (95%), 
hristian (5%). Languages: Arabic (official), 
nglish. Literacy: 70%. 


fficial Name: Hashemite Kingdom of Jor- 
an. Type: Constitutional monarchy. Inde- 
endence: May 25, 1946. Constitution: 
muary 8, 1952. Branches: Executive — king 
hief of state), prime minister (head of 
jvernment), Council of Ministers (cabinet). 
egislative — bicameral National Assembly 
ppointed 30-member Senate and elected 
)-member Chamber of Deputies). Judicial — 
vil, religious, special courts. Political Par- 
es: Only the government-sponsored Arab 
ational Union is officially recognized. Suf- 
age: Males over 20. Administrative Divi- 
ons: Eight governorates. 


DP (1979): $2.3 billion. Annual Growth 
ate: 9%. Per Capita GDP (1979): $1,060. 
verage Inflation Rate: 14% (1973-79). 
atural Resources: Phosphate, potash. 
griculture: Wheat, fruit, vegetables, olive 

oil. Industries: Phosphate, petroleum mining, 
cement production. Trade (1979): Exports— 
$2.75 million: fruits, vegetables, phosphates. 
Major Markets— Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, India. Imports— $1.9 
billion: machinery, transportation equipment, 
cereals, petroleum products. Major Sup- 
pliers— U.S., U.K., F.R.G., Japan, Lebanon, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria. Official Exchange Rate 
(1979): 1 Jordanian dinar= US$3,333. U.S. 
Economic Aid Received: $1.3 billion 

Membership in International Organizations 

U.N. and several of its specialized agencies 

(e.g., FAO, IAEA, WHO, World Bank, IMF), 
Islamic Conference, INTELSAT. 

Principal Government Officials 

Jordan: Chief of State— King Hussein I; 
Prime Minister— Mudhar Badran, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs— Mar wan al-Kasim, Ambas- 
sador to the U.S.— Abdul Hadi Majali. 
United States: Ambassador to Jor- 
dan—Richard N. Viets. ■ 

jader of Jordan, 25 years ago, that the 
ilues and principles on which your na- 
|>n's foundations were created were the 
;.me ones which are so dear to the 
|rabs and which were the foundations 
the Arab awakening and resolve from 
! e beginnings of this century. 

It was my commitment to those 
sals and principles that prompted me 
; proudly seek the establishment and 
nsolidation of a friendship between 
t nations a quarter of a century ago. 
eaningful and dynamic relations must 
ways be based on mutual understand- 
J. 'throughout these eventful years, 
e been totally committed to both the 
use of the Arab people, which is my 
use and motivation, and to a realiza- 
n that it is an honorable and just 

cause. I deemed it my duty to present it 
and defend it and explain it to the best 
of my ability. 

I'm a firm believer in the proverb 
that says you can hide the truth from all 
the people half the time, half the people 
all the time, but not all of the people all 
of the time, and that justice must in- 
evitably, finally prevail. We must not 
permit the distortions of others to 
become a barrier to the understanding 
on which our relationship is based. 

I know you to be a man of honor, 
dedicated to the highest of ideals and 
principles. I know also that you have the 
courage of your convictions. You have 
displayed this throughout your public life 
and, because of it, have the respect of 
those who know you. I am confident that 
working together with all who truly seek 

peace and security lor the people of the 
Middle East, that these qualities will 
provide the source of strength which 
that goal requires. 

At this most turbulent and critical of 
times, I see in jeopardy not only Arab 
rights and legitimate interests but a 
threat to the very Arab identity and the 
rights of future Arab generations. I also 
see the larger threats to world peace, as 
well as to the vital interests of all those 
concerned with the security of our 
region, including the United States of 

I hope that at this time I shall be 
able to present our case convincingly in 
the interest of us all and thus achieve 
greater mutual understanding. In doing 
so, we can pave the way toward formu- 
lating proper policies and build once 
more lasting and strengthened relations 
between us, based on clear and solid 
foundations. It's a great task and a 
great challenge. It is, indeed, a duty. 
Despite the difficulties that surround us 
at this most critical juncture, I am opti- 
mistic, and I am determined. I am hope- 
ful that upon my return home, I shall be 
able to carry to my people and to my 
colleagues at the next Arab summit 
promising impressions and favorable 

I can but do my best in these coming 
days. I hope it will be adequate, for 
what is at stake is both of our national 
interests and the future of so many. I 
am confident that on the basis of our 
long, close friendship and with courage, 
dedication, and God's blessing, we 
can — and, indeed, must — successfully 
meet the challenge before us. 

We are deeply in your debt for your 
friendship and the warmth of your 
welcome. May God bless you, protect 
you, guide your steps in leading the 
great American people toward a 
brighter future and in serving the cause 
of all mankind. 

'Made on the South Lawn of the White 
House (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 9, 1981, 
which also includes toasts made at the state 
dinner on Nov. 2 and remarks by the Presi- 
dent and the King upon the latter's departure 
from the White House on Nov. 3). ■ 


nuary 1982 




Use of Chemical Weapons in Asia 

by Richard R. Burt 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Arms Control, Oceans, International 
Operations, and Environment of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
November 10, 1981. Mr. Burt is Director 
of the Bureau of Politico-Military 
Affairs. 1 

Witnesses appear before the Congress 
on a whole host of subjects. But there is 
no subject of greater urgency than that 
we are here to discuss today. Over the 
past 5 years and perhaps longer, 
weapons outlawed by mankind, weapons 
successfully banned from the battlefields 
of the industrialized world for over five 
decades, have been used against un- 
sophisticated and defenseless people in 
campaigns of mounting extermination 
which are being conducted in Laos, 
Kampuchea, and more recently in 

Reports of the use of lethal chemical 
weapons in Southeast Asia began to ap- 
pear in 1976, although the initial attacks 
may, in fact, predate that by several 
years. The sites of these first attacks 
were in remote highlands of Laos, 6 
weeks by jungle track from the nearest 
neutral territory. The targets were the 
villages of the highland tribes, such as 
the Hmong, traditionally resistant to the 
lowland Pathet Lao. The victims were 
the inhabitants of these villages — men, 
women, and children, particularly the 
children, who proved least able to resist 
the lethal effects of the poisons being 
employed against them. 

In succeeding years the attacks 
multiplied and spread, first to Kam- 
puchea and then to Afghanistan. 
Reports were necessarily fragmentary, 
incomplete, and episodic. The sources 
were the victims themselves or the 
refugee workers, doctors, nurses, and 
journalists who had spoken with those 
who survived the long trek from the 
deserted villages, the poisoned wells, 
and the deadly fruit of their homeland to 
safe havens in Thailand. 

As information accumulated, it was 
clear to the U.S. Government that some- 
thing important and sinister was occur- 
ring, but it was not clear precisely what. 
Repeated stories from rural peoples in 
widely separated regions, in different 
countries, all correlated with each other. 
This made it impossible to discount 
these reports as self-serving inventions 
by dissident elements in conflict with the 
local regime. Yet while, over time, we 

felt compelled to credit these reports as 
true, we remained puzzled by them for 
two reasons: 

First, because analysis of samples 
taken from the areas of attack — samples 
of vegetation, clothing, and human 
tissue — had shown no detectable traces 
of any known chemical agent; and 

Second, because the extent and se- 
quence of the signs and symptoms 
reported were also inconsistent with the 
effects of any known chemical agent or 
combination of such agents. 

In 1979, despite these remaining 
gaps in our evidence, the State Depart- 
ment, with the support of other agen- 
cies, began to take several important 

• We set up an interagency commit- 
tee to coordinate the government's work 
on chemical weapons use and worked 
with the intelligence community to 
devote greater resources to the develop- 
ment and analysis of information on the 

• We began to brief other govern- 
ments on this issue and to encourage 
them to develop and share with us their 
own information on these attacks. 

• We began to express our concerns 
publicly and to seek wider international 

As a result of these steps, we suc- 
ceeded last fall in securing a favorable 
vote in the U.N. General Assembly- 
over the vehement opposition of the 
U.S.S.R., Vietnam, and their allies- 
mandating a U.N. investigation of 
reports of chemical weapons use. 

A second result of these steps was 
the decision, by a group of U.S. Govern- 
ment scientists and experts on the U.S. 
interagency committee on chemical 
weapons use, to take a fresh look at 
reporting on chemical weapons use from 
the beginning and, in particular, to re- 
examine the pattern of the attacks and 
the resultant symptoms. 

Pattern of Attacks and Symptoms 

Many of the reported attacks, particular- 
ly in Laos, did follow a pattern— not an 
invariable pattern but one with consis- 
tent elements from report to report. 
These attacks were conducted by low, 
slow-flying aircraft, sometimes identified 
as an AN-2— a Soviet biplane used as a 
crop duster in the U.S.S.R. The plane 
would release a cloud, often described as 
yellow, sometimes orange, red, or other 
tints. The cloud would descend upon a 

village or upon people in the neighboring 
rice paddies. The cloud seemed to be 
made up of small particles which would 
make sounds, when falling on rooftops 
or vegetation, similar to that made by 
rain. It came to be called, by its victims, 
the "yellow rain." 

For those directly exposed to this 
yellow rain, its effect was quick and 
dramatic. They would experience an ear 
ly onset of violent itching, vomiting, diz- 
ziness, and distorted vision. Within a 
short time they would vomit blood- 
tinged material, then large quantities of 
bright red blood. Within an hour they 
would die, apparently of shock and the 
massive loss of blood from the stomach. 

Those on the periphery of the at- 
tack, or under shelter, or those who 
returned to the village after an attack 
and ate contaminated, food, would ex- 
perience similar symptoms over a longei 
period, accompanied by bloody diarrhea. 
These people, too, would often die- 
after a week or two of agony— of 

These symptoms in this order canno 
be explained by positing the use of any 
known chemical agent, either of the 
blistering type, such as the mustard gas 
of World War I, or of the more modern 
nerve agents. Similar symptoms, how- 
ever, have been reported in natural out- 
breaks of toxin poisoning of a certain 
type, specifically trichothecene toxins. 
Toxins are biologically produced 
chemical substances, poisons which ap- 
pear in nature, on grain for instance. In 
some locales these pose serious hazards 
to public health. 

The U.S. Government scientists and 
experts on the chemicals weapons use 
committee combined their hypothesis of 
trichothecene poisoning based upon the 
symptomalogy of reported chemical 
weapons attacks with a review of the 
literature which revealed that the Sovie 
Union had a long experience in the field 
of trichothecene toxicology, and had 
done much research, including research 
into the massive production of trichothe 
cene toxins. Some such research had, in 
fact, been done in Soviet institutes 
under military control and with connec- 
tions to the Soviet chemical weapons 
program. We concluded, therefore, that 
we should begin to look for evidence of 
possible toxin use. As a first step in this 
direction, we started to reanalyze 
samples already tested for other 
chemical agents for the presence of 

So far I have been citing evidence 
mainly from Southeast Asia and par- 
ticularly Laos, where the yellow rain at- 
tacks were first reported and where 
they have been conducted most 


Department of State Bulletii 


systematically. In Kampuchea growing 
•eports in recent years suggest that a 
vide range of chemical warfare agents 
ire in use, including "yellow rain." 
Cyanide, for instance, has been 
liscovered in wells. Vietnamese soldiers 
lave been captured poisoning the wells 
)f refugee camps on the Thai border. 

In Afghanistan, too, the evidence of 
:hemical weapons use has been rising. 
iVe are today in much the same posi- 
;ion — in terms of our ability to establish 
i pattern of such use and to identify 
specific agents being employed in 
Afghanistan — as we were in 1979 
•egarding Southeast Asia. We have 
lumerous eyewitness reports — of vic- 
;ims, of journalists — we have sensitive 
ntelligence of technical and human 
>rigin, and we have testimony of those 
vho have fought on the Soviet side. 
Based upon this information, we are cer- 
ain that chemical weapons are being 
lsed in Afghanistan. These include ir- 
ritants, new and as yet unidentified in- 
:apacitants, and familiar lethal agents, 
ncluding nerve gas. A number of 
brmer Afghan military officers, trained 
n the Soviet Union in chemical warfare, 
lave identified lethal agents brought in- 
:o Afghanistan, have pinpointed the 
sites where these are stored, and have 
specified when they have been used, 
rhese reports are corroborated by 
'eports from refugees and victims of 
;hese same attacks. 

'hysical Evidence in Southeast Asia 

Ne do not, as yet, have physical 
:vidence of chemical warfare in Afghani- 
stan; in Southeast Asia we do. The first 
set of samples we subjected to test for 
richothecene toxins was taken from a 
tillage in Kampuchea. It was collected 
vithin a day of an attack on the village 
vhich killed people in the same brutal 
nanner I have described. The results of 
hat analysis, as you are already aware, 
showed that: 

• The leaf and stem in question con- 
ained levels of trichothecene mycotox- 
ns 20 times higher than that found in 
latural outbreaks; 

• The trichothecene mycotoxins 
bund do not occur naturally in the com- 
)ination identified in Southeast Asia; 

• In parts of the world where these 
nycotoxins do appear naturally, they do 
so in combination with certain other tox- 
ns which were not present in this sam- 
)le; and 

• The effect of these trichothecene 
nycotoxins on man and animals is the 
symptomatology I have described. These 
x)xins produce all the symptoms I have 

tanuary 1982 

mentioned, and they are not known to 
produce any symptoms not reported. 
The fit, in other words, was perfect. 

Others here are better qualified to 
discuss the technical process of analysis 
and to interpret the results for you. The 
significance of this discovery, however, 
can be simply stated. We had solved the 
mystery. We had fitted together the jig- 
saw puzzle which had bedeviled us for 5 
years. We now knew what was causing 
the bizarre and brutal deaths of Laotian 
and Kampuchean villagers. We had 
ascertained that a completely new class 
of weapons had been developed and was 
in use. 

In the past few weeks we have com- 
pleted analysis of further samples from 
both Kampuchea and Laos. The results 
have confirmed our earlier findings and 
reinforce the conclusions we have drawn 
from them. One of these new samples 
was of water, taken from the same 
Kampuchean village at the same time as 
the set of leaves and stems, which was 
first analyzed positively for trichothe- 
cenes. The other two samples are from 
sites of separate attacks in Laos, one of 
which was provided to us for analysis by 
Congressman Jim Leach [of Iowa]. 

All three of these samples reveal 
very high quantities of trichothecene 
mycotoxins, quantities even higher than 
in the first sample. Both of the samples 
of yellow powder from Laos were 
scraped from rocks, not naturally a 
medium for high levels of toxins. One of 
the Laos samples, for example, con- 
tained 150 parts per million of T 2 toxin. 
This is almost 50 times higher than the 
level of T 2 in the original sample from 
Kampuchea. The water sample from 
Kampuchea contained 66 parts per 
million of deoxynivalenol. 

In addition to samples collected from 
sites of reported attacks, we have also 
obtained samples of background soil and 
vegetation of the same species as 
originally tested from near the same 
area in Kampuchea. These were tested 
by the same analytical technique and 
found to be free of any trichothecenes, 
thus further confirming the absence of 
natural occurrence of these toxins in 
that region. 

Dr. Watson [Army Surgeon 
General's office] is prepared to discuss 
the detailed results of these latest tests, 
and their significance. Again, however, 
the basic conclusion is a straightforward 
one: We have confirmed the use of toxin 
weapons in Laos as well as Kampuchea. 

Ever since the U.S. Government 
began to voice its concerns over reports 
of chemical weapons use, critics have 
demanded that we produce the smoking 
gun. The testimony of victims, of 
witnesses, or refugee military officers 

who had engaged in chemical warfare 
activities, and the technical intelligence 
was not enough. Those who did not 
believe said they would not believe — un- 
less we produced a smoking gun, 
physical proof. 

We now have the smoking gun. We 
now have four separate pieces of 
physical evidence. We may soon have 
more as, I regret to say, chemical at- 
tacks have been reported in Laos and 
Kampuchea within the last month. We 
are taking every step to make this evi- 
dence widely available in order that 

We have confirmed 
the use of toxin weapons 
in Laos as well as 

others can form their own conclusions. 
There will always be those who will not 
believe. We are persuaded, however, 
that any person, any government, any 
journalist who approaches this issue 
with an open mind, who travels to the 
borders of conflict and seeks out victims 
and those who have treated them, that 
anyone who conducts his own inquiry, 
will come to the same conclusions we 

Having answered one question which 
bedeviled us for 5 years, we have 
opened up a new set of unanswered 
questions. Toxins are one type of 
chemical weapons in use in Southeast 
Asia. But there are other chemical war- 
fare agents in use there and in Afghani- 
stan, which we have yet to identify. The 
trichothecene mycotoxins we have 
discovered are a highly lethal mixture. 
But we are not certain that this is the 
only type of toxins in use, and we are 
not certain precisely why this combina- 
tion has been chosen or what other com- 
binations we may yet discover. 

We are also addressing ourselves to 
the question of why toxins have been 
developed and used as a weapon, when 
other lethal chemical warfare agents are 
available, off the shelf, so to speak. 

There seem a variety of factors that 
make toxin weapons particularly effec- 
tive against the rural, defenseless 
peoples of nations like Laos and Kam- 
puchea. The violence of the death— with 
victims experiencing severe vomiting, 
diarrhea, extreme irritation of the eyes 
and skin and respiratory system, and 



often dying rapidly; the ease in which 
the powder can be carefully applied to a 
limited area; and the survival rate of 
those on the periphery, who can report 
what they have seen, all contribute to 
making this type of weapon suitable for 
driving people from their homes and 
villages and insuring that they stay 
away. The limited protection needed by 
those who must handle this material — 
gloves and a simple face mask, as op- 
posed to a complete protective suit, and 
the simple method of delivery, such as 
crop-dusting aircraft — contributes to its 
attractiveness as an effective weapon of 
terror. Finally, the difficulty in detecting 
and identifying the toxins contributes to 
its attractiveness. It has, after all, taken 
the U.S. Government, with all the tech- 
nical resources at its disposal, 5 years 
and many thousands of man-hours to 
discover the true nature of "yellow rain." 

Issue of Responsibility 

I have so far addressed the question of 
chemical weapons use but not the issue 
of who is responsible for their use. The 
Soviet Union is, of course, directly in- 
volved in the fighting in Afghanistan 
and thus in the use of chemical weapons 
in that country. In Laos and Kam- 
puchea, on the other hand, these 
weapons would seem to be employed by 
indigenous forces — the Vietnamese, 
Laotians, and Kampucheans. 
Nonetheless, the links to the Soviet 
Union are strong. 

• The Soviets are providing exten- 
sive military assistance and advice in 
Laos, Kampuchea, and to the Viet- 
namese forces fighting there. The 
Soviets certainly know what is happen- 
ing and are in a position to stop it if 
they chose. 

• The Soviets are advising and con- 
trolling chemical warfare activity in 
Southeast Asia. Soviet chemical experts 
have inspected a number of chemical 
weapons storage facilities there. Both 
lethal and nonlethal chemicals are be- 
lieved to be stored at these sites and are 
transported between storage facilities 
and ordnance camps or field use areas 
as needed. 

• There exists, in so far as we are 
aware, no facilities in Southeast Asia 
capable of producing the mold and ex- 
tracting the mycotoxins in the quantities 
in which they are being used. 

• Such facilities do exist in the 
Soviet Union, including microbiological 
plants under military control and with 
heavy military guard. 

• The Soviets have resisted every 

effort to mount an impartial investiga- 
tion of chemical weapons use in South- 
east Asia and Afghanistan. 

For over 2 years we have sought, 
and failed to receive, from the Soviet 
Union an explanation of the anthrax out- 
break at Sverdlovsk. We have also 
raised with the Soviet Union our con- 
cerns regarding chemical weapons use in 
Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. More 
recently, we have raised these issues 
again in the context of new information 
on the use of toxins. We have still not 
received a substantive response. 

The use of toxins as warfare agents 
in Southeast Asia has grave implications 
for present and future arms control ar- 
rangements. As biologically produced 
chemical substances, toxins fall within 
the prohibitions of both the 1925 Geneva 
protocol, forbidding the use of chemical 
weapons in warfare, and the 1972 Bio- 
logical Weapons Convention, which for- 
bids the production, stockpiling, or 
transfer of toxin weapons. These agree- 
ments, signed by both the Soviet Union 
and Vietnam, and the customary inter- 
national law, which has developed out of 
the former, are being flagrantly 

A common feature of the Geneva 
protocol and the Biological Weapons 
Convention is that neither contains any 
provisions for verification and neither 
contains adequate mechanisms for 
resolving issues of compliance. It is too 
early to determine the full consequences 
of the use of chemical and toxin warfare 
agents for future arms control arrange- 
ments. There should be no doubt, how- 
ever, that the U.S. Government will in- 
sist that any future arms control agree- 
ments contain whatever provisions are 
needed to permit verification and to in- 
sure that questions of compliance are 
dealt with seriously. The day the United 
States signs unverifiable arms control 
agreements is over. Let us hope that the 
day when others urge us to do so in the 
cause of relaxed tensions or increased 
international goodwill is over as well. 
For nothing increases tension or poisons 
goodwill more than the lack of com- 
pliance with agreements concluded. 

U.S. Steps 

Let me next turn to the steps we have 
taken as a result of the new information 
on toxin use. As I have noted we have 
raised this issue again with the Soviet 
Union, to no effect. We have raised the 
issue with Vietnam and Laos, also with- 
out effect. We have made our evidence 
available to the United Nations and to 
all its member countries. We have sent 

our experts to a number of European 
capitals and to New York, where they 
met with the U.N. experts. We have in- 
dicated our hope that the U.N. experts 
continue their inquiry and travel at leasl 
to all of those countries neighboring the 
scenes of conflict — they have just visitec 
Thailand, and Pakistan has offered an 
invitation as well — to interview refugees 
and other sources. We have also en- 
couraged other nations and other 
private organizations, including journal- 
ists, to mount their own inquiries into 
what is going on in Southeast Asia and 

Our objective is to stop these at- 
tacks. We will keep this issue before the 
world community and on the interna- 
tional agenda as long as we need to do 
so. For the present, we believe priority 
should be given to the U.N. inquiry. A 
vote in the General Assembly on 
whether to extend the mandate for that 
investigation will be taken in the next 6 
weeks. It is very important that this be 

We are also reviewing other means 
to focus world opinion on this issue. If 
we are to succeed, we must make sure 
this is not simply perceived as a 
U.S. -Soviet contest from which others 
can disengage. This means we must in- 
sure our evidence is made as widely 
available as possible, while avoiding any 
appearance of engaging in a propagand; 
campaign. For if our efforts are to have 
any utility, others must take this infor- 
mation as seriously as we. 

There is reason they should. For 
over 50 years, as I have said, chemical 
weapons have been successfully banned 
from the battlefields of the industrialize 
world. This success is due, I expect, as 
much to the deterrent effect of possible 
retaliation as to respect for the sanctity 
of international law. What is going on 
today in Afghanistan and Southeast 
Asia is not an East-West issue. It is an 
issue of universal import with particulai 
consequences for those countries least 
prepared to defend against the use of 
chemical and biological agents. It is our 
task to put our information at the 
disposal of the world community. It is 
the response of the world community— 
not just that of the U.S. Government, it 
friends, and allies — which will, in the 
end, determine whether these attacks 
continue and proliferate or are halted 

*The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Offio 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 


Department of State Bulleti 


The Impact of 
International Terrorism 

ty Frank H. Perez 

Address before the "Conference on 
Violence and Extremism: A Leadership 
lesponse" in Baltimore on October 29, 
981. Mr. Perez is Acting Director of the 
Office for Combatting Terrorism. 

rhe decade of the 1970s has been 
[escribed as the terror decade. Since we 
>egan keeping statistics in 1968, there 
vere 6,700 international terrorist in- 
idents through 1980 in which 3,700 
>eople were killed and about 7,500 
mounded. This violence continues to 
iscalate annually, and this trend exhibits 
io signs of abating. During 1980 there 
vere 760 international terrorist in- 
idents, which resulted in more casu- 
tlties than in any year since we began 
:eeping statistics. Last year 642 people 
vere killed in international terrorist at- 
acks; 1,078 were wounded. The statis- 
ts last year reflect the trend over the 
>ast few years toward increasing death 
ind injury from terrorist attacks. 
American citizens and U.S. interests re- 
nain a primary target — of the 760 acts, 
!78, or 38%, were directed against 
Americans or American property. 

Terrorism is an ever-growing men- 
ice to the civilized community of na- 
ions. It is an assault on civilization itself 
,nd threatens our vital national interests 
.s well of those of our closest allies and 
riends. The terrorist believes that by 
nurdering, bombing, and kidnapping, he 
an damage or destroy established in- 
titutions and bring about the radical 
hanges he seeks. Terrorism is abnormal 
lecause it frequently chooses as its 
argets and its weapons innocent non- 
ombatants — passengers on airplanes; 
hildren in a schoool or on a bus; wor- 
hippers in a church, synagogue, or 
nosque; businessmen kidnapped for ran- 
om; and so often the indiscriminate kill- 
ig and injury of people who happen to 
>e at the scene of a terrorist incident, 
'he victims are cynically used as tools to 
ain resources to support the terrorists' 
lfrastructure, to create fear and ap- 
rehension in the population, to black- 
lail governments, and to promote the 
Brrorists' cause by the publicity which 
lways accompanies spectacular terrorist 

Terrorism is a threat to the social 

and political fabric of Western demo- 
cratic societies, as well as a clear viola- 
tion of the human rights of the individ- 
ual. By attempting to destablize or 
destroy established institutions, the ter- 
rorist is seeking to bring down the very 
structures within society which foster 
and nurture human rights. A contemp- 
orary example is Spain where the ac- 
tions of Basque terrorists threaten to 
bring down the still fragile democracy 
won by the Spanish people after so 
many years of dictatorship. The replace- 
ment of the civilian constitutional 
government by a military regime in 
Turkey last year was due in large 
measure to the inability of the civilian 
government to cope with the serious ter- 
rorism problems confronting Turkey. 

Attacks on diplomats and diplomatic 
facilities have been increasing steadily 
over the past decade, and this trend has 
adversely affected the conduct of 
diplomacy. Since 1968 there have been 
more than 3,000 attacks on diplomats 
worldwide, with more than 300 diplo- 

Terrorism is a 
threat to the social and 
political fabric of 
Western democratic 
societies, as well as a 
clear violation of the 
human rights of the 

mats killed and more than 800 wounded; 
20 ambassadors from 12 countries have 
been assassinated, including 5 American 
ambassadors. Whereas there were 200 
attacks worldwide against diplomats in 
1970, in 1980 there were twice as many. 
Last year alone witnessed over 100 at- 
tacks against U.S. diplomats and 
facilities. There were some 70 forcible 
incursions into diplomatic facilities 
around the world between 1970 and 
1980. Interestingly enough, more than 
half of them occurred since 1979 when 
our embassy in Tehran was seized, sug- 
gesting that successful terrorist act 

created a model for other terrorists to 

A recent phenomenon has been the 
resurgence of right-wing terrorism after 
a period of relative inactivity. Right- 
wing terrorism is usually perpetrated 
anonymously by groups with few or no 
articulated goals. These groups tend to 
be motivated by a desire to terrorize or 
destroy specific targets. Ring-wing ter- 
rorists were responsible for last year's 
bombings at the Oktoberfest in Munich 
and at the Bologna train station, both of 
which caused mass casuaiities and at- 
tracted much international attention. 

There has also been an increase in 
terrorism directed against religious 
figures and facilities. The attack on 
Pope John Paul II; bombings at 
churches and mosques in the Philippines 
and in Egypt; attacks on synagogues in 
Paris, Vienna, and most recently Ant- 
werp; and the assassination attempt on 
the Greek Catholic patriarch in Lebanon 
in February are all examples of this 

Terrorism is a global phenomenon, 
although interestingly enough it does 
not seem to be a problem in the Soviet 
Union or in the countries of East Euro- 
pean allies. Western Europe, on the 
other hand, remains a battleground for 
international and domestic terrorists. 
Recently we have witnessed the re- 
emergence of terrorist activity directed 
against U.S. officials in Western Europe 
with the bombing at Ramstein Air Base, 
the assassination attempt on the U.S. 
Army European Commander in Heidel- 
berg, and the attack on the residence of 
our consul general in Frankfurt. The 
level of violence has escalated to un- 
precedented levels in Central America 
and has resulted in the death and injury 
of a number of American citizens this 
year. Terrorism in the Middle East also 
continues at exceedingly high levels, 
especially in Lebanon, where a recent 
series of car bombs resulted in the 
deaths of many innocent people. Arme- 
nian terrorists have increased their at- 
tacks on Turkish diplomats, as evidenced 
by the recent takeover of the Turkish 
consulate in Paris. To date, some 20 
Turkish diplomats and members of their 
families have been killed by Armenian 
terrorists. The savage attack on Presi- 
dent Sadat by Muslim extremists sad- 
dened the civilized world. These are but 
a few examples of recent terrorist acts 
which unfortunately are likely to con- 

The United States is not immune 
from terrorism, although the level of 
terrorist violence is relatively low in 

nuary 1982 



comparison to the threat faced abroad. 
The major domestic terrorist group is 
the FALN— the Puerto Rican National 
Liberation Group— which has been ac- 
tive in bombings and assassinations. The 
principal cause of current U.S. domestic 
terrorism, however, stems from terrorist 
attacks against foreign government 
establishments by dissident elements. 
For example, anti- Yugoslav Croatian 
separatists have engaged in terrorism in 
this country, and earlier this year eight 
members of the Croatian National 
Resistance were arrested on charges of 
arson, murder, and extortion. Some 21 
Croatians and a lesser number of Serbs 
are now incarcerated in U.S. jails 
because of their terrorist activities. 
Armenian terrorists were responsible 
for the recent bombing of the Turkish 
mission to the United Nations. Anti- 
Castro Cuban exiles have carried out 
terrorist attacks in the United States, 
including the murder of a Cuban U.N. 
diplomat in New York last year as well 
as the bombings of the Soviet and 
Cuban missions to the United Nations. 

U.S. Strategy 

The Reagan Administration has adopted 
a firm policy to combat international ter- 
rorism. We will resist terrorist blackmail 
and pursue terrorists with the full force 
of the law. We will not pay ransom, nor 
release prisoners, and we will not 
bargain for the release of hostages. To 
make concessions to terrorist blackmail 
only jeopardizes the lives and freedom of 
additional innocent people. We en- 
courage other governments to take a 

We will not pay ransom, 
nor release prisoners, 
and we will not bargain 
for the release of hos- 
tages. . . . We encourage 
other governments to 
take a similarly strong 
stance on terrorism. 

similarly strong stance on terrorism. 
When American citizens are taken 
hostage, we look to the host government 
to exercise its responsibility under inter- 
national law to protect them, but at the 
same time we urge the government not 

to give in to terrorist blackmail. This 
Administration has made it clear that 
the United States will use all political, 
economic, diplomatic, and military 
resources at our disposal to respond to 
state-supported acts of terrorism 
directed against us such as we recently 
experienced in Iran. Our recent closing 
of the Libyan People's Bureau in 
Washington was a warning to Libya 
that we will not tolerate their terrorist 

The U.S. Government's strategy for 
combatting international terrorism in- 
volves three basic elements: 

• Measures to prevent terrorist at- 

• Measures for effectively reacting 
to terrorist incidents; and 

• Seeking an international consen- 
sus against terrorism. 

In seeking to prevent acts of ter- 
rorism, we have placed great emphasis 
on improving our intelligence on ter- 
rorist groups. If we have warning of an 
impending terrorist attack, we can take 
the necessary preventive measures to 
thwart it. We are, in fact, regularly 
receiving reports of possible terrorist 
acts which have allowed us to take ap- 
propriate countermeasures. 

The U.S. Government is also giving 
great emphasis to enhancing the securi- 
ty of our personnel and facilities abroad. 
We have undertaken a security enhance- 
ment program for our overseas posts 
which is designed to reduce their 
vulnerability. In the decade of the 1970s 
we stressed protection against small ter- 
rorist attacks. However, as a result of 
our experiences in Tehran, Islamabad, 
and Tripoli in 1979, we are now also 
stressing defense against mob attacks. 
We are constructing safe havens in our 
embassies and consulates, improving 
building access controls, installing 
nonlethal denial systems, and concen- 
trating on other life-saving measures. 
We have already conducted major 
surveys at our most threatened posts, 
and major construction projects are now 
getting underway. Our plan over the 
next few years is to significantly 
upgrade security at about 125 of our 
most threatened posts. 

We have also instituted a 2-day 
seminar called "Coping With Violence 
Abroad." All officials serving abroad are 
required to attend this course, and the 
adult dependents over 14 years of age 
are also invited to attend. This course 
advises our people on how to reduce 
their vulnerability to terrorist attacks, 
how to protect their residences, and also 
what to expect if they are taken 

Despite our efforts to avoid acts of 
terrorism, we are still likely to be faced 
with terrorist violence. It is, therefore, 
important to have a capability to re- 
spond quickly and effectively. All of the 
Federal Government agencies which 
may have to react to acts of terrorism 
have developed response capabilities. Al 
of them have command centers, and 
these are linked together to manage an; 
particular crisis. These agencies also 
conduct various contingency exercises tj 
test our response capabilities against a 
variety of different scenarios. 

Another important aspect of our 
response capability is the ability to re- 
spond with force should that be neces- 
sary. In the United States, most major 
cities have SWAT [special weapons and 
tactics] teams, and each district of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations has its 
own SWAT team. The rescue missions 
which were conducted at Entebbe, 
Mogadishu, and the Iranian Embassy in 
London last year, as well as a number c 
aircraft incidents, emphasize the need 
for an effective assault capability shoulc 
force prove necessary. The United 
States has dedicated military forces 
which could be used should the need 
arise. Late last year the Department of 
Defense announced the creation of the 
Joint Counter-Terrorist Task Force. 
Although we consider the use of force i 
resolving a terrorist incident a measure 
of last resort, it is important to have 
these capabilities should they be needed 

The Need for International 

No nation can cope with international 
terrorism by itself. International coop- 
eration is essential if we are to deal 
effectively with the threat. The interna- 
tional community, through internationa 
organizations such as the United Na- 
tions, must act together to express its 
complete and unified condemnation of 
terrorism, especially those acts which 
are sponsored by governments them- 
selves. We are working with other na- 
tions to establish a consensus under in- 
ternational law that acts of terrorism 
are equally abhorrent to all nations of 
the world and that those persons who 
commit such acts must be brought to 
justice. The United States has support* 
existing U.N. conventions outlawing te: 
rorist acts: the Hague convention 
against hijacking, the Montreal conven- 
tion against aircraft sabotage, the New 
York Convention for the Prevention an 
Punishment of Crimes Against Interna 
tionally Protected Persons, the Conven 
tion on the Physical Protection of 


Department of State Bullet 


fuclear Materials, and the Convention 
.gainst the Taking of Hostages. We 
ave encouraged all nations to become 
arties to these conventions, which 
stablish an international scheme whose 
bjective is to bring terrorists to justice. 
le are exploring ways of strengthening 
lese conventions to include consultative 
id enforcement mechanisms. The 
nited States also favors the drafting of 
iditional U.N. conventions to cover 
lose terrorist acts, such as assassina- 
ons, which are not included in existing 

The United States also has been 
orking closely with its economic sum- 
it partners— Canada, the United 
ingdom, West Germany, Italy, France, 
id Japan — on measures to deal with in- 
rnational terrorism. At the most re- 
snt summit in Ottawa last July, a state- 
ent on terrorism was issued calling for 
lhanced cooperation on terrorism. It 
so proposed the suspension of all 
ghts to and from Afghanistan in im- 
ementation of the Bonn declaration on 
jacking, unless Afghanistan meets its 
ternational obligations to bring to 
stice the hijackers of a Pakistani 
rliner hijacked last March. The Bonn 
;claration was adopted by the summit 
>wers in 1978. 

Government-condoned and -spon- 
red acts of terrorism are a particularly 
jegious form of terrorism. Countries 
ch as the Soviet Union, Cuba, and 
bya— which directly or indirectly spon- 
r, train, finance, or arm ter- 
rists— must be made to understand 
at their bahavior is unacceptable in a 
)rld seeking peace, prosperity, and 


conclusion, let me emphasize that the 
oblem of dealing with international 
rrorism is complex and difficult. There 
no single answer or solution to be 
and. It is clear, however, that the 
lited States must work with other 
e-minded nations to reduce the cycle 

terrorist violence, death, and destruc- 
>n that now plagues so many parts of 
e world. If the civilized world fails to 
al effectively with this vexing prob- 
n, the terrorists will only be encour- 
ed to continue their violent criminal 
ts in the hope of bringing about the 
iical political changes which they 
ik. Above all we would not want to 
? the terrorism which is plaguing the 
ddle East, Western Europe, and 
.tin America spill over to our 
ores. ■ 

Afghan Situation and 
Implications for Peace 

Following are a statement by U.S. 
Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane 
J. Kirkpatrick made in the General 
Assembly November 18, 1981, the text of 
the resolution adopted by the General 
Assembly on November 18, and a Depart- 
ment statement of November 19. 

NOV. 18, 1981 1 

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
launched on Christmas Eve nearly 2 
years ago, was a momentous event that 
altered the climate and, indeed, the 
course of world politics. The invasion 
was a grave violation of the U.N. 
Charter, which enjoins all members to 
"... refrain in their international rela- 
tions from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or politi- 
cal independence of any state. ..." As 
such, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
shook the very foundations of world 

The far-reaching consequences of 
this event should by now be apparent to 
all of us. It had a shattering effect upon 
the prospects for the continued stability 
of South Asia and the Persian Gulf, 
deepening anxieties throughout this vital 
region and raising the specter of a wider 
conflict. It also severely aggravated ten- 
sions between East and West. More 
than any single event in recent years, 
the Soviet invasion impelled a wide- 
spread reassessment of the world situa- 
tion based upon a new and more sober 
appreciation of the danger that the 
policies of the Soviet Union now pose to 
global stability and world peace. The in- 
vasion thus marked a watershed in the 
postwar era, bringing to a definitive con- 
clusion a period of optimism concerning 
the evolution of Soviet policy and inten- 

Nowhere, of course, have the conse- 
quences been more immediately or 
harshly felt than in Afghanistan itself. 
No sector of Afghan society has been 
spared the consequences of the Soviet 
occupation and the ruthless effort to im- 
pose upon the Afghan people a Com- 
munist totalitarian system — an effort 
that began in 1978 with the initial Com- 
munist coup overthrowing the Daoud 
government. Almost 3 million people — 
about one-fifth of the entire Afghan 
population — have been forced to flee 

their country and now constitute the 
largest single refugee group in the 
world. Tens of thousands of people have 
been killed. Afghanistan's educated class 
has been decimated. Whole villages have 
been destroyed, their inhabitants killed 
or forced to flee. Mosques have been 
desecrated and religious leaders jailed or 
murdered. Schools have been turned in- 
to centers of political indoctrination. The 
country's economic and social infrastruc- 
ture of roads, power and communication 
networks, hospitals, and educational in- 
stitutions have been badly damaged and 
in many instances completely destroyed. 

It is rarely noted that Afghanistan 
made significant economic and social 
progress during the decade of 
democratic freedoms and representative 
government brought about the 1964 con- 
stitution. All this— and more— has now 
been undone. 

There have been many attempts in 
the past to conquer Afghanistan. But 
nothing in the country's long history — 
with the possible exception of the devas- 
tating attacks more than 750 years ago 
by Genghis Khan— resembles the 
destruction wreaked in Afghanistan 
since 1978. 

The Soviet Union and the Kabul 
regime have tried to conceal this 
destruction by sealing the country off 
from journalists and other foreign 
observers and from humanitarian 
organizations, such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross. Never- 
theless, the truth about the situation 
there and about the terrible human 
suffering is becoming known to the 

How far the Soviets are willing to 
go in their war against Afghanistan is 
indicated by the kind of weapons they 
have used there, including little booby- 
trap mines which the Soviets scatter by 
the thousands along the paths used by 
the refugees and other civilians. These 
mines are frequently disguised as or- 
dinary household items or toys. Chil- 
dren, naturally the least wary, are the 
ones most likely to pick them up. If they 
do, they risk being killed or having their 
limbs blown off. 

On April 10 of this year, the Soviet 
Union signed an international conven- 
tion prohibiting the use of such 
weapons. At the time, its permanent 
representative to the United Nations 

luary 1982 



called the convention "an illustrative ex- 
ample of the possibility of reaching 
agreements on measures aimed at curb- 
ing the arms race." The real "illustrative 
example," however, is contained in the 
Soviets' continued use in Afghanistan of 
the kind of antipersonnel weapons pro- 
hibited by the treaty. It is an example 
that illustrates both the character of the 
Soviet Union's involvement in Afghani- 
stan and its attitude — in this instance, 
at least — toward a treaty obligation. 

In this connection, there are many 
reports from refugees and other victims 
of the Soviet invasion that lethal and in- 
capacitating chemical weapons are being 
used in Afghanistan, in violation of both 
the Geneva protocol of 1925 and the Bio- 
logical Weapons Convention of 1972. 

It is not possible to justify the Soviet 
actions in Afghanistan according to any 
meaningful interpretation of interna- 
tional law. The sole exception to the pro- 
scription against the use of force in in- 
ternational relations is provided for in 
Article 51 of the charter, which affirms 
"... the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations. . . ." But not even the Soviet 
Union itself has suggested that it has 
been the victim of an armed attack. 

Moreover, it is hard to imagine how 
Afghanistan might conceivably have 
posed a threat to the Soviet Union. For 
decades the Soviet Union had pro- 
claimed to the whole world, repeatedly, 
that its relations with Afghanistan were 
a model of peaceful coexistence, a prime 
example of neighborly relations between 
a small country and a big country, each 
with different systems of government 
and social structures but living together 
in peace without interference. Since 
1921 the two countries had signed 
numerous treaties, affirming and 
reaffirming Moscow's respect for 
Afghanistan's independence and terri- 
torial integrity and promising noninter- 
ference in Afghan affairs. It should not 
be forgotten, furthermore, that Afghani- 
stan was a member of the nonaligned 
movement and was not involved in any 
relationships that Moscow might look 
upon with concern. 

How, then, could it have posed a 
threat? The argument is advanced that 
the Soviet Union felt threatened by the 
turmoil inside Afghanistan. But aside 
from student riots fomented by Babrak 
Karmal and his followers in 1965 and a 
brief period of unrest following the 
bloodless Daoud coup in 1973, there was 
no turmoil at all in Afghanistan before 
April 27, 1978— before, that is to say, 

NOV. 19, 198P 

Yesterday the U.N. General Assembly 
passed by a vote of 116 to 23 a resolu- 
tion calling for the immediate 
withdrawal of foreign troops from 
Afghanistan. It also called for restora- 
tion of independence and self- 
determination to that beleaguered coun- 
try and the right of the Afghan refugees 
to return. 

The resolution passed by an even 
larger margin or majority than two 
similar resolutions adopted by the 
General Assembly in 1980 opposing 
Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. 

This new action by the United Na- 
tions is a strong reaffirmation that the 
great majority of nations are unalterably 
opposed to this invasion and occupation 
of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and 
demand a settlement based on 
withdrawal of Soviet troops and respect 
for international law. 

the Communists violently seized power 
in Kabul and, with the help of growing 
numbers of Soviet "advisers," began for- 
cibly to impose upon the people of 
Afghanistan a foreign ideology and a 
totalitarian system. 

It is also suggested by apologists for 
the invasion that the Soviet Union 
feared that a tide of Islamic funda- 
mentalism might sweep from Afghani- 
stan into its central Asian provinces. 
But even if this were true, it would 
hardly justify the Soviet invasion. In 
fact, the Afghans are a devout people, 
but they have not tried to impose their 
beliefs on others, and historically they 
have allowed minority faiths to live 
peacefully within their midst. This at- 
titude of tolerance is characteristic of 
the Afghans except when their faith 
itself is attacked, as it now is by com- 
munism. They are not tolerant, nor 
should they be, of an attack upon their 
freedom, independence, and identity, of 
which their religion is an important part. 
But there should be no doubt whatso- 
ever that the threat in this instance is 
to — not from — the people of Afghani- 

The Soviet Union also claims, of 
course, that its forces were invited in by 
the Kabul regime, which invoked its 
right to self-defense under Article 51. 
But so far, neither the Soviet Union nor 

the Kabul regime has produced a shred 
of evidence to prove that such an invita 
tion was ever issued. It is hard to imag- 
ine what kind of evidence they could 
produce since, as we know, the invasion 
preceded the installation of Babrak Kar 
mal, who wasn't even in Afghanistan at 
the time his predecessor was over- 
thrown and killed by invading Soviet 
troops. Of late, Babrak Karmal has 
taken the line that the invitation was 
issued by the Afghan Communist Party 
This, of course, is actually an admission 
that the invitation was not issued by an 

The Kabul regime, moreover, has n 
legitimacy whatsoever in the eyes of thi 
Afghan people. It exists only by virtue 
of Soviet actions and is, in fact, merely 
an appendage of Moscow. Soviet persoi 
nel direct virtually all aspects of its ad- 
ministration, including the Ministries oi 
Foreign Affairs, Defense, Interior, Info 
mation and Culture, Justice, and Eco- 
nomic Planning. Since 1979 Soviet per- 
sonnel have also commanded the Afgha 
Army down to the brigade level and 
sometimes down to the company level. 
The Soviets even control Afghanistan's 
natural resources, in particular natural 
gas, which are extracted in a one-sided 
barter arrangement in exchange for 
goods used to sustain the Kabul regime 
Suspicions have been raised that th 
Kabul regime may also have acceded, ii 
a treaty signed earlier this year, to the 
annexation by the Soviet Union of at 
least a part of the Wakhan corridor, th 
narrow strip of land that joins Afghani 
stan with China. A de facto annexation 
has already taken place since the area- 
from which the indigenous Kirghiz trib 
have been forced to flee— is now under 
the control of the Soviet Army. 

Given the Kabul regime's utter sub 
servience to Moscow, it is hardly sur- 
prising that it should have no base of 
support among the Afghan people. It i 
propped up by 85,000 Soviet troops. Y 
the freedom fighters— poorly armed ai 
trained and virtually defenseless again; 
some of the most sophisticated weapor 
in the Soviet arsenal— have been able 
deny the Soviets control of perhaps 90 
of the countryside and have made ther 
contest many of the most important 
cities. In a desperate attempt to stem 
the disintegration of the Afghan Army 
the regime has offered many times nor 
mal pay to former enlisted men. Yet si 
they do not turn up, while draft-age m 
continue to slip out of the cities to join 
the resistance, and whole units of the 
army desert en masse. The regime has 


Department of State Bulle' 


•eatedly offered amnesty to refugees 
o would return to Afghanistan from 
le. Yet every week the refugee 
iters in Pakistan and Iran swell by 
i thousands. 

What is clear today was clear in 
f9. Then, as now, the Kabul regime 
s not threatened by an outside power, 
tifying defense under Article 51 but 
s, in fact, threatened by a popular 
•ising, a spontaneous popular uprising 
the nation — of the people in whom 
ionhood inheres, and solely inheres, 
;he absence of a legitimate govern- 
nt. It was an uprising against a 
;ime that had slaughtered its own 
>ple, destroyed their homes, sent 
lost half a million people fleeing into 
le, and delivered the country to an 
;n force — an uprising that continues 
this very day against the present 
ime and its Soviet masters. 

It is this uprising and this uprising 
ne that is justified to invoke the right 
self-defense, for it is defending the in- 
lendence and very existence of the 
jhan nation against a foreign and 
ital domination. 

Small wonder, then, that the Soviet 
ion is doing whatever it can to 
cure the truth about Afghanistan. 
ire is no other way to understand the 
,rge — repeated by the Soviet Foreign 
lister before this body in Septem- 
— that the real source of the conflict 
Afghanistan is foreign interference by 

United States and China. This 
,rge is ludicrous but also revealing, 

it shows the lengths the Soviet 

ion is forced to go to conceal the real 

ure of its policy. 

There are only two realities in 
jhanistan today; the Soviet occupa- 
i and the Afghan nation, and neither 
.ompatible with the other. The Soviet 
ion can conquer Afghanistan only by 
ninating the Afghan nation. This, the 
rid must not permit to happen, for if 
jhanistan is vanquished, no independ- 

nation will be safe. 

The draft resolution now before us, 
i its predecessors, seeks an end to the 
upation of Afghanistan. It calls for: 

• Immediate withdrawal of all 
eign troops; 

• Restoration of the sovereignty, 
ritorial integrity, and nonalignment of 

• Restoration of the right of the 
rhan people to choose their own form 
government and economic and social 
tern, free from outside intervention, 
rcion, or restraint; and 

• Return of the refugees to their 

My government is firmly committed 
to these terms. The struggle of the 
Afghan nation for survival is consistent 
with the basic and most cherished pur- 
poses of the United Nations, which are 
to protect national independence and to 
maintain world peace. 

It is only fitting, therefore, that the 
United Nations should affirm the basic 
and most cherished purpose of the 
Afghan nation, which is to regain its an- 
cient homeland so that it may once 
again be independent and live in peace. 

NOV. 18, 1981 2 

The General Assembly, 

Having considered the item entitled "The 
situation in Afghanistan and its implications 
for international peace and security," 

Recalling its resolutions ES-6/2 of 14 
January 1980 and 35/37 of 20 November 
1980, adopted at the sixth emergency special 
session and the thirty-fifth session, respec- 

Reaffirming the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations and the 
obligation of all States to refrain in their in- 
ternational relations from the threat or use of 
force against the sovereignty, territorial in- 
tegrity and political independence of any 

Reaffirming further the inalienable right 
of all peoples to determine their own form of 
government and to choose their own 
economic, political and social system free 
from outside intervention, subversion, coer- 
cion or constraint of any kind whatsoever, 

Gravely concerned at the continuing 
foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan, in 
contravention of the above principles, and its 
serious implications for international peace 
and security, 

Noting the increasing concern of the in- 
ternational community over the continued 
and serious sufferings of the Afghan people 
and over the magnitude of social and 
economic problems posed to Pakistan and 
Iran by the presence on their soil of millions 
of Afghan refugees, and the continuing in- 
crease in their numbers, 

Deeply conscious of the urgent need for a 
political solution of the grave situation in 
respect of Afghanistan, 

Taking note of the report of the 
Secretary -General, particularly of the ap- 
pointment of his Personal Representative, 

Recognizing the importance of the ini- 
tiatives of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference and the efforts of the Movement 
of Non-aligned Countries for a political solu- 
tion of the situation in respect of 

1. Reiterates that the preservation of the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, political in- 
dependence and non-aligned character of 
Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful solu- 
tion of the problem; 

2. Reaffirms the right of the Afghan peo- 
ple to determine their own form of govern- 
ment and to choose their economic, political 
and social system free from outside interven- 
tion, subversion, coercion or constraint of any 
kind whatsoever; 

3. Calls for the immediate withdrawal of 
the foreign troops from Afghanistan; 

4. Also calls upon all parties concerned 
to work for the urgent achievement of a 
political solution, in accordance with the pro- 
visions of the present resolution, and the 
creation of the necessary conditions which 
would enable the Afghan refugees to return 
voluntarily to their homes in safety and 

5. Renews its appeals to all States and 
national and international organizations to 
continue to extend humanitarian relief 
assistance, with a view to alleviating the 
hardship of the Afghan refugees, in co- 
ordination with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees; 

6. Expresses its appreciation of the ef- 
forts of the Secretary-General in the search 
for a solution to the problem and requests 
him to continue these efforts with a view to 
promoting a political solution, in accordance 
with the provisions of the present resolution, 
and the exploration of securing appropriate 
guarantees for non-use of force, or threat of 
use of force, against the political in- 
dependence, sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and security of all neighbouring States, on 
the basis of mutual guarantees and strict 
non-interference in each other's internal af- 
fairs and with full regard for the principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations; 

7. Requests the Secretary-General to 
keep Member States and the Security Council 
concurrently informed of the progress 
towards the implementation of the present 
resolution and to submit to Member States a 
report on the situation at the earliest ap- 
propriate opportunity; 

8. Decides to include in the provisional 
agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item 
entitled "The situation in Afghanistan and its 
implications for internal peace and security." 

*USUN press release 120. 

2 Adopted by the General Assembly on 
Nov. 18 by a vote of 116(U.S.)-23, with 12 

3 Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment spokesman Dean Fischer. ■ 

luary 1982 



Security Council Votes 
on Golan Heights 

Following are the text of U.N. 
Security Council resolution 497 adopted 
on December 1 7 opposing the Israeli 
Government's decision to annex the 
Golan Heights and a Department state- 
ment of December 18 supporting that 


The Security Council, 

Having considered the letter of 14 
December 1981 from the Permanent Repre- 
sentative of the Syrian Arab Republic con- 
tained in document S/14791, 

Reaffirming that the acquisition of terri- 
tory by force is inadmissible, in accordance 
with the United Nations Charter, the prin- 
ciples of international law, and relevant 
Security Council resolutions, 

1. Decides that the Israeli decision to im- 
pose its laws, jurisdiction and administration 
in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights is null 
and void and without international legal 

2. Demands that Israel, the occupying 
Power, should rescind forthwith its decision; 

3. Determines that all the provisions of 
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Pro- 
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 
12 August 1949 continue to apply to the 
Syrian territory occupied by Israel since June 

4. Requests the Secretary-General to 
report to the Security Council on the imple- 
mentation of this resolution within two weeks 
and decides that in the event of non- 
compliance by Israel, the Security Council 
would meet urgently, and not later than 5 
January 1982, to consider taking appropriate 
measures in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations. 


I have a statement on Israel's deci- 
sion on December 14, through Knesset 
legislation, to extend its law, jurisdic- 
tion, and administration to the occupied 
Golan region. As you know, we have 
stated that we do not recognize Israel's 
action, which we consider to be without 
international legal effect. Their action is 
inconsistent with both the letter and the 
spirit of U.N. Security Council Resolu- 
tions 242 and 338. We continue to 
believe that the final status of the Golan 
Heights can only be determined through 
negotiations between Syria and Israel 

based upon Resolutions 242 and 338. 

We, therefore, joined with the rest 
of the Security Council in voting for a 
resolution opposing Israel's action and 
making it clear it is without interna- 
tional legal effect. 

The Israeli action was taken with no 
advance notice to us or discussion with 
us. We are particularly disappointed 
that the Government of Israel took this 
action just as we were facing a serious 
political crisis in Poland and only a few 
weeks after we signed a memorandum 
of understanding on strategic coopera- 
tion. The spirit of that agreement ob- 
liged each party to take into considera- 
tion in its decisions the implications for 
the broad policy concerns of the other. 
We do not believe that spirit was upheld 
in the case of Israel's decision on the 

With this in mind, the President has 
instructed Secretary [Caspar S.] Wein- 

berger and Secretary Haig not to pro- 
ceed at this time with discussions intend- 
ed to implement the memorandum of 
understanding signed on November 30 
of this year. This means we will not hold 
next month's scheduled meeting of the 
coordinating council as set up in the 
memorandum of understanding. 

In addition, the President has decid- 
ed that the United States will not, for 
the moment, proceed with further 
discussions on some Israeli proposals for 
promoting Department of Defense pur- 
chases of defense-related goods and 
services in Israel, on authorizing Israel 
to use some FMS [foreign military sales] 
funds to purchase Israeli-produced goods 
and services, or on the possible use of 
FMS by third countries to purchase 
Israeli defense items and services. 

Adopted by unanimous vote. 
2 Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment spokesman Dean Fischer. ■ 

Libya: A Source of 
International Terrorism 

by Kenneth Adelman 

Statement made in the U.N. General 
Assembly on October 9, 1981. Am- 
bassador Adelman is Deputy U.S. 
Representative to the United Nations. 1 

In the space of a few minutes, it is 
scarcely possible even to outline an ade- 
quate, factual response to the vicious 
diatribe, to the tissue of lies delivered in 
this assembly of nations 2 days ago by 
the representative of Qadhafi's Libya. 

I speak for my delegation and my 
government, of course, but more than 
that, I speak for the American people 
and, indeed, for the tens of millions 
everywhere in the world who today are 
mourning the death of an authentic 
Arab hero, Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt, 
whose nobility and boundless courage in 
the great cause of peace will stand 
forever in such stark and devastating 
contrast to the violence, the destruction, 
the terrorism that are hallmarks of 
Qadhafi's Libya. 

It was Qadhafi, of course, who made 
a standing offer of $1 million for anyone 
able and willing to murder Anwar al- 
Sadat— an unprincipled incitement of 
vile criminality quite rare in the world 

aside from the acts by the likes of 
Ghengis Khan, Hitler, or Stalin. Yet it is 
the appropriate mark of one who has 
chosen to spearhead violence, aggres- 
sion, and terrorism in every corner of 
the world. That record is plain. It is 
grim. And it is documented many times 

The technique used by Libya is that 
of Orwellian inversion of the truth — at- 
tribution to my government of the very 
crimes against peace and justice and 
human rights of which Libya— on the 
record — is guilty beyond question. 

The Libyan representative spoke of 
the "terrorist nature" of my government 
its practice of "physical liquidation." The 
claim is outrageous. The source makes it 
more so. 

Funding Terrorism 

No reasonable person in this hall can 
any longer doubt that Libya is a major 
source for the funding of international 
terrorism. This funding is impossible to 
estimate accurately, but most accounts 
place it at hundreds of millions of dollars 

More than a dozen training camps 
are reportedly located in Libya for the 


Department of State Bulletir 


ining of expatriates, mostly Africans 
i Asians, in terrorist practices, 
cording to the scholar, Claire Ster- 
t, in The Terror Network — a work 
en with specifics — Qadhafi made his 
>t investment in Palestinian terrorism 
•oad by providing the funds, arms, 
i training for the Munich Olympic 
ssacre in 1972. 

The list goes on. He funded the 
ly-Libya Association until it was 
Jawed by the Italian Government as a 
rorist front. In charge of this associa- 
i was Claudio Mutti, one of Italy's 
>wn Nazi terrorists, who was jailed in 
iO for his alleged role in the Bologna 
Iroad station bombing. Mutti's close 
ociate, now serving a life sentence 

terrorism, had picked up a 100,000 

payoff from the Libyan Embassy in 
me just before gunning down two 
icemen in 1975. Mutti's heroes were 
ler and Mussolini and Qadhafi. The 
yans also funded the Fascist 
anguardia Nazionale, whose posters 
ke for themselves: "We are with you 
oic Arabs-Palestinian people, and not 
h the dirty, fat Jews." 

Today this terror network extends 
m Argentina through virtually all of 
stern Europe, to Indonesia, the 
lippines, and Thailand. The work is 
m conducted through Libyan 
lomatic missions. The terrorists are 
aided and welcomed home. Members 
;he Black September and Japanese 
1 Army have been given safe haven 
jibya after conducting successful ter- 
ist operations abroad. Qadhafi's at- 
lpts to unseat other Arab 
lers— notably in Egypt and Sudan 

not limited to those two — make a 
:kery of his pan- Arab rhetoric. 

Qadhafi's use of diplomatic facilities 
support bases for terrorist operations 
I of his intelligence services as inter- 
ional terrorist instruments make a 
ckery of diplomatic immunity, 
lhafi's claim of the right to murder 
yan dissidents on foreign soil — such 
the February attack in a Rome air- 
t on anti-Qadhafi Libyans, possibly 
n in the United States — makes a 
ckery of the Libyan speech of 

Strangely, Qadhafi himself is more 
thright than his representative. I 
ite from a speech of March 2 of this 
r: "It is the duty of the Libyan people 
stantly to liquidate their 
tonents ... the physical and final li- 
gation of the opponents of popular- 

authority" — meaning his dictatorial 
authority — "must continue at home and 
abroad, everywhere." 

The announcement made in Tripoli 
last August of the desire to "undertake 
the physical liquidation of hostile in- 
dividuals "beginning with Ronald 
Reagan" beggars either response or 

Libyan Expansionism 

A second and related Libyan charge was 
of America's "ambitious designs for 
hegemony . . . which constitute a 
flagrant threat to international peace 
and security," this coming from a leader 
who maintains an expeditionary force of 
7,000 troops in neighboring Chad. 

Libya's announcement last December 
of merger with Chad was an expression 
of Qadhafi's aggressive intention to ab- 
sorb his African neighbors in a Libyan- 
dominated state. Just 2 days ago, press 
reports indicated that Qadhafi was 
escalating the conflict in Chad by dis- 
patching columns of reinforcements and 
Soviet-built bombers to strengthen his 
troops fighting in that tragic battle. 
Shortly after his initial invasion, Qadhafi 
himself said: "We consider [Niger] sec- 
ond in line to Chad." 

This is no bilateral issue between the 
United States and Libya. It is, rather, 
an issue between Libya and its 
neighbors. I can do no better than to 
cite African outrage over this Libyan ex- 
pansionism. In January of this year, an 
ad hoc committee of the Organization of 
African Unity issued a communique con- 
demning the proposed merger and call- 
ing for the immediate withdrawal of Lib- 
yan troops. Senegal, Equatorial Guinea, 
and The Gambia broke diplomatic rela- 
tions with Libya in 1980. Mauritania, 
Mali, Nigeria, Ghana, and Niger strong- 
ly objected to the transformation of Lib- 
yan embassies into "peoples bureaus" 
last year and reacted by expelling the 
Libyan diplomats from their countries. 
Kenya and Upper Volta refused to allow 
the establishment of "peoples bureaus" 
at all. 

Sudan has long considered Libya 
responsible for a series of unsuccessful 
coup attempts and aggressions in quite 

recent times. On June 25, 1981, accusing 

the Libyans of involvement in an explo- 
sion at the Embassy of Chad in Khar- 
toum, Sudan expelled all Libyan 

And this is just the beginning. Presi- 
dent Kountche of Niger— who addressed 
this assembly last week— President 
Traore of Mali, and President Nimeiri of 
Sudan have charged the Libyans with 
attempts to overthrow their govern- 
ments. The Governments of Senegal and 
The Gambia have charged the Libyans 
with imprisoning their nationals and put- 
ting them into military training against 
their wills. 

The civilian, democratically elected 
Government of Ghana charged Libya 
with internal subversion when it ex- 
pelled Libyan diplomats. The universally 
respected former President of Senegal," 
Leopold Senghor, has stated that Libyan 
forces are "designed to destroy Africa 
south of the Sahara and create a vast 
Libyan empire." 

Despite his love of revolution and 
violence for their own sake, Qadhafi has 
given assistance to some governments in 
countering dissidents. Characteristically, 
he had done so with the most savage of 
governments, those of the Central 
African Empire under Bokassa and 
Uganda under Amin. According to 
Claire Sterling, there were 200 Libyan 
soldiers in Bokassa's army when he was 
overthrown in 1979, and Qadhafi dis- 
patched 2,500 Libyan soldiers to help 
the bloodthirsty Amin in his last stand 
in 1979. Both assistance programs, for- 
tunately for the Central African and 
Ugandan people, were failures. 

Arms Purchases 

Third, the Libyan representative 
charged that "the goal of the United 
States now is to militarize the world" 
while Libya stands for "total disarma- 
ment" and the end of the "arms race." 

This is, indeed, Orwellian inver- 
sion — in its extreme form. The regional 
arms race in northern Africa has been 
spurred precisely by Libya. This coun- 
try, with its small population of under 3 
million persons, purchased $5 billion 
worth of arms between 1974 and 1978, 
of which $3.6 billion originated in the 
Soviet Union. Recently, according to Ms. 
Sterling, Qadhafi made the biggest arms 
deal of our time with the Soviet 
Union— a $12 billion order for tanks, 
planes, artillery, and missile systems. 
This comes to $600 worth of offensive 

uary 1982 



armaments for every man, woman, and 
child in the country. And $6,000 worth 
apiece for his army of 22,000. One 
observer wrote October 8 in The Wall 
St reel Journal that "the amount of 
Soviet Weapons in Libya is approx- 
imately five times that required by the 
Libyan Army." 

Where are these weapons headed? 
To terrorist, destabilization, and 
cooperative groups around the 
world — small arms to the Baader- 
Meinhof gang, ammunition to Burundi, 
various weapons to Benin, Soviet-made 
armored vehicles to Djibouti, equipment 
to guerrillas in Somalia and Oman as 
part of what Qadhafi calls "a strategic 
counteroffensive against American im- 


Fourth, the Libyans claim that the 
United States "aims at pressuring" 
Libya "to abandon its nonalignment." No 
such pressuring has taken place. None, 
indeed, is needed. 

Col. Qadhafi himself feigns no 
substantive nonalignment. In an inter- 
view in December 1979, he stated that 
"the Soviets are our friends" and "those 
who side with America will be our 

Last September, Libya signed yet 
another arms agreement with the Soviet 
Union. Today there are 2,500 Soviet ad- 
visers in Libya. They alone control the 
MiG-25s; they alone operate the missile 
systems. Airstrips have been built to ac- 
commodate the gigantic Soviet Antonov 
planes transporting personnel and spare 
parts. One thousand Libyan soldiers a 
year — all this according to Ms. Ster- 
ling — are being trained in the Soviet 
Union and some 3,000 in Bulgaria. 

More disturbing to Libya's neighbors 
is the wide perception of Libya as a 
staging ground for Soviet military 
adventurism in the Persian Gulf region 
and as a funnel through which to pour 
arms and material to groups around the 
globe who are dedicated to terrorism, to 
the overthrow of their governments. 

Fifth, Libya accuses the United 
States of leading the effort "to exploit 
the situation" in Afghanistan, charging 
that we and our "allies have no intention 
of accepting a peaceful solution to this 
issue." I would point out that the 

Afghan people themselves have "no in- 
tention of accepting a peaceful solution 
to this issue" as they continue to oppose 
the 85,000 Soviet invaders of their land. 
If one claims with any fidelity to be 
a true revolutionary, a true champion o'f 
self-determination and nonaggression, a 
true leader of Islamic people, then one 
would have to support wholeheartedly 
the Afghan liberation fighters in their 
noble struggle. But where is Col. 
Qadhafi in this conflict? Why no castiga- 
tion of these invaders and suppressors 
of Islamic people longing to be free, to 
control their own destiny? 

Human Rights Situation 

Sixth and most ludicrous, Libya claims 
the United States displays a "disdain of 
human rights." This is blatantly false. 
My nation was founded as and continues 
to be the mecca of liberty around the 
globe. It is precisely because America 
stands in the forefront of the defense of 
human rights that I am delivering this 
reply to Libya, that my government is 
trying to stem the terrorism and expan- 
sionism from Libya. 

There is no greater human right 
than the right not to be assassinated, 
bombed, or tortured by terrorists, or the 
right not to be taken over by external 

The human rights record in Libya is 
deplorable. Col. Qadhafi said in that 
December 1979 interview that his coun- 
try had "no parliament, no representa- 
tion." Since the beginning of 1980, there 
have been constant reports of a 
widespread campaign of arrests and tor- 
ture, including the arrest of more than 
2,000 persons and execution or torture 
of hundreds more. 

Reports — hard to document since 
Libya is a closed society with no opposi- 
tion allowed — tell of political prisoners 
beaten and degraded. Amnesty Interna- 
tional tells of the cofounder of the 
Ba'ath movement dying in detention in 
February 1980 and reports: "Some of 
those detained are believed to be held in- 
communicado by branches of the in- 
telligence services, where torture and 
maltreatment frequently occur." 

None of this internal repres- 
sion — nor its external manifestation, 
since at least 11 expatriate Libyan 
dissidents have been assassinated in re- 
cent months by hit squads of young 

Qadhafi militants — is surprising. Indee 
the cruelty has been publicly proclaime 
In February 1980, the third conference 
of the revolutionary councils issued a 
resolution charging these councils with 
the "liquidation of the elements that 
hinder the revolution." Later the head 
the Libyan diplomatic mission in Lond< 
boasted of the external assassinations 
and warned that more were planned. 

Other Misrepresentations 

Although the catalogue of misrepresen 
tations is now complete, I would be 
remiss if I were not to mention in pass 
ing two additional maddening lies in th 
Libyan statement. 

The first concerns Libya's well-wor 
allegations of U.S. "aggression" in the 
shooting down of two Libyan aircraft 
last August. The incident, of course, 
took place fully 60 nautical miles off th 
shores of Libya, well within universally 
recognized international waters. And i 
U.S. aircraft did not fire until fired 
on — a fact that Qadhafi himself has ad 
mitted and, indeed, boasted of. 

Then, too, the Libyan representatn 
accused the United States of engaging 
in "bacteriological war against the 
friendly people of the Republic of Cuba 
This is the third Friday evening runnin 
when this particular untruth stands to 
be rebutted. It is not necessary to go 
through the entire litany of demon- 
strable, thoroughly documented untrut 
a third time. The record, by now, speal 
for itself. 

I am delivering this response todaj 
because the chief of our delegation, Ar 
bassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, is in Cairc 
attending the funeral services of Presi- 
dent Anwar al-Sadat — a towering 
figure, as she observed last Tuesday in 
this hall, whose extraordinary career a 
a statesman and peacemaker proves th 
heroism still lives in the contemporary 

The obscene celebration in Libya o 
this hero's tragic murder must go 
without extended comment. They offei 
the sensibilities of our delegation in thi 
hall, of the American people, and — I I 
say with real confidence — of civilized 
people everywhere. 

HJSUN press release 66. 


Department of State Bullet 


U.N. Conference on New and 
Renewable Sources of Energy 

The U.N. Conference on New and 
Renewable Sources of Energy was held in 
Nairobi, Kenya, August 10-21, 1981. 
Following are a statement by Stanton D. 
Anderson, head of the U.S. delegation, 
made at the conference on August 13, 
President Reagan's letter to the Presi- 
dent of the conference (J. H. Okwanyo, 
Kenya's Minister for Energy) of August 
10, and the text of the program of action, 
which was unanimously adopted on 
August 21. 

AUG. 10, 1981 

This conference is testament to our shared 
convicition that the energy problems faced by 
all nations can be transformed, through 
foresight and statesmanship, into oppor- 
tunities for industry, employment, and pros- 
perity. This conference will gauge our com- 
mon determination to deal with our energy 
problems and the difficult task of finding and 
exploiting new energy sources. 

The United States has made considerable 
progress in the development and diffusion of 
new and renewable energy technologies. 
Thousands of private companies, citizens' 
groups, and individuals are now involved in 
the research, manufacture, and marketing of 
new energy systems. We will continue to 
share our experience with other nations as 
we also benefit from theirs. We attach high 
priority to the energy needs of developing 
countries and intend to emphasize innovative 
energy projects in our development assis- 
tance programs. 

This conference has the chance to become 
a milestone for cooperation. To achieve this, 
we need the serious and responsible efforts of 
all countries, supported by well-conceived 
regional and global initiatives. With imagina- 
tion, a cooperative spirit, and hard work, we 
can insure that all countries have sustainable 
and abundant energy resources. 

In this spirit, Mr. President, I sincerely 
wish you and all assembled delegates a suc- 
cessful conference. 

AUG. 13, 1981 

Allow me, on behalf of my government, 
to pay special tribute to the statesman- 
ship and foresight of President Daniel T. 
arap Moi and the Government of Kenya. 
Kenya was among the first to see the 
necessity of this conference. In this 
beautiful city of Nairobi, with the 
reassuring presence and inspiring com- 
mitment of Prime Ministers Indira Gan- 
dhi [India], Thorbjorn Falldin [Sweden], 
Pierre Trudeau [Canada], and Edward 
Seaga [Jamaica], we have an opportuni- 
ty to harness the expertise of diplomats 
and the knowledge of experts to address 
vital aspects of the global energy situa- 

I am certain, Mr. President, that 
under your leadership the conference 
will proceed in the spirit of cooperation 
and realism. 

In important ways, this conference 
has opened with great promise of ac- 
complishment. The preparatory process 
has brought together experts in many 
disciplines under the dynamic leadership 
of Secretary General Iglesias and the 
wise guidance of Chairman Taniguchi. 
Members of the preparatory committee 
produced an impressive body of work on 
the state of new and renewable energy. 
This work is, in and of itself, an ex- 
cellent beginning toward meeting the 
energy needs of all countries. 

The energy adversity we all ex- 
perience must not become an adversary 
contest. The varied experiences and 
perspectives with which each of us 
assesses the energy problem are not 
signs of division but signs of positive 
and healthy diversity. 

Emerging Consensus 

From this diversity a consensus is 
emerging on the basic elements of the 
global energy problem and challenge. 

First, the energy problem is global 
in scope, and the energy market is inter- 
national in nature. This challenges us to 
create a worldwide economic setting 
favorable for energy investment, ex- 
ploration, and production. It requires us 
to pursue demand-side energy policies 



that foster conservation, efficiency, and 
oil substitution, and supply-side policies 
to release the world's considerable 
potential for energy resources develop- 
ment and trade. 

Second, effective energy policy 
begins at home. Global cooperation must 
be a corollary and not a substitute for 
sound energy policy decisions made by 
committed national governments. The 
solutions lie not in apportioning blame 
nor in determining a priori which 
sources of energy are most appropriate 
for each country. Meeting the energy 
needs of the future is not a problem 
which the developing countries alone 
must face nor is it a problem which the 
developed countries alone can resolve. It 
is a challenge that we must address 
together, irrespective of ideology, stage 
of development, or form of economic 

Third, the world is overly dependent 
on a single energy source— oil— and even 
short-term disruptions in supplies can 
cause serious economic and social 
dislocations. Over the medium and long 
terms, the world must transit from over- 
reliance on one energy source to the 
utilization of a wide variety of sources. 
We must realize that there is no 
substitute to energy alternatives. 

Fourth, the developing countries 
face a special challenge in their process 
of modernization. They must be able to 
achieve an energy transition without ag- 
gravating an already debilitating 
dependence on imported petroleum. 

Fifth, the energy problem affects 
both men and women whatever their life 
styles or occupations. Both men and 
women should participate in the for- 
mulation and implementation of national 
energy programs. Energy policies should 
enable women to have access to new 
technologies and take into account the 
particular impact that the transition will 
have on women dependent mainly on 
traditional fuel supplies. 

We must not delude ourselves by the 
present, relatively favorable short-term 
oil market situation. In our journey to a 
new energy future— in our long odyssey 
of transition— we must turn a deaf ear 
to the soothing, beguiling sirens' song of 
"all is well." 

We must be realistic. The decline of 
oil consumption in 1980 was not due to a 
shift to renewable energy sources. The 
oil market situation remains fragile, and 
the prospect of stability depends on 

avoiding complacency and upon sound 
energy responses by both consuming and 
producing countries. 

Our vision must transcend the pres- 
ent circumstances. Long as the process 
of transition may be, there is no turning 

We must understand that the energy 
problem is not solely due to dwindling 
petroleum resources. Supplies of other 
traditional, even renewable, sources of 
energy are diminishing as well— with 
adverse social and environmental im- 
pacts. In many countries, the over- 
whelming majority of the people depend 
on firewood for their chief source of 
fuel. As a result, millions of hectares of 
the world's forests are disappearing 
every year. At the present rate, almost 
half of the remaining forests in the 
developing countries will be lost by the 
end of the century. Deforestation leads 
to a downward spiral of ecological 
degradation, loss of crop land, and 
worsening poverty. The precipitous 
decline in fuelwood supply dispropor- 
tionately affects the world's 
poor— especially women. 

The imperatives of need speak for 
themselves. The challenge now to the 
world community is to approach the 
transition in a consistent and pragmatic 
manner. Necessity must not become a 
convenient excuse to yield to the im- 
peratives of command economics or to 
uneconomic alternatives. We must guard 
against the replacement of crippling 
dependence on imported hydrocarbons 
with an equally debilitating collection of 
subsidized and uneconomic new and 
renewable energy projects. We believe 
that the solution lies in the long-term 
reliance on open energy markets in 
which ingenuity and enterprise can 

There is no lack of energy on planet 
Earth. Renewable resources are more 
than sufficient to meet all foreseeable 
needs, irrespective of pressures on finite 
resources— provided we encourage men 
and women to innovate and invent and 
to utilize science and technology for the 
benefit of humankind. 

The findings of the preparatory pro- 
cess have demonstrated the remarkable 
ingenuity of scientists as well as laymen, 
community groups, and private enter- 
prises in bringing to the marketplace of 
ideas new technologies and modern ap- 
plications of old ones. This is a unique 

encounter of the old and the new, wh 
people revive from the past what has 
permanent value and reach for creati 1 
ideas to chart their energy future. A 
new technology such as photovoltaic 
generation of electricity is a spinoff o: 
the space age, other renewable 
technologies are as traditional as the 
windmill. Both are testimony to hum£ 
ingenuity to invent and adapt. Ingenc 
is a precious resource which we cann< 
restrain by rigid policies that stifle in- 
dividual initiative. Instead, we must 
maintain true rewards that encourag* 

For our part, this means freedon 
for private enterprise in a free mark( 
system. We believe that sound econoi 
ics in the field of energy do not emar 
from rigid, preconceived ideas but fr< 
allowing all forms of energy to comp< 
in the marketplace. 

The market system is our way, b 
we also recognize the complexities in 
global energy balance and respect th< 
pluralistic approaches that the Unite* 
Nations symbolizes. Over the long ru 
different approaches will test their o 

In addressing the global energy 
situation, this conference will give 
special attention to the very serious 
energy problems faced by the develo 
countries. In this, we must all coopei 

• This cooperation means workii 
together to assist countries in energy 
assessments to fashion sound nation! 
energy policies. 

• Cooperation means increased < 
forts to accelerate exploration and 
greater utilization of indigenous enei 

• Cooperation means working w 
the private sector in both its interna 
tional and national dimensions. 

• Cooperation means removing 
disincentives to foreign investment i: 

• And cooperation means that 
multilateral resources should comple 
ment and catalyze rather than displs 
flows from the private sector. 

Energy and the U.S. Economy 

Secure and adequate supplies of ene 
must play a paramount role in the 
revitalization and progress of the U. 
economy. In recent years, the levelii 
off of domestic oil production and th 
creased price of imported oil have 
spurred the search for energy alter- 
natives and new methods of fuel effi 
cy and conservation. 


Department of State Bui 


The last decade has seen a great 
Tiber of initiatives to develop and 
nmercialize new and renewable 
;rgy sources. Thousands of com- 
lies, private citizens' groups, and in- 
iduals are now involved in research, 
ailing, installing, and servicing energy 
terns based on alternative energy 

At present, renewable energy 
rces meet more than 6% of U.S. 
rgy needs; this corresponds to about 
% of the energy produced in the 
ited States. Reasonable projections 
icate that renewables will play an in- 
asing role in meeting the country's 
rgy needs— close to 8% in 1990 and 
r 10% by the year 2000. 
.lternative energies are becoming 
come participants in the marketplace 
ause new energy systems are less 
mful to the environment and are 
Donsive to dispersed energy needs, 
sy are also technically feasible, and 
ly are cost competitive with conven- 
lal fuels. 

In the U.S. energy transition, 
rate industry will play the major role, 
irovides the financial, managerial, 
technological impetus necessary to 
the potential of nonconventional 
rgy sources and thereby alter the 
ntry's energy mix. 

In the realm of private initiative are 
efforts of thousands of community 
ups, nonprofit organizations, 
peratives, and citizens' associations. 
;y may be small local action organiza- 
is working on their own self-help pro- 
;s or nationwide voluntary associa- 
is with tens of thousands of members 
seminating information on renewable 
rgy systems. 

At the national level, the Federal 
rernment has been supporting the 
elopment of new and renewable 
rces of energy in four principal ways. 

First, by deregulating oil and per- 
ting increases in natural gas prices, 
have dramatically enhanced the com- 
itive position of renewables. 
Second, to assist a fledgling in- 
try the United States has adopted— 
I will maintain until scheduled expira- 
l— a series of tax incentives for cer- 
l investments in renewable energy in- 
llation and equipment. 
Third, we are removing many of the 
ibiting regulations and rules that 
e slowed the development and use of 
v and renewables. 
Fourth, we will provide ongoing 
'ernment support for long-term, basic 

research that is too risky for private 
firms to undertake. 

The overriding concern of the U.S. 
Government is to establish sound and 
stable policies that encourage individuals 
and groups, in the public and private 
sectors, to produce and use all energy 
sources wisely and efficiently. 

Energy cooperation will continue to 
be an essential ingredient of our 
political, economic, and commercial rela- 
tions with both developed and develop- 
ing countries, with oil-exporting as well 
as oil-importing nations. 

Our rationale is threefold. First, 
more abundant energy supplies lessen 
international economic and political ten- 
sions. Second, increased availability of 
overall energy resources is indispensable 
to the healthy economic growth of all 
countries. Third, new and renewable 
energy sources create markets for new 
technologies and services. 

U.S. Assistance Programs 

We are especially conscious of the 
energy needs of the developing coun- 
tries, and we will continue to devote 
bilateral development aid to areas of 
greatest need. In its bilateral develop- 
ment assistance program, the United 
States has given high priority to energy 
and intends to increase significantly its 
total level of funding for energy-related 
activities. I am especially pleased to an- 
nounce that the budget for the U.S. 
Agency for International Development 
(AID) includes plans to double funding 
for new and renewable sources of 
energy. The new funding level will ex- 
ceed $70 million for the next fiscal year. 
In addition, our Congress has recently 
passed legislation authorizing an addi- 
tional $4.0 million earmarked for a solar 
international program. 

U.S. bilateral energy assistance pro- 
grams respond to the distinct dimen- 
sions of the energy problem as defined 
by the developing countries. While our 
AID program is tailored to individual 
country needs and acts as a catalyst for 
investment, its principal activities fall in 
four major areas: 

• The assessment of needs, uses, 
and resources to assist countries to for- 
mulate sound energy policies; 

• The training of personnel and 
development of institutions to formulate 
and implement such policies; 

• The site testing, demonstration, 
and evaluation of new energy 
technologies; and 

• Increasing energy supplies, both 

conventional and renewable, with signifi- 
cant attention to fuelwood projects. 

The trade and development program 
of the U.S. Government is a corollary of 
our bilateral assistance efforts. Through 
assistance to commercial projects in 
developing countries it facilitates the 
transfer of U.S. energy technology. 

Multilateral institutions and develop- 
ment banks have a major role to play in 
assisting the energy transition. The 
United Nations and its family of agen- 
cies are involved in most aspects of new 
and renewable energy development and 
utilization. Through rationalization of 
work, greater economy and redeploy- 
ment of resources, the United Nations' 
efforts could become a cutting edge of 
change in the international energy tran- 
sition. The United States is committed 
to working out at this conference ways 
in which the international community 
can augment its efforts to make 
renewable resources available to 
developing countries. 

We believe multilateral development 
banks are most effective when they also 
generate and enhance investment from 
the private sector. The World Bank is 
already playing an active role in the 
development of new and renewable 
sources of energy. And it can do more. 
We have encouraged the Bank to ex- 
amine its priorities and procedures in 
order to make more capital available for 
energy development. We believe that 
much can be done now within the ex- 
isting Bank structure. Increased 
cooperation and cofinancing among the 
Bank, other multilateral institutions, and 
the private sector should allow existing 
resources to be used more efficiently 
and should mobilize greater amounts of 
capital for important energy investment 
needs. Similarily, the United States 
believes that regional development 
banks should review their priorities and 
procedures in order to devote increased 
finanical resources for energy develop- 

Finally, the United States stands 
ready to explore other avenues that will 
augment energy lending. In this regard, 
we hope oil exporting countries can in- 
crease their investment in developing 
countries, and— in a spirit of partner- 
ship—we are willing to discuss institu- 
tional means that may facilitate this ef- 

The essence of cooperation among 

uary 1982 



countries preparing for the energy 
future lies not in erecting intricate 
edifices but in building solid foundations, 
at the local and national level, for in- 
dividual as well as joint actions. 

Cooperation should never detract 
from our resources— it should augment 
them. Such cooperation was the 
hallmark of the long preparatory process 
for this conference. I trust the long- 
range effects of the program of action 
we adopt here will be greater than the 
sum total of our individual contributions. 

The path of energy transition is yet 
to be traversed. It is a journey we have 
just begun, an odyssey, which will be 
marked by many changes of fortune. It 
is a long path; there are no shortcuts, 
but there may be many dead ends. We 
are all companions on this journey. Each 
of us, as we forge ahead, must help 
others who fall behind, for anyone who 
stays behind slows down all of us. 

Along the path of energy transition, 
this conference will be an important 
benchmark. We have learned from the 
experience of other countries as we have 
shared ours with them. This exchange of 
experience should help us all to make 
free and fully informed choices about 
our energy future. We are discovering 
advances in alternative energy 
technologies that other countries have 
made, and we are relating our own 
achievements. This is a true and free 
transfer of technology. The lessons we 
learn, the advice we hear, will, I am cer- 
tain, influence our own thinking, 
policies, and practices in the years to 

Because in the final analysis, the 
policies and efforts of each individual 
country— the total national effort— will 
determine the scope and nature of global 
cooperation on the energy front. Exper- 
tise is important; knowledge is indispen- 
sable; experience is instructive; private 
flows of capital are vital; development 
assistance can aid; and multilateral coor- 
dination can support. But none can 
substitute for self-reliant endeavor that 
we each in turn must pledge to one 
another and to ourselves. On the global 
energy front, the country that helps 
itself aids all the others in turn. 

AUG. 21, 1981 


1 . A fundamental purpose of the United Na- 
tions is to achieve international co-operation 
in solving global problems of an economic, 
social, cultural or humanitarian character. 
The Declaration and the Programme of Ac- 
tion on the Establishment of a New Interna- 
tional Economic Order, the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States and 
the resolutions on development and interna- 
tional co-operation (General Assembly resolu- 
tions 3201 (S-VI), 302 (S-VI), 3281 (XXIX) 
and 3362 (S-VII) call, inter alia, for the 
equitable, full and effective participation on 
the basis of sovereign equality of all countries 
in the solving of world economic problems in 
the common interest of all countries, bearing 
in mind the necessity to ensure the ac- 
celerated development of all developing coun- 

2. The adoption of the International Develop- 
ment Strategy for the Third United Nations 
Development Decade was an important step 
in the promotion of international co-operation 
for development and reaffirmed the commit- 
ment of the international community to ac- 
celerate the development of developing coun- 
tries. In this context, it was, inter alia, 
agreed that: 

"In order to create conditions more 
favourable to the development of the develop- 
ing countries and the growth of the world 
economy in general, efforts for the develop- 
ment and expansion of all energy resources 
of the world should be intensified in search of 
a long-term solution to the energy problem. 
The international community will have to 
make substantial and rapid progress in the 
transition from the present international 
economy based primarily on hydrocarbons. It 
will have to rely increasingly on new and 
renewable sources of energy, seeking to 
reserve hydrocarbons for non-energy and 
non-substitutable uses. In view of the finite 
supply of fossil fuels in the world economy 
and the often wasteful and inefficient utiliza- 
tion of those resources, effective measures 
for their conservation will have to be urgent- 
ly adopted and/or improved, in particular by 
developed countries which consume the major 
share of the world's hydrcarbon production." 

3. In convening the United Nations Con- 
ference on New and Renewable Sources of 
Energy, the General Assembly defined its ob- 
jectives in resolution 33/148 of 20 December 
1978 and called, in particular, for the elabora- 
tion of measures for concerted action 
designed to promote the development and 
utilization of new and renewable sources of 
energy, 1 with a view to contributing to 
meeting future over-all energy requirements, 
especially those of the developing countries, 
in particular in the context of efforts aimed 
at accelerating the development of the 
developing countries. 

4. The General Assembly subsequently decid- 
ed that the Conference should consider the 

adoption of a programme of action in the 
area of new and renewable sources of energ 
that would, inter alia, contain concrete 
operational measures for subregional and in 
ternational co-operation in this area. 

5. The Conference had before it for con- 
sideration the reports of technical panels an 
consultants on the new and renewable 
sources of energy, the report of the ad hoc 
groups of experts on selected policy issues, 
the report of the Synthesis Group, com- 
prehensive reports of the relevant organs ai 
organizations as well as the regional commis 
sions of the United Nations system. In addi- 
tion, national papers were presented by 
Governments wishing to do so. 

6. It is in this context that the United Na- 
tions Conference on New and Renewable 
Sources of Energy met in Nairobi from 10 t 
21 August 1981 and adopted this Programir 
of Action, to be called the "Nairobi Pro- 
gramme of Action for the Development and 
Utilization of New and Renewable Sources < 

A. Energy Transition 

7. The challenge and the opportunity con- 
fronting the international community is to 
achieve an orderly and peaceful energy trar 
sition from the present international econon 
based primarily on hydrocarbons [petroleum 
and gas] to one based increasingly on new 
and renewable sources of energy in a manni 
which, consistent with the needs and option 
of individual countries, is socially equitable, 
economically and technically viable and en- 
vironmentally suitable. The transition must 
be based on technological commercial, finan 
cial and monetary modalities consistent witl 
the determination of Governments to 
establish a New International Economic 
Order, to accelerate the development of 
developing countries and to promote balano 
global development. An effective energy tra 
sition must conform with the principles of fi 
and permanent sovereignty of each country 
over its natural resources and should be im- 
plemented in accordance with its national 
plans and priorities. 

8. The issue is not whether an energy trans 
tion will take place but whether the interna 
tional community will achieve it in an order 
peaceful, progressive, just and integrated 
manner. This transition entails the ra- 
tionalization of the energy development pro 
ess. In view of the often wasteful and ineffi 
cient utilization of hydrocarbon resources b; 
some countries as well as their finite supply 
and depletable nature it has become clear 
that the previous assumption of abundant a 
cheap energy is not valid any longer. 
Hydrocarbon resources will no longer be 
available at the traditionally low levels of 
earlier years. At the same time, future de- 
mand for energy will increase not only in in 
dustrialized countries but also much more 
dramatically in developing countries. If the 
global demand for energy is to be met, it w: 
require a shift away from the current ex- 
cessive reliance on hydrocarbons towards a 
more diversified mix of energy sources. It 


Department of State Bullet 


also require significant and continuing 
gress in the efficient and rational use of 
liable resources. In this context, energy 
ining should play a significant role, 
[t is equally clear that patterns of con- 
lption with the effect of giving access to 
rgy to a limited number of countries or to 
iw within countries are not compatible 
h the agreed goals of the international 

The re is a common interest shared by all 
nines in ensuring an effective energy 
isition, which is of critical importance to 
future of all mankind. Such a transition, 
ased on equitable and open co-operation, 
ild offer new opportunities for ae- 
rating economic and social development 
leveloping countries in particular, and 
icing the present pattern of economic and 
mological dependence. Therefore, continu- 
adjustments and institutional and struc- 
il changes in international economic rela- 
is are required, taking into account the 
Is and objectives of the New International 
momic Order. What is needed now is for 
ions to demonstrate the necessary political 

to respond to the challenge and seize the 
ortunities presented. 

In this regard the developed countries 
e a particular responsibility to manifest 
r political will and use their economic and 
lagerial potential to support efforts aimed 
in effective energy transition. All coun- 
s should adapt themselves to such a tran- 
)n, which often involves high-cost ad- 
ments required to sustain and raise levels 
'conomic growth. For developing coun- 
s, an effective energy transition may in- 
re the question of economic survival, and 
•eased energy availabilities will be essen- 

if a rate and pattern of growth necessary 
neet their social and economic develop- 
it objectives is to be attained. Effective 
ievement of this energy transition should 
/jewed as an essential element for assur- 
sustained growth of the international 
nomy, in a manner that, consistent with 

needs and options of individual countries, 
eehnically and economically feasible, 
ially equitable and environmentally sus- 
lable and for safeguarding world peace 

stability. Attention is also drawn to the 
^relationship between the development of 
i and renewable sources of energy and 
ader issues, such as genuine disarmament. 
;his regard, concrete progress towards the 
Is of general and complete disarmament 
ler effective international control, in- 
iing the urgent implementation of 
isures of disarmament, would release 
stantial additional resources which could 
utilized for social and economic 
elopment — including new and renewable 
rces of energy — particularly for the 
efit of the developing countries. 

Bearing in mind the importance of 
rgy for development and the growing 
rgy requirements of the developing coun- 
i, it is recognized that these re- 
rements, if not met adequately, will hinder 

process of their economic and social 
elopment. While efficient use of energy 

should be an objective for all countries, it 
should be kept in mind that the exploration, 
development, expansion and processing of all 
energy resources of the developing countries 
must be intensified in a manner commen- 
surate with their development objectives and 
thereby contribute to the growth of the world 
economy. For this purpose, adequate finan- 
cial, technical and human resources should be 
generated. It is recognized that the success of 
an effective energy transition will depend, in- 
ter alia, upon the extent to which the critical 
issues of mobilization of financial resources 
for, and transfer of technology available to, 
in particular, developing countries can be ef- 
fectively tackled. 

13. The ultimate aim of socio-economic 
development is the constant improvement of 
the living conditions of the entire population. 
The successful achievement of the energy 
transition has direct implications for shelter, 
physical infrastructure, health, sanitation, 
nutrition and general well-being in rural and 
urban communities. It should aim at the 
generation of improved productivity, better 
income earning opportunities and increased 
employment through local manufacture and 
maintenance services, in both rural and urban 
sectors. At the same time, it should include, 
where appropriate, provisions to ensure ade- 
quate supplies of energy in case of acute 
shortage of energy for subsistence. The 
energy transition must include consideration 
of the social dimensions, including the role of 
women as agents in and beneficiaries of the 
process of development, in view of their 
special burdens as producers and users of 
energy, particularly in rural areas. The 
energy transition should take place in a man- 
ner which recognizes the existence of com- 
peting demands for basic resources and the 
need to optimize their usage. The energy 
transition should take place in a manner 
which would not cause harmful changes in 
the environment but would, insofar as possi- 
ble, improve environmental conditions. 

14. In order to ensure the energy transition, 
in addition to actively developing all types of 
energy sources, effective measures for the 
conservation of energy, including the max- 
imum efficiency of energy utilization, will 
have to be urgently adopted and/or improved, 
in particular by developed countries. The 
benefits to be derived from a more rational 
use of energy can, in some cases, contribute 
significantly to the effect brought about by 
the development of new and renewable 
sources of energy. 

15. The development and utilization of new 
and renewable sources of energy must be 
viewed in the context of the energy transi- 
tion. New and renewable sources of energy 
can make a significant contribution, but their 
role and potential in the short term should 
not be overstated. It has been estimated that 
new and renewable sources of energy at pres- 
ent meet some 15 per cent of global energy 
requirements. In the foreseeable future, 
hydrocarbon supplies will continue to play a 
very important role in meeting the global 

energy demand, but, over time, that role will 
decline. To facilitate the energy transition, a 
process should now be set in motion to en- 
sure the most efficient identification, explora- 
tion, assessment, development and utilization 
of energy sources, including new and 
renewable sources of energy. In this context, 
the potential of new and renewable sources 
of energy must be considered as a dynamic 
variable, that will tend to increase with the 
refinement, development and popularization 
of technologies. 

16. The concept of new and renewable 
sources of energy as embraced by the 
General Assembly in resolution 33/148 of the 
Nairobi Conference encompasses a 
heterogeneous range of energy forms, as well 
as a wide range of associated technologies of 
different degrees of maturity, from those 
proven and in operation to those on the fron- 
tier of scientific knowledge. It is clear that 
the dynamic scientific and technological prog- 
ress in the field in conjunction with the 
developments in the over-all energy situation, 
is an essential factor to be constantly scanned 
in the process of assessing the new and 
renewable sources of energy potential. In this 
context, there is a need to utilize the proven 
technologies to the fullest extent possible. Of 
equal importance is an early involvement of 
all countries, commensurate with their 
abilities, in the research and development, 
assimilation adaption, development and 
utilization of the new and renewable sources 
of energy. To this end, effective and efficient 
international co-operation should be under- 
taken to assist national action at the govern- 
mental and, where appropriate, at the non- 
governmental level in recipient countries in 
research, development, pre-investment and 
investment efforts, as required, so that the 
full potential of new and renewable sources 
of energy is realized. 

17. The development and utilization of new 
and renewable sources should be a common 
objective for all countries of the world. New 
and renewable sources of energy are not 
necessarily more suited to satisfy the energy 
needs of developing countries than those of 
industrialized countries. The development of 
such sources should, therefore, not be inter- 
preted as a rationale for limiting the access 
of developing countries to conventional 
sources of energy, which will continue to play 
a very important role in their development. 

18. The development of new and renewable 
sources of energy opens up the prospect of 
increasing indigenous energy supply and 
thereby contributing to greater self- 
sufficiency. The development of new and 
renewable sources of energy also creates new 
options to respond to the energy re- 
quirements of the rural, industrial, transport 
and other domestic sectors, in accordance 
with national goals and priorities and pro- 
vides for a more diversified and decentralized 
pattern of energy supply. 

19. Like any energy source or product, new 
and renewable sources of energy are 

uary 1982 



themselves both an "input" and an "output" of 
the development process. The role of new 
and renewable sources of energy should be 
perceived as a dynamic interaction between 
resources, technologies and present and 
future requirements for energy, all serving 
national objectives for economic and social 

B. Framework for National Action 

20. All Governments recognize the need to 
undertake efforts to promote the develop- 
ment and utilization of new and renewable 
sources of energy in accordance with their 
national plans and priorities. The primary 
responsibility for promoting the development 
and utilization of new and renewable sources 
of energy rests with individual countries. The 
strengthening of national capacities should 
embrace elements such as: 

(a) Assessment of new and renewable 
energy sources, including surveying and map- 
ping programmes, to provide the necessary 
information and data base for planning and 
decision-making with respect to over-all 
energy development; 

(b) Preparation of a policy framework for 
defining the role of new and renewable 
sources of energy and determining priorities; 

(c) Establishment or strengthening of ap- 
propriate national institutional arrangements; 

(d) Adequate research and development 
programmes to support the scientific and 
technical capacity to develop, choose and 
adapt technologies, including testing and 
demonstration facilities and research focal 
points in new and renewable sources of 

(e) Specific programmes to promote the ex- 
ploration, development and utilization of new 
and renewable sources of energy, taking into 
account, as appropriate, social, economic and 
environmental considerations; 

(f) Programmes to encourage the efforts of 
national public and private entities in in- 
terested countries, as appropriate, to expand 
the development and utilization of new and 
renewable sources of energy; 

(g) Mobilization of adequate resources; 

(h) Availability of qualified personnel, to in- 
clude specialized education and training pro- 
grammes equally accessible to men and 

(i) Development or strengthening of in- 
dustrial capacity to manufacture, adapt, 
repair and maintain energy-related equip- 

In this regard, international co-operation is 
indispensable and should be directed to assist 
and support national efforts. Developed coun- 
tries bear a special responsibility to ensure 
that both their bilateral and multilateral ef- 
forts contribute actively to this end. Other 
countries in a position to do so should also 
continue to promote efforts in this regard. 

21. Efforts designed to explore and develop 
conventional energy resources must be con- 
tinued, together with efforts designed to ex- 
plore and develop new and renewable sources 
of energy. This must also be accompanied by 
efforts aimed at the rational use of energy 
wherever possible and particularly in the 
developed coutries. 

C. Objectives 

22. The fundamental objective of this Pro- 
gramme of Action is to promote concerted ac- 
tion in the context of the energy transition, 
the development and utilization of new and 
renewable sources of energy with a view to 
helping meet future over-all energy re- 
quirements, especially those of developing 
countries. This Programme of Action should 
be viewed as an integral part of the efforts of 
the international community to accelerate the 
development of developing countries as set 
forth, inter alia, in the International 
Development Strategy for the Third United 
Nations Development Decade, and the rele- 
vant declarations and resolutions related to 
the establishment of the New International 
Economic Order. 

23. The Programme of Action is directed to 
the achievement of the following objectives: 

(a) To strengthen international co-operation 
for the promotion and intensification of 
research and development of technologies 
related to new and renewable sources of 
energy and to facilitate the transfer and 
adaptation of technology from developed to 
developing countries, in order to strengthen 
the indigenous scientific and technological 
capacity, including the capacity for the pro- 
duction of capital goods in developing coun- 

(b) To stimulate the mobilization of addi- 
tional and adequate financial resources from 
developed countries, international financial 
institutions and other international organiza- 
tions and the private sector, as appropriate, 
to the developing countries for the develop- 
ment of new and renewable sources of 
energy through programmes and projects at 
the national, subregional, regional and inter- 
national levels. Other countries in a position 
to do so should also continue to make efforts 
in this regard; 

(c) To provide, through international co- 
operative efforts, for the exchange of infor- 
mation and manpower training, particularly 
in the developing countries, as well as to pro- 
mote their ability to undertake energy 
resource evaluation and energy planning in 
order to accelerate the introduction of new 
and renewable sources of energy in their 
energy balances; 

(d) To promote and provide support for: 

(i) The attainment of the national objec- 
tives and priorities established by developing 
countries in the field of new and renewable 
sources of energy, related to the strengthen- 
ing of their national capabilities and institu- 
tional infrastructures for the effective incor- 
poration of new and renewable sources of 
energy into national policy and planning proc- 

(ii) The drawing up and implementation 
of new and renewable sources of energy pro- 
grammes and projects in the context of over- 
all energy plans by all countries and, in par- 
ticular, by developing countries; 

(e) To provide, as requested, and as ap- 
propriate, assistance and support for co- 
operative efforts among developing countries; 

(f) To specify measures designed to 

heighten international awareness of the a 
vantages, potential and economic viability 
new and renewable sources of energy, an 
support efforts of all countries to take 
necessary steps to bring about the maxinr 
feasible development of new and renewal: 
sources of energy, taking special account 
the stage of development reached in the 
various technologies and of their socio- 
cultural and environmental impact. 

24. The successful implementation of the 
Programme of Action will require the cor 
uing commitment and efforts of Govern- 
ments. The organs, organizations and boc 
of the United Nations system will assist i 
propriately in the implementation of the I 
gramme. In certain countries, non- 
governmental entities will also have a sig 
cant role to play. All these measures shoi 
be taken with due regard to the necessity 
promote the full participation of men and 
women on an equal basis in the realizatio 
the foregoing objectives. Such participate 
should thus receive due consideration in i 
national energy strategy or implementati 
thereof. In this context, it is necessary tc 
designate adequate mechanisms for the ii 
plementation, monitoring, follow-up and 
evaluation of the action taken to carry ou 
the Programme of Action. 


25. The objectives set out in the precedir 
section will be most effectively met if eff< 
undertaken at the subregional, regional a 
international levels are supportive of nati 
efforts. The Conference preparatory proc 
has involved examination of general polic 
measures applicable to all sources as well 
measures specific to each individual sourc 
with a view to determining areas for con- 
certed action. 

A. Policy Measures 

26. On the basis of the results of the 
preparatory process, the Conference iden 
tified five broad policy areas for concerte 
tion with the support of the international 
community according to national plans ar 

(a) Energy assessment and planning; 

(b) Research, development and demons 

(c) Transfer, adaptation and applicatior 
mature technologies; 

(d) Information flows; 

(e) Education and training. 

Every effort should be made to ensure th 
the concerted action in the above-mentior 
areas involves and benefits men and won: 

1. Energy Assessment and Planning 

27. The role of each and every source of 
energy, including new and renewable sou 
of energy and conservation, in meeting tl 
needs of countries can best be determinec 
the context of national energy planning, i 
essential element of which is national ene 


Department of State Bulli 


;essment. It is an especially acute problem 
;h respect to the data infrastructure per- 
ning to energy demand and resource inven- 
ies, as well as the impact on the ecology, 
ich can provide the basis for assessing the 
isible future role of new and renewable 
;rgy sources and related technologies, as 
11 as developing national energy policy and 
ns. Action is required as follows: 

i) Map, survey and undertake other ap- 
ipriate activities to determine the full 
ige of physical resource endowment, using, 
enever possible, standardized methodol- 
es for data collection, processing and stor- 
! and dissemination; 
3) Determine in a dynamic way energy 
iply and demand and energy balances, in- 
ding projections of future energy re- 

:) Identify and keep under review mature 
1 near-term promising energy technologies 
well as ongoing research, development and 
nonstration activities and assess their 
nomic, socio-cultural and environmental 
ts, potential and benefits; 
1) Strengthen and/or establish institutional 
•astructure to collect, maintain, analyse, 
ssify and disseminate information on all 
above as well as information pertaining to 
policy, programme and project decision- 
king process; the legislative framework 
1 related procedures (and their impact on 
:rgy supply and use patterns), and the 
.ilability of financing. 

Research, Development and 

mon strati on 

The pace and extent of the contribution 
lew and renewable sources of energy and 
ited technologies will depend to a large ex- 
t on scientific research directed towards 
ir development and widespread utilization. 
ile such research is expanding rapidly 
-Id wide, co-ordination and information 
ring is poor, duplication is widespread and 
tain important aspects are relatively 
;lected and receive few resources, 
reover, the bulk of current research is be- 
carried out in developed countries, and 
ch of it will have to be extensively adapted 
use in developing countries. In addition 
-sustained indigenous research work 
uld be actively stimulated. The following 
ies of measures to which international co- 
ration should be directed are needed in 
er to enhance the indigenous scientific and 
mological capabilities of developing coun- 
s, enabling them to exploit their own 
aurce potential fully and independently 
1 to enter into collaborative research, 
elopment and demonstration efforts, 
ch should be closely co-ordinated with 
cation and training programmes: 

t) Select promising technologies with a 
v to launching concerted efforts to ac- 
hate their development, increase their 
t effectiveness and widen their applicabili- 

1) Identify the research needed concerning 

the economic, social and environmental im- 
plications of emerging technologies, including 
employment potentials; 

(c) Establish or strengthen institutional 
machinery and national and regional capacity, 
including the private sector, where ap- 
propriate, for undertaking and co-ordinating 
research, development and demonstration ac- 
tivities, on the basis of a review initially to be 
undertaken at national, subregional and 
regional levels to of present capabilities and 
existing resources to respond to identified 
needs and priorities, in particular to those of 
developing countries; this review could later 
be extended to the global level with a view to 
the consideration of the need for a global 
research and development network around 
one or several lead institutions; 

(d) Establish or strengthen institutional 
machinery to provide links between research 
and development activities and the produc- 
tion sector (public investments, industrial 
property systems, etc.); 

(e) Consider the establishment of testing 
programmes to increase the ability of pro- 
spective consumers, producers and investors 
to make informed decisions regarding 
technological options; 

(f) Establish criteria for technical and 
economic evaluation of new technologies that 
will help national experts to identify their 
potential at specific locations; 

(g) Identify and implement demonstration 
projects relating to new and renewable 
energy technologies, including those which 
can be undertaken on a collaborative basis, 
taking into consideration the benefits in 
terms of stimulating further related research 
and development, the training of specialists 
and increased industrialization. 

3. Transfer, Adaptation and Application of 
Mature Technologies 

29. There are a number of technologies utiliz- 
ing new and renewable sources of energy 
which have reached a stage of maturity at 
which little or no further research and 
development is required for their widespread 
utilization. Channels and procedures for the 
widespread transfer of technology to all coun- 
tries, under conditions of mutual benefit to 
all parties, taking into account the special 
needs of developing countries, need to be 
established and supported through interna- 
tional co-operation, particularly in those cases 
where such technology originates in the 
developed countries. In this context, account 
should be taken of agreements to be reached 
within the framework of UNCTAD [U.N. 
Conference on Trade and Development] with 
regard to the International Code of Conduct 
on the Transfer of Technology. Furthermore, 
issues related to the climatic, cultural and in- 
stitutional settings within which the tech- 
nology is to be applied and the managerial 
aspects associated with its introduction and 
full operation in industry, agriculture, 
transport and human settlements will need to 
be taken into account by those who have to 
decide on the application of the technology. 
In addition, comprehensive analysis of its 
economic and social costs and benefits as well 
as of its environmental effects are needed. 

The following measures are required in order 
to accelerate the application and adaptation 
as well as the transfer of mature technologies 
under conditions of mutual benefit to all par- 
ties, taking into account the special needs of 
developing countries, and to enhance their 
contribution to total energy supply: 

(a) Identify and keep under review with 
respect to mature technologies utilizing new 
and renewable sources of energy their role 
within sectoral programmes and, where ap- 
propriate, establish or strengthen institu- 
tional arrangements to promote their applica- 

(b) Strenghten and/or establish measures to 
promote and facilitate the accelerated 
transfer of technology on new and renewable 
sources of energy, especially from developed 
to developing countries, in order to enhance 
the contribution of these energies to the total 
energy supply of developing countries; 

(c) Support measures to increase economic 
and technical co-operation among developing 
countries, including the undertaking of joint 
programmes of activities; 

(d) Develop national capabilities to under- 
take, inter alia, the manufacture adaptation, 
management, repair and maintenance of 
devices and equipment related to technologies 
for the assessment and utilization of new and 
renewable sources of energy; 

(e) Strengthen the ability of developing 
countries to make financial and technical 
evaluations of the different elements of the 
technologies, thereby enabling them to better 
assess, select, negotiate, acquire and adapt 
technologies required in order to utilize new 
and renewable sources of energy; 

(f) Formulate innovative schemes for in- 
vestments related to manufacture of equip- 
ment for new and renewable sources of 
energy, including the establishment of joint 
industrial programmes among interested 
countries for the manufacture and commer- 
cialization of capital goods; 

(g) Strengthen national capacity to review 
and assess domestic, fiscal, regulatory, socio- 
cultural and other policy aspects required to 
accelerate the introduction of technologies 
related to new and renewable sources of 

(h) Support as appropriate demonstration 
projects related to the application of new and 
renewable sources of energy technologies 
prior to a decision on commercial operation 
and widespread implementation. 

4. Information Flows 

30. The availability of adequate information 
is a prerequisite for sound decision-making 
for development policy and planning and for 
co-ordinated and effective basic and applied 
scientific and technological research. The 
need for improved information flows on 
energy generally and on new and renewable 
energy sources, in particular, must be viewed 
within the broader context of global informa- 
tion sharing and exchange in all relevant sec- 

31. Access to information pertaining to the 
development and utilization of new and 
renewable sources of energy raises particular 

mary 1982 



issues and problems associated with the 
newness of much of the subject-matter and 
the rapid pace of development in the area. A 
series of measures are called for along the 
following lines: 

(a) Identify currently available information 
systems and services and assess their 
capability to provide the required categories 
of information on the development and 
utilization of new and renewable sources of 
energy, in a manner and form suitable to dif- 
ferent types of users, taking into account ex- 
isting studies in that area; 

(b) Establish and/or strengthen national, 
subregional and regional energy information 
centres, preferably based on existing data 
banks or with institutions of research and 
learning, with related programmes of 
workshops, seminars and other information 
services, and integrate them into regional 
networks, which could later be joined into a 
global information network, where and when 
it may be deemed necessary and feasible; 

(c) Develop and make use of standardized 
methodologies, terminologies, procedures 
and, where feasible, equipment (software and 
hardware) for the collection and dissemina- 
tion of information to facilitate the linkage of 
data centers and systems; 

(d) Support measures which ensure the 
maximum availability of technological infor- 
mation contained in patent documents. 

5. Education and Training 

32. The establishment, development, opera- 
tion, maintenance and dissemination of new 
energy systems requires skilled scientific and 
technical manpower and increased public 
awareness and support. Specific education 
and training programmes are required, not 
only in schools and universities but also for 
the training of decisionmakers, planners, 
managers, extension workers and the general 
public as well as facilities for the training of 
specialized personnel. Those programmes, 
while taking into account the special needs 
relating to technologies utilizing new and 
renewable energy within the framework of 
broader energy programmes, must be viewed 
in the context of the general educational 

33. In order to help meet the required educa- 
tional and training needs, the following ac- 
tions are called for: 

(a) Support national efforts to estimate the 
requirements for the various categories of 
trained personnel; 

(b) Assess the capability of existing institu- 
tions to undertake the training of required 
personnel, and strengthen institutional in- 
frastructure accordingly, paying special at- 
tention to the training of teachers and 

(c) Co-ordinate and promote the exchange 
of information on educational systems, 
teaching materials, training programmes and 
technical experience relating to new and 
renewable sources of energy, between 
developed and developing countries and par- 
ticularly among developing countries; 

(d) Support efforts directed at the 

establishment or strengthening of national, 
subregional and regional training and educa- 
tional centers; 

(e) Establish training programmes for 
decision-makers, planners, managers and ex- 
tension workers; 

(f) Establish programmes to increase the 
awareness of the general public of the oppor- 
tunities that exist for using new and 
renewable sources of energy, especially in 
small-scale, decentralized applications, involv- 
ing the general educational system and the 
mass media so as to ensure the full and effec- 
tive participation of the entire population at 
all stages of the development process. 

B. Specific Measures 

34. In preparation for this Conference, 
panels of technical experts reviewed the 
status of technologies for new and renewable 
sources of energy and the prospects for their 
early use, and suggested specific activities at 
the national and international levels needed 
to realize the full potential of these 
technologies. This unprecedented review 
should lead to a new appreciation of the con- 
tribution that new and renewable sources of 
energy can make to meet the growing energy 
requirements of both developed and develop- 
ing countries. Understandably, the diversity 
of energy resource endowments, of demands 
for various end-uses, and of economic factors 
affecting each application, precludes the 
universal application of a single solution for 
all countries. 

35. Within the above-mentioned broad policy 
area, specific measures are needed. Many of 
the areas of new and renewable sources of 
energy considered during the Conference 
preparatory process are in a stage of scien- 
tific and technological evolution. Therefore, 
the findings and related priorities and 
measures must be kept under review, bearing 
in mind that technologies used on a 
widespread basis should be cost effective, 
technically appropriate, socially and en- 
vironmentally sound and affordable by the 
users; also technologies that show good 
future prospects either for local or for wider 
use should be promoted through development 
and demonstration projects even if these are 
not cost effective at present. With this in 
mind, the Conference, after due consideration 
of the results of the preparatory process, 
recommends the following measures at the 
national, subregional, regional and interna- 
tional levels as indications of broader ac- 
tivities in the context of such comprehensive 
programmes as may subsequently be 
developed. The measure listed in paragraphs 
36 to 45 below are source-specific. The 
measures listed in section A above (such as 
energy assessment and planning, programme 
appraisal, demonstration, standardization and 
education and training) relate to all energy 
sources. They are therefore not repeated in 
each source section below, but should be ex- 
plicity considered among actions to be taken 
in reference to each energy source. 

1. Hydropower 

36. Bearing in mind the immense and unus* 
hydro potential that exists, especially in 
developing countries, and the current avail- 
ability and widespread use of hydrotech- 
nology for the multipurpose exploitation of 
the water resources, the following specific a 
tions have been identified; 

(a) Assessment and Planning 

(i) Evaluate river hydro potential using 
stream records and apply existing and 
developed new methodologies to determine 
stream flow at ungauged sites; 

(ii) Establish criteria for the evaluation 
and integration of small, lowhead, as well a 
large-scale hydro resources within the con- 
text of over-all energy development and 
multipurpose programmes; 

(iii) Support studies of the relation be- 
tween the use of dams for power generatioi 
and for other purposes. 

(b) Research, Development and 

(i) Establish and/or strengthen researcl 
development and demonstration capacities < 
national Governments for assessing, selecti 
and adapting relevant hydropower 

(ii) Intensify research into ecological co 
sequences caused by hydro development. 

(c) Transfer, Adaptation and 
Application of Mature Technologies 

(i) Standardize design and performance 
specifications for hydro equipment and 
facilities as far as possible and make optimi 
use of package designs for small-scale plant 
suitable for replication and widespread use, 
consistent with national needs and practice: 

(ii) Adopt measures designed to ac- 
celerate the widespread utilization of small- 
scale (including micro) hydropower systems 

(iii) Conduct pre-investment studies 
related to enhancing the industrial 
capabilities of developing countries to desig 
adapt and manufacture hydropower equip- 
ment with a view to identifying the most 
promising projects; 

(iv) Support the design, production 
and/or adaptation of hydro equipment and 
civil engineering survey and design pro- 
cedures, especially in developing countries; 

(v) Support the collaborative efforts of 
interested developing countries in large-sea 
joint projects, which could include the inter 
connection of electrical networks. 


Department of State Bullet 


Fuelwood and Charcoal 

. Bearing in mind that fuelwood, including 
ircoal, constitutes an important source of 
3rgy for large populations especially in the 
-al areas of developing countries; that ade- 
ite management of forest resources to pro- 
e fuel, food and timber requires the 
:essment of projected supply and demand 
i the identification of deficit areas; that 
ir proper role must be seen in the context 
the over-all energy requirements and the 
•ticular problems of rural areas of most 
'eloping countries, and notwithstanding 
incial feasibility, especially in agroforestry 
terns, and that broad-based support and 
ticipation of men and women in the 
r elopment, management and efficient use 
'uelwood are essential, taking into account 
need for maintaining the ecological 
ance, the following specific actions have 
n identified: 

a) Assessment and Planning 

(i) Assess and evaluate forest resources 
irder to estimate their present and future 
tainable yield of fuelwood, to identify 
icit areas and areas in which reafforesta- 
i is both urgent and practicable; 

t>) Research, Development and 

(i) Intensify and/or establish basic and ap- 
d research on more productive species; 
(ii) Support and promote work aimed at 
moving the efficiency of stoves and cook- 
utensils, develop low-cost stoves and pro- 
;e their widespread use, taking into ac- 
nt social and cultural acceptability; 
(iii) Improve the preprocessing of fuels, 
uding those presently wasted such as 
js, branches, and dry leaves, for use in 
:ct combustion and other processes and 
rove the conversion efficiency of charcoal- 

(iv) Develop promising fuelwood and 
rcoal substitutes or supplements utilizing 
;r new and renewable sources of energy. 

) Transfer, Adaptation and 
ilication of Mature Technologies 

(i) Improve and/or establish forest 
lagement practices; 

(ii) Increase and/or establish reforestation 
afforestation programmes with selected 
tested species; 

(iii) Promote and support programmes, 
ects and activities to establish large-scale 
itations, including afforestation in deficit 
is and wood lots, establish distribution, 
;rol and pricing policies, and improve con- 
lion and utilization technologies (charcoal 
luction and gasification, kilns, ovens). 

3. Biomass 

38. Bearing in mind that considerable infor- 
mation and experience is available on biomass 
production and conversion systems within the 
international community and that the further 
evaluation of the potential of biomass 
resources requires the development and 
utilization of specific assessment techniques 
in order to determine their quantitative and 
qualitative potential, the following specific ac- 
tions have been identified: 

(a) Assessment and Planning 

(i) Assess and evaluate biomass 
resources, with special attention to the iden- 
tification and development of plant species, 
specifically for energy conversion, taking into 
account the crucial role that can be played by 
the recycling of organic matter in sustaining 
biomass productivity. 

(b) Research, Development and 

(i) Initiate and/or intensify basic and ap- 
plied research and development on specific 
aspects of biotechnology and bio/ther- 
mochemical conversion systems and on the 
use of byproducts as fertilizers and animal 

(ii) Accelerate the utilization of biomass 
resources for energy production through the 
initiation of and/or support for demonstration 
schemes such as biomethanation of manures, 
agricultural residues and other organic 
materials in different regions of the world; 
integration of biomethanation and ethanol 
production; small-scale gasifiers and sta- 
tionary engines; electricity production, using 
gasifiers and engine generators and including 
short-rotation forestry in energy farms; 
gasification and indirect liquefaction to pro- 
duce synthetic liquid fuels from lignocellulosic 

(c) Transfer, Adaptation and 
Application of Mature Technologies 

(i) Accelerate the utilization of biomass 
resources for energy production through the 
initiation of and/or support for the utilization 
of mature technologies such as: direct com- 
bustion; gasification, biomethanation of 
manure and municipal and industrial waste, 
including collection and handling; alcohol pro- 
duction from sugars and starches; anaerobic 
microbiological processes and the production 
of fuels from vegetable oils, giving due con- 
sideration to possible implications for food 
and fertilizer production and other en- 
vironmental and economic considerations. 

4. Solar Energy 

39. Bearing in mind that solar energy 
technologies are rapidly evolving and that 
some are on the threshold of large-scale and 
extensive applications in developing and 
developed countries alike, and that several 
solar applications have reached a mature 
state of technical development and are 
therefore ready under certain conditions for 
implementation, among them domestic and 

industrial water-heating with flat-plate collec- 
tors, low-pressure steam production, small- 
scale solar ponds for low temperature process 
heat production, solar crop and timber dry- 
ing, active and passive space-heating and 
cooling, water pumping (thermal and 
electric), water desalination, telecommunica- 
tions and certain other applications of solar 
photovoltaic systems — the following specific 
actions have been identified; 

(a) Assessment and Planning 

Evaluate the solar resource through: 

(i) Use of exisiting data supplemented by 
support for meteorological surveys, radiation 
and other relevant data collections using 
ground-based measuring stations, satellites 
and reliable photo-interpretation techniques 
for all climatic conditions; 

(ii) Development and application of 
methodologies to estimate radiation data 
based, for instance, on space and time cor- 
relation functions; 

(iii) Preparation of guidelines for the 
assessment of solar energy potential in 
various climatic zones; 

(iv) Support for the preparation of na- 
tional solar resources maps and data to be in- 
corporated in a world solar atlas on the 
global distribution of solar radiation. 

(b) Research, Development and 

Initiate, intensify and support research, 
development and demonstration in promising 
applications, especially those which are small 
and decentralized, in order to reach a level of 
development sufficient for widespread utiliza- 
tion such as: solar cooking, solar electricity 
production (thermal and photovoltaic), solar 
air conditioning and refrigeration, solar in- 
dustrial process heat, synthetic fuel produc- 
tion and solar crop drying. Among the main 
areas for research development are material 
and thermal sciences, photochemical conver- 
sion, durability and reliability of products, 
design and adaptation of processes, system 
analysis and control, storage systems and 
social acceptability. 

uary 1982 



(c) Transfer, Adaptation and 
Application of Mature Technologies 

(i) Initiate and/or support national pro- 
grammes for the widespread use of mature 
solar energy technologies; 

(ii) Study the problems associated with 
the widespread use of solar energy such as 
those relating to right of access to sunlight, 
transfer of development rights, building 
codes and warranties. Insurance of solar 
devices should be explored. 

(iv) Encouraging appropriate small-scale 
uses, especially for small or remote resource 

5. Geothermal Energy 

40. Bearing in mind that important and 
unevaluated geothermal resources exist in 
many countries, substantial effort is required 
to develop their energy potential. The follow- 
ing specific actions have been identified: 

(a) Assessment and Planning 

Identify and evaluate the resources by: 

(i) Utilizing all appropriate geological, 
geochemical and geophysical techniques; 

(ii) Utilizing, where applicable, oil and 
gas exploration data in the identification and 
assessment of geothermal energy prospects; 

(iii) The preparation and periodic revision 
of national and regional assessments of 
geothermal potential. 

(b) Research, Development and 

Uncertain research and development in: 

(i) Drilling technology; 

(ii) High, medium and low enthalphy 
geothermal systems; 

(iii) Multipurpose developments; 

(iv) Stimulation techniques; 

(v) Geopressurized systems; 

(vi) Hot dry rock system; 

(vii) Rock properties under high 
temperatures, and heat transfer in solid and 
fractured media; 

(viii) Chemical recovery and effluent 

(ix) Material selection and scaling con- 

(x) Binary and other alternative genera- 
tion systems; 

(xi) Problems of subsidence, gaseous 
emissions and other environmental impacts. 

(c) Transfer, Adaptation and 
Application of Mature Technologies 

Promote geothermal applications by: 

(i) Supporting the initial stages of ex- 
ploration for promising sites; 

(ii) Encouraging the location of ap- 
propriate activities near the source; 

(iii) Encouraging integrated heat and 
power projects; 

6. Wind Energy 

41. Bearing in mind that wind energy has 
been one of the few forms of renewable 
energy which have traditionally been prac- 
tical and cost effective, that several wind 
technologies have been available for a long 
time — namely, windmills for shaft power and 
wind energy for sea transport — and that 
wider use of the resource, based on 
technological advance and changes in the 
energy structures, could make an important 
contribution to future energy needs, the 
following specific actions have been iden- 

(a) Assessment and Planning 

Assess the resource by: 

(i) Improving and supporting increased 
collection of wind data at standard heights in 
forms appropriate for the evaluation of its 
potential as an energy source, using stand- 
ardized instrumentation, methods and 
analysis and, where applicable, for all climatic 

(ii) Support for the preparation of na- 
tional wind power resource maps and data to 
be incorporated in a world wind atlas, in- 
cluding data on the occurrence of extreme 
wind speeds. 

(b) Research, Development and 

(i) Initiate and support research, develop- 
ment and demonstration in such promising 
technologies as: wind machines rated at 
0.1-100 KW, especially for rural applications 
where a variable output is acceptable, in par- 
ticular for water pumps and wind turbines 
coupled with conventional power supplies or 
storage systems so as to yield reliable stand- 
alone systems (in the range 10-100 KW); 
larger wind turbines and arrays suitable for 
integration in networks in order to conserve 
conventional fuels or hydropower; 

(ii) Support research and development on 
wind characteristics for siting design and op- 
eration of windmills, rotor design, materials, 
storage systems, wind turbine — storage 
system matching environmental impact, safe- 
ty standards and social acceptability. 

(c) Transfer, Adaptation and 
Application of Mature Technologies 

Promote national programmes for the 
widespread use of mature wind energy 

7. Oil Shale and Tar Sands 

42. Bearing in mind the vast proven and j 
spective reserves of oil shale and tar sands 
including both surface and deeply buried 
deposits, and the currently available 
technology and that these resources are 
already being used in some countries to pr 
duce oil as a primary energy product to be 
used directly in helping to satisfy consump 
tion needs or to be converted to thermal 
energy either by direct combustion or 
through production of liquid fuel, the follow 
ing specific actions have been identified: 

(a) Assessment and Planning 

Initiate and intensify resource assessment 

(i) Reviewing and indexing possible oc 
currences, using the existing literature on 
geological and mineral exploration; 

(ii) Standardizing evaluation and 
measurement procedures. 

(b) Research, Development and 

Undertake research and development on: 

(i) Adapting capacity of shale retortinj 
with particular references to the end uses; 

(ii) The environmental consequences o: 
land and water resources of production an 
waste disposal; 

(iii) Extraction and recovery methods. 

(c) Transfer, Adaptation and 
Application of Mature Technologies 

Initiate and/or support national programm 
for widespread use of mature oil shale anc 
tar sands energy technologies. 

8. Ocean Energy 

43. Bearing in mind that several conversi 
technologies based on ocean energy systei 
have potential for generating electrical 
power, the following specific actions have 
been identified: 

(a) Assessment and Planning 

Assess the ocean energy resource by idem 
ing sites of potential Ocean Thermal Ener 
Conversion (OTEC), tidal and wave energ 
utilizing archival data and other existing i: 
formation as well as by undertaking OTE( 
tidal and wave energy surveys through th 
joint efforts of oceanographic and 
meteorological organizations. 


Department of State Bull* 


) Research, Development and 

[i) Initiate or continue research and 
!lopment in such areas as: 

• Aquaculture based on nutrient-rich 
> waters, floating, land-based and shelf - 
d ocean systems directed to the produc- 
of electricity, fresh water and energy- 
isive products; 

• Ocean wave systems including 
nical solutions suited for the trade wind 

ii) Accelerate the application of ocean 
gy systems when this appears justified, 
ixample by: 

• An extension of existing facilities, 

i-e feasible, for use as regional or interna- 
il demonstration sites; 

• Efforts directed at isolated com- 

Taught Animal Power 

Bearing in mind that draught animal 
3r is still a major source of energy, par- 
arly in the rural areas of certain develop- 
:ountries, the following specific actions 
been identified: 

i Assessment and Planning 

'Urce assessment and planning through: 

i) Collection of basic data on distribution 
lecies, breeds, draught capabilities, the 
it of energy on crop yields, agricultural 
jments, harnessing devices and existing 
ght animal power technologies; 
ii) Consideration of animal power as a 
: energy input in agricultural planning. 

I Research, Development and 

arch and development activities in the 
wing areas: 

i) The design, development, testing and 

ration of agricultural implements, animal- 

n vehicles, harnesses and hitching 

:es so as to enhance the productivity of 

ght animals; 

ii) Appropriate breeding schemes, 

ght animal feeding and management, 

jr and improvement of pastures. 

Transfer, Adaptation and 
ication of Mature Technologies 

der to ensure more efficient application, 
e appropriate, measures should be taken 
pport ongoing draught animal pro- 
lines in developing countries. 

J eat 

Searing in mind that small and large- 
peat technology is well established, is 
ally site-specific, and offers a viable 
native to fuelwood for domestic purposes 
an be used in suitable boilers as an 
native to other fuels for the generation 
?dium- to large-scale heat or power and 
in many countries this resource has not 
adequately surveyed, the following 
fie actions have been identified: 

Assessment and Planning 

) Initiate and/or expand the data base 

on the availability of peat to evaluate its 

(ii) Support the selection of suitable peat 
production areas, taking into consideration 
economic, employment and other social and 
environmental factors as well as the location 
of potential consumers. 

(b) Research, Development and 

(i) Develop and improve technologies for 
peat production, particularly in tropical and 
sub- tropical vegetation zones, as well as com- 
bustion and processing, including gasification 
and liquefaction processes; 

(ii) Conduct studies on alternative uses of 

(iii) Promote research in the utilization of 
cutaway peatlands for production of fuelwood 
and timber for industry, agricultural use, etc. 

(c) Transfer, Adaptation and 
Application of Mature Technologies 

Promote measures to encourage the in- 
dustrial use of peat and its use domestically, 
particularly as a replacement for fuelwood 
and charcoal in the sod, briquette and pellet 


46. The preceding section outlined the 
measures required to promote the develop- 
ment and utilization of new and renewable 
sources of energy. The effective implementa- 
tion of those measures for concerted action 
will require: 

A. The identification of selected priority 
areas requiring urgent action within the 
framework of the measures for concerted ac- 

B. Institutional arrangements for im- 
plementation and monitoring, to include: 

(a) An intergovernmental body; 

(b) Co-ordination mechanisms; 

(c) Task forces for implementing specific 
programmes and projects of the Nairobi Pro- 
gramme of Action; 

(d) Secretariat support; 

(e) Regional and subregional action; 

(f) Economic and technical co-operation 
among developing countries; 

(g) Intergovernmental and non- 
governmental organizations. 

C. The mobilization of financial resources 
for the implementation of the Nairobi Pro- 
gramme of Action. 

A. Areas for Priority Action 

47. The Conference agrees that, in order to 
establish priorities in the field of new and 
renewable sources of energy, it is necessary 
to consider a large number of parameters 
such as the availability of resources, the state 
of development of the technology involved, 
the size, type, geographical location and time- 
frame of the energy requirements, the char- 
acteristics of the end users, as well as social, 
economic, environmental and technical con- 
siderations, the potential of increased energy 
efficiency and conservation and the relative 

impact on the energy transition. In this con- 
text, the Conference decided that priority ac- 
tions should cover all policy areas listed in 
paragraph 26 in order to ensure coverage of 
the full range of the Programme of Action, 
but that within each policy area priority is to 
be assigned to certain types of actions and 
programmes, which are deemed to require 
more urgent action, consistent with national 
needs, in the context of international co- 
operation. In particular, the Conference 
recognizes that meeting rural energy re- 
quirements within the context of integrated 
rural development programmes, including 
agricultural production and transportation, 
small-scale and rural industries, household re- 
quirements and socio-cultural aspects such as 
education, health care and communications, is 
of great urgency, especially for developing 

48. The Conference recommends that the in- 
ternational community and the United Na- 
tions system, in particular, should develop 
and implement programmes and projects in 
the areas for priority actions. To this end, the 
efforts of the international community should 
be in accordance with the explicit requests, 
needs and priorities of the country, or coun- 
tries concerned. Every effort should be made 
to ensure that the above programmes involve 
and benefit men and women equally. 

49. In accordance with these concepts, the 
Conference agrees that urgent action is re- 
quired in the areas outlined below, particular- 
ly in least developed countries, on the 
understanding that such actions represent on- 
ly a first step towards the implementation of 
the Nairobi Programme of Action. The Pro- 
gramme of Action will be kept under regular 
review so as to make such adjustments as 
may be necessary in the light of emerging 
needs as they are identified. It will also be 
necessary to establish specific aims and objec- 
tives, both in respect of time and measurable 
execution of programmes and projects, so as 
to ensure an adequate review and evaluation 
of the progress made in implementing the 
Nairobi Programme of Action for the 
Development and Utilization of New and 
Renewable Sources of Energy. 

1. Energy Assessment and Planning 

50. The Conference recommends that interna- 
tional co-operation by all Governments and 
competent national, subregional, regional and 
international institutions should be directed 
to the assistance and the support of national 
efforts, particularly of developing countries, 
to assess new and renewable energy sources, 
needs and technologies within the total 
energy context and to develop energy pro- 
grammes and plans consistent with national 
development objectives. 

51. One goal of the programme is that, dur- 
ing the present decade, all countries wishing 
to do so will be in a position to formulate and 
implement national energy strategies as an 
integral part of their development planning. 
To that end countries may wish to designate 
immediately national energy assessment and 
planning focal points to begin the process of 
preparing inventories of resources, needs and 

ary 1982 



technologies as well as estimates of supply 
and demand according to end-use, in order to 
identify areas for near or longer-term action, 
including international co-operation. National 
surveys of appropriate new and renewable 
energy resources and of energy requirements 
should be completed as soon as possible. 
While the development of the necessary 
qualified personnel is a long-term process, 
early identification of projected national 
needs would provide the basis for the for- 
mulation of specific national and international 
programmes to respond to those needs. 

52. Priority programmes in this policy area 
should include support and assistance in the 
following areas: 

(a) Strengthening of national capacity for 
data gathering, energy assessment and plan- 
ning, including the strengthening or 
establishment of the appropriate institutional 
infrastructure, the training of required per- 
sonnel, and the preliminary identification and 
formulation of proposals for external 
assistance on the basis of national needs. 

(b) Comprehensive national energy planning 
efforts, including sectoral studies of energy 
supply and demand and preparation of na- 
tional energy balances. Such planning efforts, 
including assessment of natural resources for 
energy, should be based on reliable data and 
should take into account the dynamics of the 
situation and distinguish between competing 
and multiple uses of particular resources; 

(c) Identification and assessment of new 
and renewable energy resources, including 
the need for exploration, and their potential 
contribution to the total energy supply, 
through appropriate national surveys; 

(d) Evaluation of existing technologies and 
local capacities for developing and utilizing 
different sources of energy with a view to 
determining specific measures necessary bet- 
ter to promote and utilize such sources of 
energy for specific end-uses, in particular 
new and renewable sources of energy. 

2. Research, Development 
and Demonstration 

53. The Conference recommends that interna- 
tional co-operation by all Governments and 
competent national, subregional, regional and 
international institutions should be directed 
to the assistance and the support of efforts 
primarily at the national level, and particular- 
ly of developing countries, to initiate and/or 
enhance research, development and 
demonstration activities in the field of new 
and renewable sources of energy. Such 
research, development and demonstration ef- 
forts should include periodic assessment of 
the state of the art of the various 
technologies, including application-oriented 
fundamental research, in order to promote 
the accelerated development and effective 
use of new and renewable sources of energy. 
To this effect, the Conference recommends 
that measures be considered and adopted, 
where appropriate, to strengthen and/or 
establish national, subregional, regional or in- 
ternational programmes for research, 
development and demonstration in 

technological and non-technological fields 
related to new and renewable sources of 

54. The following priority programmes have 
been identified. Some of the measures listed 
under either (a) or (b) below may be ap- 
plicable to both headings. Although no 
specific heading is made for special cases, 
such as small islands, it is understood that 
priority research and development efforts 
and appropriate demonstration projects 
should take into account their special energy 

(a) Rural Energy 

(i) Identification of fast-growing species 
for fuelwood production, reforestation and af- 
forestation, especially in areas short of 

(ii) Development of more efficient low- 
cost stoves and charcoal production proc- 

(iii) Development of promising new and 
renewable sources of energy technologies 
suitable for replication and widespread use 
that are able to compete technically and 
economically with conventional alternatives, 
in a given region, and are ecologically sound 
and socially acceptable especially for such 
purposes as cooking, crop drying, pumping 
and agro-industries; 

(iv) Improvement of equipment used in 
conjunction with draught animals; 

(v) Evaluate existing and develop new 
bio-technological processes based on manure 
and other organic materials for the produc- 
tion of mechanical and electrical power, heat 
and light, as well as small-scale gasifiers 
based on thermo-chemical processes to fuel 

(vi) Develop new or improved technol- 
ogies based on new and renewable sources of 
energy for harvesting, preserving and proc- 
essing food and for using agricultural and 
forest residues for energy purposes. Such 
development should involve the major end- 

(b) Urban and Industrial Energy 

(i) Intensification of research in solar 
technologies for domestic and industrial use, 
especially in the areas of heat and power 
generation, solar passive architecture, solar 
refrigeration, air conditioning and water 

(ii) Intensify research for the production 
of fuels from biomass and the processing and 
use of urban and agro-industrial wastes for 
energy and other purposes; 

(iii) Undertake research and development 
in the areas of multipurpose development of 
hydro and geothermal energy, including drill- 
ing technologies; 

(iv) Intensify research, development and 
demonstration in increased energy efficiency 
and conservation as well as in the area of 
energy storage systems. 

3. Transfer, Adaptation and Application of 
Mature Technologies 

55. The Conference recommends that interna- 
tional co-operation by all Governments and 

competent national, subregional, regional : 
international institutions should be directe 
to the assistance and the support of the in 
plementation of national energy programn 
for the widespread utilization of new and 
renewable sources of energy, particularly 
the developing countries. The following 
priority areas have been identified: 

(a) General Programmes 

(i) Designation, strengthening and/or 
establishment of national, subregional or 
regional centres to serve as focal points fc 
transferring and adapting new and renew; 
sources of energy technologies. These foe* 
points could be based on a source and/or e 
use specific approach as appropriate. Fielc 
testing, demonstration and evaluation of c 
plete systems, in the context in which the; 
are to be used and in accordance with Iocs 
energy characteristics are included within 
transfer and adaption functions of these I 
tres. Such centres should work in co- 
operation with local industry and also sen 
for information, education and training pu 
poses, and could later be integrated into 
subregional, regional and international nei 

(ii) Establishment and development at 
national, subregional and regional levels o 
the capacity for the manufacture, operatic 
maintenance, marketing and management 
equipment and spare parts related to the i 
of new and renewable sources of energy. 

(b) Rural Energy 

Of particular concern to developing count] 
is the need for taking urgent measures aii 
at alleviating the acute domestic energy st 
ply problem, particularly the fuelwood cri; 
which is assuming alarming dimensions. 
goal of the Nairobi Programme of Action 
that during the present decade countries a 
undertake planned programmes with a vi€ 
to ensuring that the energy needs of the 
rural areas can be met on a sustainable bs 
To that end the following priority actions 
transferring, adapting and applying matui 
technologies in rural areas have been iden 

(i) Widespread application of improvec 
practices and technologies for the conserv 
tion and more effective use of natural 
forestry resources; 

(ii) Establishment and acceleration of 
grammes for large-scale reforestation and 
forestation with selected and tested specii 
as well as for smaller scale wood lots and 
plantations of energy crops, particularly ii 
arid, semi-arid and deficit regions, as part 
an effort to increase five-fold the annual i 
of fuelwood planting and to meet effectiv< 
and sustainably the demand for biomass f 
by the year 2000; 

(iii) Generalized rural application of la 
ly available new and renewable sources of 
energy, in particular integrated systems 
where feasible, using mature or proven 

(iv) Adoption of programmes to expan 
the application of improved techniques for 


Department of State Bulk 


zing draught animal power, including im- 
/ed husbandry practices. 

) Urban and Industrial Energy 

irder to help meet the growing industrial 
urban energy demand in many countries, 
articular that brought about by develop- 
it and industrialization efforts of develop- 
countries, and to diversify the energy 
Dry base, efforts are needed to increase 
ificantly the contribution of new and 
:wable sources of energy to urban and in- 
;rial energy requirements. To that end the 
iwing priority areas have been identified: 

(i) Expand, where appropriate, the utiliza- 
of small and large-scale hydro resources, 
;hermal resources and associated 
ismission systems; 

(ii) Initiate and encourage the wider ap- 
ition of active and passive solar heating 
cooling systems for domestic, commercial 
industrial purposes; 

(iii) Initiate and implement programmes 
romote the use of urban and industrial 
tes for energy and other purposes; 
(iv) Initiate and implement programmes 
ccelerate the incorporation of congenera- 
and total energy systems in the in- 
rial sectors and other such energy effi- 
cy and conservation programmes. 

i formation Flows, Education and 

rhe Conference recognizes that to in- 
se significantly the utilization of new and 
wable sources of energy, it is of vital im- 
ance to stimulate, support and assist ac- 
y the implementation of education and 
ling programmes at all levels, particular- 
developing countries, and to promote 
exchange and sharing of information to 
fullest and freest extent possible between 
doped and developing countries and 
ng developing countries, as well as pro- 
rimes for the enhancement of public 
reness of the energy situation. To these 
;, the following priority actions have been 

Designation, strengthening and/or 
blishment of national, subregional or 
mal centres to serve as focal points for 
•mation, education and training at all 
Is in the field of new and renewable 
ces of energy. These focal points could 
serve for the transfer, adaptation, 
nation and demonstration of technologies; 

Establishment of education and training 
rammes in the following areas, in order 
lsure a self-generating capacity and to 
t personnel requirements in such areas of 

i) Courses on energy assessment, plan- 
and utilization for personnel of institu- 
; dealing with those responsibilities, as 
as for decision-makers and personnel of 
financial institutions; 
ii) Specialized courses to train scientists, 
neers and qualified technicians to select, 
rn, construct, test, operate, maintain and 
iate equipment and installations needed 
;ilize new and renewable sources of 


(c) Establishment of effective systems of in- 
formation on new and renewable sources of 
energy at the national level which should be 
closely linked with information systems and 
networks at the subregional, regional and in- 
ternational levels utilizing existing informa- 
tion systems at all these levels to the max- 
imum extent possible. 

B. Institutional Arrangements 

57. Adequate institutional mechanisms are 
needed to ensure the effective mobilization 
and co-ordination of the resources required 
for the development of new and renewable 
sources of energy as well as the implementa- 
tion of the measures contained in the Nairobi 
Programme of Action. Further, the United 
Nations system and other international 
organizations should help ensure that ap- 
propriate assistance will be available to 
Governments for pursuing projects in the 
field of new and renewable sources of energy. 

58. To this end, the Conference recommends 
to the General Assembly the following ar- 
rangements, drawing to the fullest extent 
possible on the resources available within the 
United Nations: 

1. Intergovernmental Body 

59. There should be an intergovernmental 
body in the United Nations specifically con- 
cerned with new and renewable sources of 
energy and entrusted with guiding and 
monitoring the implementation of the Nairobi 
Programme of Action. For this purpose, this 
body should be open to the participation of all 
States as full members and should submit its 
reports and recommendations to the General 
Assembly through the Economic and Social 
Council, which may transmit to the Assembly 
such comments on the report as it may deem 
necessary, particularly with regard to co- 
ordination. The recommendation of the 
General Assembly on the report of the com- 
mittee would be transmitted for follow-up to 
the organs, organizations and bodies of the 
United Nations system, as well as to Govern- 
ments and the international community. 

60. The intergovernmental body would, inter 
alia, undertake the following functions: 

(a) To recommend policy guidelines for dif- 
ferent organs, organizations and bodies 
within the United Nations system in regard 
to new and renewable sources of energy, on 
the basis of the Nairobi Programme of Ac- 

(b) To formulate and recommend action- 
oriented plans and programmes for carrying 
out the Nairobi Programme of Action in ac- 
cordance with the priorities identified in 
paragraphs 47 to 56 above; 

(c) To keep under review and modify as 
may be necessary the priorities established in 
paragraphs 47 to 56 above; 

(d) To review and assess trends and policy 
measures related to the development and 
utilization of new and renewable sources of 
energy, with a view to increasing their con- 
tributions to meeting future over-all energy 

(e) To promote the mobilization of the 
resources required in the implementation of 

the Nairobi Programme of Action; 

(f) To recommend guidelines to the financial 
organs, organizations and bodies of the 
United Nations system in the financing of the 
activities related to the implementation of the 
measures of the Nairobi Programme of Ac- 
tion, and to help ensure the implementation 
of the measures listed in this section of the 
Programme of Action relating to financial 

(g) To monitor the implementation and help 
ensure co-ordination of the measures 
established in the Nairobi Programme of Ac- 
tion as well as of the activities of the organs, 
organizations and bodies of the United Na- 
tions system in the field of new and 
renewable sources of energy; 

(h) To be informed of, draw upon and con- 
tribute to the work and expertise of govern- 
mental and other intergovernmental institu- 
tions in the fields of new and renewable 
sources of energy; 

(i) To review the activities of the United 
Nations system in the field of new and 
renewable sources of energy and the im- 
plementation of the Nairobi Programme of 
Action, and where necessary make recom- 
mendations on the adaption of the Nairobi 
Programme of Action. 

61. It is necessary that there should be con- 
tinuity between the preparatory process for 
the United Nations Conference on New and 
Renewable Sources of Energy and the 
launching of the Nairobi Programme of Ac- 
tion. Accordingly, and without prejudice to 
final institutional arrangements, the Con- 
ference recommends that the immediate 
launching of the implementation of the 
Nairobi Programme of Action should be en- 
trusted to a committee patterned on the Pre- 
paratory Committee for the United Nations 
Conference on New and Renewable Sources 
of Energy. This committee will hold one ses- 
sion only and that in 1982, which would not 
last more than two weeks. On that occasion, 
the committee would be entrusted with the 
functions and responsibilities detailed in 
paragraph 60 above. It will report to the 
General Assembly at its thirty-seventh ses- 
sion through the Economic and Social Coun- 
cil, which may transmit to the Assembly such 
comments on the report as it thinks 
necessary. The final decision on further in- 
stitutional measures will be taken by the 
General Assembly at its thirty-seventh ses- 

2. Co-ordination Mechanisms 

62. The United Nations system should fully 
participate in and support the implementation 
of the Nairobi Programme of Action, with 
due consideration to national plans and 
priorities, so as to ensure its successful im- 
plementation. It is imperative to increase the 
responsiveness of the system in this respect, 
as well as to provide for the co-ordinated ac- 
tion of the organs, organizations and bodies 
of the United Nations system in the develop- 
ment of new and renewable sources of 
energy. Such institutions should organize 

uary 1982 



their work and rationalize their activities ac- 
cording to established priorities in such a way 
as to meet the need for implementing the 
Nairobi Programme of Action. 

63. The Director-General for Development 
and International Economic Co-operation, 
acting under the authority of the Secretary- 
General who chairs the Administrative Com- 
mittee on Co-ordination, would be entrusted 
with the task of co-ordinating the contribu- 
tions of the organs, organizations and bodies 
of the United Nations system within the 
framework of his mandate as defined by the 
General Assembly in its resolutions 32/197 
and 33/202. In order to ensure the necessary 
co-operation and co-ordination for the im- 
plementation of the Nairobi Programme of 
Action, co-ordinating capacity for new and 
renewable sources of energy in the Office of 
the Director-General, who would exercise the 
supervisory role, should be provided for, 
making full and efficient use of resources 
already existing within the United Nations 
and subject to the normal procedures of the 
General Assembly. All organs, organizations 
and bodies of the United Nations system are 
called upon to co-operate with the Director in 
the accomplishment of his over-all co- 
ordination tasks. 

64. Specialized intergovernmental organiza- 
tions and institutions related to the field of 
new and renewable sources of energy are in- 
vited to extend their co-operation in order to 
strengthen the co-operative action of the in- 
ternational community and to ensure that 
further resources are made available for the 
development of new and renewable sources of 

65. United Nations resident co-ordinators, 
designated by the Secretary -General in ac- 
cordance with General Assembly resolution 
34/213 with the consent of the Governments 
concerned, should provide a focal point for 
new and renewable sources of energy ac- 
tivities at the national level in consultation 
with the country representatives of the 
organizations concerned. 

3. Task Forces for Implementing Specific 
Programmes and Projects of the Nairobi 
Programme of Action 

66. Since the activities that will have to be 
carried out in the field of new and renewable 
sources of energy will require actions that 
differ widely in nature, size, complexity and 
level of application, adequate mechanisms 
may be devised to undertake specific actions 
related to the implementation of the Nairobi 
Programme of Action at the appropriate 

67. In this connexion, and in cases where 
other machinery within the United Nations 
system cannot effectively undertake a 
specific task or programme, the intergovern- 
mental body may recommend the establish- 
ment of ad hoc task forces tailored to the re- 
quirements of specific time-limited tasks 
related to the research, development, 
demonstration, application and utilization of 
new and renewable sources of energy on a 
sectoral or cross-sectoral basis, from among 

the organs, organizations and bodies of the 
United Nations system and other appropriate 
intergovernmental organizations, in consulta- 
tion with these bodies. Other appropriate in- 
stitutions may be invited to participate in 
these task forces. 

4. Secretariat Support 

68. The intergovernmental body will require 

a range of secretariat services in carrying out 
its functions as defined in paragraph 60 
above. The co-ordinating functions of the 
secretariat shall be carried out in accordance 
with paragraph 63 above. The Secretary- 
General is requested to make recommenda- 
tions to the thirty-sixth session of the 
General Assembly on the most effective and 
efficient arrangements for carrying out the 
substantive services required, including the 
possibility of a small separate secretariat unit 
for new and renewable sources of energy, 
making full and efficient use of resources 
available in the United Nations, subject to the 
normal procedures of the General Assembly. 

5. Regional and Subregional Action 

69. One of the tasks of international co- 
operation with respect to the development of 
new and renewable sources of energy in- 
cludes support to regional and subregional ef- 
forts for implementing the Nairobi Pro- 
gramme of Action. 

70. In this context, whenever appropriate and 
necessary, the strengthening of regional com- 
missions, and regional development banks, 
support for regional programmes relevant to 
new and renewable sources of energy and the 
establishment of intergovernmental bodies 
should be undertaken in order to facilitate 
the implementation of the Nairobi Pro- 
gramme of Action. 

71. Priority attention should be given to the 

(a) Support of resource evaluation, 
research, development and demonstration, 
training, energy planning and identification 
of regional or subregional projects for the 
development of new and renewable sources of 

(b) These activities should be developed and 
carried out through the establishment of 
specialized institutions and/or the strengthen- 
ing of the ones existing in the countries of 
each region, which would co-operate in order 
to achieve a more effective implementation of 
their respective regional programmes; 

(c) The strengthening and/or establishment 
of regional information networks which could 
connect with the international information 
networks and focus at the regional level on 
technologies and application and on the cen- 
tralization and diffusion of information on 
equipment, its use and its limits; 

(d) Organization of joint research and 
development activities related to promising 

(e) The feasibility and usefulness of organiz- 
ing regional demonstration and pilot projects 
and installations designed both to test ap- 
plication and to disseminate information on 

technologies related to new and renewable 
sources of energy; 

(f) Development of pre-investment activit 
designed to provide a basis for the ac- 
celerated implementation of technologies fc 
the utilization of new and renewable source 
of energy; 

(g) The strengthening and support of 
regional efforts directed at the transfer am 
diffusion of technologies; 

(h) Undertaking of joint industrial activiti 
for the production of energy-related capital 
goods; and 

(i) The organization of technical meetings 
seminars, conferences, study tours and like 
events with a view to facilitating and 
developing exchanges of information and e: 
perience on the utilization of new and 
renewable sources of energy. 

6. Economic and Technical 
Co-operation Among Developing 

72. Developing countries seek to enhance 
their collective self-reliance in various area; 
which are in their mutual benefit, through 
programmes of economic and technical co- 
operation in such areas as exchange of info: 
mation, joint ventures in project develop- 
ment, joint efforts in research, developmen 
demonstration and adaptation of technologi 
for new and renewable sources of energy, 
and technical assistance, to supplement the 
indispensable action to be undertaken by th 
international community. 

73. In this context, the international com- 
munity will take measures to provide, as ap 
propriate, support and assistance to the ef- 
forts of developing countries to accelerate c 
operation among themselves in the field of 
new and renewable sources of energy. 

7. Intergovernmental and 
Non-governmental Organizations 

74. Intergovernmental and non-government 
organizations can make a useful contributio 
to the successful implementation of the Pro 
gramme of Action and are requested to 
review their activities to determine how the 
can best support and contribute to the im- 
plementation of the Nairobi Programme of 

75. Non-governmental organizations in both 
the developing and developed countries can 
contribute in various ways to the implemenl 
tion of the Nairobi Programme of Action. Ir 
this regard, Governments and financial agei 
cies are encouraged to draw, as appropriate 
upon the expertise and support of non- 
governmental organizations in the implemer 
tation of projects in the field of new and 
renewable sources of energy. 

C. Mobilization of Financial Resources fo 
the Implementation of the Nairobi Pro- 
gramme of Action 

76. The implementation of the Nairobi Pro- 
gramme of Action requires the mobilization 
of additional and adequate resources. Each 
country will continue to bear the main 
responsibility for the development of its new 
and renewable sources of energy which won 


Department of State Bulletii 


ire vigorous measures for a fuller 
lization of its domestic financial and 
• resources. In pursuing national pro- 
lines potential applications at the 
inal and international levels should also 
msidered where appropriate. The im- 
entation of the Nairobi Programme of 
>n requires additional and adequate inter- 
nal financial resources, both public and 
,te, from all developed countries, interna- 
1 financial institutions and other interna- 
1 organizations. Developing countries in 
lition to do should also continue to pro- 
assistance to other developing countries. 

financial resources would be used to 
art national efforts of developing coun- 
aimed at the development of new and 
vable sources of energy, within the con- 
of the Nairobi Programme of Action. Ef- 

should be made to increase concessional 
i allocated to the financing of projects 
)rogrammes in the field of new and 
vable sources of energy in developing 
;ries in accordance with their national 

and priorities. Particular attention 
d be given to the need for accelerated 
opment of the least developed countries 
>ther developing countries where 
opment needs and problems are 

he development of new and renewable 
«s of energy involves numerous types of 
rtakings, ranging from supporting ac- 
i including national assessment of new 
enewable sources of energy for over-all 
ry development and pre-investment ac- 
2s, to capital investment in projects and 

he supporting actions include, in addi- 
;o the assessment of new and renewable 
jy resources, such areas as strengthen- 
f the relevant national institutional in- 
"ucture, data collection, training and 
ition, research, development and 
nstration, etc., while the pre-investment 
ties encompass feasibility studies, 
n and engineering, etc. 
he magnitude of the demand for financ- 
jch types of actions or activities is 
dy considerable and will increase in the 
i to come, particularly with the im- 
itation of the Nairobi Programme of 

n addition to the financing of supporting 
ns and pre-investment activities, it is of 
nount importance to promote the financ- 
f capital investment in the field of new 
•enewable sources of energy in develop- 
oun tries. 

he financing requirements for these pur- 
i are of a very significant magnitude and 
expected that such requirements will 

progressively as new and renewable 
:es of energy become, on a wide scale, 
lically and economically more and more 
lie. This should make it possible to at- 
greater amounts of traditional interna- 
1 development financing, including con- 
)nal financing, as well as commercial 

financing for development projects of new 
and renewable sources of energy in the 
developing countries. 

82. Consistent with national development 
plans and priorities, Governments should con- 
sider developing and implementing policies 
and programmes which serve to promote the 
contribution of new and renewable sources of 
energy to total energy supplies and en- 
courage a transition from excessive 
dependence on non-renewable sources. 

83. Joint ventures in activities related to new 
and renewable sources of energy should be 
based on sound economic considerations con- 
sistent with national plans and priorities. Ef- 
forts should be made by interested countries 
to promote, as appropriate, an environment 
conducive to an increase in net flow of non- 
concessional capital and a mobilization of 
domestic resources required for contributing 
to the financing needs of new and renewable 
sources of energy in the developing countries, 
in the framework of their national plans and 

84. All countries might also examine gaps in 
which regional co-operation can be supportive 
of efforts undertaken at the national level. 

85. For the purpose of undertaking the 
various activities in line with the Nairobi Pro- 
gramme of Action, the financial mechanisms 
and institutions of the United Nations system 
should be provided with additional and ade- 
quate funds to meet the growing re- 
quirements for preliminary supporting ac- 
tions and pre-investment activities related to 
the development of new and renewable 
sources of energy in developing countries. In 
this context, it is necessary to improve ex- 
isting mechanisms and institutions with a 
view to enhancing their effectiveness and ef- 
ficiency. Specific and additional resources 
should be directed through such channels as 
the United Nations Development Programme, 
the Revolving Fund for the Exploration of 
Natural Resources, the interim financial ar- 
rangements for science and technology, the 
UNDP Energy Account and others directly 
or indirectly involved, in accordance with na- 
tional plans and priorities. Consideration 
might also be given to establishing on a 
voluntary basis new financing mechanisms 
for the development of new and renewable 
sources of energy in the developing countries 
within the United Nations system if and 
when necessary. 

86. Within over-all efforts to ensure the 
growth of official development assistance, all 
developed countries will emphasize the 
development and utilization of new and 
renewable sources of energy as one of the 
priority areas in their international co- 
operation and development assistance. Other 
countries in a position to do so should also 
continue to make efforts in this regard. In ac- 
cordance with its mandate, as described in 
paragraph 60 above, the intergovernmental 
body should keep under review the financial 
needs of the field of new and renewable 
sources of energy and suggest measures to 
meet these needs. 

87. In order to secure access to the widest 
possible range of financial resources, interna- 
tional and regional development financial 

organizations and institutions, in particular 
the World Bank, are urged to provide addi- 
tional and adequate resources specifically for 
large-scale supporting actions, pre-investment 
and investment activities in the field of new 
and renewable sources of energy, in accord- 
ance with national priorities. 

88. These financial mechanisms and institu- 
tions are urged to respond more widely and 
effectively to national requests, as well as to 
requests from the subregional, regional and 
international organizations engaged in the 
development of the new and renewable 
sources of energy in developing countries, 
according to the priorities established in the 
Nairobi Programme of Action and in 
response to recommendations from the in- 
tergovernmental body as regards its im- 

89. Financial requirements for over-all 
energy investment will continue to grow at a 
fast rate during the coming years. According 
to studies undertaken by a World Bank ex- 
pert group, during the period 1981-1985 total 
annual energy investment needs of all 
developing countries will be of the order of 
$54 billion. Investments in new and 
renewable sources of energy will account for 
a substantial and growing proportion of in- 
vestment needs. While developing countries 
will continue to bear the main responsibility 
for their development, which would require 
vigorous measures for a fuller mobilization of 
their domestic financial and other resources, 
external financial resources, private and 
public, particularly concessional flows and of- 
ficial development assistance, will constitute 
nevertheless an indispensable element of sup- 
port for the developing countries' own ef- 

90. In view of the urgency of meeting the 
developing countries' needs in this respect, 
early and specific measures will have to be 
taken for purposes of financing supporting 
actions, pre-investment and investment ac- 
tivities as warranted by the progress of proj- 
ect preparation efforts. To this end, the 
World Bank and the United Nations Develop- 
ment Programme should be invited to under- 
take a joint study for making as accurate an 
estimate as possible of the supporting actions 
and pre-investment requirements for new and 
renewable sources of energy in the develop- 
ing countries in the 1980s to be completed as 
soon as possible and, if practical, by the end 
of 1981. 

91. In the course of the United Nations Con- 
ference on New and Renewable Sources of 
Energy held in Nairobi, many countries in- 
dicated their willingness to make more 
resources available for the financing of the 
development and utilization of new and 
renewable sources of energy. In order to 
generate additional funding and to encourage 
co-financing of new and renewable sources of 
energy, the Conference recommends that, at 
the global, regional and subregional levels, 

ary 1982 



multilateral and bilateral donors and in- 
terested recipient countries should consider 
convening, where appropriate, consultative 
meetings to review and facilitate concerted 
action in this field, bearing in mind the need 
to avoid duplication of efforts and taking 
fully into account national plans and 
priorities. These consultative meetings should 
address the priority areas identified by the 
Nairobi Programme of Action, and deal par- 
ticularly with financing the promotion of 
research, demonstration and development ac- 
tivities in new and renewable sources of 

92. These consultations should take into ac- 
count the guidelines recommended by the in- 
tergovernmental body which should be kept 
informed of activities for increasing and im- 
proving the efficiency of financial and 
technical assistance for the development and 
utilization of new and renewable sources of 
energy in developing countries. 

93. The Secretary -General of the United Na- 
tions Conference on New and Renewable 
Sources of Energy in his report to the 
General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session 
should indicate progress made towards the 
implementation of the consultative meetings 
mentioned above. 

94. In addition, the Conference urges all in- 
terested parties to accelerate consideration of 
other possible avenues that would increase 
energy financing, including, inter alia, the 
mechanisms being examined in the World 
Bank, such as an energy affiliate. 

95. In order to enhance the efforts of 
developing countries towards greater collec- 
tive self-reliance, the implementation of the 
Nairobi Programme of Action should reflect 
their commitments to utilize fully their own 
capabilities in the field of new and renewable 
sources of energy. In this respect, the inter- 
national community should support and 
enhance the actions of economic and technical 
co-operation among developing countries as 
appropriate and especially as regards the 
areas of supporting actions, pre-investment 
and investment activities in the field of new 
and renewable sources of energy. 

The Situation in Kampuchea 

1 For the purposes of this conference, 
new and renewable sources of energy are 
defined as solar, geothermal and wind power, 
tidal power, wave power and thermal gra- 
dient of the sea, biomass conversion, 
fuelwood, charcoal, peat, energy from 
draught animals, oil shale, tar sands, and 
hydropower. ■ 

Following are a statement by 
Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, U.S. 
Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations, made in the U.N. General 
Assembly on October 19, 1981, and the 
text of the resolution adopted by the 
General Assembly on October 21. 

OCT. 19, 1981 1 

Our purpose in meeting here today is 
both clear and urgent: 

• To uphold the right of the 
Kampuchean people, as of all people, to 

• To restore Kampuchea's sovereign 
identity and national independence; and 

• To bring stability, peace, and 
development to Southeast Asia, an area 
that has suffered destruction, violence, 
and death for too long. 

In each of its two preceding ses- 
sions, the General Assembly, by over- 
whelming majorities, has found the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam in viola- 
tion of fundamental provisions of the 
U.N. Charter — the inviolability of the 
sovereignty, independence, and terri- 
torial integrity of nations; noninter- 
ference in the internal affairs of other 
nations; and the inadmissibility of the 
threat or use of force in international 
relations. A conference mandated by last 
year's Assembly has reaffirmed these 
findings and proposed a program to 
restore Kampuchea's independence, its 
territorial integrity and sovereignty, and 
to allow Kampuchean people freely to 
choose their own form of government. 

Almost 3 years have passed since 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, sup- 
ported and financed by the Soviet 
Union, first invaded and occupied Kam- 
puchea, and nearly 200,000 Vietnamese 
troops still occupy that grief-stricken 
country. The people of Kampuchea, 
ravaged by a succession of horrors, 
including three decades of war and the 
savage devastation of Pol Pot, must now 
endure conquest and occupation by their 
historic adversaries. Vietnamese forces 
and administrators stand above the law. 
They deny all human rights to the con- 
quered Khmer people. Vietnamese pene- 
tration of the country is broad and deep. 
Vietnamese advisers work in Phnom 
Penh and in rural areas; each Khmer 
province has a sister province in Viet- 
nam to "assist" it. All ministries have 

Vietnamese advisers who hold final d 
sionmaking power. Kampucheans wil 
to work for the Vietnamese puppet 
regime have been paid in internation 
provided relief commodities; rural 
Khmer not employed by the regime s 
left to fend for themelves. 

Naturally, economic breakdown r 
accompanied Vietnam's alien, impe- 
rialistic government. An unofficial lai 
bridge spanning the Thai-Kampuchea 
border, and established over the obje 
tions of Vietnamese authorities, has 
rescued some 1 million Khmer from 

But while the people of Kampucr 
are the principal victims of Vietnam'; 
aggression, they are not the only vic- 
tims. The people of Vietnam itself — 
indeed, all the people of Southeast 
Asia— suffer from the oppressive tyi 
ny of the Vietnamese Government. 1 
pursuit of an unpopular war has caus 
widespread misery within Vietnam; i 
imperialist adventures have necessity 
escalation of the already scandalous 
level of oppression inside Vietnam. > 
surprisingly, then, thousands of Viet 
namese continue to flee their country 
each month, risking pirates, storms, 
rejection; citing government repressi 
unreasonable controls on daily life, 
stepped up military conscription and 
teriorating economic conditions as th 
reasons for leaving. Once again, misi 
and insecurity engulf the region, and 
people of non-Communist Southeast 
Asia, having only recently emerged \ 
a conflict of 30 years' duration, face 
precarious future as their governmei 
divert resources sorely needed for 
development to strengthen their 
defenses against the possibility of fu 
ther Vietnamese expansionism. 

Vietnam's aggression also confrc 
the rest of us here in the United Na1 
with a grave challenge. If Vietnam c 
invade, subjugate, and occupy a 
neighboring state by brute force and 
with impunity and retain the prize o\ 
aggression, then the security of all 
members of this Assembly is substar 
ly diminished. Aggression feeds on a 
gression: It is the great lesson and tl 
warning of history. It is hardly 
necessary to note that aggression is 
more tolerable because its perpetrate 
claim to have been "invited in" by a 
regime that did not exist until it was 
up by those same aggressors. Vietna 


Department of State Bui 


ms threaten to establish an ominous 
edent whose consequences should be 
special concern to the smaller, 
iligned members of this body. 
How has the Socialist Republic of 
nam justified this travesty against 
Kampuchean people? What defense 
it offered for this threat to its other 
hbors in Southeast Asia, this affront 
le vital principles of international 
r, reaffirmed in this case specifically 
vo General Assemblies? It has 
/ered as tyrants always do: with a 
t lie, for tyranny abhors truth and is 
lined only by lies. 
Representatives of Vietnam have 
onded to the clearly expressed will 
te overwhelming majority of the 
ibers of this Organization by accus- 
hat majority of interference in 
puchean affairs. They have rejected 
egitimate role of the United Nations 
eking a solution to this international 
sdy and have attempted to portray 
nam's aggression as a rescue mis- 
undertaken at the behest of the 
I Samrin regime. Vietnamese ef- 
- to justify their invasion and oc- 
tion of Kampuchea are both dis- 
iuous and incredible and only serve 
'ing their nation into further 

Vietnam's claim to have acted at the 
st of the Heng Samrin regime is ab- 

on its face. The Heng Samrin 
ne — which according to Hanoi in- 
1 Vietnamese forces into Kampuchea 
whose permission Hanoi piously 
is is required in order to withdraw 
lamese forces from Kampuchea — is, 
urse, a Vietnamese creation whose 
;r is maintained by Vietnamese 
>ons. That government did not even 

at the time of the invasion; its so- 
i invitation to the Socialist Republic 
letnam had to be issued retroactive- 
"ter the Vietnamese forces had 
.dy invaded and occupied Kam- 
ea. In this, as in other respects, the 
ramese invasion of Kampuchea is 
ingly, tragically analogous to the 
3t invasion of Afghanistan. Indeed, 
lew imperialism can be recognized 
/where by its aggressiveness, its 
nee, its contempt for truth. 
Vietnam's attempt to pose as the 
itor of the Kampuchean people is a 
cularly clumsy masquerade that has 
d no one. All of us remember that it 
precisely that Government of Viet- 
that assisted the accession of the 
} ot regime to power in the first 
!. All of us remember that, at a time 
1 many of our governments were 
rly critical of the Pol Pot regime for 
Dtorious human rights violations, it 

was the Government of Vietnam that 
staunchly defended Pol Pot's human 
rights record. In this and in other 
forums, Vietnam persisted in its defense 
of the Pol Pot regime, right up to its in- 
vasion of Kampuchea late in 1978. Thus, 
Vietnam's contention that its invasion of 
Kampuchea was prompted by a 
solicitude for human rights of the Kam- 
puchean people is the kind of falsehood 
that is as offensive as it is egregious. 

Instead of rescuing the Kampuchean 
people from oppression, the Vietnamese 
have demonstrated a cruel, cynical 
disregard for their welfare. It was Viet- 
nam's invasion which precipitated a 
massive famine throughout Kampuchea, 
bringing starvation and further devasta- 
tion to a people that already had suf- 
fered all too much. It was Vietnamese- 
imposed authorities who then 
endeavored, first to deny the very fact 
of the famine to potential donors of 
relief outside of Kampuchea and then to 
obstruct the efforts of international 
organizations and other donors to pro- 
vide desperately needed relief to the 
people of Kampuchea. 

This callous policy has forced hun- 
dreds of thousands of Khmer to flee 
their ancestral homes for Thailand and 
for the border no-man's land. By, in ef- 
fect, hurling these Khmer on their 
neighbor's doorstep, Vietnam and its 
Kampuchean puppet regime have ab- 
dicated the most basic responsibilities of 
government. That the refugees who 
have left Kampuchea for Thailand, or 
for the relative safety of the Thailand- 
Kampuchea border, remain there for 
fear of returning to Vietnam-dominated 
Kampuchea is the clearest possible 
demonstration of the true character of 
Vietnam's self-styled "liberation." 

It is a marvelous tribute to the 
United Nations that its specialized agen- 
cies have been able to meet this massive 
humanitarian challenge. When I visited 
the border camps last August, I felt and 
have said repeatedly that seeing their 
good work made me proud of the United 
Nations and proud of my country's con- 
tribution to the agencies that carry it 
out. I was, therefore, especially pleased 
when that great honor — the Nobel Prize 
for Peace — was awarded to the Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees. The High Commissioner, 
Mr. Poul Hartling, and those who assist 
him deserve the gratitude of the interna- 
tional community for their efforts on 
behalf of the victims of war and political 

Reviewing the arguments advanced 
by Hanoi to justify its aggression, one 
can only marvel at their lameness, their 
utter lack of plausibility. In fact, no 
arguments, however artfully con- 
structed, could possibly obscure the 
reality that the Government of Vietnam, 
financed and supported by the Soviet 
Union, has conquered a member state of 
this Organization. It refused to comply 
with repeated General Assembly resolu- 
tions calling on it to withdraw its forces. 
It refused to attend the International 
Conference on Kampuchea mandated by 
the General Assembly to seek a solution 
to the Kampuchean problem. It pro- 
foundly compromised its own integrity 
and independence by making itself an in- 
strument of Soviet ambition in Asia. 

A majority of the nations of the 
world have clearly asserted and 
reiterated that they will not acquiesce in 
Vietnam's aggression. Neither will they 
forget it. They have rejected Vietnam's 
threadbare rationalizations and have for- 
mulated a concrete program to restore 
Kampuchea's independence, territorial 
integrity, and sovereignty, a program 
which will allow the Kampuchean people 
to choose their own government. The 
declaration of the International Con- 
ference on Kampuchea, held last July, 
judiciously addresses the needs of all 
parties and provides a reasonable, prac- 
tical, and wholly honorable basis for a 
negotiated settlement of the Kam- 
puchean problem: 

• It calls for a U.N. -supervised 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from 

• It makes full provision for the 
legitimate security needs of all the coun- 
tries of the region, including Vietnam. 

• It contains safeguards to insure 
that armed Kampuchean factions would 
be unable to prevent, disrupt, intimidate, 
or coerce the outcome of free elections. 

• It emphasizes the need for an in- 
dependent Kampuchea to remain neutral 
and nonaligned. 

• And it calls upon the Government 
of Vietnam to participate in the 
negotiating process that can lead to a 
peaceful solution to the Kampuchean 
problem and a restoration of peace and 
stability to Southeast Asia. 

In addition, through its ad hoc com- 
mittee and through the possibility of its 
reconvening whenever needed, the con- 
ference represents a continuing 
mechanism to negotiate a settlement in 

The declaration of the International 
Conference on Kampuchea was for- 

ary 1982 



mulated by the countries of the region 
with the advice and unanimous approval 
of the delegations present, who comprise 
a majority of the U.N. membership. We 
believe the General Assembly should 
now formally express its strong support 
for the declaration by its vote on the 
present resolution. We call upon the 
Government of Vietnam and its Soviet 
patron to heed this Assembly's urgent 
plea for justice and compassion and to 
join in negotiations designed to resolve 
the tragic plight of the people in Kam- 
puchea and end the threat to the peace 
and stability of Southeast Asia. Surely, 
the Kampuchean people, and all the peo- 
ple of Southeast Asia, are entitled to 
more from life than endless conflict and 
constant turmoil. Surely they deserve 
our unremitting efforts to restore peace, 
independence, and security to their 
strife-torn region. 

The principles of self-determination, 
of national independence, of nonaggres- 
sion — the principles on which this 
Organization was founded — have never 
been more centrally involved than here, 
in the continuing occupation of Kam- 
puchea. The integrity of the United Na- 
tions, as well as the well-being of the 
Kampuchean people, are, therefore, in- 
volved here this morning. 

OCT. 21, 1981* 

The General Assembly, 

Recalling its resolutions 34/22 of 14 
November 1979 and 35/6 of 22 October 1980, 

Taking note of the report of the 
Secretary-General on the implementation of 
Genera] Assembly resolution 35/6, 

Welcoming the convening of the Interna- 
tional Conference on Kampuchea, held at 
United Nations Headquarters from 13 to 17 
July 1981, as a step forward towards a com- 
prehensive political settlement of the Kam- 
puchean problem, 

Noting the joint statement issued in 
Singapore on 4 September 1981 by Prince 
Norodom Sihanouk, Mr. Son Sann and Mr. 
Khieu Samphan concerning their agreement, 
in principle to form a coalition, 

Hfiin in/ in mind the Declaration on Kam- 
puchea and resolution 1 (I) adopted by the 
( lonference on 17 July 1981, as contained in 
the report of the Conference, 

Deploring that foreign armed interven- 
tion continues and that foreign forces have 
not been withdrawn from Kampuchea, thus 
causing continuing hostilities in that country 
and seriously threatening international peace 
and security. 

Greatly concerned that the continuing 
deployment of foreign forces in Kampuchea 
near the Thai-Kampucliean border has 
heightened tension in the region, 

Gravely disturbed that the continued 
fighting and instability in Kampuchea have 
forced more Kampucheans to flee to the Thai- 
Kampuchean border in search of food and 

Recognizing that the assistance extended 
by the international community has continued 
to reduce the widespread food shortages and 
health problems of the Kampuchean people, 

Emphasizing that it is the inalienable 
right of the Kampuchean people who have 
sought refuge in neighboring countries to 
return safely to their homeland, 

Emphasizing further that no effective 
solution to the humanitarian problems can be 
achieved without a just and lasting political 
settlement of the Kampuchean conflict, 

Convinced that, to bring about durable 
peace in South-East Asia, there is an urgent 
need for a comprehensive political solution to 
the Kampuchean problem which will provide 
for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and 
ensure respect for the sovereignty, in- 
dependence, territorial integrity and neutral 
and non-aligned status of Kampuchea, as well 
as the right of the Kampuchean people to 
self-determination free from outside in- 

Convinced further that, after the com- 
prehensive political settlement of the Kam- 
puchean question through peaceful means, 
the countries of the South-East Asian region 
can pursue efforts to establish a zone of 
peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East 
Asia so as to lessen international tensions 
and to achieve lasting peace in the region, 

Reaffirming the need for all States to 
adhere strictly to the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations, which call for 
respect for the national independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all 
States, non-intervention and non-interference 
in the internal affairs of States, non-recourse 
to the threat or use of force, and peaceful 
settlement of disputes, 

1. Reaffirms its resolutions 34/22 and 
35/6 and calls for their full implementation; 

2. Reiterates its conviction that the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kam- 
puchea, the restoration and preservation of 
its independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, the right of the Kampuchean peo- 
ple to determine their own destiny and the 
commitment by all States to non-interference 
and non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
Kampuchea are the principal components of 
any just and lasting resolution to the Kam- 
puchean problem; 

3. Approves the report of the Interna- 
tional Conference on Kampuchea and adopts: 

(a) The Declaration of Kampuchea, 
which includes four elements of negotiations 
for a comprehensive political settlement of 
the Kampuchean problem; 

(6) Resolution 1 (I) in which the Con- 
ference, inter alia, established the Ad Hoc 
Committee of the International Conference 
on Kampuchea; 

4. Requests the Secretary-General to con- 
sult with, to assist and to provide the Con- 
ference and the Ad Hoc Committee with the 

necessary facilities to carry out their func- 

5. Authorizes the Ad Hoc Committee t 
convene during regular sessions of the 
General Assembly in order to carry out its 

6. Further requests the Secretary- 
General to undertake a preliminary study c 
the possible future role of the United Na- 
tions, taking into account the mandate of t 
Ad Hoc Committee and the elements of 
negotiations for a comprehensive political I 
tlement as set out in paragraph 10 of the 
Declaration on Kampuchea; 

7. Expresses its appreciation to the 
Secretary-General for taking appropriate 
steps in convening the Conference; 

8. Requests the Secretary-General to 
follow the situation closely and to exercise 
good offices in order to contribute to a con 
prehensive political settlement; 

9. Decides to reconvene the Conference 
at an appropriate time in accordance with 
Conference resolution 1 (I); 

10. Urges all States of South-East Asu 
and others concerned to attend future ses- 
sions of the Conference; 

11. Requests the Conference to report 
the General Assembly on its future session; 

12. Expresses its deep appreciation to 
donor countries, the United Nations and its 
agencies and other national and internation 
humanitarian organizations which have 
rendered relief assistance to the Kampuche 
people, and appeals to them to continue to 
assist Kampucheans who are still in need, 
especially those along the Thai-Kampucheai 
border and in the holding centers in Thailar 

13. Deeply appreciates the efforts of th 
Secretary-General in co-ordinating 
humanitarian relief assistance and in monife 
ing its distribution, and requests him to con 
tinue such efforts as are necessary to deal 
with the situation; 

14. Urges the countries of South-East 
Asia, once a comprehensive political solutioi 
to the Kampuchean conflict is achieved, to 
exert renewed efforts to establish a zone of 
peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East 

15. Expresses the hope that, following a 
comprehensive political solution, an in- 
tergovermental committee will be establishe 
to consider a programme of assistance to 
Kampuchea for the reconstruction of its 
economy and for the economic and social 
development of all States of the region; 

16. Requests the Secretary-General to 
submit to the General Assembly at its thirty 
seventh session a report on the implementa- 
tion of the present resolution; 

17. Decides to include in the provisional 
agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item 
entitled "The Situation in Kampuchea." 

'USUN press release 77. 

2 Adopted by the General Assembly by I 
vote of 100 (U.S.) to 25, with 19 
abstentions. ■ 


Department of State Bulletir 




Jeane J. Kirkpatrick 

Statement before the U.N. General 
>embly on October 2, 1981. Ambas- 
br Kirkpatrick is U.S. Permanent 
yresentative to the United Nations. 1 

aeak this afternoon less in reply than 
protest against the speech made 
terday by the Ethiopian Minister of 
*eign Affairs. His strident and 
iperative attack on the United States 
at beyond even what we have come to 
lect from such quarters. 

The remarks of the Ethiopian 
•eign Minister represent an extreme 
.mple of what is known as the 
vellian inversion of the truth. The 
tern is a simple one: He accuses 
ers of committing crimes which have, 
act, been perpetrated by his own 
ime and by those countries with 
ich his regime is allied. 

He speaks, for example, of "the ex- 
amination of Africans" by "sabre- 
tling warmongers (who) are either 
jctly or through their paid agents 
aged in a savage massacre of men, 
nen, and children around the 
De — and all this in the name of 
;ice and democracy." In fact, it is his 
1 regime that is guilty of the very 
agery of which he speaks. 

>orts of Crimes 

nesty International estimates that 
le 30,000 persons in Ethiopia were 
unarily executed for political reasons 
Areen 1974 and 1978—10,000 in 1977 
le. During the so-called Red Terror, 
ch climaxed in February 1978, the 
iopian police and army squads 
"dered some 5,000 grade school, high 
doI, and university students and im- 
ioned some 30,000 others — this is a 
ntry whose entire student population 
> only 36,000 10 years ago. 
Again, according to Amnesty Inter- 
ional, 12-year-old children were 
>ng those immersed in hot oil, sexual- 
ortured, or flung out of windows and 
to die in the streets. Amnesty Inter- 
ional reports that the relatives of the 
dren were prohibited by state edict 
n mourning, yet at the same time 
•e encouraged to buy back the body 
burial — a practice that came to be 
ed "paying for the bullet." All this 

wholesale massacre was committed in 
the name of justice and democracy — in 
the name of a liberating revolution. 

The Ethiopian Foreign Minister told 
us that his country's "epochmaking 
popular revolution . . . ushered in an era 
of prosperity and equality." Yet the 
respected African scholar Colin Legum 
wrote of Ethiopia at the end of 1978 
that, "There are today perhaps a hun- 
dred times the number of political 
prisoners than in the worst period of the 
late Emperor Haile Selassie's rule." 

There are at least 300-400 arrests 
every week in Addis Ababa alone. Many 
of those arrested simply disappear and 
are presumed executed. Last year 
Amnesty International published the 
names of a number of long-term promi- 
nent political prisoners whose food, 
brought in daily, had been turned away 
by prison officials in 1979. This usually 
meant that the prisoner had been sum- 
marily executed. Amnesty's request for 
information about several prominent 
"disappeared political prisoners" and its 
separate appeal for information about 
Pastor Gudina Tumsa have gone 
unanswered. So have its protests against 
the arrest and torture of church 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Ethiopia accused the United States of 
"stifling progressive movements, under- 
mining sovereign states," and engaging 
in a "massive military buildup" that has 
increased tensions in the region. Yet it 
is his own regime that is engaged in a 
war against its own ethnic minorities — 
among them the Eritreans, the Somalis, 
and the Tigreans. It is his own regime 
that received from the Soviet Union 
more than $1 billion in military equip- 
ment in late 1977 and early 1978— 
which is over twice as much military aid 
as the United States provided to that 
country during a quarter of a century 
under the late Haile Selassie. It is his 
own regime that now hosts — and 
depends upon for its survival — some 
15,000 Cuban military personnel and 
some 1,000-1,500 Soviet military ad- 

Charges of Intervention 

In a characteristic attempt to find 
scapegoats to account for the failure of 
his own regime, the Ethiopian Foreign 
Minister charged that the "imperialist 
forces" are preventing his country from 

devoting itself to the tasks of develop- 
ment. The truth is exactly the reverse. 
It is his regime's devotion to war — and 
to the imposition of totalitarian rule 
over its population — that is responsible 
for the diversion of its energies and 
resources from the tasks of develop- 
ment. Indeed, its policies have caused so 
much hardship and disruption that more 
than a million and a half people have 
been forced to flee to neighboring coun- 
tries to seek refuge. 

In addition, the Ethiopian Foreign 
Minister speaks of lasting peace being 
restored in Afghanistan and Kampuchea 
"only if the people concerned are left on 
their own without any form of im- 
perialist meddling." I do not take issue 
with that statement. But, surely, 
everyone in this hall knows that the only 
"imperialist meddling" in Afghanistan is 
being done by some 85,000 Soviet troops 
against whom the entire Afghan popula- 
tion is engaged in heroic resistance. And 
it should not be necessary to point out 
that Kampuchea is occupied today by 
200,000 troops from Vietnam. These are 
the "imperialist meddlers." The Govern- 
ment of Ethiopia is integrated into this 
imperialistic network through friendship 
treaties, including military clauses, with 
the Soviet Union, Libya, and South 

Biological Warfare 

The Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs has repeated the charge that the 
United States is using biological warfare 
against the people of Cuba. The 
American delegation dealt with this sub- 
ject at length on September 25 when we 
pointed out that Cuban health officials, 
themselves, had told officials of the Pan 
American Health Organization, 
American diplomats in Havana, and 
tropical health specialists, both in the 
United States and other countries, that 
the current epidemic of dengue fever in 
Cuba had been introduced into the coun- 
try by Cuban troops returning from 

It was only after this quiet consulta- 
tion that Fidel Castro decided to blame 
the disease on the United States. The 
Ethiopian Foreign Minister has now 
repeated that lie. He adds to this the 
charge of racism and asserts that the 
World Health Organization has reached 
the conclusive verdict that no such 
disease exists in Africa. In fact, Profes- 
sor Wilbur Downs of Yale University, an 
international distinguished authority on 

uary 1982 



the subject, has written a book, entitled 
Arthropod Borne Viruses of Vertebrates, 
that dengue virus type one and type two 
are found in West Africa as far south as 
South Africa, meaning in the Angola 
area. And the American Public Health 
Association states in the book, Control 
of Communicable Diseases in Man, that 
the dengue viruses "have been recovered 
from West Africa," meaning in the 
Angola area. 

These unfounded charges against 
the United States are particularly 
unseemly in light of the fact that the 
United States, through the Pan 
American Health Organization, has pro- 
vided hundreds of tons of a pesticide to 
fight that self-same epidemic in Cuba. 


The Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs has decried a "crisis of consensus" 
in the United Nations, a crisis he 
characteristically blames on the United 
States. But the true crisis on consensus 
is rooted in the Orwellian falsehoods 
spread by countries that are concerned 
principally with shifting the blame onto 
others for their own internal failures 
and external acts of aggression. A real 
consensus must be based upon a spirit of 
cooperation and a genuine commitment 
to the truth. We remain committed to 
that kind of consensus, but we cannot sit 
by silently when the "big lie" echoes in 
these chambers. 

U.N. Conference on 
Least Developed Countries 

USUN press release 60. 

The U.N. Conference on Least 
Developed Countries was held in Paris 
September 1-14-, 1981. Following is a 
statement by M. Peter McPherson, Ad- 
ministrator of the Agency for Interna- 
tional Development (AID) and head of 
the U.S. delegation, made in the con- 
ference on September 2. 

In a spirit of understanding and 
cooperation, I would like to outline 
today — particularly for the distinguished 
representatives of the least developed 
countries — the approach of my govern- 
ment to their developmental needs in 
the decade ahead. 

The international community has 
long recognized the special development 
problems of the poorest countries. We 
also know that we need to take special 
measures to assist these countries in 
their development efforts. To this end, 
the United States has already taken 
many practical steps in its international 
economic and aid policies. We are com- 
mitted to continue these efforts. We will 
participate actively with other delega- 
tions to develop a realistic "substantial 
new program of action." 

Shared Constraints of the Least 
Developed Countries 

Of the many challenges facing the inter- 
national community in the 1980s, those 
facing you — the least developed coun- 
tries — are among the most difficult. 
Your capacity to respond to these 
challenges will vary. While your coun- 
tries are similar in terms of relative 
poverty and low levels of literacy and in- 
dustrialization, they are very diverse in 
terms of economic and social structures 
and natural resource endowment. 
Moreover, the particular problems and 
constraints you face, and the actions and 
policies you have adopted to address 
them, also differ markedly from country 
to country. Therefore, as was apparent 
in the country reviews that preceded 
this conference, any effective action pro- 
gram must be geared to your individual 

The most widely shared constraints 
in your countries seem to be insufficient 
development of your human resources, 
weak institutional bases, and inade- 
quacies in your physical infrastructure. 
These constraints inhibit broad progress 

in promoting development objectives ii 
specific sectors. Moreover, they limit 
your capacity to respond to the 
challenges you face. These constaints 
also limit, to varying degrees, your 
ability to participate in international 
trade and to use larger amounts of 
economic assistance effectively. 

As a result of these constraints, 
most of you face serious problems in n 
jor sectors of your economies. 

• In agriculture, growth in food pi 
duction has often fallen short of popul; 
tion growth. This adversely affects 
nutrition and productivity. 

• In energy, increased deforestati< 
has compounded the problems created 
by the oil-price increases of recent yea 
It also contributes to long-term en- 
vironmental degradation. 

• In industry, low productivity 
limits the effective competition with in 
ports or development of exports. 

These problems are not insurmoun 
able. The progress made by many deve 
oping countries over the last 20 years : 
impressive. This offers hope that 
substantial progress is possible for all 
countries — even the poorest. 

Not long ago, the development pro 
pects of many countries — now called 
"middle-income" or "newly industri- 
alized" — were considered bleak. But 
through their own unstinting commit- 
ment and efforts and with support of 
the international community, they are 
now often in a position to help others. 

While the development process is 
complex and often uneven, one point is 
.clear: The economic peformance of 
developing countries has been deter- 
mined primarily by their own economic 
policies and budget allocations. The in- 
ternational community can serve as an 
important, and sometimes even an 
essential, catalyst to development whei 
appropriate economic policies and 
budget allocations are in place. 
However, foreign aid can never be a 
substitute for the countries' own effort 
Where policies distort or hinder the ef- 
fective operation of the economy, 
economic performance will be poor. Ex 
ternal action can achieve little under 
such conditions. 


Department of State Bullet 


nples of Success 

culture gives us, perhaps, the most 
latic illustration. In that sector, ar- 
illy low prices have weakened 
ers' incentives and, thus, made food 
lems worse. Current policies that 
urage food production must be 
•sed. This reversal is necessary if 
[rowing population of the develop- 
rorld is to be fed. It is essential for 
of you here who face low and 
itimes declining levels of food pro- 
on and corresponding rising import 

"he case of South Asia is an instruc- 
sxample of what can be done. In In- 
nd Pakistan, effective agricultural 
ies have resulted in dramatically in- 
led food production. In Bangladesh, 
e food production has been a mat- 
f worldwide concern, the govern- 
; has undertaken major reforms in 
and agriculture policy. In recent 
>, total grain production has in- 
:ed from 13 million tons to over 16 
>n tons. Wheat production alone in- 
;ed tenfold. We are proud to have 
associated with achievements like 

n education, the accomplishments of 
,1 again illustrate the importance of 
jpriate policies. Under the 
:ated leadership of His Majesty, 
)1 enrollment increased from less 
1% in 1951 to nearly 60% in 1975. 
I recently, Nepal's government has 
promoting local initiative through 
itralization. In our view, such 
ies that cultivate the talents and 
ivity of people are critical to 

lapid population growth may be the 
sensitive of the problems you face, 
success of Indonesia in this area of- 
hope for progress elsewhere. Since 
nesia launched its nationwide family 
ling program in 1970, contraceptive 
lationwide has nearly doubled. In 
it tripled in some provinces. 
iover, the birth rate dropped by 
to one-third between 1960 and 
. The Government of Indonesia is 
ng the benefit of its experience and 
odologies with the officials of other 
oping countries. 


erted international action, of 
;e, is needed to support your 
lopment. At the same time, people 
y own country are now being asked 
ake sacrifices to restore economic 
th in the context of limited budget 

resources. It is, therefore, more impor- 
tant than ever to demonstrate that in- 
ternational action and resources for 
development support effective economic 

The main contributions that my 
government can make to international 
action in support of your development 
are to: 

• Restore noninflationary growth in 
our economy and to assist other coun- 
tries in doing the same; 

• Maintain and work to increase the 
openness of our markets to the exports 
of the developing countries; 

• Maintain substantial levels of con- 
cessional assistance to the poorer coun- 
tries and to provide such assistance in 
forms and under conditions appropriate 
to individual countries; and 

• Bring the vast resources of the 
U.S. private sector more effectively into 
the development process. 

Restoring growth in the U.S. econ- 
omy will result in increased demand for 
developing countries' exports of both 
manufactured goods and primary com- 
modities. Arresting inflation is essential 
for the long-term prosperity of all coun- 
tries. It will keep down the cost of im- 
ports of goods and services by develop- 
ing countries, which are essential to 
their development. 

A liberal trade system is basic to 
economic growth in all countries. We 
have reaffirmed our strong commit- 
ments to maintaining liberal trade pol- 
icies and an open multilateral trading 
system as established in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 

We have also recognized the special 
problems which you face in expanding 
your trade and have taken the following 
steps to promote your exports to us. 

• Consistent with your commit- 
ments in the Tokyo declaration, we have 
undertaken for the least developed coun- 
tries an immediate staging of most 
Tokyo Round tariff concessions. This is 
in contrast to the normal 7-year staging 
that applies to other countries. 

• Under our generalized system of 
preferences, we have given special con- 
sideration to products of interest to the 
least developed countries — e.g., han- 
dicrafts. We have also adopted a de 
minimis rule, which waives the 
competitive-need requirement where im- 
ports fall below a certain dollar level. 
This measure provides a potential 
benefit to least developed countries as 
small exporters of individual items. 

As a result of these actions, as well 
as our overall effort to maintain an open 
trading system, over 80% of U.S. im- 
ports from the least developed countries 
now enter duty free. 

We are committed to continue to 
resist protectionist pressures. We will 
work with all countries to strengthen 
the multilateral trade system, recogniz- 
ing that this will involve structural adap- 
tation to changes in the world economy. 

U.S. Assistance 

Despite efforts to integrate the develop- 
ing countries into the world economy, 
many of the poorer countries will need 
concessional assistance for some time to 
come. We recognize that this is par- 
ticularly true of the least developed 
countries. This recognition has led to a 
significant increase in our assistance to 
the least developed countries in recent 

• Between 1978 and 1980, U.S. 
bilateral economic assistance to the least 
developed countries grew from $369 
million to $542 million; this represents 
an increase of close to 50%. We have 
also taken a series of actions which have 
increased the capacity of our assistance 
programs to respond flexibly to your 
special needs. 

• For some years now our economic 
assistance to least developed countries 
has been provided mostly in the form of 
grants. As a result, the grant element of 
U.S. assistance to the least developed 
countries in 1979 was more than 96%. 
As you know , the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
guideline specifies 90%. 

• Our food for development pro- 
gram provides special benefits to the 
least developed countries. 

• AID has untied its development 
assistance loans and grants to the least 
developed countries, permitting procure- 
ment of goods and services not only in 
the United States but also in other 
developing countries. 

• We have provided increased fund- 
ing of local currency requirements of 
development projects. 

• We have waived, for specific proj- 
ects in the least developed countries, the 
normal host country contribution to 
development projects and the normal 
time limit on project funding. 

Looking ahead, this Administration 
has requested a 16% increase in foreign 
assistance in fiscal year 1982. This in- 
crease was made in spite of the major 

ary 1982 



budget reductions essential to carrying 
out the President's economic recovery 
program. We will make every effort to 
win congressional approval of our 
foreign assistance programs. This ap- 
plies equally to meeting our multilateral 
negotiated agreements. 

In addition, we will continue our 
support of the multilateral development 
institutions, including the International 
Development Association (IDA), which 
has special importance to the least 
developed countries. Significantly, we 
have just obtained congressional 
authorization to participate in the 
general capital increase of the World 
Bank. Congress has also authorized full 
U.S. participation in the sixth replenish- 
ment of the IDA. We have also obtained 
restoration of amounts cut by Congress 
last year in funding for the International 
Development Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank. 

We believe that our bilateral 
assistance program addresses your main 
development constraints. The main 
thrust of our program is to help the 
developing countries build their own 
capacity to progress by developing and 
improving their own institutions. I 
believe it is in this area that we can 
make a significant and lasting contribu- 
tion to the development process. By 
these means, developing countries can 
improve their capacity to use assistance 
effectively and increase their ability to 
develop, obtain, or adapt technology to 
meet their specific needs. In this way, 
they can move closer to self-sustaining 
and dynamic development. 

In fact, the United States has 
worked with developing countries for 
many years in their efforts to train their 
people, build their basic institutions, and 
improve their management of develop- 
ment programs. The progress that India 
and other developing countries have 
made in developing their agricultural in- 
stitutions demonstrates what can be 
achieved through these mutual efforts. 

We believe our institutions have 
been a major strength of our own na- 
tional development. It is precisely in this 
area of institution-building where we can 
match your needs with our own 
capabilities. The importance we attach 
to this is seen in the institutional 
development efforts we are mutually 
undertaking in many of the countries 
represented here. 

The sectoral thrust of our bilateral 
assistance program will continue to be in 
agriculture, human resource develop- 
ment, energy, and population. These 

areas, in our view, require priority at- 
tention to increase the productivity and 
incomes of the people in the developing 
world — including women, who play an 
important economic role in most 
developing countries. Programs that 
recognize the specific contributions of 
women in development increase the ef- 
fectiveness and impact of the assistance 

These are also the areas in which we 
have demonstrated, through our 
bilateral assistance efforts, what suc- 
cessful international cooperation can 

• Within the context of the Club du 
Sahel, bilateral donors have undertaken 
a major effort to combat desertification 
through range management and re- 
forestation projects. 

• Similarly, the effort to attack 
river blindness in the Volta River Basin 
of West Africa represents a long-term 
multidonor effort to eradicate a major 
disabling disease. 

• In Bangladesh, our 5-year fer- 
tilizer distribution project has supported 
major reforms which have put the 
distribution of fertilizer into the private 
sector. This program, together with fer- 
tilizer imports from other donors and 
multidonor support of the country's own 
productive capacity, has made fertilizer 
available to all farmers, a major factor 
in Bangladesh's striking progress in food 

Similar progress is possible else- 
where and in the future. We hope to 
continue working with these and other 
countries in support of programs that 
help address the basic needs of their 

Administration and institutional 
limitations in your countries sometimes 
also hamper your capacity to utilize 
foreign aid. In recognition of this prob- 
lem, we continually attempt to simplify 
and improve the administration of our 
aid program. For example, we and other 
donors have introduced standard 
documentation for project identification 
in the Club du Sahel. We are currently 
reviewing policies and procedures in our 
bilateral aid. Our objective is to further 
simplify procedures and increase the 
delegation of authority to our represent- 
atives in the field. Decisions made in 
light of this review will, I believe, in- 
crease the efficiency of our assistance 
program. They will also enhance our 
ability to respond to your particular 
needs and circumstances. 

Private Sector Contributions 

Over the years, the assistance effort 
the U.S. Government have been ext< 
sive. However, this contribution to 
development is relatively limited con 
pared to the potential of the U.S. 
private sector. 

The creative energies and en- 
trepreneurial initiative of the U.S. 
private sector have made a major co 
tribution to global economic growth 
development. This contribution has 1 
made by a range of entities — from c 
smallest shops and farms to the larg 
educational institutions, firms, or pr 
voluntary organizations. Their energ 
and initiatives were important to th( 
development and applications of the 
high-yielding varieties of wheat and 
that have revolutionized food produc 
tion. It is their flexibility which has 
reached the women food producers i 
often neglected by large national 
agricultural programs. It is their in- 
genuity which resulted in some recei 
major breakthroughs in the effort tc 
develop a vaccine to prevent malaria 
This disease afflicts more than 200 
million people in the developing wor 
International private institutions ha) 
often spearheaded efforts to develop 
adapt agricultural technology to the 
ditions of the developing world. An < 
ample is the work of the Internation 
Rice Research Institute with U.S. 
private sector support. 

This Administration will stimula 
and encourage the U.S. private sect< 
help create new scientific technologi* 
breakthroughs. Thus, we will draw i 
the combined strength of the U.S. pi 
and private sectors. Through such a] 
proaches, my government will contir 
to demonstrate the concern and com 
ment of the American people in assi: 
the poorer countries in their develop 
ment efforts. I would hope that othe 
donors would also provide increased 
port to these efforts. This hope exte: 
particularly to the oil-exporting coun 
tries and other developing countries 
position to do so. I refer also to the 
members of Group D whose develop- 
ment assistance efforts to date have 
been so limited. 

Post-Conference Objectives 

Before closing I would like to make 1 
points regarding the further work of 
conference. The first is a call for 
realism. Many of the objectives set f< 


Department of State Bull 


e developing countries are com- 
lable. However, the pace of prog- 
envisioned is much faster than ex- 
nce suggests is feasible. We should 
)ach our tasks with determination 
lso with realism about what is 
vable in the near term. Similarly, 
emands for increased assistance 
: exceed what many donors are able 
ovide. These demands may also ex- 
the economic and institutional 
:ity of recipients to use such in- 
es effectively. We hope that the 
tantial new program of action" 
oped here will prove useful. We 
it will guide both the developing 
;ries and the donors as we work 
her to address the development 
ems you will face in the 1980s. To 
eful, it must be realistic, 
'he second point is on the issue of 
e country reviews. We recognize 
this is an important question for 
' of you. We also recognize the 
of an exchange of ideas between 
*s and the recipient country. A 
jue of this kind can make the 
n of a development program more 
Die to the circumstances of in- 
lal countries. As a result, the 
;d States has long supported the 
iltative group process. We believe 
such consultations are most effec- 
vhen they are geared to the specific 
"ion faced by individual countries, 
elieve in open and candid discussion 
?en donors and the recipient coun- 
ts its problem and policies, as well as 
pecific donor contribution to their 
opment process. 

'his conference offers an important 
•tunity for the international com- 
ty to identify and discuss the 
fie developmental problems which 
fou individually. It is also an oppor- 
f to explore ways in which these 
ems can be addressed. Progress, of 
e, will not always be rapid or even, 
rtheless, I firmly believe that the 
le of the 1980s will be one of prog- 
ind growth in the least developed 
ries. We will achieve that goal by 
lating and utilizing the talent and 
tive of your own people in concert 
the contributions and efforts of the 
lational community both public and 
te. We pledge to work closely with 
ther delegates of this conference to 
op a useful plan of action. Such a 
■vill permit the international com- 
;y to take practical steps in support 
lr efforts to improve the economic 
ocial welfare of your people. ■ 

U.S. Ratifies Protocol I 
of Treaty of Tlatelolco 

On May 26, 1977, President Jimmy 
Carter signed Protocol I to the Treaty 
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
in Latin America (treaty of Tlatelolco); 
at the request of President Reagan, the 
Senate gave its advice and consent to the 
ratification of that treaty, subject to cer- 
tain understandings, on November 13, 
1981. President Reagan signed the in- 
strument of ratification on November 19, 
1981, and Secretary Haig formally 
deposited the U.S. instrument of ratifica- 
tion during a ceremony in Mexico City 
on November 23, 1981. 

Following are Secretary Haig's 
remarks made on that occasion, the text 
of Protocol I to the treaty of Tlatelolco, 
and the Senate understandings attached 
to the treaty. 1 


Last week President Reagan described 
the control of nuclear weapons as an 
essential part of an American program 
for peace. It is my privilege today to 
take this program one step further as 
the United States deposits the instru- 
ment of ratification of Protocol I to the 
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons in Latin America. By adhering 
to Protocol I, the United States under- 
takes not to test, use, produce, or deploy 
nuclear weapons anywhere within the 
zone of the Latin American treaty. Our 
action today, combined with our earlier 
adherence to Protocol II, completes for- 
mal U.S. involvement in the process of 
establishing such a zone. 

The United States is proud to par- 
ticipate in this pioneering achievement. 
The Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 
speaks to the finest aspirations of the 
hemisphere. It embodies our yearning 
for peace by prohibiting the most terri- 
ble instrument of war. It strengthens 
the cause of nuclear nonproliferation 
that must be a priority for all nations. It 
demonstrates that patient but imag- 
inative diplomacy can, indeed, advance 
us toward a more secure future. It 
testifies to the vision and dedication of 
the nations that conceived it. Finally, it 
is a great tribute to the unique role of 
Mexico that the pact will be known to 
history as the treaty of Tlatelolco. 

The treaty of Tlatelolco— the effort 
to establish a nuclear-free zone for Latin 
America— has a significance that goes 
beyond our hemisphere. The zone, when 
fully realized, will help to stabilize world 
politics and reduce the risk of war. The 
treaty is already being studied as a 
possible model for use in other regions 
of the world exposed to the threat of 
nuclear proliferation. 

The progress we celebrate in this 
ceremony does not complete the task. 
Other states have yet to adhere to the 
treaty and to take steps to fulfill its 
promise. But we are pleased to join your 
request for the cherished goal of a 
nuclear-weapons-free zone in Latin 


The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, furnished 
with full powers by their respective Govern- 

Convinced that the Treaty for the Pro- 
hibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin 
America, negotiated and signed in accordance 
with the recommendations of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in Resolution 
1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, 
represents an important step towards ensur- 
ing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, 

Aware that the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but, 
rather, a means of achieving general and 
complete disarmament at a later stage, and 

Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in 
their power, towards ending the armaments 
race, especially in the field of nuclear 
weapons, and towards strengthening a world 
at peace, based on mutual respect and 
sovereign equality of States, 

Have agreed as follows: 

Article 1. To undertake to apply the 
status of denuclearization in respect of 
warlike purposes as defined in articles 1, 3, 5, 
and 13 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in ter- 
ritories for which, de jure or de facto, they 
are internationally responsible and which lie 
within the limits of the geographical zone 
established in that Treaty. 

Article 2. The duration of this Protocol 
shall be the same as that of the Treaty for 
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin 
America of which this Protocol is an annex, 
and the provisions regarding ratification and 
denunciation contained in the Treaty shall be 
applicable to it. 

ry 1982 



Article 3. This Protocol shall enter into 
force, for the States which have ratified it, on 
the date of the deposit of their respective in- 
struments of ratification. 

In witness whereof the undersigned 
Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full 
powers, found in good and due form, sign 
this Protocol on behalf of their respective 


1) That the provisions of the Treaty made ap- 
plicable by this Additional Protocol do not 
affect the exclusive power and legal com- 
petence under international law of a State 
adhering to this Protocol to grant or deny 
transit and transport privileges to its own or 
any other vessels or aircraft irrespective of 
cargo or armaments. 

2) That the provisions of the Treaty made 
applicable by this Additional Protocol do not 
affect rights under international law of a 
State adhering to this Protocol regarding the 
exercise of the freedom of the seas, or 
regarding passage through or over waters 
subject to the sovereignty of a State. 

3) That the understandings and declara- 
tions attached by the United States to its 
ratification of Additional Protocol II apply 
also to its ratification of Additional Protocol I 
as follows: 

I. That the United States Government 
understands the reference in Article 3 of the 
treaty to "its own legislation" to relate only 
to such legislation as is compatible with the 
rules of international law and as involves an 
exercise of sovereignty consistent with those 
rules, and accordingly that ratification of Ad- 
ditional Protocol II by the United States 
Government could not be regarded as imply- 
ing recognition, for the purpose of this treaty 
and its protocols, or for any other purpose, of 
any legislation which did not, in the view of 
the United States, comply with the relevant 
rules of international law. 

That the United States Government takes 
note of the Preparatory Commission's inter- 
pretation of the treaty, as set forth in the 
Final Act, that, governed by the principles 
and rules of international law, each of the 
contracting parties retains exclusive power 
and legal competence, unaffected by the 
terms of the treaty, to grant or deny non- 
contracting parties transit and transport 

That as regards the undertaking in Arti- 
cle 3 of Protocol II not to use or threaten to 
use nuclear weapons against the Contracting 
Parties, the United States Government would 
have to consider that an armed attack by a 
Contracting Party, in which it was assisted 

by a nuclear-weapon state, would be incom- 
patible with the Contracting Party's corre- 
sponding obligations under Article 1 of the 

II. That the United States Government 
considers that the technology of making 
nuclear explosive devices for peaceful pur- 
poses is indistinguishable from the technology 
of making nuclear weapons, and that nuclear 
weapons and nuclear explosive devices for 
peaceful purposes are both capable of releas- 
ing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner 
and have the common group of character- 
istics of large amounts of energy generated 
instantaneously from a compact source. 
Therefore the United States Government 
understands the definition contained in Arti- 
cle 5 of the treaty as necessarily encompass- 
ing all nuclear explosive devices. It is also 
understood that Articles 1 and 5 restrict ac- 
cordingly the activities of the contracting 
parties under paragraph 1 of Article 18. 

That the United States Government 
understands that paragraph 4 of Article 18 of 
the treaty permits, and that United States 
adherence to Protocol II will not prevent, col- 
laboration by the United States with con- 
tracting parties for the purpose of carrying- 
out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful 
purposes in a manner consistent with a policy 
of not contributing to the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons capabilities. In this connec- 
tion, the United States Government notes Ar- 
ticle V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons, under which it joined in 
an undertaking to take appropriate measures 
to ensure that potential benefits of peaceful 
applications of nuclear explosions would be 
made available to non-nuclear-weapons states 
party to that treaty, and reaffirms its willing- 
ness to extend such undertaking, on the same 
basis, to states precluded by the present trea- 
ty from manufacturing or acquiring any 
nuclear explosive device. 

III. That the United States Government 
also declares that, although not required by 
Protocol II, it will act with respect to such 
territories of Protocol I adherents as are 
within the geographical area defined in para- 
graph 2 of Article 4 of the treaty in the same 
manner as Protocol II requires it to act with 
respect to the territories of contracting par- 

'The United States is not eligible to sign 
the treaty of Tlatelolco but did ratify Pro- 
tocol II to the treaty on May 12, 1971 (for 
text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 29, 19(58). 

-Press release 400 of Nov. 24, 1981. ■ 

Visit of 



Venezuelan President Luis Herre 
Campins made a State visit to 
Washington, D.C., November 16-19, 
1981, to meet with President Reagan i 
other government officials. Following 
remarks made by Presidents Reagan 
Herrera at the welcoming ceremony a 
to reporters at the conclusion of their 
meetings. x 

NOV. 17, 1981 2 

President Reagan 

President Herrera and I had the opp< 
tunity to get to know each other at h 
month's summit in Cancun. While we 
were there, we reaffirmed that our t\ 
nations share common goals and mut 
concerns especially about liberty and 
progress in the American family of m 
tions. The challenges facing the peop] 
of the Americas are greater than eve 
before. Maintaining independence anc 
freedom will require the same dedical 
demonstrated during the struggle for 
dependence that is common to every 
American nation. 

Venezuela played a unique role in 
America's struggle for independence, 
role in the future of the region is no 1 
important. The great liberator Simon 
Bolivar once said: "It is harder to mai 
tain the balance of liberty than to en- 
dure the weight of tyranny." He 
lamented that all too often mankind ii 
willing to rest unconcerned and accep 
things as they are. 

If Bolivar were alive today, he wc 
be proud indeed of the current geners 
tion of Venezuelans and what it has a 
complished. In two decades, you have 
built a free nation that is a beacon of 
hope for all those who suffer oppressi 
After courageously casting off the 
chains of dictatorship, Venezuelans re 
jected the tyranny of left and right ar 
held firm in their commitment to dign 
and freedom. 

While still in its infancy, your you 
democracy withstood a serious challer 
from an external force that still 
threatens other emerging nations, 
undermining legitimate attempts at 
social change in order to exploit chaos 


Department of State Bulle 


promote tyranny. But, clearly, in a 
ite to the decency and values of 
' people the love of liberty has 
r ailed. It is to Venezuela's credit and 
eeping with Bolivar's dream that you 
now helping others overcome similar 
lenges to their freedom and pros- 


I know that we will stand together 
jr opposition to the spread to our 
■es of hostile totalitarian systems 
in our dedication to true liberty and 

Venezuela's development program, 
icularly in the Caribbean region, is 
xample of humanitarianism and far- 
tedness that has the highest respect 
admiration of the people of the 
;ed States. Your recognition of the 
ate sector's role in development is 
h appreciated here, but this, too, is 
Dur tradition. 

Over a century ago, Andres Bello, 
ntellectual giant and a Venezuelan, 
d a relationship between liberty and 
rprise. "Liberty," he suggested, 
es wings to the spirit of enterprise 
rever it meets it. It breathes breath 
where it does not exist." 
We have much to learn from the 
ole of Venezuela. Your knowledge of 
sloping nations is invaluable, and I'm 
sonally looking forward to your 
isel on this vital subject. 
Venezuela reaches out today, in the 
it of Bolivar and Bello— the liberator 
the educator — to better mankind 
to unite the freedom-loving peoples 
lis hemisphere. 

Just a few months ago, President 
rera, you spoke to the United Na- 
s and eloquently outlined your na- 
's commitment to principle. There 
stated: "Venezuelans believe in and 
:tice democracy. We do not attempt 
npose our own values and concepts 
aciety on anyone, but we know that 
dom is the road of history." Let me 
to you as clearly and directly as I 
in this expression of Venezuela's 
ished goals, you have the firm and 
ng support of the people of the 
;ed States of America. 
Our two peoples will walk that road 
ither as equals, as friends who share 
mon values. And so, as one 
jrican to another, we bid you a 
"tfelt welcome. 

sident Herrera 

nk you on behalf of my wife, the 
)le who accompany me, and in my 
name, for your kind words of 
:ome. The United States and 

Venezuela— A Profile 


Area: 352,143 sq. mi. (about the size of 
Texas and Oklahoma). Capital: Caracas (pop. 
2.7 million). 


Population: 16.5 million (1980). Annual 
Growth Rate: 3.2%. Ethnic Groups: 

Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Arab, German, 
Amerindian, African. Religions: Roman 
Catholic (96%), Protestant (2%). Languages: 
Spanish (official), Indian dialects spoken by 
some of the 200,000 Amerindians in the 
remote interior. Literacy: 85.6%. Life Ex- 
pectancy: 67 years. 


Official Name: Republic of Venezuela. Type: 
Federal republic. Independence: July 5, 
1821. Constitution: Jan. 23, 1961. Branches: 
Executive — president (head of government 
and chief of state), 24-member Council of 
Ministers (cabinet). Legislative — bicameral 
Congress (200-member Chamber of Deputies, 
49-member Senate). Judicial — 18-member 
Supreme Court. Political Parties: 
Democratic Action (AD), Social Christian 
(COPEI), People's Electoral Movement 
(MEP), Movement to Socialism (MAS), 
Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV). Suf- 
frage: Universal and compulsory over 18. 
Administrative Divisions: 20 states, 2 
federal territories, 1 federal district, and a 
federal dependency (72 islands). 


GNP: $59.9 billion (1980). Annual Growth 
Rate: -1.2% (1980). Per Capita Income: 
$3,639. Average Inflation Rate: 22% (1980). 
Natural Resources: Petroleum, natural gas, 
iron ore, gold, other minerals, hydroelectric 
power, bauxite. Agriculture: Rice, coffee, 

corn, sugar, bananas, and dairy, meat, and 
poultry products. Industries: Petrochemicals, 
oil refining, iron and steel, paper products, 
aluminum, textiles, transport equipment, con- 
sumer products. Trade (1980): Exports — 
$19.2 billion: petroleum ($18.2 billion), iron 
ore, coffee, aluminum, cocoa. Major 
Markets— U.S., F.R.G., Japan. 
Imports — $11.1 billion: machinery and 
transport equipment, manufactured goods, 
chemicals, foodstuffs. Major Suppliers — U.S., 
F.R.G., Japan. Official Exchange Rate: 4.28 
botivares= US$1.00. 

Membership in International Organizations 

U.N., OAS, IMF, World Bank, IDB, Interna- 
tional Coffee Agreement, Latin American In- . 
tegration Association (ALADI), Andean pact. 
Rio pact, OPEC, Latin American Energy 
Organization (OLADE), Latin American 
State Reciprocal Petroleum Assistance 
(ARPEL), Latin American Economic System 
(SELA), Andres Bello agreement, 

Principal Government Officials 

Venezuela: President — Luis Herrera Cam- 
pins; Foreign Relations — Jose Alberto Zam- 
brano Velasco; Ambassador to the U.S. — 
Marcial Perez-Chiriboga. United States: Am- 
bassador to Venezuela — William H. Luers. ■ 

Venezuela have enjoyed throughout their 
history friendly and cordial relations 
with inevitable coincidence and 
divergences, but with the unalterable 
constant of friendship and understand- 
ing in a spirit of mutual and strict 
respect for the national dignity of our 

Venezuela has acquired a growing 
weight in international affairs. Today, 
we constitute an obligatory point of 
reference for all issues related to 
hemispheric dialogue and relations be- 
tween the industrialized and the develop- 
ing worlds. We follow an honorable, in- 
dependent, and serious international 
policy, attempting at all times to project 

the image of our democratic institutions, 
observant of the demands of freedom. 

We have attained and consolidated 
since 1958 our democratic stability, 
following the effort made by our 
democratic organizations and the na- 
tional armed forces to achieve mutual 
understanding and respect and after 
overcoming the threats of a Marxist- 
inspired subversion that meant to 
destabilize our process of democratiza- 

The presence of Venezuela in the 
hemisphere and in the world is enhanced 
by our position as a producer and ex- 
porter of strategically valuable energy 

iary 1982 



resources, our status of promoter and 
founder of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries, and 
holder of a privileged geographical posi- 
tion in a region afflicted by international 
tensions. We labor indefatigably so that 
peace will not suffer impairment or 

The foreign policy actions of my 
government are not characterized by 
any kind of notion against, anti, 
anything. They are governed by an 
unyielding purpose of acting in favor of, 
pro, the interests of Venezuela, of Latin 
America, of the developing world, and of 
all of mankind. 

In our observance of this principle, 
when we coincide with other nations, we 
do not do so in submission. And when 
we disagree, it is not because of aver- 
sion. When we coincide, it is without 
complexes. When we differ, it is without 
fear. We are not, and shall not be, 
passive subjects or instruments in the 
struggle between the superpowers over 
the issue of world supremacy. 

Our foreign policy is, as you well 
know, autonomous and sovereign, as is 
fit for a country that is the birthplace of 
Simon Bolivar — the liberator, father of 
our independence, and fighter of Latin 
American integration. It is this intellec- 
tual and political legacy that inspires our 
domestic and foreign policies. 

My visit to this great nation comes 
at a precarious moment in world affairs. 
I hope that the talks we will hold will 
produce more points of coincidence than 
discrepancy both on the political and the 
social-economic issues. 

We shall speak on the tense reality 
of the Central American and the Carib- 
bean regions, all the complex factors 
that affect it and serve as breeding 
ground for convulsions resulting from 
social imbalances which are seized upon 
by political hegemonic aspirations and 
destabilizing ideological radicalisms. We 
want to preserve this region from the 
tensions of bloc politics. 

We shall pursue, led by the same 
constructive spirit, the dialogue begun in 
Cancun on the urgency of making 
substantial changes in the present inter- 
national economic relations. The peoples 
of the world continue to hope to see 
global negotiations held within the 
framework of the United Nations. And 
even if they are to be initially frail, they 
will build up gradually as trade develops. 

We shall discuss the improvement 
and expansion of bilateral relations be- 
tween our two countries, both of which 
enjoy systems of freely elected 


democratic governments and a historical 
commitment to defend the freedom of 

Our conversations will be clear in 
their wording, specific in their subject 
matter and positive in their results. That 
is the deepest hope I harbor on the occa- 
sion of my visit here. 

I thank you, your government, and 
your people for this invitation you have 
extended to me to hold a dialogue on the 
future of our countries, of our continent, 
and of peace. 

NOV. 18, 198P 

President Reagan 

President Herrera and I have just con- 
cluded a series of productive meetings in 
which we reviewed the relations be- 
tween our two countries and the interna- 
tional situation. 

The overall relations between the 
United States and Venezuela are ex- 
cellent, and we've discovered that both 
nations share similar concerns about the 
international situation. We took a close 
look at development in the Caribbean 
Basin region and discussed what can be 
done to promote peace, freedom, and 
representative government in that part 
of the world. 

We agreed to pursue the initiative 
begun by Venezuela, Mexico, Canada, 
and the United States for the Caribbean 
Basin region. We will continue, and 
strengthen where possible, our in- 
dividual assistance programs and en- 
courage other states to do likewise. And 
furthermore, we agreed that we must 
promote the economic and social 
development of the hemisphere through 
international cooperation. We can be ex- 
pected to continue our opposition to any 
interference in the internal affairs of 
Western Hemisphere countries. 

We agreed that efforts must be 
made to strengthen democracy, liberty, 
and pluralism against extremism and 
totalitarianism. We continued discus- 
sions we started at Cancun about global 
economic relations and exchanged views 
on the alternative paths to Third World 

Finally, we conducted a comprehen- 
sive and forthright review of the rela- 
tions between Venezuela and the United 
States. We found that there is a high 
level of cooperation and respect between 
our nations and pledged to continue this 
friendly relationship. 

In addition to the usefulness of 
reviewing these issues, I want to em- 
phasize how much I enjoyed sharing the 
past 2 days with my friend President 

Herrera, with Mrs. Herrera, and the 
distinguished delegation that accom- 
panied them. We expect to remain ir 
close contact on matters of crucial in 
portance to peace and to the well-bei 
of the hemisphere. 

President Herrera 

Allow me first of all to thank very h< 
ily the President of the United State 
my friend Ronald Reagan, for the ki: 
invitation he extended to me to visit 
great democracy. Allow me to thank 
for the excellent organization of this 
visit, for having made possible for us 
have contacts not only at the highest 
level, that of the Presidency of the c 
try, but also at the level of high offic 
and personalities coming from the e? 
ecutive and the legislative powers of 
United States. 

We shall return to Venezuela wil 
our hearts filled with the attentions 
the kindness shown to us by Preside 
Reagan, Mrs. Reagan, and all the 
Americans we saw and talked to. 

I wish to say that I believe that 1 
is a fortunate coincidence — the fact 
I was here in Washington the mornii 
of the extraordinary speech made by 
President Reagan. And I believe tha 
this speech will have a great impact 
throughout the world, especially in 
regard to the need of limiting nuclea 
armament in Europe both by the Un 
States and the Soviet Union. I believ 
that the four points you stated, Mr. 
President, in your speech to the Na- 
tional Press Club will be a great con 
tribution to detente. And I must say 
am very happy to have been here thi 

We studied the bilateral relation; 
tween Venezuela and the United Sta 
relations which, I must say, are pres 
ly at an optimal level. And we re vie v 
the need to continue implementing 
agreements signed in the past betwe 
our two countries, most of them rela 
to matters of technical exchange. 

We also analyzed the difficult 
political situation existing in the Cen 
American area and the Caribbean. A 
must say that I expressed the indep€ 
ent, dignified, and serious position ol 
our foreign policies with frankness, i 
I expressed in this way the views of 
government. And allow me to say als 
that I was listened to with respect ai 
not only with respect but also with o 
diality and understanding. And the c 
cepts of peace, liberty, and democrac 
were ever present, were like a backd 
to our talks on the area. 

Department of State Bull 


s you know, the line of action of 
jvernment, the one we have always 
red, is a line of nonintervention and 
ct for the self-determination of na- 
and the projection of the goods of 
sracy and of freedom. And when 
oke about such a delicate situation 
: one existing in El Salvador, we 
ded in the need to encourage the 
rement of a democratic way out 
/ill enable that country to over- 
the subversion coming from Marx- 
iical movements. 

e know of the great efforts made 
i junta of the government, presided 
>e Napoleon Duarte in El Salvador, 
inded by so many difficulties in 
to achieve an institutional way out 
situation there. 
e have ratified the will of the 
nments of the United States, 
uela, Mexico, and Canada to pro- 
in ambitious program of coopera- 
i the area of the Caribbean and 
il America and also a program 
not only we would participate but 
e would encourage other govern- 
to cooperate in the political, 
al, economic, and social develop- 
}f this crucial area, 
has been of utmost importance for 
I the developing nations of the 
to have heard throughout my 
vith President Reagan, and again 
speech he made this morning, a 
ation of the political will expressed 
lcun, favoring global negotiations 
leld soon, and thus bringing hope 
ace through concrete and effective 
s to all developing countries, 
id finally, let me insist in extend- 
er thanks again for all the kindness 
i by President Reagan, Mrs. 
n, and the team working with 
to me, my wife, the members of 
mezuelan party, and the special 
; on this trip I made to Wash- 
i. And allow me to say that I ap- 
te greatly the generous concepts 
ive formulated time and again for 
m person, for the government, 
ratic government I preside 
—a government that tries to 
i for peace, development, par- 
ion, and respect of human rights 

ixts from Weekly Compilation of 

jntial Documents of Nov. 23, 1981, 

ilso includes toasts made at the state 

on Nov. 17. President Herrera spoke 

lish, and his remarks were translated 


aid in the East Room of the White 

Bid on the South Lawn of the White 

Current Actions 


Automotive Traffic 

Customs convention on the temporary impor- 
tation of private road vehicles. Done at New 
York June 4, 1954. Entered into force Dec. 
15, 1957. TIAS 3943. 

Notification of succession deposited: Solomon 
Islands, Sept. 3, 1981. 


Convention on international civil aviation. 
Done at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into 
force Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1591. 

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of 
the convention on international civil aviation 
(Chicago, 1944) (TIAS 1591), with annex. 
Done at Buenos Aires Sept. 24, 1968. 
Entered into force Oct. 24, 1968. TIAS 6605. 
Notification of adherence deposited: Antigua 
and Barbuda, Nov. 10, 1981. 


Agreement establishing the Common Fund 
for Commodities, with schedules. Done at 
Geneva June 27, 1980.' 
Signatures: Afghanistan, Sept. 11, 1981; 
Congo, Oct. 22, 1981; Gambia, Oct. 23, 1981. 


Universal copyright convention, as revised, 
and additional protocols I and II. Done at 
Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 
10, 1974. TIAS 7868. 
Accession deposited: Guinea, Aug. 13, 1981. 


Convention on the prevention and punish- 
ment of the crime of genocide. Adopted at 
Paris Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into force Jan. 
12, 1951.- 

Accession deposited : St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Nov. 9, 1981. 

Human Rights 

International covenant on economic, social. 

and cultural rights. Adopted at New York 

Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 


Accession deposited : St. Vincent and the 

Grenadines, Nov. 9, 1981. 

International covenant on civil and political 
rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. 
Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.- 
Accession deposited : St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Nov. 9, 1981. 

Optional protocol to the international cove- 
nant on civil and political rights. Adopted at 
New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force 
Mar. 23, 1976.- 

Accession deposited: St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Nov. 9, 1981. 

Maritime Matters 

International convention on maritime search 

and rescue, L979, with annex. Dune at Ham- 
burg Apr. 27, 1979. 1 

Accession deposited : Argentina, May IS. 
Ratification deposited: Chile, Oct. 7, 1981. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental 

Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 
4044, 6285, 6490. 8606). Adopted at London 
Nov. 14, 1975. Enters into force May 22. 
1982, except for Art. 51 which enters into 
force July 28, 1982. 

Acceptances dep osited: Ireland. Oct. 27. 
1981; Ivory Coast, Nov. 4, 1981. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London 
Nov. 17, 1977. ' 

Acceptances deposited : Ireland, Oct. 27, 
1981; United Arab Emirates, Nov. 2, 1981; 
Ivory Coast, Nov. 4, 1981. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948. as amended, on the Intergovernmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London 
Nov. 15, 1979. ' 

Ac ceptances deposited: Ireland. Oct. 27, 
1981; United Arab Emirates, Nov. 2, 1981; 
Ivory Coast, Nov. 4, 1981. 

North Atlantic Treaty 

Agreement to amend the protocol of signa- 
ture to the agreement of Aug. 3, 1959, to 
supplement the agreement between the 
parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regard- 
ing the status of their forces with respect to 
foreign forces stationed in the F.R.G. (TIAS 
5351), as amended by the agreement of 
Oct. 21, 1971 (TIAS 7259). Signed at Bonn 
May 18, 1981. Enters into force 30 days after 
the deposit of the last instrument of ratifica- 
tion or approval, with effect from Apr. 1, 
1974. 1 

Signatures: Belgium, Canada, France, 
F.R.G., Netherlands, U.K., U.S., May 18, 

Ratifications deposited: Canada, Oct. 9, 1981; 
Belgium, Nov. 10, 1981. 

Nuclear Free Zone — Latin America 

Additional protocol I to the treaty of Feb. 14, 

1967 for the prohibition of nuclear weapons 

in Latin America. Done at Mexico Feb. 14, 


Senate advice and consent to ratification : 

Nov. 13, 1981. 3 

Instrument of ratification signed by the 

President: Nov. 19, 1981. 3 

Ratification deposited: U.S., Nov. 23, 1981. 3 

Entered into force for the U.S.: Nov. 23, 



International convention for the prevention 
of pollution of the sea by oil, with annexes, as 
amended. Done at London May 12, 1954. 
Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the U.S. 
Dec. 8, 1961. TIAS 4900. 




Acceptance deposited: Bangladesh, Sept. 28, 

Convention on long-range transboundary air 
pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 1979. ' 
Ratification deposited: France, Nov. 4, 1981. 

Property — Industrial 

Convention of Paris for the protection of in- 
dustrial property of Mar. 20, 1883, as re- 
vised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. 
Entered into force for Articles 1 through 12, 
May 19, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1973; for 
Articles 13 through 30, Apr. 26, 1970; for the 
U.S., Sept. 5, 1970. TIAS 6923, 7727. 
Notification of accession deposited : Zim- 
babwe, Sept. 30, 1981. 

Property — Industrial — Classification 

Nice agreement concerning the international 
classification of goods and services for the 
purposes of the registration of marks of 
June 15, 1957, as revised (TIAS 7419). Done 
at Geneva May 13, 1977. Entered into force 
Feb. 6, 1979. 2 
Notification of ratification deposited: F.R.G., 

Oct. 12, 1981." 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellec- 
tual Property Organization. Done at Stock- 
holm July 14, 1967. Entered into force 
Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S., Aug. 25, 1970. 
TIAS 6932. 

Accession deposited: Zimbabwe, Sept. 29, 


Arrangement relative to the repression of the 
circulation of obscene publications. Signed at 
Paris May 4, 1910. Entered into force 
Sept. 16, 1911. TS 559. 

Protocol amending the agreement for the 
suppression of the circulation of obscene 
publications signed at Paris May 4, 1910, and 
annex (TS 559). Done at Lake Success May 4, 
1949. Entered into force May 4, 1949; for the 
U.S. Aug. 14, 1950. TIAS 2164. 
Notification of succession : Solomon Islands, 
Sept. 3, 1981. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of 
all forms of racial discrimination. Adopted at 
New York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force 
Jan. 4, 1969. 2 

Accession deposited: St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Nov. 9, 1981. 

Red Cross 

Geneva convention for the amelioration of the 
condition of the wounded and sick in armed 
forces in the field. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 
1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for 
the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3362. 

Geneva convention for the amelioration of the 
condition of the wounded, sick, and ship- 
wrecked members of armed forces at sea. 
Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into 
force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2, 
1956. TIAS 3363. 

Geneva convention relative to the treatment 
of prisoners of war. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 
1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for 
the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3364. 

Geneva convention relative to the protection 
of civilian persons in time of war. Done at 
Geneva Aug. 12, 1959. Entered into force 
Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. 
TIAS 3365. 

Notifications of succession: Solomon Islands, 5 
St. Lucia, 6 Dominica, 7 Oct. 30, 1981. 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions 
of 12 Aug. 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 
3365), and relating to the protection of vic- 
tims of international armed conflicts (Protocol 
I), with annexes. Adopted at Geneva June 8, 
1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978. 2 
Ratification deposited: Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, Oct. 19, 1981. 


Protocol relating to the status of refugees. 
Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered in- 
to force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1, 
1968. TIAS 6577. 
Accession deposited: Kenya, Nov. 13, 1981. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life 

at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London 

Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25, 

1980. TIAS 9700. 

Ratification deposited: Switzerland, Oct. 1, 



Convention to suppress the slave trade and 
slavery. Concluded at Geneva Sept. 25, 1926. 
Entered into force Mar. 9, 1927; for the U.S. 
Mar. 21, 1929. TS 778. 

Protocol amending the slavery convention 
signed at Geneva on Sept. 25, 1926 (TS 778), 
and Annex. Done at New York Dec. 7, 1953. 
Entered into force Dec. 7, 1953 for the Pro- 
tocol; July 7, 1955 for Annex to Protocol; for 
the U.S. Mar. 7, 1956. TIAS 3532. 
Notification of succession: Solomon Islands, 
Sept. 3, 1981. 

Supplementary convention on the abolition of 
slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and 
practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva 
Sept. 7, 1956. Entered into force Apr. 30, 
1957; for the U.S. Dec. 6, 1967. TIAS 6418. 
Accession deposited: St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Nov. 9, 1981. 


Agreement governing the activities of states 
on the moon and other celestial bodies. 
Adopted at New York Dec. 5, 1979. 1 
Ratifications deposited: Uruguay, Nov. 9, 
1981; Chile, Nov. 12, 1981. 


International convention against the taking of 

hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 17, 

1979. 1 

Ratifications deposited: Suriname, Nov. 5, 

1981; Chile, Nov. 12, 1981. 


Constitution of the U.N. Educational, Sci 
title, and Cultural Organization. Conclude 
London Nov. 16, 1945. Entered into fore 
Nov. 4, 1946. TIAS 1580. 
Acceptances deposited: Western Samoa, 
Apr. 3, 1981; Bahamas, Apr. 23, 1981. 

U.N. Industrial Development Organizai 

Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Devel 

ment Organization, with annexes. Adopti 

Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. 1 

Signatures: Kenya, Oct. 28, 1981; Djibou 

Oct. 29, 1981. 

Ratifications deposited: Ivory Coast, Nov 

1981; Chile, Nov. 12, 1981; Kenya, Nov. 

1981; Belgium, Nov. 18, 1981. 


1981 protocol for the sixth extension of 1 

wheat trade convention, 1971 (TIAS 714 

Done at Washington Mar. 24, 1981. Ent< 

into force July 1, 1981. 

Ratification deposited: Portugal, Nov. 16 


Accession deposited: Israel, Nov. 18, 198 


Convention on the elimination of all forn 
discrimination against women. Adopted ; 
New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into f< 
Sept. 3, 1981. 2 

Signature: Benin, Nov. 11, 1981. 
Ratifications deposited: Nicaragua, Oct. ! 
1981; Panama, Oct. 29, 1981; Ecuador, 
Nov. 9, 1981. 

World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of 
world cultural and natural heritage. Don 
Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force 
Dec. 17, 1975. TIAS 8226. 
Ratification deposited: Greece, July 17, 1 



Memorandum of understanding providinj 
a radio relay facility in Antigua for relay 
Voice of America programs to areas in t 
Caribbean. Signed at St. John's Sept. 12 

1980. Entered into force Sept. 12, 1980. 


Convention for the avoidance of double t 
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion 
respect to taxes on income, with exchanj 
notes. Signed at Dacca Oct. 6, 1980. 1 
Senate advice and consent to ratification 
Nov. 18, 1981 (with understandings). 

Agreement for cooperation concerning p 
ful uses of nuclear energy, with annex ai 
agreed minute. Signed at Dacca Sept. 9 

1981. Enters into force on the date on vs 
the parties exchange diplomatic notes in 
ing each other that they have complied \ 
all applicable requirements for its entry 


Department of State Bui 



ty to submit to binding dispute settle- 

; the delimitation of the maritime bound- 

n the Gulf of Maine Area, as amended, 

annexed agreements. Signed at Wash- 

n Mar. 29, 1979. 

uments of ratification exchanged : 

20, 1981. 

red into force : Nov. 20, 1981. 


ement for the eradication of foot-and- 
h disease in the areas adjacent to the 
nbian-Panamanian border, with annex. 
>d at Bogota Aug. 8, 1979. 
red into force : Oct. 10, 1979. 

ement confirming the agreement be- 
i the Colombian Ministry of Agriculture 
he U.S. Department of Agriculture for 
ontrol and eradication of foot-and-mouth 
se in certain portions of northwest Co- 
a. Effected by exchange of notes at 
ta Nov. 27, Dec. 3, 14, and 17, 1973. 
red into force Dec. 17, 1973. TIAS 7763. 

ement amending the agreement of 
27, Dec. 3, 14, and 17, 1973 (TIAS 
I for the control and eradication of foot- 
nouth disease in certain portions of 
iwest Colombia. Effected by exchange of 
; at Bogota Apr. 4 and May 8, 1974. 
red into force May 10, 1974. TIAS 7879. 
linated: Oct. 10, 1979. 

ention for the avoidance of double taxa- 
md the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
tct to taxes on income. Signed at Cairo 
24, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 31, 

te advice and consent to ratification: 

18, 1981 (with an understanding and a 


ied by the President: Dec. 1, 1981 (with 

iderstanding and a reservation). 

uments of ratification exchanged : Dec. 1, 

(with an understanding and a reserva- 

agement for the exchange of technical 
mation and cooperation in nuclear safety 
jrs, with addenda. Signed at Bethesda 
"airo Apr. 27 and June 8, 1981. Entered 
'orce June 8, 1981. 

ral Republic of Germany 

ement on cooperation in coal liquefaction 
' the SRC-II process. Signed at Wash- 
n Oct. 5, 1979. Entered into force 
5, 1979. TIAS 9928. 

>col relating to the agreement of Oct. 5, 
on cooperation in coal liquefaction us- 
le SRC-II process. Signed at Washing- 
uly 31, 1980. Entered into force July 31, 
. TIAS 9928. 
linated: Aug. 14, 1981. 

Agreement relating to the taking of evidence. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn 
Oct. 17, 1979 and Feb. 1, 1980. Entered into 
force Feb. 1, 1980. TIAS 9938. 
Applicable to: Land Berlin, Oct. 14, 1981. 

Agreement relating to jurisdiction over 
vessels utilizing the Louisiana Offshore Oil 
Port. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington July 2, Sept. 4 and 15, 1981. Entered 
into force Sept. 15, 1981. 

Agreement concerning the listing of reactors 
supplied from the F.R.G. to the Taiwan 
Power Company on the inventory of the 
IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] 
safeguards agreement of Dec. 6, 1971 (TIAS 
7228). Effected by exchange of letters at 
Washington Nov. 5, 1981. Entered into Nov. 
5, 1981. 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa- 
tion with respect to taxes on estates, inheri- 
tances, and gifts. Signed at Bonn Dec. 3, 
1980. 1 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
Nov. 18, 1981 (with an understanding). 


Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 
19, 1977, on procedures for mutual assistance 
in connection with matters relating to the 
Boeing Company (TIAS 8726), to include 
alleged illicit acts pertaining to transactions 
between Phillips Petroleum Company and 
Cochin Refineries, Ltd. Effected by exchange 
of letters at Washington Mar. 28 and 
Apr. 17, 1979. Entered into force Apr. 17, 


Convention with respect to taxes on income. 
Signed at Washington Nov. 20, 1975.' 

Protocol amending the convention with 
respect to taxes on income signed at Wash- 
ington on Nov. 20, 1975, with exchanges of 
notes. Signed at Washington May 30, 1980. ' 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
Nov. 18, 1981 (with an understanding). 
Ratified by the President : Dec. 1, 1981 (with 
an understanding). 


Memorandum of understanding concerning 
the furnishing of satellite launching and 
associated services for the IRIS payload. 
Signed at Washington and Rome July 23 and 
29, 1981. Entered into force Sept. 21, 1981. 


Agreement on cooperation in coal liquefaction 
using the SRC-II process. Signed at Wash- 
ington July 31, 1980. Entered into force 
July 31, 1980. TIAS 9921. 
Terminated: Aug. 14, 1981. 

Joint determination for reprocessing of 
special nuclear material of U.S. origin, with 
joint communique and exchange of letters. 
Signed at Washington Oct. 30, 1981. Entered 
into force Oct. 30, 1981. 


Memorandum of understanding concerning 
constructing, equipping, and operating a com- 
bined, Hardened Tactical Air ('ontrol Center 
facility at Osan Air Base. Signed at Osan and 
Seoul June 19 and July 20, 1981. Entered in- 
to force July 20, 1981. 

Memorandum of understanding on education, 
with annex. Signed at Seoul Oct. 28, 1981. 
Entered into force Oct. 28, 1981. 


Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of payments due under PL 480 
Title I agricultural commodity agreement, 
with annexes. Signed at Monrovia Oct. 15, 
1981. Entered into force Oct. 15, 1981. 


Agreement with respect to taxes on income, 

with related exchange of notes. Signed at 

ValletaMar. 21, 1980. ' 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 

Nov. 18, 1981 (with an amendment and an 



Agreement concerning trade in cotton, wool, 
and manmade fibers, with annex. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Brussels Oct. 2 and 5, 
1981. Entered into force Oct. 5, 1981. 


Memorandum of understanding to control the 
sanitary quality of fresh or fresh-frozen bi- 
valve mollusca destined for exportation to the 
U.S. Signed at Mexico Mar. 7, 1979. Entered 
into force Mar. 7, 1979. TIAS 9424. 
Terminated: Oct. 15, 1981. 

Memorandum of understanding to control the 
sanitary quality of fresh or fresh-frozen bi- 
valve mollusca destined for exportation to the 
U.S. Signed at Washington Oct. 15, 1981. 
Entered into force Oct. 15, 1981. 

Agreements amending the agreement of 
June 2, 1977 (TIAS 8952) relating to addi- 
tional cooperative arrangements to curb the 
illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at Mexico Oct. 14, 1981. 
Entered into force Oct. 14, 1981. 


Convention for the avoidance of double taxa- 
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on income, with related 
notes. Signed at Rabat Aug. 1, 1977. 1 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
Nov. 18, 1981 (with a reservation and an 


Agreement relating to jurisdiction over 
vessels utilizing the Louisiana Offshore Oil 
Port. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington Mar. 9 and 16, 1981. Entered into 
force Nov. 2, 1981. 


Protocol amending the convention for the 
avoidance of double taxation and the preven- 
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on 

iary 1982 



income and property, signed at Oslo on 
Dec. 3, 1971 (TIAS 7474). ' 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
Nov. 18, 1981 (with an understanding). 


Agreement on economic and technical 
cooperation. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Mogadishu June 14, Oct. 12 and 13, 1981. 
Entered into force Oct. 13, 1981. 


Agreement extending the treaty of friendship 
and cooperation of Jan. 24, 1976 (TIAS 
8360). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Madrid Sept. 4, 1981. Entered into force pro- 
visionally Sept. 4, 1981. 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: 

Nov. 18, 1981. 


Arrangement relating to the employment of 
dependents of official government employees. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
Oct. 27 and 30, 1981. Entered into force 
Oct. 30, 1981. 


Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. Govern- 
ment and its agencies, with annexes and 
agreed minute. Signed at Ankara Sept. 24, 
1981. Entered into force Nov. 2, 1981. 

'Not in force. 

2 Not in force for the U.S. 

3 With understandings. 

■Applicable to Berlin (West). 

6 Effective from date of accession to 
independence, July 7, 1978. 

6 Effective from date of accession to 
independence, Feb. 22, 1979. 

7 Effective from date of accession to 
independence, Nov. 3, 1978. ■ 

November 1981 

November 1 

King Hussein I and Queen Noor of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan make a State 
visit to Washington, D.C. Nov. 1-4. 

Caribbean nation of Antigua and Barbuda 
becomes an independent nation, ending 350 
years of British rule. 

November 2 

U.S. announces it agrees separately with 
Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Oman to hold a 
3-week coordinated exercise in the Southwest 
Asia region. The operation known as "Bright 
Star '82" will be conducted in coordination 
with each host nation by elements of the U.S. 
Armed Forces deploying from the U.S. Navy 
and Marine Corps units operating in the In- 
dian Ocean. 

November 5 

At the invitation of the U.S. Government, 
H.E. Dr. Lee Chung Oh, Minister of Science 
and Technology of the Republic of Korea 
visits the U.S. Nov. 5-11 to discuss scientific 
and technical cooperation between the two 
countries. The Minister held meetings with 
the Presidential Science Adviser Dr. George 
Keyworth, high-level officials of the Depart- 
ments of State and Energy, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, and the National 
Science Foundation. 

November 10 

Antigua and Barbuda becomes the 157th 
member of the U.N. 

November 12 

President Reagan sends a notice to the 
Federal Register, stating that because the 
"internal situation in Iran remains uncertain" 
the national emergency with respect to Iran 
is to continue in effect beyond the November 
14, 1981 expiration date. The national 
emergency was declared Nov. 14, 1979 by 
former President Jimmy Carter. Under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act, a declaration of emergency is 
automatically terminated on its anniversary 
date unless prior to that date the President 
publishes in the Federal Register and 
transmits to the Congress a notice that the 
emergency authority is to continue. 

In Paris, Charge dAffaires Christian A. 
Chapman escapes unhurt in an unsuccessful 
assassination attempt by a gunman. 

November 13 

By a vote of 109 to 2 (U.S. and Israel) with 
34 abstentions, U.N. General Assembly 
adopts a resolution which "strongly con- 
demns" Israel for its "aggression" in the June 
7 attack on a nuclear reactor outside 

November 15 

In Bangladesh, Abdus Sattar of the ruling 
National Party and acting Chief of State 

since President Ziaur was assassinated in 
May wins the Presidential election. 

November 16 

Venezuelan President Luis Herrera Camp 
and Mrs. Campins make a State visit to 
Washington, D.C. Nov. 16-19. 

November 18 

By a vote of 116 to 23 (12 abstentions) U. 
General Assembly renewed its demand in 
resolution that the "foreign troops" leave 
Afghanistan. This is the Assembly's third 
vote since Moscow's military intervention 
that country in Dec. 1979. 

On behalf of some 3,000 U.S. citizens 
corporations whose claims against the Ira 
Government total less than $250,000.00 i 
the U.S. Agent at the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal in The Hague files a claim again; 

November 19 

Semiannual U.S.-EC high-level consultatk 
are held at the Department of State Nov. 
19-20. Under Secretary for Economic Afl 
Myer Rashish and Sir Roy Denman, Direc 
General for External Relations of the Cor 
mission of the European Communities, le< 
U.S.-EC delegations. 

November 20 

Sudanese President Gaafar Mohamed 
Nimeiri, on a private visit to the U.S., pa; 
courtesy call on President Reagan. They 
discuss bilateral relations and issues con- 
nected with the Middle East and Africa. 

Department of State releases figures 
showing a Soviet advantage over the U.S 
intermediate-range nuclear systems. Figu 
show that the U.S. has a total of approx- 
imately 560 systems while the Soviet Uni 
total of such systems number over 3,800. 

Secretary Haig hosts and speaks at tl 
Department's Foreign Policy Conference 
Leaders in Teacher Education held at the 
Department. The Conference is cosponsoi 
by the American Association of Colleges i 
Teacher Education and the International 
Council on Education for Teaching. 

To reinforce U.S. commitment to seel 
stability on the Lebanon-Israel border, Pi 
dent Reagan asks special emissary to the 
Middle East, Philip Habib, to return to tr 
area to determine how the U.S. could fur 
help reduce rising tensions and help in im 
proving basic conditions in Lebanon. A d< 
for Ambassador Habib's departure is set : 
some time after the Thanksgiving holiday 

November 21 

Soviet State airline A eroflot is banned frc 
flying to the U.S. from Nov. 21-28. The t 
is ordered after A eroflot deviated "from 
routes they are required to follow while c 
flying United States territory." 

November 23 

Agreeing that U.S. -Mexican relations re- 
quired a special framework to assure thai 
matters of mutual concern are appropriat 
considered and managed, in a June 1981 


Department of State Bull 


ing at Camp David, President Reagan 

Mexican President Lopez Portillo formed 

lational Secretarial Commission appoint- 

iecretary Haig and Foreign Secretary 

i Castaneda de la Rosa as cochairman. 

ecretary Castaneda's invitation, 

jtary Haig visits Mexico City Nov. 23-24 

he first meeting of that Commission. 

e there, he presents the Mexican Govern- 

; with the instruments of ratification of 

jcol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of 

aar Weapons in Latin America (treaty of 

ilolco), unanimously ratified by the 

te on Nov. 13, 1981 and signed by Presi- 

Reagan on Nov. 19. 

lore than $122 million were pledged by 

45 countries for the 1981 program of 

J.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. 

U.S. alone pledges $80 million. 

•mber 24 

pport of Soviet human rights activist 
■ei Sakharov and his wife Elena Bonner, 
J.S. Senate unanimously adopts a resolu- 
ieclaring that the Soviet Union must be 
responsible for their fate. On November 
iakharov and Bonner began a hunger 
e to protest Soviet refusal to allow Liza 
seyeva to emigrate to the U.S. to join 
arov's stepson, Alexi Semyonov. The 
were married last summer in a proxy 
nony in the U.S. The resolution calls the 
;al a "flagrant violation" of the Helsinki 

'resident Reagan authorizes $30 million 
grant to Poland. During 1981 the U.S. 
>rovided $765 in credits and food assist- 
to Poland. The President states that the 
t "reflects the humanitarian concern of 
lation for the well-being of the people of 

smber 27 

etary Haig and Israeli Foreign Minister 
lak Shamir meet at the Department of 
! to discuss a wide range of issues con- 
ng the Middle East as well as discus- 
| related to European participation in the 
>, U.S. -Israel relations, Lebanon, and the 
e process. 
Vmbassador Habib departs for the Middle 

;mber 29 

i annual Conference of Caribbean Trade, 
stment, and Development is held in 
pi, Nov. 29-Dec. 1. 

n the first presidential elections in the 
arily ruled country of Honduras in more 

a decade, Liberal Party candidate 
;rto Suazo Cordova is elected over his 
onal Party opponent Ricardo Zuniga 

^resident Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire 
3 Washington, D.C. Nov. 29-Dec. 2 on a 
J working visit which is to include talks 

President Reagan Dec. 1, Secretary of 

Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, U.S. con- 
gressional leaders, and officials of multilateral 
financial institutions. 

November 30 

U.S. -Soviet talks open in Geneva on inter- 
mediate-range nuclear forces. The chief U.S. 
negotiator is Ambassador Paul H. Nitze and 
the chief Soviet delegate is Yuli A. Kvitsin- 
sky. Other members of the U.S. delegation 
include the Deputy head of the delegation, 
Maynard W. Glitman, John A. Woodworth, 
Office of the Secretary of Defense; William F. 
Burns, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff; Thomas Graham, Jr. and Norman G. 
Clyne, Arms Control and Disarmament 

U.S. -Israel announce agreement on a 
memorandum of understanding that 
recognizes "the need to enhance strategic 
cooperation to deter all threats from the 
Soviet Union to the region." In a joint state- 
ment, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. 
Weinberger and Israeli Defense Minister 
Ariel Sharon say that "the agreement is 
designed to enable the two countries to act 
cooperatively, to provide military assistance 
to cope with threats to the security of the en- 
tire region caused by the U.S.S.R. or Soviet- 
controlled forces introduced from outside the 
region into the region." ■ 

Department of State 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date 

*365 11/1 
♦366 11/2 

*367 11/2 

*368 11/2 

*369 11/4 

*370 11/5 

*371 11/5 

*372 10/28 

*373 11/5 


Haig: remarks at U.N. Day 
reception, Oct. 30. 

10th Conference of the U.S.- 
Japan Consultative Pro- 
gram on the Development 
and Utilization of Natural 
Resources, Oct. 29-30. 

International Telegraph and 
Telephone Consultative 
Committee (CCITT), study 
groups A&B, Nov. 18. 

Haig: remarks at the 21st 
annual U.N. concert, 
Oct. 31. 

Haig: statement before the 
Senate Foreign Relations 

John D. Negroponte sworn 
in as Ambassador to Hon- 
duras (biographic data). 

Haig: press briefing, Cancun, 
Oct. 21. 

Haig: news conference, 
Cancun, Oct. 24. 

Advisory Committee on In- 
ternational Investment, 
Technology, and Develop- 
ment, Dec. 1. 













*381 11/16 

*382 11/16 

*374 11/5 Shipping Coordination Com- 
mittee (SCC), Subcommit- 
tee on Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS), working 
group on radiocommunica- 
tions, Dec. 3. 

Foreign policy conference for 
leaders in teacher educa- 
tion, Nov. 20. 

Conference on Caribbean 
trade, investment, and 
development, Miami, 
Nov. 29-Dec. 1. 

Haig: statement before the 
Senate Foreign Relations 

Program for the State visit 
of Venezuelan President 
Luis Herrera Campins, 
Nov. 16-19. 

U.S. -EC high-level consulta- 
tions held at Department 
of State, Nov. 19-20. 

Haig: speech and question- 
and-answer session at the 
Palm Beach Round Table, 
Palm Beach, Fla., Nov. 14. 

SCC, SOLAS, working group 
on subdivision, stability, 
and load lines and on safe- 
ty of fishing vessels, 
Dec. 1. 

U.S. Organization for the 
International Radio Con- 
sultative Committee 
(CCIR), Dec. 8. 

Anglo-American cooperation 
against drug trafficking. 

Harry W. Schlaudeman, 
Ambassador to Argentina 
(biographic data). 

Langhorne A. Motley, Am- 
bassador to Brazil (bio- 
graphic data). 

Patricia M. Byrne, Ambassa- 
dor to Burma (biographic 

Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Am- 
bassador to Czechoslovakia 
(biographic data). 

Raymond C. Ewing, Am- 
bassador to Cyprus (bio- 
graphic data). 

Jerrold Martin North, Am- 
bassador to Djibouti (bio- 
graphic data). 

Evan Griffith Galbraith, Am- 
bassador to France (bio- 
graphic data). 

Larry G. Piper, Ambassador 
to The Gambia (biographic 

Peterson De Vos, Ambassa- 
dor to Guinea-Bissau and 
Cape Verde (biographic 
393 11/18 U.S. claims against Iran. 





















ary 1982 









394 11/19 Gulf of Maine Boundary 

Dispute Settlement Treaty 
enters into force between 
the U.S. and Canada. 
*395 11/19 U.S., Mauritius sign textile 
agreement, Oct. 2 and 5. 
*396 11/23 David Charles Miller, Jr. 

sworn in as Ambassador to 
Tanzania (biographic data). 
*397 11/23 Alan M. Hardy sworn in as 
Ambassador to Equatorial 
Guinea, Nov. 3. 

Haig: interview on "This 
Week," Nov. 22. 

Haig: statement upon arrival 
in Mexico City, Nov. 23. 

Haig: remarks upon deposit 
of U.S. instrument of rati- 
fication for Tlatelolco trea- 
ty, Mexico, Nov. 23. 
*401 11/25 Arthur A. Hartman sworn in 
as Ambassador to the 
Soviet Union (biographic 

CCITT, study group A and 
B, Dec. 10. 

CCITT, study group A, 
Dec. 11. 

Haig: remarks and question- 
and-answer session before 
journalists from NATO 
countries and Spain, 
Nov. 25. 
405 11/30 Haig: interview on the 
"Today Show." 

*Not printed in the Bulletin. ■ 










*48 8/14 













Ambassador Kirkpatrick to 
visit six Latin American 
countries, July 30-Aug. 12. 

Ambassador Kirkpatrick to 
visit six South Asian coun- 
tries, Aug. 16-31. 

Ambassador Lichenstein's 
statement and letter to the 
Special Committee on 
Decolonization concerning 
Puerto Rico. 

Lichenstein: Puerto Rico. 

Lichenstein: Angolan 
complaint against South 
Africa, Security Council. 

Adelman: South African 
credentials, General 
Assembly emergency 
special session. 

Kirkpatrick: membership of 
Vanuatu, General 

Adelman: credentials of 
representatives of 
Democratic Kampuchea, 
General Assembly. 

U.S. delegation to the 36th 
session of the U.N. General 
Assembly. ■ 

Department of State 

Free, single copies of the following Depart- 
ment of State publications are available from 
the Public Information Service, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C., 20520. 

President Reagan 

U.S. Program for Peace and Arms Control, 
National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 
Nov. 18, 1981 (Current Policy #346). 

Opening Statement at Cancun Summit, Inter- 
national Meeting on Cooperation and 
Development, Cancun, Oct. 22, 1981 (Cur- 
rent Policy #335). 

Secretary Haig 

An Agenda for Cooperation in the Western 
Hemisphere, General Assembly of the 
Organization of American States, St. Lucia, 
Dec. 4, 1981 (Current Policy #351). 

Overview of Recent Foreign Policy, House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, Nov. 12, 1981 
(Current Policy #344). 

Arms Control and Strategic Nuclear Forces, 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Nov. 4, 1981 (Current Policy #339). 

Arms Control 

Prospects for Arms Control, Eugene V. 
Rostow, Director of Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, Committee I, U.N. 
General Assembly, New York, Oct. 21, 
1981 (Current Policy #336). 


Use of Chemical Weapons in Asia, Bureau of 
Politico-Military Affairs Director Burt, Sub- 
committee on Arms Control, Oceans, Inter- 
national Operations, and Environment of 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Nov. 10, 1981 (Current Policy #342). 

Japan and the United States: A Durable Re- 
lationship, Assistant Secretary Holdridge, 
Japan-America Society of Washington, 
D.C., Oct. 28, 1981 (Current Policy #337). 


The African Private Sector and U.S. Policy, 
Assistant Secretary Crocker, Chicago 
Council on Foreign Relations, Nov. 19, 
1981 (Current Policy #348). 

Liberia: The Road to Recovery, Ambassador 
Swing, Liberian Shipowners' Council, 
Houston, Texas, Oct. 28, 1981 (Current 
Policy #343). 


Population Growth, Refugees, and Immigra- 
tion, Richard Benedick, Coordinator of Pop- 
ulation Affairs, Houston Media Roundtable 
on World Issues of the 1980s, Houston, 
Oct. 23, 1981 (Current Policy #341). 

U.S. Trade and Foreign Policy, Under Sec 
tary Rashish, Assistant Secretary Horm 
Subcommittee on Trade, House Ways ai 
Means Committee, Oct. 29, 1981 (Currei 
Policy #338). 

Trade Patterns of the West— 1980, Lucie 
Kornei, Office of Analysis for Western 
Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research, Aug. 25, 1981 (Special Reporl 

Planetary Product in 1980: A Creative 
Pause?, Dr. Herbert Block, Office of 
Economic Research, National Foreign 
Assessment Center, Central Intelligence 
Agency, Aug. 1981 (Pamphlet). 

Soviet-West European Natural Gas Pipelii 
Assistant Secretary Hormats, Subcomm 
tee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation an 
Government Processes, Senate Committ 
on Governmental Affairs, Oct. 14, 1981 
(Current Policy #331). 

Agriculture in U.S. Foreign Economic Pol 
(GIST, Nov. 1981). 


The Alliance at a Crossroad, Bureau of P< 

ico-Military Affairs Director Burt, Fried 

Ebert Foundation, Bonn, Dec. 2, 1981 (l 

rent Policy #350). 

Background Notes on Denmark, Oct. 198] 

Background Notes on Norway, Oct. 1981. 

Middle East 

U.S. Proposes Air Defense Package for S 
Arabia, Bulletin Reprint from Oct. 198] 
Department of State Bulletin. 


The Impact of International Terrorism, 
Frank H. Perez, Acting Director, Office 
Combatting Terrorism, Conference on 
Violence and Extremism: A Leadership 
Response, Baltimore, Oct. 29, 1981 (Cui 
rent Policy #340). 

Western Hemisphere 

Arms Transfers to Latin America, Assist; 
Secretary Enders, Bureau of Politico- 
Military Affairs Director Burt, Subcomi 
tees on International Security and Sciei 
tific Affairs and Inter-American Affairs 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Oct. 
1981 (Current Policy #349). 

Background Notes on Brazil, Sept. 1981. 

Background Notes on St. Lucia, Nov. 198 

Background Notes on San Marino, Sept. 

Background Notes on the Solomon Island 
Oct. 1981. 

Background Notes on Venezuela, 
Nov. 1981.B 


Department of State Bulk 


luary 1982 
I. 82, 2058 


an Situation and Implications for Peace 
•Cirkpatrick, text of resolution, Depart- 

lent statement) 57 

if Chemical Weapons in Asia (Burt) ... 52 


Aew of Recent Foreign Policy (Haig) . . 16 

Interests in Africa (Crocker) 23 

i Control 

Negotiations Open in Geneva (Haig) ... 30 

Consults With Allies on INF Negotiating 

osition (Burt, Eagleburger) 31 

Ratifies Protocol I of Treaty of Tlatelolco 
iaig, text of protocol, Senate understand- 

igs) 85 

Soviet INF Systems: A Response to 
oviet Claims 31 

Use of Chemical Weapons in Asia (Burt) 


il. Vice President Bush Visits Latin 

Lmerica (remarks, toasts, statement) . . 12 


dian Investment Policy and U.S. Re- 

ponses (Johnston) 32 

itary International Guidelines on Anti- 
rust (joint letter, questions and answers) 


da. Canadian Investment Policy and U.S. 

Responses (Johnston) 32 

I. Libyan Involvement in Sudan and Chad 

.lyman) 27 

mbia. Vice President Bush Visits Latin 

imerica (remarks, toasts, statement) . . 12 


dian Investment Policy and U.S. Re- 

ponses (Johnston) 32 

th Report on Cyprus (message to the 

longress) 43 

nal Situation in Zimbabwe (letter to the 

-ongress) 26 

in Involvement in Sudan and Chad 

Lyman) 27 

iing Peace and Security in the Middle 

last (Veliotes) 47 

Ratines Protocol I of Treaty of Tlatelolco 
Haig, text of protocol, Senate understand- 

igs) 85 

)f Chemical Weapons in Asia (Burt) ... 52 
us. Fourth Report on Cyprus (message to 

he Congress) 43 

loping Countries 

view of Recent Foreign Policy (Haig) . . 16 

Conference on Least Developed Coun- 

ries (McPherson) 82 

inican Republic. Vice President Bush 
Visits Latin America (remarks, toasts, 

tatement) 12 

lomics. OAS General Assembly Meets in 
St. Lucia (Haig, Department announce- 

nent, texts of resolutions) 1 

alvador. President Reagan's News Con- 
erence of November 10 (excerpts) .... 9 
'gy. U.N. Conference on New and Re- 
lewable Sources of Energy (Anderson, 
'resident's letter, program of action) . . 63 

opia. Ethiopia (Kirkpatrick) 81 


Negotiations Open in Geneva (Haig) ... 30 
view of Recent Foreign Policy (Haig) . . 16 
erving Western Independence and Securi- 
y (Eagleburger) 36 

Consults With Allies on INF Negotiating 

'osition (Burt', Eagleburger) 31 

■Soviet INF Systems: A Response to 

soviet Claims 31 

iign Aid. U.N. Conference on Least De- 
'eloped Countries (McPherson) 82 

Human Rights 

OAS General Assembly Meets in St. Lucia 
(Haig, Department announcement, texts of 
resolutions) 1 

The Situation in Kampuchea (Kirkpatrick, text 
of resolution) 79 

International Law. Claims Against Iran . .49 

International Organizations and Confer- 
ences. U.N. Conference on New and Re- 
newable Sources of Energy (Anderson, 
President's letter, program of action) . . 60 

Iran. Claims Against Iran 49 


Security Council Votes on Golan Heights 
Situation (text of resolution, Department 
statement) 60 

U.S. and Israel Review MFO Participation 
(U.S. -Israel statement) 46 

U.S., Israel Agree on Strategic Cooperation 
(joint press statement, memorandum of 
understanding) 45 

Jordan. Visit of Jordanian King Hussein 
(Hussein, Reagan) 50 

Kampuchea. The Situation in Kampuchea 
(Kirkpatrick, text of resolution) 79 

Latin America and the Caribbean 

OAS General Assembly Meets in St. Lucia 
(Haig, Department announcement, texts of 
resolutions) 1 

Overview of Recent Foreign Policy (Haig) . . 16 

U.S. Ratifies Protocol I of Treaty of Tlatelolco 
(Haig, text of protocol, Senate understand- 
ings) 85 

Liberia. Liberia: The Road to Recovery 
(Swing) 18 


Libya: A Source of International Terrorism 
(Adelman) 60 

Libyan Involvement in Sudan and Chad 
(Lyman) 27 

President Asks Americans to Leave Libya 
(Clark) 46 

Middle East 

Overview of Recent Foreign Policy (Haig) . . 16 

President Reagan's News Conference of No- 
vember 10 (excerpts) 9 

President Reagan's News Conference of De- 
cember 17 (excerpts) 10 

Pursuing Peace and Security in the Middle 
East (Veliotes) 47 

U.S. and Israel Review MFO Participation 
(U.S. -Israel statement) 46 

Military Affairs 

President Reagan's News Conference of No- 
vember 10 (excerpts) 9 

U.S., Israel Agree on Strategic Cooperation 
(joint press statement, memorandum of 
understanding) 45 

Use of Chemical Weapons in Asia (Burt) . . .52 

Nuclear Policy. Preserving Western Inde- 
pendence and Security (Eagleburger) . .36 

Organization of American States. OAS 
General Assembly Meets in^ St. Lucia 
(Haig, Department announcement, texts of 
resolutions) 1 


President Reagan's News Conference of De- 
cember 17 (excerpts) 10 

The Situation in Poland (Haig, Department 
statements) 40 

Presidential Documents 

Fourth Report on Cyprus (message to the 
Congress) 43 

Internal Situation in Zimbabwe (letter to the 
Congress) 26 

President Reagan's News Conference of No- 
vember 10 (excerpts) 9 

President Reagan's News Conference of De- 
cember 17 (excerpts) 10 

U.N. Conference on New and Renewable 
Sources of Energy (Anderson, President's 
letter, program of action) 63 

Visit of Jordanian King Hussein (Hussein, 
Reagan) 50 

Visit of Spanish King Juan Carlos I (President 
Reagan, King Juan Carlos I) 43 

Visit of Venezuelan President (Herrera, 
Reagan) 86 

Publications. Department of State 94 

Security Assistance. Pursuing Peace and 
Security in the Middle East (Veliotes) . . 47 

Spain. Visit of Spanish King Juan Carlos I 
(President Reagan, King Juan Carlos I) 43 

Sudan. Libyan Involvement in Sudan and 
Chad (Lyman) 27 


The Impact of International Terrorism (Perez) 

Libya: A Source of International Terrorism 
(Adelman) 60 


Current Actions 89 

U.S. Ratifies Protocol I of Treaty of Tlatelolco 
(Haig, text of protocol, Senate understand- 
ings) 85 


Afghan Situation and Implications for Peace 
(Kirkpatrick, text of resolution, Depart- 
ment statement) 57 

INF Negotiations Open in Geneva (Haig) ... 30 

Overview of Recent Foreign Policy (Haig) . . 16 

Preserving Western Independence and Securi- 
ty (Eagleburger) 36 

U.S. Consults With Allies on INF Negotiating 
Position (Burt, Eagleburger) 31 

U.S. -Soviet INF Systems: A Response to 
Soviet Claims 31 

United Nations 

Afghan Situation and Implications for Peace 
(Kirkpatrick, text of resolution, Depart- 
ment statement) 57 

Ethiopia (Kirkpatrick) 81 

Libya: A Source of International Terrorism 
(Adelman) 60 

Security Council Votes on Golan Heights Situa- 
tion (text of resolution, Department state- 
ment) 60 

The Situation in Kampuchea (Kirkpatrick, text 
of resolution) 79 

U.N. Conference on Least Developed Coun- 
tries (McPherson) 82 

U.N. Conference on New and Renewable 
Sources of Energy (Anderson, President's 
letter, program of action) 63 

Venezuela. Visit of Venezuelan President 
(Herrera, Reagan) 86 

Zimbabwe. Internal Situation in Zimbabwe 
(letter to the Congress) 26 

Name Index 

Adelman, Kenneth 60 

Anderson, Stanton D 63 

Baxter, William F 34 

Burt, Richard R 31, 52 

Bush, Vice President 12 

Carlos, King Juan, I 43 

Clark, William P 46 

Crocker, Chester A 23 

Eagleburger, Lawrence S 31, 36 

Haig, Secretary 1, 16, 30, 40, 85 

Herrera Campins, Luis 86 

Hormats, Robert D 34 

Hussein, King I 50 

Johnston, Ernest B, Jr 32 

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J 57, 79, 81 

Lyman, Princeton 27 

McPherson, M Peter 82 

Perez, Frank H 55 

Reagan, President 9, 10, 26, 43, 50, 63, 86 

Robinson, Davis R 34 

Sharon, Ariel 45 

Swing, William Lacy 18 

Veliotes, Nicholas A 47 

Weinberger, Caspar W 45 

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U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 


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. I ' 


of State 


m ot State -jm -m m . a 


e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 82/ Number 2059 

February 1982 


00 W8? 

Poland /1 

Department of State 


Volume 82 / Number 2059 / February 1982 

Cover: Poland's national seal 

The Department of State Bulletin , 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and 
government agencies with information 
on developments in U.S. foreign 
relations and the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; 
special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press 
releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission 
to the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 


Secretary of State 


Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 



Office of Public Communication 


Chief, Editorial Division 




Assistant Editor 

The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is 
necessary in the transaction of the public 
business required by law of this 
Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the 
Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget through January 31, 1986- 

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the 
Department of State Bulletin as the 
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is 
indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical 

For sale by the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
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issues plus annual index— $21.00 (domesticl 
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copy— $2.50 (domestic) $3.15 (foreign) 



President's Address on Poland 

Situation in Poland (Department Statements) 

U.S. Measures Taken Against the Soviet Union (President Reagan) 

Visit of West German Chancellor Schmidt (Joint Statement) 

Secretary's News Conference on Chancellor Schmidt's Visit 

Solidarity Day With Poland (Proclamation) 

NATO Council Meets on Poland (Secretary Haig, Declaration) 

e Secretary 

Interview on "Face the 


The African Private Sector 
and U.S. Foreign Policy 
(Chester A. Crocker) 

Visit of Zaire President 
Mobutu (White House 

Internal Situation in Zimbabwe 
(President Reagan's Letter 
to the Congress) 

ms Control 

The Unnecessary War 
(Eugene V. Rostow) 

nsular Affairs 

Consular Services to U.S. 
Citizens (Diego C. Asencio) 

st Asia 

No Sale of Advanced Aircraft 
to Taiwan (Department 


Auto Parts Industry 
(Robert D. Hormats) 


The Alliance at a Crossroad 

(Richard R. Burt) 
Fifth Report on Cyprus 

(Message to the Congress) 

Human Rights 

46 Bill of Rights Day, Human 

Rights Day and Week, 1981 


46 International Narcotics Control 
Strategy (Joseph H. 

49 Anglo-American Cooperation 
Against Drug Trafficking 

Nuclear Affairs 

52 Nuclear Cooperation and 

Nonproliferation Strategy 
(James L. Malone) 
IAEA Safeguards System 
(Richard T. Kennedy) 



59 U.S. Interests in the Pacific Island 
Region (John H. Holdridge) 


63 Population Growth, Refugees, and 
Immigration (Richard Elliot 

United Nations 

65 Double Standards in Human Rights 
(Jeane J. Kirkpatrick) 

Western Hemisphere 

68 Cuba's Renewed Support for 
Violence in Latin America 

80 Strategic Situation in Central 
America and the Caribbean 
(Thomas 0. Enders) 


82 Current Actions 


84 December 1981 

Press Releases 

86 Department of State 


86 Department of State 





President's Address 
on Poland 

President Reagan's address 

to the nation 

from the White House 

on December 23, 198 1. 1 

At Christmas time every home takes on 
a special beauty, a special warmth. That 
is certainly true of the White House, 
where so many famous Americans have 
spent their Christmases over the years. 
This fine, old home— the people's 
house— has seen so much, been so much 
a part of all our lives and history. It has 
been humbling and inspiring for Nancy 
and me to be spending our first Christ- 
mas in this place. 

We've lived here as your tenants for 
almost a year now. And what a year it's 
been. As a people, we've been through 
quite a lot, moments of joy, of tragedy, 
and of real achievement— moments that 
I believe have brought us all closer 

G. K. Chesterton once said that the 
world would never starve for wonders; 
but only for the want of wonder. At this 
special time of year we all renew our 

Since martial law was declared in 
December 1981, strikes and demonstrations 
have occurred throughout Poland. 
Thousands of Polish citizens, from all 
walks of life, have been detained by the 
authorities. Here in Warsaw in December, 
armored personnel carriers passed by the 
Academy of Science and the statue of 
Nicholas Copernicus. 

(UPI photo) 

sense of wonder in recalling the story of 
the first Christmas in Bethlehem nearly 
2,000 years ago. Some celebrate Christ- 
mas as the birthday of a great and good 
philosopher and teacher. Others of us 
believe in the divinity of the child born 
in Bethlehem; that he was and is the 
promised Prince of Peace. 

Yes, we have questioned why he 
who could perform miracles chose to 
come among us as a helpless babe. But 
maybe that was his first miracle, his 
first great lesson that we should learn to 
care for one another. Tonight, in 
millions of American homes, the glow of 
the Christmas tree is a reflection of the 
love Jesus taught us. Like the shepherds 
and wisemen of that first Christmas, we 
Americans have always tried to follow a 
higher light, a star, if you will. At lonely 
campfire vigils along the frontier, in the 
darkest days of the Great Depression, 
through war and peace, the twin 
beacons of faith and freedom have 
brightened the American sky. At times 
our footsteps may have faltered, but 
trusting in God's help we've never lost 
our way. 

Just across the way from the White 
House stand the two great emblems of 
the holiday season— a menorah, symbol- 
izing the Jewish festival of Hanukkah, 
and the national Christmas tree, a 

ruary 1982 

beautiful, towering blue spruce from 
Pennsylvania. Like the national Christ- 
mas tree, our country is a living, grow- 
ing thing planted in rich American soil. 
Only our devoted care can bring it to full 
flower. So let this holiday season be for 
us a time of rededication. Even as we 
rejoice, however, let us remember that 
for some Americans this will not be as 
happy a Christmas as it should be. I 
know a little of what they feel. I re- 
member one Christmas eve during the 
Great Depression, my father opening 
what he thought was a Christmas 
greeting. It was a notice that he no 
longer had a job. 

Over the past year, we have begun 
the long, hard work of economic re- 
covery. Our goal is an America in which 
every citizen who needs and wants a job 
can get a job. Our program for recovery 
has only been in place for 12 weeks now, 
but it is beginning to work; with your 
help and prayers it will succeed. We are 
winning the battle against inflation, run- 
away government spending, and taxa- 
tion. And that victory will mean more 
economic growth, more jobs, and more 
opportunity for all Americans. 

A few months before he took up 
residence in this house, one of my 
predecessors, John Kennedy, tried to 
sum up the temper of the times with a 
quote from an author closely tied to 
Christmas, Charles Dickens. We were 
living, he said, in "the best of times and 
the worst of times." In some ways, that 
is even more true today. The world is 
full of peril as well as promise. Too 
many of its people, even now, live in the 
shadow of want and tyranny. 

Events in Poland 

As I speak to you tonight, the fate of a 
proud and ancient nation hangs in the 
balance. For a thousand years, Christ- 
mas has been celebrated in Poland, a 
land of deep religious faith. But this 
Christmas brings little joy to the 
courageous Polish people. They have 
been betrayed by their own government. 

The men who rule them, and their 
totalitarian allies, fear the very freedom 
that the Polish people cherish. They 
have answered the stirrings of liberty 
with brute force— killings, mass arrests, 

The tragic events now 
occurring in Poland . . . 
have been precipitated 
by public and secret 
pressure from the Soviet 

and the setting up of concentration 
camps. Lech Walesa and other Solidari- 
ty leaders are imprisoned, their fate 
unknown. Factories, mines, universities, 
and homes have been assaulted. The 
Polish Government has trampled under- 
foot solemn commitments to the U.N. 
Charter and the Helsinki accords. It has 
even broken the Gdansk agreement of 
August 1980, by which the Polish 
Government recognized the basic right 
of its people to form free trade unions 
and to strike. 

The tragic events now occurring in 
Poland, almost 2 years to the day after 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, have 
been precipitated by public and secret 
pressure from the Soviet Union. It is no 
coincidence that Soviet Marshal Kulikov, 
chief of the Warsaw Pact forces, and 
other senior Red Army officers were in 
Poland while these outrages were being 
initiated. And it is no coincidence that 
the martial law proclamations imposed 
in December by the Polish Government 
were being printed in the Soviet Union 
in September. 

The target of this repression is the 
Solidarity movement. But in attacking 
Solidarity, its enemies attack an entire 
people. Ten million of Poland's thirty-six 
million citizens are members of Solidari- 
ty. Taken together with their families, 
they account for the overwhelming ma- 

jority of the Polish nation. By persec 
ing Solidarity, the Polish Governmen 
wages war against its own people. 

I urge the Polish Government an 
its allies to consider the consequence; 
their actions. How can they possibly 
justify using naked force to crush a p 
pie who ask for nothing more than tl 
right to lead their own lives in freedc 
and dignity? Brute force may intimid 
but it cannot form the basis of an en- 
during society and the ailing Polish 
economy cannot be rebuilt with 
terror tactics. 

Poland needs cooperation betwee 
its government and its people— not n 
tary oppression. If the Polish Govern 
ment will honor the commitments it 1 
made to basic human rights in docu- 
ments like the Gdansk agreement, w 
America will gladly do our share to r. 
the shattered Polish economy, just as 
helped the countries of Europe after 
both world wars. It is ironic that we 
offered— and Poland expressed inter* 
in accepting— our help after World 
War II. The Soviet Union intervened 
then and refused to allow such help t 

But if the forces of tyranny in 
Poland— and those who incite them f: 
without— do not relent, they should 
prepare themselves for serious conse 
quences. Already, throughout the fre 
world, citizens have publicly demon- 
strated their support for the Polish p 
pie. Our government and those of ou 
allies have expressed moral revulsion 
the police state tactics of Poland's op 
pressors. The church has also spoken 
out in spite of threats and intimidatk 

U.S. Response 

But our reaction cannot stop there. I 
want emphatically to state tonight th 
if the outrages in Poland do not ceaS' 
we cannot and will not conduct "busii 
as usual" with the perpetrators and 
those who aid and abet them. Make i 
mistake: Their crime will cost them 
dearly in their future dealings with 
America and free peoples everywhen 

Department of State Bull 


I do not make this statement lightly 
/ithout serious reflection. We have 
i measured and deliberate in our 
:tion to the tragic events in Poland, 
have not acted in haste, and the 
is I will outline tonight— and others 
nriay take in the days ahead— are 
I just, and reasonable. 
In order to aid the suffering Polish 
Die during this critical period, we will 
;inue the shipment of food through 
ate humanitarian channels but only 
>ng as we know that the Polish peo- 
themselves receive the food. 
The neighboring country of Austria 
opened its doors to refugees from 
md. I have, therefore, directed that 
erican assistance, including supplies 
asic foodstuffs, be offered to aid the 
trians in providing for these 

But to underscore our fundamental 
osition to the repressive actions 
;n by the Polish Government against 
>wn people, the Administration has 
>ended all government-sponsored 
ments of agricultural and dairy 
iucts to the Polish Government. This 
>ension will remain in force until ab- 
te assurances are received that dis- 
ution of these products is monitored 
guaranteed by independent agen- 
. We must be sure that every bit of 
I provided by America goes to the 
sh people — not to their oppressors. 
The United States is taking im- 
liate action to suspend major ele- 
its of our economic relationships 
1 the Polish Government. 

• We have halted the renewal of the 
iort-Import Bank's line of export 

lit insurance to the Polish Govern- 

• We will suspend Polish civil avia- 
privileges in the United States. 

• We are suspending the right of 
md's fishing fleet to operate in 
erican waters. 

• And we are proposing to our 
I the further restriction of high- 
mology exports to Poland. 

These actions are not directed 
against the Polish people. They are a 
warning to the Government of Poland 
that free men cannot and will not stand 
idly by in the face of brutal repression. 
To underscore this point, I have written 
a letter to General Jaruzelski, head of 
the Polish Government. In it, I outlined 
the steps we are taking and warned of 
the serious consequences if the Polish 
Government continues to use violence 
against its populace. I've urged him to 
free those in arbitrary detention, to lift 
martial law, and to restore the inter- 
nationally recognized rights of the Polish 
people to free speech and association. 

The Soviet Union, through its 
threats and pressures, deserves a major 
share of blame for the developments in 
Poland. So I have also sent a letter to 
President Brezhnev urging him to per- 
mit the restoration of basic rights in 
Poland, provided for in the Helsinki 
Final Act. In it, I informed him that, if 
this repression continues, the United 
States will have no choice but to take 
further concrete political and economic 
measures affecting our relationship. 

Worldwide Spirit of Solidarity 

When 19th century Polish patriots rose 
against foreign oppressors, their rallying 
cry was "For our freedom and yours." 
That motto still rings true in our time. 
There is a spirit of solidarity abroad in 
the world tonight that no physical force 
can crush. It crosses national boundaries 
and enters into the hearts of men and 
women everywhere. In factories, farms, 
and schools, in cities and towns around 
the globe, we the people of the free 
world stand as one with our Polish 
brothers and sisters. Their cause is ours, 
and our prayers and hopes go out to 
them this Christmas. 

Yesterday, I met in this very room 
with Romuald Spasowski, the distin- 
guished former Polish Ambassador who 
has sought asylum in our country in pro- 
test to the suppression of his native 
land. He told me that one of the ways 
the Polish people have demonstrated 
their solidarity in the face of martial law 
is by placing lighted candles in their win- 
dows to show that the light of liberty 
still glows in their hearts. 

Ambassador Spasowski requested 
that, on Christmas eve, a lighted candle 

U.S. Ambassador to Poland 

Francis J. Meehan was born February 14, 
1924, in East Orange, New Jersey. He 
received an M.A. from the University of 
Glasgow (1945) and an M.P.A. from Harvard 
(1957). He served in the U.S. Army from 
1945 to 1947. 

Ambassador Meehan joined the Foreign 
Service in 1951 and has served in Frankfurt, 
Hamburg, Paris, Moscow, Berlin, and at the 
Department of State. In addition, he was 
deputy executive secretary of the Depart- 
ment (1967-68), deputy chief of mission in 
Budapest (1968-72), counselor for political af- 
fairs in Bonn (1972-75), and deputy chief of 
mission in Vienna (1975-77), and in Bonn 
(1977-79). He was ambassador to 
Czechoslovakia (1979-80). 

He was sworn in as Ambassador to 
Poland on October 8, 1980. Ambassador 
Meehan speaks French, German, and Rus- 
sian. ■ 

ruary 1982 

will burn in the White House window as 
a small but certain beacon of our soli- 
darity with the Polish people. I urge all 
of you to do the same tomorrow night, 
on Christmas eve, as a personal state- 
ment of your commitment to the steps 
we are taking to support the brave peo- 
ple of Poland in their time of troubles. 
Once, earlier in this century, an evil 
influence threatened that the lights were 
going out all over the world. 

Let the lignt of millions of candles in 
American homes give notice that the 
light of freedom is not going tu be ex- 
tinguished. We are blessed with a free- 
dom and abundance denied to so many. 
Let those candles remind us that these 
blessings bring with them a solemn obli- 
gation—an obligation to the God who 
guides us, an obligation to the heritage 
of liberty and dignity handed down to us 
by our forefathers, and an obligation to 
the children of the world, whose future 
will be shaped by the way we live our 
lives today. 

Christmas means so much because 
of one special child. But Christmas also 
reminds us that all children are special, 
that they are gifts from God, gifts 
beyond price that mean more than any 
presents money can buy. In their love 
and laughter, in our hopes for their 
future, lies the true meaning of 

So, in a spirit of gratitude for what 
we have been able to achieve together 
over the past year, and looking forward 
to all that we hope to achieve together 
in the years ahead, Nancy and I want to 
wish you all the best of holiday seasons. 
As Charles Dickens, whom I quoted a 
few moments ago, said so well in A 
Christmas Carol, "God bless us, every 

Situation in Poland 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 28, 1981. 


Dec. 18, 1981 1 

We are deeply concerned for the leaders 
of Solidarity and the thousands of other 
prisoners being held in Poland. Our 
reports indicate that many of these 
prisoners are being held in inadequate 
facilities and are not being accorded 
humane treatment. It is also extremely 
disturbing that the leader of Solidarity 
[Lech Walesa] is being held under de 
facto house arrest and that he has not 
been allowed to make a public statement 
to reassure the world about his welfare. 
We call on the Polish Government to 
release the prisoners, whose only crime 
has been their attempt to exercise those 
civil and political rights enshrined in 
many international documents to which 
that country is party and to allow Lech 
Walesa to speak to his countrymen and 
to the world. 

Dec. 18, 1981 1 

Polish workers continue to defy the 
strike-breaking regime in several trouble 
spots, especially in the Silesian coalfields 
where miners still occupy several mine 
shafts and have threatened to sabotage 
the mines, according to unconfirmed 
reports. Workers also appear to have 
barricaded themselves in some of the 
buildings at the Lenin shipyard in 
Gdansk. In Warsaw yesterday, several 
hundred demonstrators were dispersed 
by security forces using clubs and tear 

A high-level Polish Government of- 
ficial informed our embassy that there 
were strikes in 43 enterprises in eight 
provinces yesterday. The official also 
claimed that no more than 4,000 persons 
were detained. Other reports, of course, 
give higher figures. A Polish television 
news- program reported that seven 
miners were killed in an incident involv- 
ing the militia and the army at a coal 
mine in Katowice. 

The present situation continues to 
of great concern because it is now clei 
that the martial law regime has adopt 
a policy of using violence to restore la 
and order, and as the President said 
yesterday: "Violence invites violence a 
threatens to plunge Poland into chaos 

Dec. 19, 1981 1 

We continue to watch events in Polan 
with great concern, particularly the us 
of violence against persons who attem 
to exercise their civil and political 
rights— rights set forth in the Helsink 
Final Act of which Poland is a 
signatory. We again call for the releas 
of political prisoners. 

Increasingly a pattern is emerging 
of using Polish Army forces to seal of: 
public areas and workplaces from out- 
side interference while the armed seci 
ty forces of the Ministry of Interior 
engage in often violent acts of intimid; 
tion and repression against protesting 
workers, students, and intellectuals. 

There are unconfirmed reports thi 
more people may have been killed in tl 
clashes between strikers and militarize 
police and army units in Katowice thai 
has been reported by the official Polisl 
media. We call upon the Polish Goverr 
ment to cease its repressive attacks or 
Polish workers. 

Warsaw was calm yesterday follov 
ing the demonstrations on December 1 
A funeral mass for a Solidarity activis 
who died of natural causes was attend 
by a crowd of approximately 3,000 
which dispersed without incident folto 
ing the service. Our embassy has 
reported that things are quiet in War- 
saw today, and there is no evidence of 
strike activity. 

The Military Council has proposed 
that the government limit the activitie: 
of workers' councils until the political 
situation is stabilized. Presumably, the 
council is concerned about Solidarity 

Department of State Bullet 


lination of these instruments of 
'kers' self-management. 
Trybuna Ludu on December 18 
arts that in "militarized" enterprises 
industry, the work week may be ex- 
ied to 6 or even 7 days and the 
•king day to 12 hours. Another item 
bribed new travel restrictions on 
es except when they travel between 
ir home and their place of work. 

Dec. 21, 1981 1 

Our embassy reports that Warsaw ap- 
pears calm this morning. Despite recent 
severe weather, including a heavy snow 
storm yesterday, streets are clear and 
transportation appears normal. 
We still have only fragmen- 
tary — and belated — reports from other 
major urban centers. These suggest con- 
tinuing resistance to martial law in some 
areas and continued use of force in some 
instances by the authorities. There are 
also unconfirmed reports concerning the 
arrest of some priests. We note that 

These factory workers struck at the Lenin 
shipyard in Gdansk in August 1980. A 
month later in Gdansk, the new independ- 
ent labor unions forged a single national 
labor organization, Solidarity. It won legal 
status the following October. 

(UPI photo) 

Vatican representatives are now in War- 
saw conferring with Polish church of- 

In Silesia strikes appear to be con- 
tinuing in perhaps as many as 20 coal 
mines, with a major confrontation 
reported in one. Warsaw radio stated 

ruary 1982 

Sunday morning the Solidarity activists 
had blown up the entrance to the 
Ziemowit coal mine "trapping 1,300 
miners below" but did not repeat the 
report, which had been picked up by 
TASS in the evening. We have no con- 
firmation of this report. 

Major enterprises in Katowice, in- 
cluding the Huta Katowice steelworkers, 
were reportedly on strike at least 
through December 18, although police 
were said to have arrested nearly all the 
regional Solidarity leadership on the 
night of December 12-13. 

Western and Polish eyewitnesses 
reported strikers remained inside the 
Lenin steel mill outside Krakow after 
two attempts by security forces to 
dislodge them. 

In Gdansk, Gydnia, and Szczecin, 
shipyard workers have been told not to 
report to work until after Christmas. 
Governmental officials have confirmed 
that workers in Gdansk have taken over 
a building filled with flammable 

We are unable to confirm reports 
that Lech Walesa has been moved to 
Warsaw military district headquarters 
from a villa south of the capital. 

Dec. 22, 1981 1 

There have been no major developments 
that we are aware of in Poland. We are 
continuing to follow events closely and 
remain deeply concerned about the 
widespread suspension of civil liberties, 
mass internments, and use of violence 
against striking workers. 

At a press conference in Warsaw 
yesterday, a spokesman for the govern- 
ment stated that approximately 5,000 
Poles have been detained since the start 
of the martial law regime. He also 
claimed that some detainees have 
already been released. We cannot con- 
firm the 5,000 figure cited by the Polish 
authorities but note that estimates of 
the number of Polish citizens detained 
have ranged much higher. 

The spokesman admitted that strikes 
are continuing among the coal miners at 
the Ziemowit and Piast mines in Silesia, 


Lech Walesa is the 37-year-old leader of 
the Solidarity labor movement and an elec- 
trician by trade. He has been detained by 
Polish authorities in a undisclosed location 
since Solidarity's activities were suspended 
and martial law was imposed in December 

(UPI photo) 


with approximately 3,000 miners said 
be participating. We understand that 
priests were able to conduct masses a 
the mines yesterday and that miners' 
families have brought them food. 

At this government press con- 
ference, it was also stated that Lech 
Walesa remains under detention in W 
saw but was visited on Sunday by a 
priest, who said mass, and by his wif( 
and children. It was stated that Wale: 
will be released "as soon as the situat 
allows." We understand that Walesa i 
in good health. 

The Military Council warned priv; 
farmers on December 21 (in Trybuna 
Luda) that lagging food deliveries to 
state might compel it to reinstitute cc 
pulsory deliveries. If this were carrie< 
out, it would mark an end to the 
agricultural policy pursued during the 
past year which sought to convince 
private farmers that they would be a 
permanent part of the system. 

Although the labor situation in P< 
nan is reported to be relatively calm 
factories appear to be in operation, tl 
food supplies are declining. Milk, bre; 
and eggs are scarce or unavailable, ai 
long food lines were in evidence. 

Warsaw and Krakow were quiet 
yesterday. In Krakow the food situat 
appears to be somewhat better than i 
Poznan. Warsaw appears to have the 
best food situation of these three citi< 
as the authorities are making availab 
large stocks of meat, eggs, and carp, 
favorite fish for Christmas. Our embs 
reports an exceptionally good supply 
meat in the showcase, "Supersam," 
market, with long lines in evidence tl 
and throughout Warsaw. 

We have no reliable information < 
the food siutation in other parts of 

Dec. 23, 1981 1 

Strikes apparently continue in two m 
jor coal mines in Silesia and the oil 
refinery in Gdansk as well as other lc 
tions, but there are no reports of maj 
new developments in Poland. 

Department of State Bull* 



Reuters reports that [Gen. Wojciech] 
ozelski is preparing a television ad- 
ss to the nation for delivery possibly 
arly as today. We cannot confirm 

According to PAP [Polish news 
ncy] there was a Politburo meeting 
December 22 during which party 
lers reportedly discussed the political 
social situation in Poland and 
rted the duties of the party during 
lial law. 

The Ministry of the Interior has 
ided to lift the curfew for the night 
)ecember 24-25 throughout the coun- 
to facilitate attendance at Christmas 
> midnight mass. However, there is 
sign that any of the thousands of de- 
lees will be released, and we do not 
have any word on whether repre- 
tatives of the International Commit- 
of the Red Cross have been allowed 
r isit any of the detention camps. 
Warsaw television on December 22 
ounced the prosecution of three men 
used of attempting to burn the civil 
tia station in Gdansk. This is the 
t official admission of the extent of 
est in the city. 

We have no further information on 
whereabouts of Lech Walesa. 

:. 24, 1981 1 

have not yet received any official 
ish or Soviet reaction to the Presi- 
t's Christmas address last night. I 
not going to have any comment on 
letters to Gen. Jaruzelski and Chair- 
n Brezhnev. 

The Polish Ambassador to Japan, 

Zdzislaw Rurarz, his wife Januna, 
I his daughter Eva came to our em- 
sy in Tokyo on December 23 and for- 
lly sought asylum in the United 
tes. After notification to the 
•anese Government, they were issued 
is permitting them to enter the 
ited States and are now enroute. 

The Polish Government announced 
t the strike at the Katowice steel mill 
3 broken yesterday and claimed that 
re were no casualties. Meanwhile 
ikes in Gdansk continued and there 

are also reports of a strike in the fer- 
tilizer plant in Pulawy. 

The address to the nation that Gen. 
Jaruzelski was reportedly scheduled to 
make yesterday has been postponed. We 
do not know the reason for this. 

In an apparent effort to affect 
Polish public opinion and defuse increas- 
ingly broad and stinging world criticism 
of the repressive actions of the martial 
law regime, Polish media are portraying 
current conditions in Poland as return- 
ing to normal. 

We continue to receive reports from 
our embassy and from our two con- 
sulates in Krakow and Poznan that 
American citizens have not been har- 
assed or molested in any way. Despite 
the travel restrictions on our officials in 
Poland, American citizens visiting or 
studying in Poland have unhampered ac- 
cess to the embassy and consulates. 
Polish citizens, however, continue to be 
denied access to our consular officer by 
the Polish police. 

Dec. 28, 1981 1 

According to recent reports from War- 
saw, a number of convictions of local 
union leaders have been announced by 
Polish provincial courts, with sentences 
ranging from 6 months in the case of 
continuation of strike activity after the 
imposition of martial law to 2, l k years 
given to the organizers of a sit-in strike 
at an electronics factory. 

We note the statement made by 
Gen. Jaruzelski in his speech of 
December 24, denying that those ar- 
rested and detained are suffering from 
harsh treatment. We urge the Polish 
authorities to grant an international Red 
Cross delegation full access to those in 
detention so that their whereabouts and 
their condition can be verified. 

Dec. 29, 1981 2 

We have noted statements by Polish of- 
ficials that the period of martial law will 
be prolonged not by conditions in Poland 

These Warsaw citizens waited at a tram stop during the 1-hour general strike in 
October 1981. 

(UPI photo) 

Jruary 1982 

but by Western economic sanctions. This 
line of reasoning is absurd. These sanc- 
tions were applied as the result of the 
ruthless suppression of human and civil 
rights in Poland by the Military Council. 
We are, as we have stated, prepared to 
reexamine our position once martial law 
is lifted, prisoners are released, and gen- 
uine negotiations in a free atmosphere 
are underway among the leading 
elements of Polish society, including 

We are concerned also about new 
reports of arrests and trials of workers 
who allegedly were local strike 
leaders — arrests which continue the pat- 
tern of intimidation begun on Decem- 
ber 13. We again urge the Polish 
authorities to grant full access to all 
those in detention so that their 
whereabouts and condition can be 

It is clear that passive resistance re- 
mains widespread in Poland and that the 
majority of the Polish people opposes 
this repression of their civil and human 
rights. Thus, while military rule can 
make the streets quieter, the major 
problems which Poland faces cannot be 
solved by subjugating its people. Only a 
return to genuine internal negotiations 
and conciliation can put Poland back on 
the path to solving its own problems, 
and it is only such a policy that free 
peoples in the West can be expected to 

Dec. 30, 1981 1 

A spokesman of the Military Council 
told foreign correspondents yesterday in 
Warsaw that Poland remains in an of- 
ficial state of war. It is a startling spec- 
tacle to see a state professing to repre- 
sent the working class declaring a state 
of war against its own workers. 

Solidarity has clearly shown itself to 
be an extremely broad-based workers' 
movement in which over 10 million 
Polish working men and women have 
sought to gain a meaningful and 
legitimate voice in decisions which affect 
their lives. The tragic repression of this 
popular force can only be described as a 

U.S. Measures Taken 
Against the 
Soviet Union 

DEC. 29, 1981 1 

The Soviet Union bears a heavy and 
direct responsibility for the repression in 
Poland. For many months the Soviets 
publicly and privately demanded such a 
crackdown. They brought major 
pressures to bear through now-public 
letters to the Polish leadership, military 
maneuvers, and other forms of intimida- 
tion. They now openly endorse the sup- 
pression which has ensued. 

Last week I announced that I had 
sent a letter to President Brezhnev urg- 
ing him to permit the restoration of 
basic human rights in Poland as provid- 
ed for in the Helsinki Final Act. I also 
informed him that, if the repression con- 
tinued, the United States would have no 
choice but to take further concrete 
political and economic measures affect- 
ing our relationship. 

The repression in Poland continues, 
and President Brezhnev has responded 
in a manner which makes it clear the 
Soviet Union does not understand the 
seriousness of our concern and its 
obligations under both the Helsinki Final 
Act and the U.N. Charter. I have, 
therefore, decided to take the following 
immediate measures with regard to the 
Soviet Union. 

• All Aeroflot service to the United 
States will be suspended. 

• The Soviet Purchasing Commis- 
sion is being closed. 

• The issuance or renewal of 
licenses for the export to the U.S.S.R. 
of electronic equipment, computers, and 
other high-technology materials is being 

• Negotiations on a new long-term 
grains agreement are being postponed. 

• Negotiations on a new U.S.-Sov 
maritime agreement are being suspen 
ed, and a new regime of port-access c> 
trols will be put into effect for all Sov 
ships when the current agreement ex- 
pires on December 31. 

• Licenses will be required for ex 
port to the Soviet Union for an expan 
ed list of oil and gas equipment. Is- 
suance of such licenses will be suspem 
ed. This includes pipelayers. 

• U.S. -Soviet exchange agreemen 
coming up for renewal in the near 
future, including the agreements on 
energy and science and technology, w 
not be renewed. There will be a com- 
plete review of all other U.S. -Soviet e 
change agreements. 

The United States wants a constr 
tive and mutually beneficial relationsli 
with the Soviet Union. We intend to 
maintain a high-level dialogue. But w( 
are prepared to proceed in whatever 
direction the Soviet Union decides 
upon — toward greater mutual restraii 
and cooperation or further down a ha 
and less rewarding path. We will wat< 
events in Poland closely in coming da; 
and weeks. Further steps may be 
necessary, and I will be prepared to t 
them. American decisions will be dete 
mined by Soviet actions. 

Secretary Haig has been in com- 
munication with our friends and allies 
about the measures we are taking an( 
explained why we believe such steps s 
essential at this time. 

Once again I call upon the Soviet 
Union to recognize the clear desire of 
the overwhelming majority of the Pol 
people for a process of national recon 
ciliation, renewal, and reform. 

'Made at the Century Plaza Hotel in I 
Angeles (text from Weekly Compilation ol 
Presidential Documents of Jan. 4 1982).B 

Department of State Bulk 



actionary, indeed couuterrevolu- 
mary, act. 

We remain concerned about the 
iny thousands of detainees who are 
w being held in Polish camps, 
though some reportedly have been 
leased, thousands remain under arrest 
uncertain conditions and for undeter- 
ned periods and without having been 
rally charged. 

We urge the Polish Government to 
fill its obligations under the Helsinki 
rial Act by releasing those so-called de- 
nees now. Only in this way can the 
lish authorities make good on their 
pressed intention to return to condi- 
ns in which a genuine national 
ilogue can take place. 

We note that several decisions by 
Dvincial and military district courts for 
Nations of martial law provisions were 
nounced on Polish television on 
member 29. These range from 8 years 
a case involving the transportation of 
ilets to 3 years for preparing and pro- 
iming strike actions in a factory. Such 
rsh and repressive punishments for 
I exercise of rights taken for granted 
most of the world are deplorable. 

Finally, we want to express our 
ep concern over the fact that Voice of 
nerica's Polish language broadcasts to 
land are now being heavily jammed, 
ch jamming, which we have confirmed 
originating in the Soviet Union, is a 
ilation at least in spirit of the Helsinki 
lal Act, a clear violation of Article 35 
the International Telecommunication 
nvention of 1973, and a violation of 
tide 19 of the U.N. Human Rights 

The refusal by the Soviet authorities 
permit their own citizens, and now 
i people of Poland as well, to know 
i facts about events in Poland and 
ewhere is a renewed demonstration of 
i glaring weaknesses of the Soviets' 

ousands of women and children marched 
Warsaw in July 1981 protesting food 
ortages. Earlier, in the spring, Polish 
thorities had instituted a national ration- 
J program. 
'I photo) 


ibruarv 1982 

own system and of the regime they have 
imposed on Poland. 

Dec. 31, 1981 2 

Despite press reports that the Military 
Council in Poland is establishing groups 
of experts to draw up programs of 
social, economic, and political reforms, 
the actual situation at this moment is 
that martial law has not been lifted, 
thousands of Poles remain under deten- 
tion, and internal communications in 
Poland have not been restored. Travel 
within Poland is controlled, the mails 
are uncertain, and the use of the 
telephone — with rare exceptions — im- 

Furthermore local elections sched- 
uled for February have been indefinitely 
postponed. The United States would 
welcome immediate steps by the Polish 
authorities to restore to the Polish peo- 
ple the ability to participate directly in 
decisions which affect their lives and 
Poland's future. 

Jan. 4, 1982 1 

We have noted recent assertions by 
Polish officials that normalization is tak- 
ing hold. While harsh military rule can 
make the streets quieter for a time in 
that unhappy land, martial law can 
never lead to normalcy. 

Release of the thousands of political 
prisoners together with internal negotia- 
tions and restoration of internationally 
recognized rights could begin a process 
leading to normalcy, but we have as yet 
seen no evidence that the Polish 
authorities are prepared to return their 
troops to barracks and take the path of 
political wisdom. 

Jan. 5, 1982 1 

We note with concern the number of 
Solidarity trade union leaders who have 
been put on trial by Poland's martial law 
authorities in recent days. Some have 
been given harsh sentences of up to 7 
years. Yesterday the first trials began in 
Warsaw, ironically in the same court- 

Defense Minister Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski 
became Poland's Prime Minister in 
February 1981 and the following October 
replaced Stanislaw Kania as the Com- 
munist Party leader. In mid-December, he 
declared martial law and military rule 
throughout the country. 

(UPI photo) 

house where Solidarity was officially 
registered as a legal organization not so 
long ago. 

Even as these trials take their 
foreordained course, Polish leaders are 
stating publicly that they are looking 
forward to self-governing and independ- 
ent trade unions in Poland. We cannot 
give credence to these assertions when 
courts throughout Poland are rendering 
stiff sentences under summary pro- 
cedure for union activity. 

Jan. 7, 1982 1 

The United States has not softened its 
stance on the need for a Western 
response to the Polish situation. In fac 
the United States is exercising its 
leadership through the example of its 
own actions and in consultations with 

Progress is being made. The Euro 
pean Communities foreign ministers' 
communique was the strongest state- 
ment yet out of Europe. There was fu 
ther convergence as a result of the 
Schmidt (Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
West Germany) visit. 

Our aim now in the NATO 
ministerial is to create a U.S.-EuropeE 
consensus and a common strategy. Th 
will provide a basis for coordinated ac 
tion. We have never expected the allie 
to take the same steps as we, at the 
same time. We're moving in the same 
direction. The United States will con- 
tinue its leadership effort as long as tl 
situation in Poland requires it. 

Jan. 8, 1982 1 

Under Secretary [for Political Affairs 
Walter J.] Stoessel called in Soviet Ar 
bassador Dobrynin yesterday to make 
formal protest on the jamming of Voi( 
of America (VOA) Polish-language 
broadcasts from facilities inside the 
Soviet Union. The Under Secretary sa 
that we consider this activity to be tot 
ly unacceptable and demanded that it 
cease immediately. 

Jamming is incompatible with the 
U.S.S.R.'s commitments under the 
Helsinki Final Act and a direct violatii 
of Article 35 of the International 
Telecommunication Convention and A 
cle 19 of the U.N. Human Rights 

The Under Secretary, in our de- 
marche, categorically rejected charges 
made by the Soviet official media that 
VOA broadcasts constitute subversive 
activity directed at Poland and other 
Soviet-bloc nations; VOA carries objec 
tive news and information denied the 
Polish and Soviet peoples by their owi 
government-controlled media. 


Department of State Bulle 


. 11, 1982 2 

pite some cosmetic changes, most 
ibly in the area of transportation and 
imunication, the harsh and brutal 
tial law restrictions imposed by 
sh authorities remain in force, 
usands of Poland's workers, farmers, 
intellectuals have been behind bars 
almost a month as political prisoners 
without having been formally charg- 

ed with anything. A Stalinist-type proc- 
ess of verification is being carried on 
throughout the country in which com- 
mon workers are being threatened with 
the loss of their jobs and access to ration 
coupons should they not renounce 
Solidarity. As Archbishop Glemp 
[Primate of Poland] has stated, such ac- 
tions are immoral and unethical and 
need not bind the consciences of those 
who signed them. 

Long food lines have been a common sight 
throughout Poland. This one is outside a 
Gdansk supermarket in October 1981. 
(UPI photo) 

>ruary 1982 


The Polish Government continues to 
control access to our embassy and con- 
sulates, and our ability to travel around 
the country remains heavily restricted. 
The travel of average Poles is also 
severely limited. The small amount of in- 
ternal telephone and telex communica- 
tion that is just now being permitted is 
under heavy censorship. Communication 
with the outside world continues to be 
sharply curtailed. 

Jan. 13, 1982 2 

A ranking Polish official told Western 
reporters in Warsaw yesterday that the 
martial law authorities "would like to" 
end martial law by February 1. He gave, 
however, no indication of a timetable, 
nor do we see any signs that martial law 
will be ended soon. 

In spite of recent marginal im- 
provements in the transportation and 
communications areas, thousands of 
political prisoners are still being held, 
and there has been no movement toward 
negotiations with Solidarity. 

Meanwhile prosecutors are busy 
bringing in indictments of strikers, 
many of whom are receiving stiff 
sentences. Moreover, the martial law 
authorities have rolled back gains in 
higher education to the pre-August 1980 

Over the weekend the Polish 
Government forbade foreign citizens to 
enter Western embassies of countries 
other than their own. We immediately 
protested in Warsaw and expected that 
this new practice will shortly be stopped. 

Last night, Warsaw time, the am- 
bassadors of the vast majority of NATO 
countries did not attend the traditional 
New Year diplomatic reception hosted 
by the Chairman of the Council of State. 
Business as usual is impossible while 
martial law remains in effect. 

Visit of West German 
Chancellor Schmidt 

1 Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment spokesman Dean Fischer. 

2 Read to news correspondents by acting 
Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■ 

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the 
Federal Republic of Germany visited 
Washington, D.C., January 4.-6, 1982, to 
meet with President Reagan and other 
government officials. 

Following is the joint statement 
issued January 5. 1 

The President and the Chancellor on Janu- 
ary 5, 1982 held extensive talks in which 
Secretary of State Haig and Foreign Minister 
Genscher participated. The Chancellor also 
met with Vice President Bush, Secretary 
Weinberger, and senior Administration 
officials and with leaders of Congress. 

The President and the Chancellor had a 
thorough exchange of views on the situation 
in Poland. They expressed grave concern 
about the imposition of martial law, which 
has resulted in the suppression of the funda- 
mental rights of Polish citizens in violation of 
international agreements, including the Final 
Act of Helsinki, the United Nations Charter 
and the Universal Declaration on Human 

The Chancellor informed the President 
about the final communique issued by the 
Foreign Ministers of the member countries of 
the European Communities on January 4. 
The President welcomed this statement. 

The President and the Chancellor agreed 
on their analysis of the Polish situation. They 
noted that contrary to the undertaking of the 
Polish leadership to reestablish liberty and 
the process of reform, repression and viola- 
tion of basic human rights in Poland con- 

The President and the Chancellor call 
again on the Polish authorities to end the 
state of martial law, to release those arrested 
and to restore the dialogue with the Church 
and Solidarity. 

The President and the Chancellor agreed 
that developments in Poland demonstrate 
once again the obvious inability of the com- 
munist system to accept those changes 
necessary to meet the legitimate aspirations 
of their peoples. This endangers public 
confidence in cooperation between East and 
West and seriously affects international rela- 
tions and stability. 

They both noted the responsibility of tl 
Soviet Union for developments in Poland a 
expressed concern about the serious pressi 
it is bringing to bear against Polish efforts 
for renewal. They insist Poland be allowed 
resolve its problems without external inter 

The President and the Chancellor reite 
ated their position that any military inter- 
vention in Poland would have the gravest 
consequences for international relations an 
would fundamentally change the entire inti 
national situation. 

The President explained the economic 
measures taken by the United States with 
regard to the Soviet Union. The Chancelloi 
informed the President that the Federal 
Republic, together with its partners in the 
European Community, will undertake close 
and positive consultations in this regard wi 
the United States and with other Western 
states in order to define what decisions wil 
best serve their common objectives and avi 
any step which could undermine their resp> 
tive actions. They welcomed the agreemen 
of the NATO Allies to hold a special Foreij 
Ministers' meeting in Brussels next week f 
further discussion of these matters. 

The Chancellor drew the President's at 
tention to the resolution passed on Decem- 
ber 18, 1981, in which the Bundestag, in 
agreement with the Federal Government, 
decided to hold in abeyance official econom 
aid to Poland as long as the present regimi 
continues its oppression of the Polish peop! 
The President reiterated his previous state 
ment that further assistance by the United 
States to the Government of Poland is not 
possible under present circumstances. The 
President and the Chancellor expressed thi 
hope that the course of developments in 
Poland would permit their countries to 
review these decisions. 

The President and the Chancellor ex- 
pressed their solidarity with the Polish peo 
and their readiness to continue humanitari; 
aid provided that it directly benefits the pe 
pie. In this context, the President informec 
the Chancellor that American labor and otl 
private groups are working together to 
organize a day of solidarity with the Polish 
people on January 30. 


Department of State Bullel 


In view of the grave developments in 
ind, which constitute a serious violation of 
Helsinki Final Act, the President and the 
.ncellor agreed that the Madrid Con- 
;nce on the implementation of the Helsinki 
a.1 Act should deal with the situation as 
i as possible at the level of Foreign 
isters. They will take action as ap- 
Driate within the framework of the United 
ions with a view to denouncing the viola- 
of human rights as well as acts of 
snce. Other measures will be considered 
he situation in Poland develops. 
They welcomed the initiatives by the 
opean Parliament and the US Congress 
stablish March 21 as "Afghanistan Day" 
xpress common hope and support for the 

pie of Afghanistan, agreed that the Soviet 
apation of Afghanistan must end, and 
landed the withdrawal of Soviet troops 
n Afghanistan and respect for the right of 
Afghan people to choose an independent 
non-aligned government. 
The President and the Chancellor 
erlined the significance of arms control as 
ndispensable element of their common 
irity policy. They reaffirm their deter- 
lation to continue their efforts for effective 
is control. In this context the Chancellor 
ressed his deep appreciation of the Presi- 
t's speech of November 18, 1981, and 
corned the initiatives for a comprehensive 
is control policy it contains. 

The President and the Chancellor also 
stressed the great importance of current 
economic issues. In this context, the 
Chancellor referred to the danger of a 
worldwide depression and ensuing far- 
reaching political hazards that may arise if 
the industrial countries fail to agree on a 
common strategy to combat unemployment. 
The Chancellor emphasized in particular the 
strategic significance of social and economic 
stability in the industrial countries of the 
West as an important element in the 
maintenance of a stable East- West balance. 

The President and the Chancellor agreed 
that protectionism is to be rejected and 
stated their resolve to work for a maximum 
degree of freedom in international trade. 

They also noted that their governments 
were following policies aimed at reducing 
significantly the level of interest rates 
through control of budget deficits, combatting 
inflation and overcoming the recession. 

The two leaders emphasized the impor- 
tance of close bilateral and multilateral con- 

sultations at all levels between the members 
of the Western Alliance. 

The President and the Chancellor 
underlined the close and trusting relationship 
between the United States and the Federal 
Republic of Germany. They agreed on the 
need to maintain and deepen US-German 
friendship by furthering and broadening 
mutual contacts and, in particular, a better 
understanding among the members of the 
younger generation. 

To this effect, they noted with satis- 
faction that Secretary of State Haig and 
Foreign Minister Genscher have named coor- 
dinators in their respective departments for 
American-German relations. In the State 
Department the duties have been assigned to 
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Assistant 
Secretary of State for European Affairs. In 
the Foreign Office the duties will be assumed 
by Minister of State, Dr. Hildegard Hamm- 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Jan. 11, 1982. 

Secretary's News Conference on 
Chancellor Schmidt's Visit 

Secretary Haig held a news con- 
ference on January 6, 1982, to brief news 
correspondents on President Reagan's 
meeting with West German Chancellor 

I wanted to take this opportunity this 
morning to provide an on-the-record 
overview of the just completed visit of 
[West German] Chancellor Schmidt, with 
special focus on the relationship of that 
visit to ongoing events in Poland, and to 
summarize for you in general and to 
answer your questions on the Polish 
situation as it now stands and events 
related to it. 

First, I think it's important that we 
understand that the visit of the 
Chancellor, which was scheduled before 
the Polish crisis and which in his own 
terms was designed to exchange views 
with President Reagan on the interna- 

tional economic situation, of course, took 
on a different character in the wake of 
the crisis in Poland. And, therefore, a 
large portion of the discussions between 
the two leaders focused on the Polish 
situation itself. 

At the conclusion of it, a joint state- 
ment by President Reagan and 
Chancellor Schmidt was released yester- 
day afternoon, which I think encom- 
passes in a very detailed way the overall 
character of the discussions and the 
close accord that was arrived at between 
the two leaders. Certainly first and fore- 
most within that broad term "accord" 
was a common assessment of what is 
happening in Poland and why it is hap- 
pening and a common view between the 
two leaders that the Soviet Union bears 
a heavy responsibility for the situation in 
Poland today. 

bruary 1982 


We were fortunate that the meeting 
itself between the two leaders occurred 
at a time when there was a meeting of 
the Ten [the ten members of the Euro- 
pean Communities— Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Federal Republic of Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom] in 
Europe, attended by Foreign Minister 
Genscher, representing the Federal 
Republic of Germany. And the Foreign 
Minister flew from that meeting here to 
Washington and provided President 
Reagan and the Chancellor with a de- 
tailed report of the outcome of that 

That meeting itself represented a 
very positive outcome and reflected a 
general consensus within the Ten on the 
situation in Poland, the responsibility of 
the Soviet Union, and I think agreed 
with the position taken by President 
Reagan and Chancellor Schmidt both— a 
common position— on what was 
necessary in Poland today to remedy the 
current unsatisfactory state of affairs. 

First, an immediate lifting of mar- 
tial law; 

Second, a release of the prisoners; 

Third, national reconciliation 
through compromise and negotiation 
among Solidarity, specifically, the church 
and the government and party. 

The discussions between the Presi- 
dent and Chancellor Schmidt also 
touched upon the subject of economic 
sanctions, respective policies vis-a-vis 
the Government of Poland on the one 
hand and the Soviet Union on the other, 
and both agreed to pursue intensive con- 
sultations on a bilateral basis as well as 
collectively within the existing fora to 
deal with this subject. 

As you know, there will be a NATO 
Foreign Ministers meeting on the 11th 
in Brussels at which I will represent the 
U.S. Government. I had an opportunity 
during Foreign Minister Genscher's for- 
tuitous visit here to discuss that 
meeting, which we hope will further con- 

solidate and unify the Western ap- 
proaches to the Polish question. 

I am not going to go through the 
joint statement that was published 
yesterday afternoon, but I would hope 
that you would focus your attention to 
that statement. I hope all here have a 
copy of it. I think in general and in sum- 
mary that I speak for President Reagan 
in emphasizing his great sense of satis- 
faction with the outcome of this visit, 
with the rapport which has existed from 
the outset of this Administration that he 
has established with Chancellor Schmidt, 
and with his sense of confidence that 
Western unity, Western solidarity, re- 
mains the essential aspect of the out- 
come of the Polish crisis. And that what 
we are really witnessing— and we must 
continually keep that fact in mind in our 
analysis and observations— is a profound 
failure in the East and not disarray in 
the West. 

Q. The President said after his 
meeting with the Chancellor yesterday 
that if the alliance fails to insist that 
the Soviet Union stop pressuring 
Poland directly and indirectly, the 
gravest consequences for international 
relations could ensue. Would you 
elaborate on that? 

A. I think the words were very 
carefully chosen, and they say precisely 
what they mean in the context of the 
obligation of the Soviet Union not to be 
an advocate, as it has been publicly and 
officially, of repression in Poland; and a 
joint assessment that the Soviet leader- 
ship has an obligation to abide by the 
provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, 
whether these violations occur within 
what is referred to as the Western 
world or the Eastern world. 

Q. In his news conference yester- 
day, Chancellor Schmidt left me with 
the impression that even if the situa- 
tion continues as it is today in Poland, 
that the United States will return to 
the INF [intermediate-range nuclear 
forces] talks in Geneva a week from 
today. Is that a correct impression? 

A. This was a topic that was dis- 
cussed with considerable care between 
President Reagan and Chancellor 
Schmidt. Both leaders believe that the 
INF talks constitute a very special cat 
gory of East- West relations, and, as 
such, they must be dealt with outside 
the context of what we would refer to 
more normal East- West relationships 
cause there are fundamental advantag 
to the West as well as the East in the 
continuation of a dialogue seeking con 
trol of nuclear armaments. 

I would suggest that both leaders 
concluded that there should be a con- 
tinuation of this dialogue, except unde 
the most exceptional of circumstances 
and I don't include the current situatk 
to include that. 

Q. And how about your meeting 
with Foreign Minister Gromyko? Is 
that also still on schedule? 

A. That meeting, which is schedu 
for the 27th of this month in Geneva, 
are looking at very carefully in the coi 
text of the current sitation and events 
which will occur between now and the 
But I would underline also the positioi 
of President Reagan in a recent inter- 
view in which he was asked about the 
importance of summitry. I know that 
the President feels very, very stronglj 
that perhaps in time of crisis com- 
munication between governments is 
more, rather than less, important, anc 
we intend to maintain communications 

That does not give you a firm con 
mitment to go ahead with the meeting 
because there are a number of uncer- 
tainties facing us in Poland which cou 
have an impact on the decision. But, i 
of now, the inclination would be to be 
sure that lines of communication are 

Q. Could you explain the rations 
behind setting up a high-level specu 
coordinator for American-German 
relations as opposed to American- 
French, American-Italian? 

A. I think both governments have 
felt that generation gaps, if you will, 
sometimes contribute to a lack of ap- 


Department of State Bulle 


>priate communication, especially 
ong our young, and we are seek- 
; — and the President has agreed with 
roposal made by the Federal Repub- 
— to establish a special approach to a 
ole host of German-American ac- 
ities, both unofficial and government 
msored, designed to be sure that the 
toric and traditional friendship and 
ierstanding between the German peo- 
, and especially the youth, and the 
lerican people, and especially the 
ith, are facilitated and augmented, 
at's in general the purpose of this. It 
s agreed to in general before this 
eting as a result of a common assess- 
nt, and it was formalized in the joint 

Q. You were asked a question a 
ment ago about the possibility of 
lr meeting Gromyko at the end of 
s month, and in your answer you 
sed the issue of summitry and then 
Iressed yourself to that possibility, 
w is one to understand that? Were 
1 talking about summitry between 
irself and — 

A. I was talking about communica- 
n in general at high levels, whether it 
at the summit or at the Foreign 
lister and Secretary of State level, 
.t clearly it is the President's view 
.t while this is desirable at all times, 
;imes of crises such communication 
y be even more important. 

I think that's why the President said 
answer to a question, "Will events in 
land affect whether or not you have a 
nmit with Chairman Brezhnev," he 
d, "It may and it may not," if you will 
all, in a recent interview. The point I 
nt to make is that the President is 
■y sensitive to the requirement to 
intain rather than to terminate com- 
nications in time of crisis. 

Q. Have the two sides exchanged 
ssages on the possibility of a sum- 
t since the Polish crisis began? 

A. No. 

Q. Given what we know about 
lat Chancellor Schmidt said before 
ning to meet with President 

Reagan, to what can you point to say 
that there has been any change in the 
West German position on Poland and 
on the Soviet Union? Has there been 
any change since the meeting? 

A. I think I would refer you first 
and foremost to the joint statement. It 
speaks for itself, and it expresses a com- 
mon point of view on a number of very 
specific issues which had been the source 
of rather hyperactive press speculation 
prior to the visit. 

I think as is the case in all visits of 
this kind, and discussions, the views of 
the participants are shaped by the ex- 
changes that occur. On the other hand, 
in this instance it's also very clear that 
some of the differences that were specu- 
lated about before the visit did not really 
exist at all in the first instance. 

I think in that regard it would be 
very well to refer back to the statement 
of the Chancellor to the Bundestag and 
the resolution of the West German 
Bundestag. If one will read that very 
carefully, they will see a very, very close 
alignment of the West German view 
with the American view from the outset 
of this crisis. 

Q. Talking about communications, 
the German Government tries, ob- 
viously in one way, to obtain the reali- 
zation of the three principles men- 
tioned in the communique by having 
contact with the Polish leader- 
ship—the visit of Mr. Rakowski 
[Polish Deputy Prime Minister 
Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski] with Mr. 
Genscher in Germany. I wonder 
whether you, the American Govern- 
ment considers the possibility also to 
use that channel and having direct 
high-level contacts between your 
government and the Polish leadership 
at the moment? 

A. I don't know of any bias against 
such communications here, but we've 
been well served by Ambassador 
Meehan's [U.S. Ambassador to Poland 
Francis Meehan] contacts, both with the 
Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister 
in Warsaw. He's had several detailed 
meetings. He had a meeting following 
the meeting of the Ten with the Prime 
Minister in which similar exchanges 
were provided. 

I think the important thing for us to 
understand in this respect is that re- 
gardless of the view you have of the role 
of the current government or the ruling 
junta — which, as I understand, is four 
military men and four civilian leaders — 
that the consequences of their action, if 
it were to continue, are going to result 
in a worsening of their relationships 
with the Western world at large and 
with the United States in particular. 

With respect to Western policies on 
Poland itself, I think there's a clear con- 
vergence of views on actions to be taken 
with respect to Poland — future credits, 
government-to-government assistance, 
all of which have been placed in jeopar- 
dy — and also the concurrent need recog- 
nized, I think, by all Western leaders 
that we have an obligation to provide for 
the humanitarian aspects of this crisis 
and to do so in a way that we can be 
assured that such Western assistance 
will go to the people of Poland and not 
to a repressive regime which would be 
reinforced by such assistance. 

)ruary 1982 


Q. I have a number of specific 
items. One, do you expect either at the 
NATO meeting or in that same time 
period any concerted action or parallel 
actions by the allies on sanctions 
against the Soviet Union? And, sec- 
ondly, is it possible to flesh out the 
references in the communique to: one, 
a foreign ministers level meeting of 
the CSCE [Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe] conference; 
and, secondly, of raising the Polish 
matter within the framework of the 
United Nations? 

A. I think first with respect to the 
upcoming NATO meeting at foreign 
minister level, I would say that what we 
are looking for is a convergence of as- 
sessment, much as we did in a bilateral 
sense with the Chancellor's visit here 
and our earlier discussion. I would hope 
for a vigorous and robust and realistic 
common assessment on Monday. 

With respect to Poland, as I say, 
and our relationships with the Polish 
Government, I would anticipate some 
substantial convergence of view. 

With respect to the question of eco- 
nomic sanctions against the Soviet 
Union, clearly each member government 
has an entirely different set of problems 
and a different set of assets with which 
they can deal with this subject. I would 
not anticipate a uniform outcome on 
that very difficult issue. I would antici- 
pate, however, very clear language with 
respect to Soviet responsibility for 
events and Soviet obligations to deal 
with those events and clearly a reitera- 
tion of the consequences of Soviet in- 
volvement in even greater repression as 
well as a continuing repression. 

Now, you raised two other aspects 
that I want to answer because the one 
had to do with the CSCE meeting and 
the call — an urgent call — which we sup- 
port, and which the President and the 
Chancellor discussed, and which the 
meeting of the Ten also suggested. 
Clearly, you know that such meetings in- 
volve not just the Western nations — the 
Ten or the NATO family of nations; they 
involve the nonaligned and they involve 
the Soviet Union. 

So there is no way of predicting 
whether or not such a meeting will oc- 
cur. But I do believe if the Soviet Union 
refused to attend such a meeting that 
this is a clear signal for the world to 
assess, in the context of their adherence 
to the spirit of the Helsinki fora and 
ongoing discussions related to the Final 
Act, as well as their current state of 
mind with respect to the crisis in 

Now, the last one, the reference to 
the United Nations in the joint state- 
ment yesterday, was not designed to 
outline a specific body of the United Na- 
tions but generally that at the ap- 
propriate time that we would be 
prepared to joint in an effort to bring 
the Polish crisis to the attention of the 
world body. And whether that would be 
in the humanitarian area and the bodies 
associated with humanitarian problems 
remains to be seen, but I would expect 
that would be the case. 

Q. At this point does the United 
States want West Germany to impose 
economic sanctions against the Soviet 

A. I would say the answer to that 
question is that we recognize that the 
West German Government is operating 
from a rather different base with respect 
to the economic impact of actions that 
they may or may not take vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Union. What we are seeking is a 
clear recognition— which I think the 
Chancellor's visit confirmed— of Soviet 
responsibility and obligations associated 
with events in Poland and that the over- 
all relationship between Western 
governments and the Soviet Union will, 
in the final analysis, be determined by 
Soviet conduct in this crisis. 

You know there has been a number 
of viewpoints suggesting that the 
Soviets bear no responsibility, that this 
is exclusively an internal matter in 
Poland. The facts and joint assessments 
contribute to precisely the opposite con- 
clusion. And that was arrived at bilater- 
ally here, although I don't think it re- 
quired particular education on the part 

of either of the leaders. I think they 
came into the meeting with that assur 

Q. If I understand you correctly 
you are saying that we do not want 
pursue business as usual with the 
Russians and that it's OK with us if 
the Germans do. , 

A. That's not at all what I said. 
What I said was we are not asking foi 
lock-step treatment of this problem 
given our differing bases. Business as 
usual, we would hope, would not be a 
ried out in this current climate under 
any set of circumstances; and I think 
yesterday's statement is anything but 
affirmation of business as usual. 

Q. Can you explain— when we h 
a briefing in this very room about th 
differences between the way the 
Soviets were communicating with u 
and with the Germans and the fact 
that there was a gap in the way the 
German Government looked at this 
event, while we wanted the same 
three conclusions— that their analys 
was quite different from ours. Now, 
what happened? Did we learn some- 
thing from Schmidt, or did Schmidt 
learn something from us? What 
brought about the great accord be- 
tween leaders? 

A. I hope we both learned from 
each other. I know we always do. Wei 
first, let me point out that we definite 
did get a greater appreciation for 
Chancellor Schmidt's attitude on this 
Polish crisis; and I think we all learne 
as a result of his expositions here and 
his reference to his Bundestag speech, 
which he complained bitterly— and I 
think with justification— seemed to ha 
dropped on a disappearing cloud in th 
Western press and in the American 
press, and he expressed disappointme 
that no one in the American press 
looked very carefully at that statemer 

I think in that sense we could tak 
justified criticism not only in the 
Western press and American press bi 
here in the Department as well. Then 
are always some differences in nuan« 


Department of State Bulle 


ween different levels of contact, and 
it's the great value of having two 
ders sit down. And in that context I 
nk both the President and Chancellor 
imidt had their own views modified 

I shaped by the exchanges. 

In the case of Chancellor Schmidt, I 
uld not want to attribute it to the 
cussions here or to a clarification of 
ws that he has had prior to coming 
■e. I think his Bundestag speech eer- 
ily would justify the latter theory— 
,t he already had those views. 

Q. He seemed to imply yesterday 
tt one of the things he had learned 
m President Reagan is that he does 
/e a tremendously deep reservation 
mt imposing a grain embargo. Did 
! President tell him that basically 
're not going to impose a grain em- 
■go? And, if not, what specific ac- 
ns can we expect at Brussels next 

A. No. I don't think the President 
[gested for a moment that it might 

be necessary in the period ahead to 
w the full range of American-Soviet 
itionships beyond those which have 
jady been affected as being matters 
t would have to be considered. But I 
lk both leaders expressed the view 
t economic sanctions per se indeed in- 
ve some liabilities and have limited 
)act when political decisions are made 
:apitals. You can only expect so much 
m them in near-term policy manage- 

You know the President's longstand- 

view with respect to grain itself, and 
t is that he does not feel that it's con- 
ictive to isolate one segment of our 
iness and impose a burden on one 
ment of American society in dealing 
h the economic sanction question but 
her he would approach it from a very 
adly based sanction. 

Now, in that context, the situation 

yet to develop in such a way that 
h a conclusion would be appropriate 
iither the President's view or in mine; 

I I think Chancellor Schmidt shares 
t same attitude. But both recognize 

Solidarity Day With Poland 

Jan. 20, 1982 1 

Solidarnosc, the Polish free trade union 
Solidarity Movement, was born not only of 
the failure of the Polish Government to meet 
the needs of its people but also from a tradi- 
tion of freedom preserved and nourished by 
the proud Polish people through two cen- 
turies of foreign and domestic tyranny. 

Solidarity symbolizes the battle of real 
workers in a so-called workers' state to sus- 
tain the fundamental human and economic 
rights they began to win in Gdansk in 
1980— the right to work and reap the fruits 
of one's labor, the right to assemble, the right 
to strike, and the right to freedom of expres- 
sion. Solidarity sought to address and to 
resolve Poland's deep-rooted economic ills; it 
acted in good faith and pursued a path of 
constructive dialogue with the Polish Govern- 

Despite these peaceful efforts on the part 
of Solidarity, a brutal wave of repression has 
descended on Poland. The imposition of mar- 
tial law has stripped away all vestiges of 
newborn freedom. Authorities have resorted 
to arbitrary detentions, and the use of force, 
resulting in violence and loss of live; the free 
flow of people, ideas and information has 
been suppressed; the human rights clock in 
Poland has been turned back more than 30 
years. The target of this repression is the 
Solidarity Movement but in attacking Solidar- 
ity its enemies attack an entire people. Ten 
million of Poland's thirty-six million citizens 
are members of Solidarity. Taken together 
with their families, they account for the over- 
whelming majority of the Polish nation. By 
persecuting Solidarity, the Polish military 
government wages war against its own peo- 

History shows us that stability in Europe 
is threatened when Poland is suppressed. The 
hearts and minds of free people everywhere 
stand in Solidarity with the people of Poland 
in the hour of their suffering. 

We hold in high esteem the leadership 
and objectives of Lech Walesa, the head of 
Solidarity, and we express our grave concern 

for his present well-being. As Americans we 
feel a special affinity with Solidarity and the 
basic human values it seeks to uphold, in 
keeping with the long tradition of Polish- 
American friendship and freedom. President 
Wilson's advocacy of self-determination for 
the Polish people helped to bring about a 
rebirth of the Polish nation earlier in this 
century. America stands ready today to pro- 
vide generous support and assistance to a 
Poland which has returned to a path of genu- 
ine internal reconciliation. 

There is a spirit of Solidarity abroad in 
the world today that no physical force can 
crush. It crosses national boundaries and 
enters into the hearts of men and women 
everywhere. In factories, farms, and schools, 
in cities and towns around the globe, we the 
people of the Free World stand as one with 
our Polish brothers and sisters. Their cause is 

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, 
President of the United States of America, 
do hereby designate January 30, 1982, as 
Solidarity Day. I urge the people of the 
United States, and free peoples everywhere, 
to observe this day in meetings, demonstra- 
tions, rallies, worship services and all other 
appropriate expressions of support. We will 
show our Solidarity with the courageous peo- 
ple of Poland and call for an end to their 
repression, the release of all those arbitrarily 
detained, the restoration of the international- 
ly recognized rights of the Polish people, and 
the resumption of internal dialogue and rec- 
onciliation in keeping with fundamental 
human rights. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto 
set my hand this twentieth day of January, in 
the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and 
eighty-two, and of the Independence of the 
United States of America the two hundred 
and sixth. 

Ronald Reagan 

1 Text from White House press release.l 

)ruary 1982 


the extreme importance of grain as an 
economic sanction in American-Soviet 

Q. But it sounds like both are do- 
ing what Russell Long used to say 
about taxes: "Don't tax you, don't tax 
me; tax that fellow behind the tree." 
And that in each instance everybody is 
saying: "I don't want to give up my 
meetings; I don't want to give up my 
economic leverage. You do it, or we'll 
just talk about it." 

A. No. I don't think that's the case 
at all. I think the case is to recognize the 
limitations of the act— to recognize there 
are two sides to it— to recognize that 
one nation cannot apply, as we learned 
in the post- Afghan grain embargo, as 
limited as it was— and it was limited— 
that unless you approach it either on a 
broad front nationally— and pehaps even 
more importantly in the case of grain, 
internationally— that other grain pro- 
ducers do not support the action, that in 
the long run it will fall of its own weight 
because of the contradictions and incon- 
sistencies that it poses. 

Q. The Chancellor several times 
and now you have raised this issue of 
the American press not reporting his 
Bundestag speech and his resolution. 

A. I think I quoted it. That was in 
that regard. 

Q. Yes. You added some thoughts 
of your own. I would like to ask 
whether anybody has researched this. 
Both the Bundestag speech and the 
resolution were the main topics, the 
lead topics, of the lengthy article in 
The Washington Post the following 
day and The New York Times — two 
newspapers which I assume the Em- 
bassy here reads — and while this is 
not the American press per se, cer- 
tainly they're major newspapers. Why 
is this being done? Why is this being 

A. Simply because it was so said, 
and I have so stated to you it was said. 

Q. But these events were reported 
in the Post. 

A. I think the main point the 
Chancellor was trying to make— and 
with some justification— is that there's a 
certain tendency— and I don't attribute 
this to the press per se; I attribute it to 
those who talk to the press, those who 
are very much engaged and concerned 
about the situation in Poland— that 
there's a tendency for us to sometimes 
even masochistically attribute events in 
Poland to failures in the West. The 
fundamental reality of Poland is a 
failure of the Marxist/Leninist system. 
And if we turn it into a failure of the 
Western system, I think it would be an 
abuse of our own common interests— 
but, also, somewhat of an abuse of 
reality— and I don't mean to suggest by 
that that there haven't been differences. 
There have always been on unpro- 
grammed or on unanticipated interna- 
tional events. And I don't even put that 
in this category because we have long 
been involved in mutual consultations on 
the likelihood of a crisis in Poland, cer- 
tainly over the last year. 

Now, don't misread what I said or 
what I said the Chancellor said subjec- 
tively. The point is that he felt— and I 
think with justification— that he had 
taken a rather robust early position on 
the crisis in Poland 6 days after the 
crisis happened, and he was one of the 
first Western leaders to be out on 
record. And he was probably sensitive, 
as I would be were I he, of a lot of 
criticism to suggest that he was less 
than robust. 

Now, be that as it may, that's not 
the issue. The issue today is: "Where are 
we today?" And we are today as cited in 
the joint statement that was released 
yesterday, and I would suggest that that 
reflects a high degree of unanimity be- 
twen the United States and West Ger- 
many on the Polish question. 

Q. If the Marxist/Leninist 
system — as you describe it now— is 
such a failure, why is the United 
States holding out the prospect of aid 
if things ease? 

A. I think it's awfully important t 
recognize that there are values in 
Western societies that cannot be cast 
aside, even in the context of fundamei 
tal interests; and one of those values i 
to assist people who are facing starva 
tion and deprivation, and in this conte 
what we are talking about is making 
such assistance conditional in several 
respects— one, in the context of being 
sure that it gets to the people and dot 
not become an asset for further repre 
sion by government; and, secondly, to 
sure that it is a contributor to the pro 
ess or the outcome that we are seekin 
to achieve in terms of the maintenanc 
of the freedom of Solidarity, the 
influence and autonomy of the church 
and a reconciliation which we hope 
would continue the process of rejuven 
tion internally in Poland. 

Q. Does the second paragraph ii 
page 3 of the joint statement mean 
that West Germany will participate 
the pipeline project with Russia ove 
the U.S. objection? 

A. Thus far, as you know, the 
governments involved in this essential 
private-sector endeavor have not pose 
any objections to a continuation of th< 
project. I make no secret of the fact t 
the U.S. Government views this proje 
with great skepticism and concern. W 
have expressed that concern repeated 
We have suggested other alternatives 
which thus far have not been convinc- 
ing—and we are continuing to consult 
our concerns about this pipeline. 

1 Press release 11. 


Department of State Bulk 


IATO Council Meets on Poland 

Secretary Haig was in Brussels 
muary 10-12, 1981, to attend a special 
inisterial session of the North Atlantic 
mncil concerning events in Poland 
anuary 11). 

Following are the declaration issued 
the conclusion of this session and the 
'cretary's remarks at the International 
"ess Center. 


lN. 11, 1982 

The Allied Governments condemn the 
position of martial law in Poland and 
lounce the massive violation of human 
hts and the suppression of fundamental 
il liberties in contravention of the United 
tions Charter, the Universal Declaration 
Human Rights and the Final Act of 

2. The process of renewal and reform 
ich began in Poland in August 1980 was 
tched with sympathy and hope by all who 
ieve in freedom and self-determination; it 
iulted from a genuine effort by the over- 
timing majority of the Polish people to 
lieve a more open society in accordance 
th the principles of the Final Act of 

3. The imposition of martial law, the use 
force against Polish workers, with the 
)usands of internments, the harsh prison 
ltences and the deaths that followed, have 
prived the Polish people of their rights and 
sedoms, in particular in the field of trade 
ions. These acts threaten to destroy the 

sis for reconciliation and compromise which 
; necessary to progress and stability in 
land. They are in clear violation of Polish 
mmitments under the Helsinki Final Act, 
rticularly the principle relating to respect 
* human rights and fundamental freedoms. 

Developments in Poland demonstrate once 
again the rigidity of the Warsaw Pact 
regimes with respect to those changes 
necessary to meet the legitimate aspirations 
of their peoples. 1 This endangers public con- 
fidence in cooperation between East and 
West and seriously affects international rela- 

4. The Allies deplore the sustained cam- 
paign mounted by the Soviet Union against 
efforts by the Polish people for national 
renewal and reform, and its active support 
for the subsequent systematic suppression of 
those efforts in Poland. These acts cannot be 
reconciled with the Soviet Union's inter- 
national undertakings, and in particular with 
the principles of the Final Act of Helsinki, 
especially those dealing with sovereignty, 
non-intervention, threat of force and self- 
determination. The Soviet Union has no right 
to determine the political and social develop- 
ment of Poland. 

5. The Allies call upon the Polish leader- 
ship to live up to its declared intention to re- 
establish civil liberties and the process of 
reform. They urge the Polish authorities to 
end the state of martial law, to release those 
arrested and to restore immediately a dia- 
logue with the church and Solidarity. Only 
with reconciliation and genuine negotiations 
can the basic rights of the Polish people and 
workers be protected, and the economic and 
social progress of the country be secured. 
Poland could then expect to enjoy fully the 
benefits of stability in Europe and of con- 
structive political and economic relations with 
the West. 

6. The Allies call upon the Soviet Union 
to respect Poland's fundamental right to 
solve its own problems free from foreign in- 
terference and to respect the clear desire of 
the overwhelming majority of the Polish 
people for national renewal and reform. 
Soviet pressure, direct or indirect, aimed at 
frustrating that desire, must cease. The 
Allies also warn that if an outside armed 
intervention were to take place it would have 
the most profound consequences for inter- 
national relations. 

7. In their communique of 11th 
December, 1981, NATO ministers reaffirmed 
their commitment to work for a climate of 
confidence and mutual restraint in East-West 
relations; what has since happened in Poland 

has great significance for the development of 
security and co-operation in Europe. The per- 
sistence of repression in Poland is eroding 
the political foundation for progress on the 
full agenda of issues which divide East and 

8. The Allies remain committed to the 
policies of effective deterrence and the pur- 
suit of arms control and in particular have 
welcomed the initiatives contained in Presi- 
dent Reagan's 18th November speech. The 
Soviet Union will bear full responsibility if its 
actions with regard to Poland and failure to 
live up to existing international obligations 
damage the arms control process. A return to 
the process of real reforms and dialogue in 
Poland would help create the atmosphere of 
mutual confidence and restraint required for 
progress in negotiations in the field of arms 
control and limitations, including the Geneva 
talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces 
due to resume on 12th January. 

9. In view of the grave developments in 
Poland, which constitute a serious violation of 
the Helsinki Final Act, the Allies agreed that 
the Madrid Conference should deal with the 
situation as soon as possible at the level of 
foreign ministers. 

10. The Allies will also intensify their 
efforts to bring to the attention of world 
public opinion and international organiza- 
tions, including the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies such as the International 
Labor Organization, the violation of human 
rights and acts of violence in Poland. 

11. Each Ally will, in accordance with its 
own situation and legislation, identify 
appropriate national possibilities for action in 
the following fields: 

(a) Further restrictions on the 
movements of Soviet and Polish diplomats, 
and other restrictions on Soviet and Polish 
diplomatic missions and organizations; 

(b) Reduction of scientific and technical 
activities or non-renewal of exchange 
agreements. Meanwhile the Allies emphasize: 

• Their determination to do what lies in 
their power to ensure that the truth about 
events in Poland continues to reach the 
Polish people despite the obstacles created by 
the authorities in Warsaw and Moscow in 
direct contravention of their obligations 
under the Helsinki Final Act; 

bruary 1982 



• Their resolve that the quality of their 
relations with the military regime in Poland 
should reflect the abnormal nature of the 
present situation and their refusal to accept 
it as permanent; 

• Their willingness to contribute, with 
other Governments, to the solution of the 
problem of Polish citizens now abroad and 
unable or unwilling to return to their own 
country. 2 

12. The Allies recognize the importance 
of economic measures to persuade the Polish 
authorities and the Soviet Union of the 
seriousness of Western concern over develop- 
ments in Poland, and stress the significance 
of the measures already announced by Presi- 
dent Reagan. 2 

13. Regarding economic relations with 
Poland, the Allies: 

• Noted that future commercial credits 
for goods other than foods will be placed in 

• Noted that the question of holding 
negotiations about the payments due in 1982 
on Poland's official debts should, for the time 
being, be held in suspense; 

• Affirmed their willingness to continue 
and increase humanitarian aid to the Polish 
people for distribution and monitoring by 
non-governmental organizations to ensure 
that it reaches the people for whom it is 

• Noted that those Allies which sell food 
to Poland will seek the clearest possible 
Polish commitments with regard to the use of 
the food. 2 

14. In the current situation in Poland, 
economic relations with Poland and the 
Soviet Union are bound to be affected. Soviet 
actions towards Poland make it necessary for 
the Allies to examine the course of future 
economic and commercial relations with the 
Soviet Union. Recognizing that each of the 
Allies will act in accordance with its own 
situation and laws, they will examine 
measures which could involve arrangements 
regarding imports from the Soviet Union, 
maritime agreements, air services agree- 
ments, the size of Soviet commercial repre- 
sentation and the conditions surrounding ex- 
port credits. 2 

15. The Allies will maintain close con- 
sultations on the implementation of their 
resolve not to undermine the effect of each 
other's measures. 

16. In addition to agreeing to consult on 
steps to be taken in the near future, the 
Allies will also reflect on longer-term East- 
West economic relations, particularly energy, 
agricultural commodities and other goods and 
the export of technology, in light of the 
changed situation and of the need to protect 
their competitive position in the field of 
military and technological capabilities. 2 


JAN. 12, 1982 3 

The beginning of a new year is always a 
moment for reflection and resolve. As 
we in the West reflect upon our societies 
and resolve to improve them, we should 
recall the principles that sustain our 
governments, our law, and our behavior 
toward each other. Our idea of a just 
community is founded upon respect for 
the rights of the individual, including 
freedom of expression, freedom of 
choice, and freedom of association. 

We believe that the rights of free 
men sustain the creativity of civilization. 
The arts, science, and technology of the 
West flourish because creative talents 
can develop undisturbed. And our enor- 
mous material abundance comes from 
the cooperative efforts of free men and 
women working together. 

An ancient scholar once wrote that 
"history is philosophy drawn from 
examples." The philosophy of freedom 
that unites the Western community of 
nations is an enduring theme of Euro- 
pean history. Already in this decade, 
Poland, a nation steeped in 1,000 years 
of European culture, has given us an ex- 
ample of the link between liberty and 
creativity. The Polish people sought the 
dignity of the workplace through free 
association in their union Solidarity in 

order to resolve their mounting eco- 
nomic problems. Such dignity meant, 
above all, respect for the individual, his 
talents, and his right to a just reward 
for his work. 

The Polish search for reform was a 
peaceful movement. Solidarity respecte 
both Poland's geographic situation and 
the imperatives for social progress. Thi 
example of peaceful change in the 
world's most heavily armed continent 
would surely have contributed to a mor 
legitimate and secure international 

After 18 months of achievement, 
Solidarity is now being violently sup- 
pressed. In a grotesque parody of their 
own propaganda, the Communist autho 
ities are employing the police power of 
the state to oppress the very workers 
they are pledged to protect. Fear is 
widespread. Thousands remain in jail. 
Tens of thousands are being forced to 
violate their consciences, a practice 
described by His Holiness the Pope as 
"the most painful blow inflicted on 
human dignity." Once again, a knock at 
the door heralds the arrival of the secre 
police. Poland today exemplifies the 
historic failure of Soviet-style com- 
munism to produce either bread or 

Myths and Realities 

Poland's future now hangs in the 
balance. Will there be reform or reac- 
tion, a renewal of hope, or a deepening 
of despair? This is not a question for 
Poland alone. The poet Schiller wrote 
that "world history is the world's court 
of judgment." The historic events in 
Poland with their far-reaching implica- 
tions demand a judgment by the West. 
We must not let our judgment be 
confused by four myths about Poland: 

• First, that Solidarity brought 
about its own suppression through ex- 
cessive ambition; 

• Second, that the Soviet Union did 
not intervene in Poland and is, there- 
fore, not accountable; 


Department of State Bulletin 


• Third, that Poland's rulers are 
ting out of laudable national consider- 
ons; and 

• Fourth, that the West can and 
Duld do nothing because what hap- 
ned in Poland is strictly an internal 

Each of these myths is belied by 

First. The first myth is that the 
utality which began on December 13 
is provoked by the excesses of Soli- 
rity itself. The reality was different. 
>r months prior to the sudden imposi- 
<n of martial law, Solidarity worked 
•enuously to halt strikes and prevent 
aos. Lech Walesa traveled from city 
city, from factory to factory, calling 
r people to return to work. His call 
is heard. After March 1981, strikes in 
iland never exceeded a small fraction 
the work force. After August 1981, 
e Polish Government's own statistics 
corded increasing production. 

Solidarity's search for stability was 
t reciprocated. The Jaruzelski govern- 
mt had planned a different course. Its 
ly contribution to the call for national 
ilogue was the introduction of a law to 
rbid strikes, making confrontation in- 

The contrast could not be greater 
tween the victims and the conspi- 
tors. On the one side, the Solidarity 
iders, representing a free association 
workers, were caught virtually intact 
a single building. On the other side, a 
ivernment claiming to protect the 
)rkers prepared so well to impose mar- 
il law that its plans have been accu- 
tely described in the Soviet Union as 
rilliantly conspired." 

Second. The second myth is that the 
>viet Union did not intervene in Poland 
id, therefore, should not be held 
countable. The reality was different, 
fter August 1980, Poland was sub- 
cted to a continuous campaign of 
oscow's pressures, threats, and in- 
nidation— including military maneu- 
ts. All of these actions were intended 
:plicitly to halt the process of reform. 

The secret preparations were even 
more ominous. It is known that as early 
as last March the Soviets were arguing 
for the imposition of martial law. In 
September the martial law decree itself 
was printed in the Soviet Union. And 
the commander of the Warsaw Pact 
forces, a Soviet marshal, was positioned 
in Poland both prior to martial law and 
during its execution. 

Can anyone seriously be surprised 
by the Soviet role? Have we forgotten 
earlier episodes in Poland, East Ger- 
many, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia? 
The use of force on a nationwide scale 
against the Polish people today takes 
place only because the Soviet Union 
instigated it, supports it, and encourages 

Third. The third myth is that we 
are witnessing a Polish attempt to 
establish law and order in the hope of 
forestalling an otherwise inevitable 
Soviet military intervention. In a cruel 
paradox, we are asked to believe that 
martial law, like Solidarity itself, is a 
purely national phenomenon, inspired by 
a high national purpose. It follows, 
therefore, that we must somehow be 
prepared to accept what is happening in 
Poland today because it is a lesser evil. 

The reality is different. Regardless 
of motivation, a Soviet-trained military 
man is suppressing his own people under 
the pressure of the Soviet Union. As the 
Polish bishops put it: "Our suffering is 
that of the entire nation, terrorized by 
military force." The loss of liberty in 
Poland is no less keenly felt because a 
Polish general, rather than a Soviet 
general, is in charge. 

Fourth. The fourth myth is that 
Poland's misfortunes are strictly an in- 
ternal affair, that the West has no right 
to judge the situation nor to take any 
action that might affect it. The reality is 
different. The Soviet Union and Poland 
both signed the Helsinki Final Act of 
1975. All the signatories were obligated 
to nurture conditions of freedom and 
diversity, thereby encouraging our 

peoples to resolve the problems dividing 
Europe. The standards of freedom and 
diversity established at Helsinki have 
been violated. The process begun at 
Helsinki has been put in jeopardy. We 
have both a right and an obligation to 
point out this danger. 

For centuries the Poles have known 
the bitterness of aggression. Instigated, 
aided, and abetted by the Soviet Union, 
the suppression of Poland's search for 
social justice is taking place today. Once 
again the dictates of a foreign power are 
determining the shape of Polish society. 

Strategy for the West 

The people of Poland are now looking to 
the West. We must give them clear and 
unequivocal evidence of our support. But 
our policies must be practical as well, 
taking into account Polish and Soviet 
realities. We want real progress, not 
just empty posturing. 

My President and other Western 
leaders have, therefore, stated that we 
seek an end to martial law and repres- 
sion, release of political prisoners, and 
the restoration of those rights— as prom- 
ised in the Helsinki Final Act— that pro- 
tect the independence of a trade union 
movement and the church. Only in this 
way can the basis be established for 
reconciliation through negotiation within 
Polish society. 

The outcome of such a negotiation is 
entirely a matter for the Polish people. 
Nonetheless, under the Helsinki accord, 
we must counter the external and inter- 
nal pressures which impede the recon- 
ciliation and reform so clearly desired by 
the citizens of Poland. 

These are realistic objectives based 
on both the situation in Poland and 
East- West relationships. The desire for 
dignity in the workplace, embodied by 
Solidarity, cannot be eradicated. The 
brutal suppression of Poland's first free 
union has provoked profound outrage 
throughout Polish society. Resistance 

3bruary 1982 



The Polish economy will not revive 
without the cooperation of the Polish 
worker, upon whom the brunt of the 
repression has fallen. And the growing 
problems of Poland cannot be resolved 
alone. The Polish Government should 
not expect our assistance while repres- 
sion continues. Moscow can also be 
made aware of the benefits of restraint. 
Neither assumption of Poland's economic 
burdens nor military intervention are 
easy decisions for a Soviet Union with 
such problems as a weakening economy 
and war in Afghanistan. Clearly, 
Moscow wants to sustain economic and 
other elements of cooperation with the 

Prudent Western leadership can help 
to achieve a greater degree of modera- 
tion in Poland so that the necessary 
process of reform may continue. With 
this in mind, President Reagan has 
taken serious steps to signal both the 
Polish and Soviet Governments of our 
concern. He has also reserved additional 
action in the hope of deterring both fur- 
ther repression and Soviet intervention. 

• All future credits and govern- 
ment-to-government assistance will be 
denied the Polish regime until progress 
resumes. At the same time the United 
States will continue to provide food, 
medicine, and other humanitarian 
assistance through private institutions 
or other arrangements that guarantee 
delivery to the Polish people and not the 
regime. The President has also stated 
that we are prepared to offer significant 
help if the path of reconciliation and 
reform is chosen and pursued, of course, 
with meaningful acts and not just ges- 
tures to delude the West. 

• President Reagan brought to 
President Brezhnev's attention our 
fundamental concerns; the response was 
negative. The United States has, there- 
fore, initiated a number of actions, 
primarily in the economic field, which 
will penalize the Soviet Union. The 

President is prepared to go further, if 
necessary. At the same time, Moscow 
has been informed of our desire to pur- 
sue a more constructive path, if the 
Soviet Union will reciprocate. 

The United States is not alone. 
Yesterday, the North Atlantic Council 
condemned developments in Poland. In a 
special ministerial declaration, they 
made clear that both the Soviet Union 
and the Polish Government have vio- 
lated the Final Act of Helsinki and other 
international standards. The allies left 
no doubt that repression in Poland is 
eroding the foundation for East-West 

The United States and its partners 
stated that the current situation in 
Poland is bound to affect their economic 
relations with both Poland and the 
Soviet Union. They stressed the sig- 
nificance of the measures already 
announced by President Reagan. In this 
spirit, the members of the council re- 
solved not to undermine the effect of 
each other's measures. And they agreed 
to identify appropriate national possi- 
bilities for action across a broad front, 
including an examination of the course 
of future economic and commercial rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union. 

Far-Reaching Implications 

Thus it is clear that events in Poland 
have a significance beyond the tragic 
fate of that country. A repressed Poland 
is not a factor for stability in Europe. 
Only respect for internationally recog- 
nized rights can form the basis for na- 
tional reconciliation and reform to 
rescue Poland from the abyss of despair. 

Once again, the Polish events have 
revealed a faultline in the political 
geography of the East. Once again, an 
ideology has been discredited. Funda- 
mental disregard for individual rights 
has brought about a basic failure in 
social creativity. The attempt to ignore 
this prevailing weakness in Soviet-style 

communism by resort to force is a 
source of great danger in the nuclear 
era. Far from being inconsistent with 
constructive East-West relations, refor: 
in the East is the basis for greater 
legitimacy, stability, and security 
throughout Europe. 

The Polish situation also challenges 
the credibility of the West. We also 
stand at a crossroads. Do we want a 
world characterized by growing free- 
dom, cooperation, and security or in- 
creasing repression, confrontation, and 
fear? Are we going to see free nations 
acting to help expand liberty and peace 
or will international change be dom- 
inated by totalitarian forces? 

For well over a year, the alliance 
has stated that there would be serious 
consequences if the Soviet Union inter- 
vened to reverse an entirely peaceful 
dialogue in Poland. Soviet responsibilit, 
for present events is clear. A Western 
failure to act would not only assist the 
repression of the Polish people but alsc 
diminish confidence about our reaction; 
to future events in Poland and else- 
where. Stable relations between East 
and West depend upon what Chancello 
Schmidt has called "calculability." The 
Soviets must know that there can be 
negative or positive consequences, 
depending on their conduct. Poland is ; 
test case, and European history teache 
that the greatest mistake in dealing wi 
heavily armed aggressors is to ignore 
their violations of international agree- 
ments and to act as though nothing ha 

Beyond the fate of Poland, beyond 
East-West relations, we must ultimate' 
ask ourselves what these developments 
mean for our self-respect if we do not 
respond together. The West is often 
accused of being merely a collection of 
consumer societies. Are we so sated or 
intimidated that we fear to defend the 
values that make life worth living? 


Department of State Bullet 


The Soviet Union has proclaimed for 
,ny years that there is no contradic- 
n between the pursuit of detente and 
ological competition. And Moscow has 
rays supported the spread of 
.rxism-Leninism. Are freedom and 
nocracy less a part of our policy? Do 

imagine that we can purchase peace 
silence and inaction? Poland should 
nind us that in the battle for the 
ids of men, the best arguments are to 
found on our side. The existence of 
icessful industrial democracies in the 
;st is a striking rebuke to Soviet-style 
nmunism. Our persistent progress, 
;n with all of our faults, means that 
I Soviet system is neither necessary 
| inevitable. After all, the Polish 
)ple sought nothing more than free 
;ociation, the dignity of labor, and 
pect for the individual— rights that 

in the West sometimes take for 

Poland should also change our think- 
' about world affairs. For over 60 
irs, each new Marxist-Leninist regime 
l been greeted by some in the West 
;h fresh hopes and expectations, 
en, as the urge for social justice and 
edom which helped bring them to 
ver in the first place was suppressed, 
illusionment set in. It took 20 years 
more of Stalinism before many 
:stern observers saw the reality of the 
viet Union. It took just a year after 
! North Vietnamese takeover of South 
itnam and Kampuchea for under- 
nding of that supposedly progressive 
fime. We are still learning about this 
ind of totalitarianism as the evidence 
oints of the yellow rain of terror in 
utheast Asia and Soviet complicity, 
me still do not understand what is 
apening in Nicaragua or what is at 
ke in El Salvador. 

The greatest danger to the West to- 
day may be the tendency to apply dif- 
ferent standards to the behavior of the 
East and the West. No matter how 
much Communist repression, no matter 
how many Soviet nuclear missiles, no 
matter how many Afghanistans and 
Polands, some would still put pressure 
on the West to improve relations with 
the Soviet Union— rather than to de- 
mand from Moscow the moderation of 
its behavior. 

The common sense of our citizens 
rejects this double standard. Above all, 
the crime against the Polish people has 
outraged the workers of the world. A 
state supposedly founded on the 
workers' movement is actively suppress- 
ing a workers' movement 10 million 
strong. The Polish workingman is the 
target— and the victim. His voice has 
been silenced. His productive energies 
have been sapped. His labor is being 
forced. His chosen leaders have been im- 
prisoned. His hopes are being sacrificed 
because they do not fit with Soviet plans 
for maintaining absolute control over the 
countries of Eastern Europe. 

It is, therefore, appropriate that our 
unions are taking the lead— with 
churches and other private groups— to 
honor the Polish people on January 30. 
This gesture of mass solidarity will 
represent a major expression of moral 
support. It will also demonstrate to the 
Soviets and their friends that the 
crushing of human rights will not be 
ignored. Such an expression of moral 
support will be equally important as a 
celebration of freedom. 

My country is a child of European 
civilization. The American people share 
your outrage about the trampling of a 
nation in the center of Europe, because 
it has dared to assert its Europeanness. 
We can disagree about which events in 
the world are central to the security of 
the alliance and which are peripheral to 

its purposes; but surely there can be no 
disagreement that events in Poland 
touch the core of the conscience of the 

We have spoken with one voice 
about these events. Yesterday, we 
created a clear and united framework 
for action. Now we must act. Winston 
Churchill once observed that "the world 
is divided into peoples that own the 
governments and governments that own 
the peoples." Poland challenges us to 
remember our values and to advocate 
them. In the final analysis, only we, the 
people of the world that own the govern- 
ments, are the guarantors of both peace 
and freedom. 

'The Greek delegation reserved its posi- 
tion on this sentence. 

2 The Greek delegation reserved its posi- 
tion on this paragraph. 

3 Press release 15. ■ 

)ruary 1982 



Secretary Interviewed on 
"Face the Nation" 

Secretary Haig was interviewed on 
CBS's "Face the Nation" by George Her- 
man, CBS News; John Walcott, News- 
week; and Robert Pierpoint, CBS News, 
on December 20, 1981. 1 

Q. A number of reports tell us 
that the Soviet Union has supplied 
technical assistance, advice, some sup- 
plies, all kinds of help and encourage- 
ment in the martial law imposed in- 
side Poland. Are they not in a sense 
involved? Are they not an involved 
party in the martial law in Poland? 

A. I think, as the President said in 
his statement this week, there's no ques- 
tion about Soviet cooperation and sup- 
port for the activities going on in Poland 
today. Just as the Polish authorities 
must be held responsible for the ex- 
cesses of the situation, so too must the 
Soviet Union. 

Q. Does that mean that if there 
are any sanctions imposed against 
Poland, they should similarly be im- 
posed against the country that is sup- 
porting it and pressing it on — the 
Soviet Union? 

A. With respect to actions that will 
be taken in the future, either with 
regard to the Polish Government or the 
Soviet Union, I would prefer to let 
events speak for themselves. 

Q. My question was: Since the 
Soviet Union is involved, as you say, 
in what is going on inside Poland, if 
we apply sanctions against Poland, 
should we apply them equally and at 
the same time against the Soviet 
Union? And your answer was, in 
effect, that we'll have to let conditions 

What I am trying to get at now is, 
can you give us your thinking about 
the policy which will guide the 
American side of these actions? 

A. I think our policy thus far, and 
the President's policy in particular, has 
been one to avoid excesses and the, 
perhaps, preoccupation with contem- 
porary muscle tone and be influenced by 
the historic significance of the events 
with which we are dealing. 

These are very important events and 
the situation is, in the President's words, 
grave. Today, for example, the Polish 
Ambassador to Washington [Romuald 

Spasowski] has formally requested 
asylum here in the United States. He 
will be making an announcement to that 
effect this afternoon at the Department 
of State. This will involve his request for 
asylum for his wife, his daughter, and 
his son-in-law. I think his own remarks 
this afternoon will speak to the serious- 
ness of this problem. 

What is very important at this time 
is that we Americans keep the historic 
significance of the events before us and 
not the contemporary give-and-take of 
the situation, and that we apply all of 
the leverage available to us. In some 
respects it is limited, but it is not insig- 
nificant to effect moderation, negotia- 
tion, and, hopefully, conciliation among 
the peoples and the parties in Poland. 

Q. Given facts like the one you've 
just provided us, do you think there's 
any hope that some of what Solidarity 
has achieved in Poland can be saved? 
And what do you think the United 
States and its allies can do to preserve 
some of the reforms made in Poland? 

A. I think in the first instance we 
cannot accept a doomsday theory that 
all is lost and it is inevitably lost. After 
all, there's been 18 months of toleration 
in dialectic form, and thus far, until this 
recent crisis, the Soviet Union and the 
party in Poland have accepted historic 
change in the normal way of doing 

We must hope that those same con- 
straints that have operated in the past 
will continue to influence the outcome of 
the situation in Poland and do all we can 
to be sure that these pressures continue. 

Q. Before I go on to my first ques- 
tion, you've dropped kind of a bomb- 
shell here about Ambassador 
Spasowski, and I assume — but I 
would like to have you confirm 
it — that we will grant him and his 
family asylum. 

A. He made the request yesterday 
afternoon, and the President personally 
ordered the government to move 
promptly to provide asylum and protec- 
tion for the Ambassador and his family. 

Q. I assume that they will disap- 
pear from sight after this afternoon's 
appearance at the State Department? 

A. We are going to be very con- 
scious of the safety and well-being of 
this individual. 

Q. I would like to go on and ask 
you, as my first major question: You 
said that the United States must app 
all leverage available to us in this 
situation. What leverage do we reall 
have at this time? 

A. Without labeling particular 
levers, which sometimes is self-defeati 
and lessens the impact when they're a] 
plied, they involve political, economic, 
and, of course, security-related assets. 

Q. By security-related assets, yo 
sound like you might be hinting at 
some kind of military leverage that I 
might apply against the Soviets. 

A. I think it's important that, at a 
time like this, no public official describ 
in detail either what we will or what w 
will not do as events unfold. 

Q. Let me take you back to 
another thing you said. You talked 
about how the Soviet Union and the 
Communist Party inside Poland had 
showed considerable accommodation 
to the new freedoms in Poland. 
Perhaps I'm misunderstanding you, 
but it implies to me just a little bit 
that you feel that Solidarity over- 
stepped itself, perhaps, when it calk 
for a referendum to overthrow the 

. A. I think it's important that we I 
give too much weight to the contem- 
porary excuse for the crackdown in 
Poland as being the consequence of ex 
cess exuberance or radicalism within tl 
Solidarity movement. 

Clearly, from the outset the Soviet 
Union has been insisting on a crackdo\ 
and urging the Polish Government to 
crack down. Up until this point they've 
been able to blunt those pressures. Th( 
fact that this call for a referendum oc- 
curred very, very recently belies the fa 
that it was, in fact, the triggering 
mechanism. The plans put in place in 
Poland that were implemented last 
Saturday had been in preparation for e 
extended period. 

Q. Did we know about them all 

A. We were clearly conscious of tl 
likelihood that the initial repression 
would come from Polish security and 
military forces. 

Q. Do you have some sort of a 
feeling what it is that the Polish 
Government under Prime Minister or 
General Jaruzelski wants out of all 
this? What kind of a Poland it wants 

A. I think his actions will determir 
the answer to that question. I hope the 
will reflect a consciousness on the Prirr 


Department of State Bulleti 


inister's part that a rejuvenation, if 
iu will, or a reform has been under- 
ly, leading toward greater liberties, 
id that those improvements must be 

They have, after all, assured us— the 
)lish Government has— that is their in- 
rition. Thus far their actions belie the 
edibility of that. 

Q. So do you have any feeling how 
r back they may roll things? Origi- 
illy they said they would hold to the 
peements of August 1980. Now you 
em to imply that they're going to 
11 things back even further than 

A. One can only look to the actions 
at are underway today: repression, 
jlence, imprisonment without due 
use, termination of the right of the 
)lish people to travel, suppression of 
e free press— to the degree there ever 
is one but certainly those of more in- 
pendent character. All of these things 
e very worrisome from the standpoint 
the ultimate intentions of Prime 
inister Jaruzelski. 

Q. You talked about putting it in 
trspective. Is this another Hungary, 
tother Czechoslovakia, another in the 
ries that we've seen of Soviet slap- 
>wns of movements of this kind? 

A. I think it's important for the 
merican people to recognize this is not 
Hungary or a Czechoslovakia. It's 
mething far more profound in historic 
rms. We've witnessed for 18 months a 
osening up of political reins of suppres- 
m in Poland. The previous incidents 
ere more, I think, associated with eco- 
>mic deprivation, food shortages, or 
pression, per se. This represents a pro- 
und challenge to the Marxist-Leninist 
stem of traditional control, and for 
at reason it is all the more dangerous, 
does constitute a vital threat to the in- 
rests of the Soviet Union. For all 
ese reasons we should not draw 
storic parallels in a precise sense. 

Q. Given what you've just said 
>out the historic nature of the 
lange in Poland, how can the United 
tates continue to do business with 
le Soviet Union as usual, providing 
rain that they need, high technology 
lat they need and can't produce for 
lemselves, in light of what you've 
ready said is their role in this 
ackdown in Poland? 

A. It's a very important question, 
id one that events may force us to deal 
ith in the days and hours ahead. Thus 
r, however, I think it is vitally impor- 
.nt that we preserve the leverage we 

have available to bring about outcomes 
internally in Poland, which meet the in- 
terests of the Polish people and the 
values to which we aspire. 

Q. Let me just follow that up by 
asking: Even before the crackdown by 
Jaruzelski, the Polish economy was in 
tatters. Do you think that this brand 
of martial law being practiced today in 
Poland is going to restore the Polish 
economy without some more overt 
Soviet economic and political inter- 

A. One could draw a very valid case 
that it will aggravate the situation. 
Clearly, Poland has been at an economic 
standstill since these events occurred a 
week ago. Incidentally, that's another 
reason why we must recognize that 
there are still events to occur which will 
influence the outcome of this situation. 
Thus far we are watching the conse- 
quences of the ideological implications of 
the crackdown. Within a matter of days 
or hours we will begin to see economic 
deprivation begin to socialize this situa- 
tion, not just merely keep it ideological 
in consequences. In that sense, again we 
have levers and we have assets with 
which we can influence the situation, 
hopefully in the direction of moderation. 

Q. Do you have any information on 
what has happened to the leadership 
of Solidarity, particularly Lech Walesa 
himself, that you could pass on to us? 
You sound like you have some kind of 
knowledge about the possibility that 
he might be surfaced or something. 

A. It is our understanding from a 
host of related intelligence reports that 
Mr. Walesa is in confinement outside the 
outskirts of Warsaw under government 
control. We also have had some reports 
that he continues to remain the inde- 
pendent figure that he has proven to be 
thus far. 

Q. But he is not cooperating with 
the military regime? 

A. We've seen no signs of coopera- 
tion. We would hope that the Polish 
authorities would permit Mr. Walesa to 
bring his experience and wisdom to bear 
in this situation. 

Q. The third force that's generally 
mentioned inside Poland is their own 
Catholic Church, Archbishop Josef 
Glemp. Do you see any signs that they 
are in any position— are things close 
enough to equilibrium so that the 
third party could do some good here, 
pushed on, of course, by the Pope who 
is a Pole himself? 

A. This is an anguishing problem 
for the church, of course, with its great 
emphasis on the moral values and the 
humanitarian aspects of this tragedy. 
But the church in Poland plays an ex- 
tremely important role, and thus far I 
think it has been an extremely construc- 
tive role. 

In the days ahead we would hope 
that their influence on the situation 
would continue to be one which urges 
conciliation and negotiation and com- 
promise, and not the total crushing of 
the Solidarity movement. 

Q. Let me ask you a question that 
I think is sort of behind everybody's 
questions and in everybody's mind 
about this: Do you see Poland becom- 
ing a blazing sort of Armageddon? 
Everybody remembers Poland in 
World War II. Do you see Poland 
bringing things into a terrible collapse 
in a bloody outcome of some kind? 

A. A situation which embodies the 
ingredients that this situation embodies 
is replete with grave dangers for peace 
and stability. Of course, the potential for 
that continues to exist. We would hope 
that the obligation of the government— 
and of the Soviet Union— to work to pre- 
vent such an outcome is recognized in 
both circles. 

Q. I think maybe we ought to try 
to switch our focus, because this pro- 
gram never is quite long enough. As 
you are well aware, Prime Minister 
Begin and the Israeli Government 
have issued this morning some rather 
strong statements. They have canceled 
the so-called strategic relationship 
with the United States, and they are 
indicating they can get along without 
our help. 

I'm wondering if you have any 
reaction to the possibility that now 
Israel may go ahead and annex the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and 
refuse to surrender the Sinai. And if 
that happens, what is our response go- 
ing to be? 

A. Let me address the major issue 
first. You know, Israel has been, is to- 
day, and will remain a close friend of 
the United States. President Reagan 
recognizes— perhaps far more than any 
President in recent history— the vital im- 
portance of our obligations to the people 
of Israel and our guarantees to the sur- 
vival of that state. Nothing has changed. 

Now, it is always the case that dif- 
ferences occur, even among very good 
friends; and this is just such a differ- 
ence. The task of American diplomacy in 
the days ahead is to work to resolve 

'bruary 1982 



these issues, not to exacerbate them. I 
would hope that the rhetoric and the de- 
meanor of both governments would 
recognize the overall imperative of our 
continuing cordiality and interrelation- 

I anticipate that Israel will live 
religiously by the obligations of the 
Camp David accords, will return the 
Sinai on schedule, and will continue, as 
it has in recent months, to participate as 
an active and cooperative member of the 
autonomy process. I'm very optimistic 
that today's storm clouds will pass, as 
they have. 

Q. Are you equally confident that 
the Israelis will refrain from moving 
against the Palestinian positions in 
southern Lebanon and re-igniting the 
conflict there? 

A. I think it's important that Ameri- 
cans recognize that Palestinian locations 
overlooking the northern borders of 
Israel have been a constant irritation 
over an extended period. The recently 
established cease-fire, or cessation of 
hostilities, has been a welcome relief in a 
pattern of historic trouble and danger 
for Israel. 

I have been very conscious of great 
incentives in Israel to take military ac- 
tion and to remove that danger, from 
their subjective point of view. But it is 
also important at this time in the peace 
process that restraint be exercised by 
Israel, by the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO), by the parties in 
Lebanon, and by Syria. I'm very happy 
that, thus far, restraint has manifested 
itself. The recent trip of Ambassador 
Habib [President's special emissary to 
the Middle East], directed by the Presi- 
dent, has reassured us that all of the 
parties are very, very pleased with the 
cessation of hostilities and are going to 
work together to retain that situation. 

Q. Let me ask you what happened 
to make everything so smooth, soft, 
and sweet since the day when you first 
heard about the Israeli announcement 
and said, "We regret this very surpris- 
ing announcement which we first read 
about today. It is not consistent with 
Resolution 242 of the United Nations, 
which is the fundamental resolution 
underlying the peace process." [U.S. 
Defense] Secretary Weinberger called 
it "provocative and destabilizing." 
Now, all of a sudden it is part of our 
friendship with Israel, or what? 

A. No, my remarks with respect to 
our historic relationship with Israel 
should in no way be interpreted as a 
whitewash of the concern and disap- 

proval that we felt— and expressed— on 
this recent annexation action. On the 
other hand, one must keep clearly in 
mind that the longstanding policies of 
this country represent not only the vital 
interests of Israel but of the United 
States as well. And it is our task now, 
having spoken, having joined in a reso- 
lution of condemnation at the United 
Nations, having held in suspension the 
recent MOU, or Memorandum of Under- 
standing, on Israeli-American strategic 
cooperation, the time has come now for 
the leadership in both countries to get to 
work to repair the damage— 

Q. And to bring the "sinner" back 
into the fold? 

A. —and above all, to continue with 
this peace process, which this action 
tended to put in jeopardy, and that's the 
reason for our concern. 

Q. Do you have any feeling at all 
that this was designed to happen at a 
time when the U.S. Government was 
so deeply preoccupied with Poland, 
that Mr. Begin pulled this out of his 
hospital room and thrust it on the 
floor of the Knesset in such a hurry 
while we were totally preoccupied 
with Poland? 

A. I'm not going to label tactics or 
motives in this particular case. There 
are perhaps historic precedents. But I 
think it is important to recognize that 
the fact of the action did constitute a 
threat to the peace process. Therefore, 
we had an obligation, the President felt 
very strongly, not to create an atmos- 
phere in which blank checks are 
available for the leadership in Israel, and 
that they have mutual obligations as 

Q. You talk about getting on with 
the peace process, and, obviously, it is 
now in some jeopardy. There have 
been suggestions that maybe it is time 
to appoint a special high-level negotia- 
tor to help out between Egypt and 
Israel. Have you decided to do that, 
and if so, who will it be? 

A. We've kept this option steadily in 
mind throughout the autonomy discus- 
sions that have been underway now for 
several months; and the moment the 
President feels that the appointment of 
a higher level U.S. representative will 
make a constructive contribution to the 
outcome, I can assure you he will take 
that step. 

Q. But it's not yet? 

A. At this point, we are assessing 
the progress made, and decisions on that 

issue will probably be forthcoming in 
maybe a month or two. 

Q. Do you have any new informa- 
tion on the kidnaping of the America 
General, General Dozier, in Verona? 
And would the United States be will- 
ing to be a party, in a sense— a third 
party or whatever— in any negotiatioi 
to secure his release from the ter- 

A. We are following this situation 
moment by moment, and the President 
is, personally. I spoke to him a few 
moments before this show. As you 
know, he feels very, very strongly not 
only about the despicable character of 
this act but the overall subject of inter- 
national terrorism. It is always prudenl 
with respect to the second part of your 
question, to never lay out your plans 
before the fact, and we will not do so ii 
this case. 

Q. While we are on international 
terrorists, let me bring up the word 
"Libya" to you, and ask you if you 
have anything new on their "hit 
squads"? Are you under new, special 
protection, or are you beginning to 
relax a little bit? 

A. I've had some recent jokes on 
that subject at home. We continue to b< 
very alert to the dangers of assassina- 
tion attempts on high American official! 
We continue to be because we know th< 
those dangers continue. 

Q. In that same vein, there has 
been a great deal of skepticism recen 
ly about these reports of assassinatio: 
plots. You clearly believe the reports 
to be true, or true enough, that 
prudence is indicated, and yet you 
have produced no evidence— and cer- 
tainly no arrests— to back this up. 

Q. I'm going to have to cut you 
off. Can you give us a one-word 

A. The one-word answer to that is 

Press release 426.1 


Department of State Bulletii 


he African Private Sector 
nd U.S. Foreign Policy 

Chester A. Crocker 

Address before the Council on 
reign Relations in Chicago on 
vember 19, 1981. Mr. Crocker is As- 
tant Secretary for African Affairs. 

• subject today is Africa's economic 
;mraa and this Administration's 
iponse to a problem which endangers 
al U.S. interests. My text is that 
netimes controversial phrase, the 
vate sector. The headlines which an- 
inced President Reagan's speech in 
iladelphia before the Cancun summit 
naged to convey the impression that 
j foreign economic policy toward the 
ird World consists in large part of 
iffing multinational capitalism down 
; throats of reluctant Socialists. I am 
re to assure you that this is a very 
sleading oversimplification. 

A careful reading of the President's 
ttements on the occasion of the Can- 
i summit reveals that he emphasized 
o points of particular relevance to 
velopment policy. 

• First, he noted that economic 
ledom— "freedom to choose, to own 
jperty, to work at a job of [one's] 
Dice, and to invest in a dream for the 
;ure"— is an ingredient vital to econ- 
lic success. 

• Second, he stressed the impor- 
ice of individuals. "Individual farmers, 
>orers, owners, traders and mana- 
rs," he said at Cancun, "... are the 
art and soul of development." 

Of course, this invocation of produc- 
e individualism and economic freedom 
fleets good and long-established Re- 
blican beliefs. We offer no apology for 
em. But I would also emphasize that it 
so reflects a growing, bipartisan, inter- 
tional consensus, shared by experts 
d practitioners of development as well 

politicians, about development policies 
id aid programs in places like Africa, 
lis consensus is found among liberals 

well as conservatives and is increas- 
ed apparent in the south as well as 
e north. It reflects a concern which 
is little to do with multinational cor- 
•rations, which for better or worse (in 
y view it is for worse) are barely pres- 
it in most countries in Africa. Rather, 
is a concern for small economic units 
id for individuals who must realize 

their productive potential if development 
is to occur in the poor countries. 

Africa's Economic Dilemma 

Let me digress briefly to note two 
familiar aspects of Africa's condition: 
poverty and diversity. Africa has the 
worst economic growth rate of any con- 
tinent. It contains two-thirds of those 
countries certified by the United Nations 
as the very poorest. It is the only conti- 
nent which is afflicted with declining per 
capita food production. An alarming pro- 
portion of African countries, including 
several of major strategic importance, 
are caught in a merciless squeeze be- 
tween soaring oil prices, stagnating ex- 
port production, and ever-mounting 

Yet for all its problems, Africa has 
both great human potential and vast, 
largely untapped mineral and agricul- 
tural wealth. The most populous black 
African country, Nigeria, is our second 
largest source of imported oil. Southern 
Africa— from Zaire to the Cape — con- 
tains mineral wealth of great importance 
to both the U.S. and European econo- 
mies. Africa has great plains and valleys 
with major agricultural potential and un- 
tapped hydroelectric capacity beyond 
that of any other continent. 

Africa's unsatisfactory economic per- 
formance is rooted in many factors, in- 
cluding an often harsh environment, 
postindependence civil turmoil, and lack 
of both human and physical infra- 
structure. I do not want to underem- 
phasize these factors. But it must also 
be realized that these handicaps have all 
too often been compounded by ques- 
tionable government policies. 

Perhaps most important, trade and 
exchange rate policies of many African 
countries have systematically discrimi- 
nated against agriculture, holding down 
the returns to producers of both food 
and export crops while raising the prices 
of imports and consumer goods. Pro- 
ducers of traditional exports like coffee, 
cocoa, and sisal frequently receive far 
less than the real value of their crops, 
while they pay inflated prices for even 
such basic implements as animal-drawn 
plows and engines used in irrigation. 

This discrimination against domestic 
agriculture is reinforced by government- 
controlled marketing, common to many 

African countries, which operates to 
keep farm prices low as a way of reduc- 
ing prices to the urban population. The 
result has been one major cause of 
declining per capita food production and 
increased dependence on food imports. 
As food imports increased, African 
governments subsidized the local selling 
price of these imports, again to keep ur- 
ban prices down. The result has con- 
tributed to spiraling budget deficits 
which are now becoming untenable, even 
as the removal of subsidies causes politi- 
cal tension. 

Industrial policies offer another ex- 
ample. In the postindependence period, 
most African countries combined na- 
tionalization with the creation of public 
enterprises. These state-owned firms 
were in many cases called upon to in- 
crease employment, to deliver goods at 
low prices to key groups, and, in short, 
to do everything but produce economic 
returns. Governments often intended 
that public enterprises operate economi- 
cally and provide revenue, but, over 
time, political pressure for low prices 
and constant shortfalls in revenue led to 
their being starved of returns to cover 
depreciation and capital investment. As 
a result, Africa is strewn with so-called 
parastatals [state-owned enterprises] 
that are seriously undercapitalized and 

Economic policy in Africa often 
derived from social goals or represented 
carryover from colonial practice, as in 
the use of government marketing boards 
for agricultural goods. Government na- 
tionalization of foreign firms and in- 
volvement in new enterprises was also 
designed to substitute for the genuine 
lack of an indigenous private sector at 
the time of independence. All too often 
commercial activity was, in the colonial 
era, controlled by ethnic minorities 
(whether Lebanese as in West Africa or 
Indians in the East) which raised na- 
tionalistic emotions. But the record 
makes clear that replacing such ele- 
ments with bureaucracies is rarely work- 
able. (We should bear in mind that 
bureaucrats, too, can be predatory, 
especially when they act to protect 
favored clienteles at the expense of 
others with less political clout.) In 
general, governments have not been able 
to provide the goods and services that a 
thriving private sector could. As a result 
(and in part because of the pricing 
policies mentioned earlier) the rural 
areas of many African countries are 
starved for goods. 

In summary the productive sectors 
in Africa have been overregulated and 
underassisted. All too often, farmers 

bruary 1982 



have their prices held down and their 
marketing freedom restricted, typically, 
imports are closely controlled and li- 
censed, the public sector overwhelms the 
private, and conflicting social goals in- 
terfere with the operation and capitaliza- 
tion of even essential industries. 

The full cost of these policies to the 
economies of Africa was masked for a 
long time by periods of high prices for 
some African commodities, heavy 
foreign borrowing, and foreign 
assistance. But with the slowdown of 
economies in Africa's industrialized 
country markets, falling prices for many 
primary products, escalating debt serv- 
ice costs, and sharply rising oil prices, 
African countries are today facing an 
economic crisis of enormous magnitude. 
In some cases debts are staggering. 
Often foreign exchange shortages are so 
great that imports of spare parts and 
other essential goods must be controlled. 
The weight of public subsidies and obli- 
gations is so great as to choke off invest- 
ment and prevent adequate maintenance 
for existing activities. 

More and more African countries 
must seek short-term balance-of-pay- 
ments help from institutions like the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund and debt 
rescheduling from both public and 
private creditors. But in country after 
country, it is becoming apparent that 
this is not enough, that something more 
fundamental is needed to pull Africa out 
of this most dangerous situation. 

Unsatisfactory Results of Foreign Aid 
to Date 

We need to ask ourselves about the role 
of outside influences on these events, in- 
cluding the role of foreign aid. Total 
economic aid to sub-Saharan Africa, 
bilateral and multilateral, is now running 
at the rate of approximately $9 billion a 
year. Of this, the U.S. share, including 
our contribution to the World Bank and 
other multilaterals, is approximately 
10%. Given the situation described 
above, the effectiveness of this con- 
siderable effort clearly leaves something 
to be desired. 

Foreign aid, to be sure, has accomp- 
lished a great deal. These accomp- 
lishments include: 

• The enormous development of 
human resources in Africa since inde- 
pendence, when there were practically 
no universities or university graduates; 

• The building of agricultural 
research and extension services for food 
production, when previously these only 
existed for export crops; 

• The creation of basic infrastruc- 
ture such as roads and railroads into 
some hitherto isolated areas unable to 
market crops and minerals; 

• The exploration and documenta- 
tion of Africa's economic potential; and 

• The conquering of several major 
diseases and the development of basic 
health infrastructure. 

All of these accomplishments owe 
much to foreign aid and to technical 
cooperation between Western and Afri- 
can governments. Nor should one expect 
instant results in a field as complex as 
economic development, and the 20 years 
or so in which we have been involved 
seriously in aid to Africa is an instant in 
the historical development of modern 

Nevertheless, it is a fact that we, 
the donors, in close dialogue with 
African decisionmakers themselves, need 
to adjust our own policies to deal more 
effectively with the African crisis. One 
problem is that international aid trends 
and policies have pursued a somewhat 
erratic course. Well-intentioned theories 
have been developed with excessive zeal, 
pressed upon African governments, then 
abandoned before they could be fairly 
tested. Aid donors must learn to adapt 
new policies without automatic, whole- 
sale rejection of the old. 

The development policy emphasis of 
the 1970s was basic human needs. 
Pioneered in the United States but wide- 
ly adopted by others, it resulted from 
liberal impatience over the fact that 
economic growth is an uneven process 
and from a genuine and well-placed con- 
cern that some economic programs were 
not benefiting the majority population in 
developing countries. But in its more 
elaborate forms this policy became 
divorced from the recognition that pro- 
ductivity — economic growth — is a sine 
qua non for development. 

All too often, therefore, foreign aid 
in the last decade has created elaborate 
pilot projects which foreign countries 
can barely keep in operation, must less 
replicate. The maintenance costs of com- 
plex service-oriented projects and, in- 
deed, of much of the basic infrastructure 
that was created, in the absence of 
economic growth, have become un- 
manageable. One study has suggested 
that old irrigation systems in Africa may 
be falling into disrepair at about the 
same rate that donors are building new 
ones at great expense. 

Without throwing out all we have 
learned about the basic human needs of 
food, health, and education, nor aban- 
doning all the programs we have now 

underway to build up African institu- 
tions, we must look afresh at the way 
our aid reaches or does not reach the 
productive sectors and how we can link 
social and humanitarian concerns once 
again with sound growth policies. 

Reassessing Development Policy 

Recognition of unsatisfactory perform- 
ance by African countries and donors 
alike has led in fact to a healthy and 
broad-based reexamination of develop- 
ment policies for Africa. As I noted 
earlier, this reexamination is coming 
from several quarters. It comes from 
those as concerned with equity as with 
growth, from those long and deeply in- 
volved with African problems and ac- 
complishments, as well as from those ir 
bank and donor offices fretting over 
debts and deficits. And there is a grow- 
ing consensus about the inadequate at- 
tention that has been given to the pro- 
ductive sectors. Some examples of this 
reassessment are these. 

• Uma Lele, a development special- 
ist deeply concerned with equity, argue; 
in a recent article in Science Magazine 
that foreign-funded rural development 
projects have overburdened weak public 
bureaucracies, without doing nearly 
enough to train policy-level managers, 
the shortage of which is, ironically, a 
fundamental cause of bureaucratic weal 
ness and inadequate rural growth. 

• In another critique, anthropologis 
Thayer Scudder, who has long worked 
with World Bank projects, argues that 
international planners have too often in 
posed development from above. Scudde 
writes, "Planners are ignoring the 
private sector and its involvement." He 
continues, "Though I am stressing here 
the involvement of small- and medium- 
sized private sector operators — the fam 
ily firm whether farm or business — the 
same applies to larger businesses." 

• The World Bank at recent intern; 
tional meetings has called for caution ir 
funding of new projects and new institu 
tions in this period of economic crisis in 
Africa. In many cases, the bank is now 
recommending nonproject forms of aid 
that can be disbursed quickly to rehabili 
tate old and decaying infrastructure, 
that will go more directly to the produc 
tive sectors and be used in conjunction 
with policy reforms related to growth. 

• Most impressive is the response o 
the Africans themselves. Increasingly 
we observe nominally Marxist govern- 
ments from Guinea to Mozambique seek 
ing increased private trade and invest- 
ment from the West to stimulate growt 


Department of State Bulletii 


1 employment. Governments like Mali, 
;h a strong Socialist tradition, have 
lounced their intention to reduce the 
s of parastatal corporations and 
ive private sector activity in both 
•iculture and industry. 
• Meeting in Lagos in 1980, the 
ids of state of the Organization of 
•ican Unity endorsed a "Plan of Ac- 
i" to achieve far-reaching economic 
lis. More recently, and in response to 
■pening economic problems, the 
•ican governors of the World Bank 
nmissioned a report (Accelerated 
velopment in Sub-Saharan Africa: An 
mda for Action) to propose means by 
ich the attainment of the Lagos plan's 
ectives could be accelerated. The con- 
sions of this report, billed as a "new 
ial compact," call for a doubling of 
eign aid to Africa but emphasize that 
reased aid must be accompanied by 
icy changes to provide more incen- 
*s — such as higher prices for 
mers — for the productive sectors of 
"ican economies. 

With the nature of the African 
relopment dilemma more clearly in 
id we can, I believe, reach a more 
isfactory definition of "private sector" 
m the stereotype limited to multi- 
;ional corporations. As the World 
nk report notes, in Africa the most 
aortant aspect of the private sector is 
'. small producer — the artisan, the 
iinessman, the trader, the road 
lder, the fisherman, the cooperative, 
i above all the farmer, whether he is 
(during food or export crops. 

Growing emphasis on policy reform, 
lajor feature of the recent World 
nk report on Africa, is based on the 
umption that no amount of aid can 
p if governments are suffocating their 
n productive elements. But it also 
iumes that aid can, through a range 
instruments, support and encourage 
/ernments that are willing to embark 
self-help efforts which often involve a 
;h degree of political risk. 

Inappropriate economic policies are 
least partially responsible for the per- 
>ive balance-of-payments problems in 
rican nations. In the context of 
ance-of-payments adjustment, the In- 
national Monetary Fund is the oldest 
i most effective practitioner of the art 
encouraging policy reform. It offers 
nificant temporary financial support 
governments that agree to undertake 
>nomic reforms required to restore 
ancial equilibrium and growth. The 
)rld Bank and other bilateral and 
iltilateral donors can, particularly if 

they work together, offer much addi- 
tional support. 

It should be obvious from what has 
been said that emphasis on the produc- 
tive sectors, usually private, does not 
mean a total rejection of a government 
role. It remains a valid truism that each 
country must work out the mix between 
private and public sector in accordance 
with its own priorities. Good govern- 
ment is what policy reform is all about. 
Certainly we remember from our own 
history that government played a major 
part in setting the stage for successful 
capitalism. One of our own greatest suc- 
cess stories— agriculture— is also one 
sector of the U.S. economy where 
government's involvement has been both 
long and creative, providing at various 
times infrastructure, technical 
assistance, research and extension, and 
direct financial support. 

Implications for U.S. Policy in Africa 

Where does this lead us? Several new 
approaches to U.S. aid and development 
policy are evolving within the Ad- 
ministration. All would emphasize eco- 
nomic growth and assistance to the pro- 
ductive sectors. I hope I have made it 
clear that in the African context, the 

term "private sector" includes both the 
highly capitalized, multinational sector 
and the more widespread phenomenon 
of small producers. We must never 
forget, in discussing development, that 
our mainstream economic interaction 
with African economies comes over- 
whelmingly through the private sector, 
through our markets and investments, 
and that U.S. banks and corporations 
are our most potent agents of economic 

Our policies will emphasize working 
more closely with other institutions as 
well as with governments to encourage 
policy reforms which free the productive 
sectors to produce both more food and 
more growth. In addition, we will struc- 
ture our programs to utilize wherever 
possible the potential of the U.S. private 
sector and encourage it to play a greater 
role in Africa. 

Let me describe a policy framework 
in relation to what I see as the three 
broad economic categories of sub- 
Saharan African countries. The first 
category, unfortunately not yet very 
numerous, consists of those countries 
with relatively healthy market 
economies, in many (but not all) cases 
supported by oil or mineral wealth. 
These include Nigeria, Gabon, 

Visit of Zaire President Mobutu 

President Sese Seko Mobutu made a 
private visit to the United States 
November 29-December 8, 1981. While in 
Washington, D.C., November 30- 
December 3, he met with President 
Reagan and other government officials. 

Following is a White House state- 
ment issued December i. 1 

President Reagan met for 45 minutes 
this afternoon with President Sese Seko 
Mobutu of Zaire in the Oval Office. He 
welcomed the opportunity to learn more 
about the interests and concerns of this 
important African country and friend of 
the United States. The meeting was 
friendly and open. Among the issues 
discussed were Namibia and Chad, 
where the President praised Zaire's con- 
tribution to a peaceful solution. They 
also discussed Zaire's need for the 
cooperation of friendly states, including 
the United States and our European 
allies as well as international organiza- 
tions, in working to develop its economy 
and reinforce its national security. 

There was a mutual understanding 
of the need for strengthening Zaire's 
economic institutions and the armed 
forces. The President told President 
Mobutu that the United States is 
prepared to help Zaire achieve its 
development and security goals while 
recognizing that those goals require 
some difficult decisions, such as those 
now being taken and planned by the 
Zairian Government, particularly in im- 
proved administration. There was agree- 
ment on the importance of the private 
sector as a force for economic develop- 

The President wished President 
Mobutu well during his meetings with 
Members of Congress and the business 
community and visits to other parts of 
the United States. 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 7, 1981 (last 
paragraph of statement omitted here). ■ 

Druary 1982 



Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Botswana, Zim- 
babwe, and, of course, South Africa. 
Here we can pursue our mutual econom- 
ic interests mainly through improved 
trade and investment policies. These in- 
clude elimination of legal and regulatory 
disincentives to U.S. businessmen 
operating abroad, including the revised 
tax policy already enacted, proposed 
revision of the Foreign Corrupt Prac- 
tices Act, and proposed legislation to 
permit export trading companies. We 
are also reinvigorating our trade promo- 
tion efforts and making the facilitation 
of U.S. business activities abroad a 
primary concern of American Ambas- 

In some countries unique bureau- 
cratic mechanisms may be called for. 
The best example in Africa is Nigeria, 
where the Joint Agricultural Con- 
sultative Committee has been estab- 
lished. The joint committee is an associa- 
tion of U.S. and Nigerian Governments 
and agribusiness firms formed in 
response to Nigeria's keen desire to 
overcome an alarming food deficit. It 
has already resulted in proposals for 
substantial new U.S. trade and invest- 
ment in a country where at present we 
run a massive trade deficit— our second 
largest anywhere last year— because of 
oil imports. 

Unfortunately, perhaps, Nigeria is 
atypical. The "average" African country 
is a non-oil less developed country 
characterized by moderate to severe 
economic difficulties, small market size, 
and little to attract the transnational en- 
trepreneur. In these countries the term 
private sector means primarily the small 
operators and institutions mentioned 

Here our policy must continue to 
emphasize concessional assistance but 
focused more on the productive sectors. 
As suggested above, aid can encourage 
and support policy reforms. We can 
stretch official aid dollars by financing 
feasibility studies and otherwise en- 
couraging the U.S. private sector to get 
involved in the development process, as 
for example through cohnancing of 
profitable, development-oriented proj- 
ects. Direct participation by commercial 
institutions will make it more likely that 
development projects contribute to real 
growth. The new Bureau for Private 
Enterprise of the U.S. Agency for Inter- 
national Development is already in the 
process of developing new programs in 
these areas. 

Direct, participation by the U.S. 
private sector in development activities 
can have a number of additional 
beneficial effects. Aid can, as the Euro- 
peans have discovered, serve as a 

valuable means of encouraging business 
in high-risk environments typical of less 
developed countries everywhere— for ex- 
ample, by providing technical assistance 
and seed capital for joint venture oppor- 
tunities. And the participation of 
business can serve as an important 
source of technology transfer, enhancing 
indigenous entrepreneurship and 
managerial skill. 

This approach will involve a con- 
siderable shift away from the govern- 
ment-to-government aid programs 
favored exclusively in recent years. It 
will not mean a wholesale, indiscrimi- 
nate rejection of "orthodox" project aid. 
Such assistance will continue to be vital, 
with emphasis on food production and 
human resource development— including 
management capacity in both public and 
private sectors. 

Finally there is a third category of 
countries, the least developed countries. 
As currently defined by the United Na- 
tions, these have per capita GNP lower 
than $220; 21, or two-thirds of them, are 
in Africa. Some, such as Somalia and 
Sudan, are of major geopolitical signifi- 
cance, and all have the potential to 
develop. But it cannot be denied that 
most least developed countries have 
been dealt a bad hand by history and en- 
vironment. Many are landlocked, and all 
too often their boundaries, drawn at the 
Congress of Berlin, accord with neither 
economic nor political reality. 

Some of the new approaches to aid 
policy mentioned above are applicable to 
these countries, all of which do have im- 
portant agricultural sectors typically 
afflicted with severe overregulation. But 
generally speaking, aid policy in the 
least developed countries will continue 
to be somewhat different, with more em- 
phasis on humanitarian requirements 
(especially where refugees are present), 
regional integration (particularly vital 
for the small and landlocked), and basic 
institution building. 

Finally, I would emphasize that the 
Administration's emphasis on our own 
domestic economic recovery and growth 
will benefit virtually all less developed 
countries. Combined with vigorous em- 
phasis on free trade, an expanding U.S. 
economy will strengthen markets for our 
African friends, whether they are pro- 
ducers of commodities (typically the case 
today) or nascent manufacturers. The 
United States currently absorbs about 
one-half of all manufactured goods that 
non-OPEC developing countries export 
to the industrialized world, even though 
our market is only one-third the in- 
dustrialized world market. And as Presi- 
dent Reagan noted before Cancun, every 
1 % reduction in our interest rates due to 

lower inflation improves the balance ol 
payments of developing countries by $ 

The urgency of our own domestic 
recovery program dictates that, for th 
next few years, budgetary restraint w: 
be a matter of highest priority. Becau; 
of this, there is little chance that our 
official foreign assistance outlays will i 
crease dramatically in the near future, 
is, therefore, all the more important tl 
we redouble our efforts to make our 
development policies more effective. 


I have outlined a spectrum of policies 
designed to respond to Africa's varied 
conditions. It assumes three major in- 
novations: ' 

• More support for policy reform 
that will stimulate the indigenous pro- 
ductive sectors; 

• More direct private sector par- 
ticipation in development; and 

• More integration of foreign aid 
with foreign trade and investment 

This approach will demonstrate oi 
conviction that the "private sector," w 
large, involves most Africans, must b« 
encouraged by government if growth ; 
to occur, and can be helped by aid pro 
grams as well as by interaction with t 
foreign private sector. I care deeply 
about this subject because I know thai 
the growth of healthy economic systei 
in Africa will in the long run do more 
than anything else to reduce the pros- 
pects for contagious regional conflict 
and externally based destabilization oi 
shaky governments. We are convincec 
that African economic security, like 
other dimensions of security, is a cent 
ingredient in reaching the goal of a cc 
tinent of stable and friendly states. 

In the years ahead, as we and oth 
donors rethink with African leaders tl 
dilemmas of development, we must 
operate with empathy and sensitivity. 
Development does not occur in a 
vacuum. Seldom in history have younj 
governments faced such an awesome 
and simultaneous mixture of challeng< 
as those in Africa— imperatives of 
growth, equity, dignity, stability, and 
stitution building. Economic policy re- 
form cannot work unless it is political 
feasible for decisionmakers to take 
tough decisions. We recognize this res 
ity. Our approach, therefore, will be 
summed up by the phrase: Let's do th 
most to help those who help them- 
selves. ■ 


Department of State Bullet 


ternal Situation in Zimbabwe 

C. 17, 1981 1 

iccordance with the provisions of Section 
of the International Security and 
'elopment Cooperation Act of 1980, I am 
mitting the following report on the inter- 
situation in Zimbabwe. 
One of the more significant events to 
e place since the submission of the last 
>ort to the Congress was the unanimous 
ision handed down by the Zimbabwe 
>reme Court which held that the War Vic- 
s Act, introduced shortly after in- 
endence to replace the Victims of Ter- 
ism Act, was constitutional. The latter Act 
. been introduced by the former govern- 
nt to encourage commercial farmers to 
y in the country by providing compensa- 
1 in the event they suffered property 
nage as a result of military action. The 
v law which provides for relief only in case 
leath or injury, but not property loss, was 
tcted because of government's fear of be- 
financially overwhelmed by new claims 
compensation— loss of cattle by peasant 
mers for example— which would have had 
oe honored under the old Act. This land- 
rk decision was precipitated by a suit in 
ich the plaintiff argued that application of 
i War Victims Act constituted an un- 
lstitutional acquisition by the government 
property (a claim for compensation that 
1 occurred under the old Act) without ade- 
ite compensation. 

This court case, like the one in which 
mer Cabinet Minister Edgar Tekere was 
juitted, again demonstrated the govern- 
nt's resolve to adhere to the Lancaster 
use Constitution and to the due process of 
| Owing to the importance of this case the 
vernment selected a renowned South 
rican attorney to represent it in the pro- 

Some whites will no doubt see the Court's 
cision as eroding the protection of their 
sperty rights. This in turn, will lead to in- 
cased speculation on the part of many that 
j stage has now been set for the govern- 
mt to deprive large landowners of their 
operty and give it to squatters. Any such 
vernment action, however, would clearly 
nstitute an unjustified extension of the 
ecedent in this case and would directly con- 
:t with explicit constitutional prohibitions 
ainst the acquisition and redistribution of 
id without adequate compensation. 

On the economic side the agricultural sec- 
r continues to lead the field in terms of out- 
t and is followed by construction and retail 
les. The government, however, is still faced 
th a difficult balance of payment situation 
id foreign exchange deficiencies, and there 
e still serious shortages of skilled and ex- 
rienced manpower. 

Zimbabwe's banking and financial institu- 
tions have repeatedly demonstrated the abili- 
ty to adapt to changed circumstances. They 
have continued to do so since independence 
and the phenomenon is evidenced by the 
speed with which these institutions have 
taken advantage of recent opportunities to 
participate in international arrangements 
with foreign banks. Mainly because of 
government's strict management of its exter- 
nal debt and its tight-fisted spending policies, 
Western banking institutions have come to 
regard Zimbabwe as one of the more credit- 
worthy countries in Africa. Citibank recently 
became the second U.S. bank to open an of- 
fice in Salisbury. 

After hitting record lows the Zimbabwe 
stock market, long considered one of the key 
indexes of business confidence in the country, 
is presently enjoying a modest recovery. This 
development was probably triggered by in- 
creases in fuel supplies and the prospects for 
considerable improvements in economic and 
commercial relations with South Africa, 
which continues to be Zimbabwe's main 
trading partner. The realization by the 
government that the country has attracted 
very little foreign investment since in- 
dependence and the resulting efforts to 
create a more favorable investment climate 
could be strong catalysts for restoring in- 
vestor confidence in the future of private 
enterprise in Zimbabwe. This in turn, could 
lead to the long-term recovery of the stock 

Politically, it appears that post-election 
euphoria is beginning to wane, and with it, 
some of ZANU's [Zimbabwe African National 
Union] early popularity. The government's 
very deliberate and pragmatic approach to 
land resettlement and the rising cost of living 
are primarily responsible for much of the 
criticism being directed at it. The govern- 
ment, believing that it is being judged too 
harshly, is sensitive to criticism and has 
shown little tolerance for its critics, Ian 
Smith and Bishop Abel Muzorewa in par- 

A recently introduced order requiring 
prior notification to the Minister of Home Af- 
fairs of the intent to hold public political 
gatherings has the potential for seriously 
restricting the opposition's ability to present 
dissenting views. The Minister of Home Af- 
fairs, acting on the strength of this new 
measure, recently refused permission for a 
Muzorewa-sponsored rally to be held in 
Bulawayo, but granted permission to 
ZANUPF [Zimbabwe African National 
Union/Patriotic Front] and ZAPU [Zimbabwe 
African People's Union], partners in the 
government coalition, to hold political 
meetings in Bulawayo on the same day. This 
order was also recently cited as justification 
for preventing ZAPU-oriented youth from 
carrying out a demonstration in support of 
the anniversary of the Soviet revolution. 

These new restrictive measures appear 
unwarranted unless there is evidence not yet 
made public that Prime Minister Mugabe's 
government is being more threatened than it 
appears to be by opposition politicians. From 
all outward appearances, the Prime Minister 
is still firmly in control and the threat of 
political instability continues to diminish. 

Prime Minister Mugabe has continued to 
take steps to reassure the whites by reaffirm- 
ing his commitment to reconciliation and by 
stressing the point that Zimbabwe's brand of 
socialism would not be built on the basis of 
destroying the present economic infrastruc- 
ture, but by preserving that structure. At the 
same time, however, he does not hestitate to 
castigate those whites who, according to him, 
have not changed their negative racial at- 
titudes. His decision to fire Health Minister 
Herbert Ushewokunze, considered one of the 
more provocatively radical Cabinet members, 
has been a significant boost to white morale. 

The exercise designed to integrate the 
two former guerrilla armies and the former 
Rhodesian forces into a single army, which 
was organized and directed by the British, 
has been sucessfully completed. The entire 
operation took 18 months and involved ap- 
proximately 58,000 troops. The success of 
this operation reflects credit on the British, 
Prime Minister Mugabe, Joshua Nkomo and 
the white leadership of the former Rhodesian 
forces. It has also laid to rest the problem of 
force amalgamation which was one of the 
most intractable issues in the Anglo- 
American and Lancaster House settlement 

Prime Minister Mugabe continues to view 
a Namibian settlement as an urgent issue, 
and he has stated publicly that Zimbabwe 
supports recent Contact Group efforts to 
bring about independence. Zimbabwe's 
balanced position on key regional issues is im- 
portant to us in seeking a Namibian settle- 
ment and pursuing other U.S. objectives in 


Ronald Reagan 

identical letters addressed to Charles H. 
Percy, chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee, and Clement J. Zablocki, 
chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Com- 
mittee (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 21, 1981). ■ 

Jbruary 1982 



The Unnecessary War 

by Eugene V. Rostow 

Address at the Winston Churchill 
Lecture of the English-Speaking Union 
in London on November 30, 1981. Mr. 
Rostow is Director of the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). 

This ceremony gives me pleasure at 
many levels. I believe in the English- 
Speaking Union and value the compli- 
ment of your invitation to speak tonight. 

What makes this evening singular, 
however, is that I have been asked to 
give a lecture in honor of Winston 
Churchill. The only occassion in my life 
which made my skin tingle with com- 
parable feeling was the challenge of 
writing and delivering a 4th of July ora- 
tion in honor of Thomas Jefferson from 
the steps of Monticello. 

Both Churchill and Jefferson are 
heroes in the Pantheon of the English- 
speaking peoples. The heroism of these 
giants is not simply that they had the 
courage to fight against odds in times of 
trouble; there are many heroes of whom 
that could be said. Their special quality 
is that they had the gift of words as well 
as the gift of action. What they did and 

vehemence these days behind the Iron 
Curtain and in other parts of the world 
ruled by tyrants or oligarchs. The 
themes which cluster around the idea of 
liberty lie just below the surface of the 
political and military problems which 
preoccupy our foreign offices. And they 
dominate the psychological and educa- 
tional tasks which constitute at least 
half the agenda of our governments in 
the realm of foreign affairs. 

Nominally, my subject tonight, in 
Churchill's compelling phrase, is "the un- 
necessary war" — the war we must pre- 
vent. Churchill proposed the phrase as 
the name for what is generally called the 
"Second World War." It commands us to 
remember that if the United States, the 
United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet 
Union had acted wisely during the 
1930s, the war could never have taken 
place. After Hitler came to power, 
Churchill urged a course with all his 
magnificent resources of reason, 
historical knowledge, experience, elo- 
quence, and wit. He was denounced for 
his pains as a senile, drunken war 
monger who saw Huns under every bed. 
His critics — they were numerous and 
influential — dismissed him as a romantic 

Until the Soviet Union joins us in agreements 
which could genuinely remove the menace of 
nuclear war from world politics . . . there can be 
no escape from nuclear deterrence. . . . 

what they said are woven together into 
an epic whole. Like the other great epics 
of our tradition, Churchill and Jefferson 
will remain part of the living faith not 
only of the English-speaking peoples but 
of all the peoples in the world who share 
the creed of liberty, equality, and frater- 
nity — the rights of man. 

That faith is the heart of what I 
have to say tonight. It is embodied in 
many famous slogans — in the motto of 
the French Revolution I have just re- 
called; in Jefferson's "unalienable rights 
of life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap- 
piness"; in the four freedoms of 
Churchill and Frankin Roosevelt; and in 
the natural human and civil rights men 
and women are claiming with increasing 

who still lived in the days before 1914, 
besotted by endless quantities of cham- 
pagne or brandy or both. To adapt one 
of Churchill's best phrases, "Some cham- 
pagne; some brandy." Nonetheless, he 
was kept in the wilderness until the war 
had started and was nearly lost. 

Both World Wars did terrible 
damage to the fabric of our civilization. 
The twin evils of fascism and com- 
munism were among their progeny. But 
a third world war in a nuclear environ- 
ment would be far, far worse. We must 
not fail to prevent war this time, as As- 
quith and Grey failed before 1914, and 
as Churchill and Roosevelt failed before 
1939. President Reagan made it clear in 
his speech of November 18 that this is 

the dominant idea of American foreig 
policy today. 

The situation we confront resemb 
that of the 1930s in many ways. But i 
significantly different too — more 
dangerous, more volatile, and far mor 
difficult to control by the polite warn- 
ings and veiled threats of old-fashione 
European diplomacy. 

The Indivisibility of Peace 

My thesis tonight is simple: Peace has 
now become truly indivisible, in the 
memorable words of a Soviet foreign 
minister 45 years ago. It is a thesis ei 
tirely appropriate for us to consider o 
the first day of a new round of Soviet 
American talks on the reduction of 
nuclear weapons. The pervasive mena 
of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and the 
parently inexorable spread of nuclear 
weapons create profound political in- 
stabilities. But nuclear weapons are n 
the only factors of disequilibrium in tl 
world. Conventional warfare, subver- 
sion, and terrorism have become 
epidemic and commonplace. Their in- 
fluence, added to that of the nuclear 
arsenals, has transformed world politi 
into a witches' brew for a reason whic 
becomes more obvious and more omi- 
nous every day: because the wall be- 
tween conventional and nuclear war c 
never be impermeable, no matter how 
high we make it. Small wars can beco 
big ones at least as readily as in the 
days when archdukes were assassinafc 
at Sarejevo, and Danzig was the cent* 
of world concern. It is now apparent 
that arms control agreements are har 
worth having if they make the world 
safe for conventional warfare, terroris 
and the movement of armed bands 
across international frontiers. 

Consider, for example, an issue r 
before our governments. The Soviet 
Union has revived its old proposal for 
U.N. General Assembly declaration be 
ning the first use of nuclear weapons. 
The Soviet goal is transparent. They 
know as we do that the recovery and 
renaissance of the NATO allies, Japar 
and many other countries since 1945 
have depended on the credible threat 
the United States to use its full milita 
capability, including nuclear weapons 
necessary, in defense of its allies and 
other supreme interests against conve 
tional as well as nuclear attack. That 
what nuclear deterrence and the 


Department of State Bulle 


■rican nuclear umbrella are about; 
relief throughout the world— and 
icularly in the higher circles of the 
et Union— that nuclear weapons 
Id be used, however reluctantly, if 

were needed, for example, to stop a 
sive invasion of Western Europe. 
il the Soviet Union joins us in 
tements which could genuinely 
ove the menace of nuclear war from 
Id politics altogether — a goal to 
:h the United States has been pas- 
ately committed since we offered the 
ach plan in 1946— there can be no 
pe from nuclear deterrence when 
supreme interests of the United 
;es and the free world are threatened 

The sound and reasonable response 
le Western allies to the Soviet pro- 
il for a ban on the first use of 
ear weapons, therefore, should be an 
sal for a rededication of the entire 
Id community to the principles of the 
I Charter against any form of ag- 
ssion, whether conducted by nuclear 
onventional force or by the move- 
it of armed bands across interna- 
al frontiers. This appeal should be 
pled with a corresponding rededica- 

to the goal of bringing nuclear 
rgy under more effective interna- 
ial control in order to permit the 
fet possible use of nuclear energy for 
ceful purposes and end the danger of 
lear weapons proliferation. The 
uch plan, you will recall, would have 
:ed what was then an American 
lear monopoly into the hands of a 
i. agency. The means proposed in the 
■uch plan are obsolete now, but its 
mating ideas remain important. 

No lesser steps could begin the in- 
Densable process of restoring world 
>lic order. The decline of world public 
er and the specter of nuclear anarchy 
ond it are the greatest of all the 
eats to the peace. The best available 
y to deal with that threat is through 
srnational cooperation in enforcing 

rules of peace embodied in the 
irter of the United Nations. They 
istitute the only available code of 
ente — and the only possible code of 

There is no blinking the fact that the 
net Union risks war in its campaigns 
expansion all over the world. Those 
npaigns use aggressive war as an in- 
ument of national policy; they are car- 
et on by methods which violate the 
es of the charter governing the inter- 
zonal use of force. No one claims that 
; Soviet Union initiates all the trouble 
the world. But it does take advantage 

of trouble in order to expand its sphere 
of influence. The Soviet campaigns of 
expansion have gone too far. They now 
threaten the world balance of power on 
which the ultimate safety of the 
Western nations depends, and, there- 
fore, they touch nerves of immense sen- 

Western Public Opinion 

The men and women on the Clapham 
omnibus know this in their bones. That 
is why there is so much concern about 
war in Western public opinion. The cur- 
rent wave of anxiety about the possibili- 
ty of war is natural and reasonable. We 
all share it. But we cannot allow it to 
paralyze us. The pervasiveness of anxie- 
ty is not a sign of cowardice or pacifism 
but a normal symptom of the fact that 
public opinion has reluctantly begun to 
acknowledge the true condition of world 

The turbulence of our public opinion 
does not prove that there is something 
wrong with the younger generation, that 
our moral fiber has been ruined by the 
welfare state, or that the leaders of our 
churches and peace movements are all 
Communists or fellow travelers or their 
innocent dupes. Of course the Com- 
munists are trying to manipulate the 
feelings of people about war and to 
harness them to a political movement 
that would serve the ends of the Soviet 

But Communists have never con- 
trolled our politics in the West, and they 
will not succeed now. We cannot ignore 
their activities. But we should not be un- 
duly agitated about them, either. 

After all, the anxiety of public opin- 
ion about war is not manifested only in 
demonstrations against the presence of 
troops and weapons and in expressions 
of the perfectly correct view that there 
is insanity in the continued accumulation 
of weapons, especially nuclear weapons. 
There are other expressions of that anx- 
iety and concern, equally significant and 
much more realistic. Throughout the 
West, people are coming to the conclu- 
sion that their governments must stop 
the process of Soviet expansion before 
it explodes into general war. They know 
that peace cannot be achieved by unilat- 
eral disarmament. And they recognize 
the wisdom of the old Russian proverb, 
"If you make yourself into a sheep, you 
will find a wolf nearby." Sadly and 
without jingoism, our people support 
their governments in policies which seek 
to prevent war while there is still time 
to do so by peaceful means. 

As a result, the North Atlantic allies 
and many other nations are following 
the broad lines of policy Churchill 
counselled in vain before the Second 
World War. They are restoring the 
military balance which has eroded dur- 
ing the last decade. And they are resum- 
ing the quest for peace through negotia- 
tion with the Soviet Union. They realize 
how little has been accomplished by 
arms control and disarmament treaties 

The decline of world 
public order and the 
specter of nuclear anar- 
chy beyond it are the 
greatest of all the 
threats to the peace. 

in the past. Nonetheless, without illusion 
or euphoria, they wish to be certain that 
no conceivable opportunity for peace is 
ignored. Therefore, they welcome Presi- 
dent Reagan's effort to persuade the 
leaders of the Soviet Union that it is in 
the highest interest of the Soviet state 
and of all other states — and, indeed, in 
the highest interest of humanity itself — 
to accept the obligation which history 
has thrust upon the Soviet Union and 
the United States. 

If we are to retreat, step by cautious 
step, from the brink of the abyss, the 
United States and the Soviet Union 
must lead the way, together. This duty 
can be translated into two simple 

• The United States and the Soviet 
Union should reach verifiable arms 
reduction agreements which give each 
side an equal deterrent capacity. 

• World public order should be 
restored in conformity with the rules 
upon which the United Nations agreed 
in San Francisco at the end of a terrible 
war they had barely won. 

These two propositions are closely 
related. Together they define the objec- 
tives of the United States as we ap- 
proach these nuclear arms negotiations. 
We hope the Soviet Union will come to 
agree with us and to accept these prin- 
ciples as major premises for a process of 
Soviet-American cooperation which has 
now become imperative. 

Jruary 1982 



Preparing for Arms Control 

The two principles I have tried to for- 
mulate are the essence of President 
Reagan's methodical approach to the 
task of preparing for the nuclear arms 
control negotiations. If the Soviet Union 
accepts the principle of equal deter- 
rence, it should be possible for carefully 
worked out and verifiable agreements to 
improve the security position of the 
West as a whole. By allowing each side 
to maintain equal deterrence, nuclear 
arms agreements should prevent any 
form of coercive predominance. They 
could, therefore, result in a somewhat 
more stable environment, at least in 
restraining the potential escalation of 
conventional force conflicts. Under con- 
temporary circumstances, however, this 
is an insufficient goal and probably an il- 
lusory one. But it should give diplomacy 
an opportunity to press for the ultimate 
fulfillment of agreement on the second 
principle, that of mutual and reciprocal 
respect for the rules of the charter 
regarding the international use of force. 
As President Reagan has pointed out, a 
double standard in this regard is simply 
not viable. 

Sometimes the Soviet spokesmen 
say that the American position would re- 
quire the Soviet Union to give up a 
foreign policy rooted in its nature as a 
society and a state. This is not the case. 
So far as the United States is con- 
cerned, the Soviet Union is free to 
preach the gospel of communism 
throughout the world. But we cannot ac- 
cept its claim of a right to propagate its 
faith with a sword. All the United States 
urges is that, with regard to the interna- 
tional use of force, the Soviet Union 
follows the same rules which all states 
accepted when they became signatories 
of the U.N. Charter. There can be no 
peace until those rules are equally and 
reciprocally obeyed. 

Thus far, there have been no signs 
of progress in that effort. Soviet 
behavior, diplomacy, and propaganda re- 
main what they have been for a long 
generation. The Soviet submarine 
caught in the approaches to a Swedish 
naval base is hardly an encouraging 
omen. We have no choice but to 
persevere, however, in seeking to reach 
the Russian people and the other peoples 
of the Soviet Union with every resource 
of our intelligence and imagination while 
the expansionist policies of the Soviet 
Government are restrained by the calm 
deployment of deterrent force. We know 
that more than 60 years of Soviet rule 

have not destroyed the love of liberty 
and justice in Russia and that the 
peoples of Eastern Europe, who have 
always been of the West, remain an in- 
tegral part of the European culture and 
policy. So long as we in the West are 
strong, confident, and determined, the 
forces of hope in the East will not sink 
back into despair. 

The analysis I have just summarized 
is adequate and accurate, I believe, so 
far as it goes. But it does not go very 
far. Rationally, it is easy to prescribe 
the course the NATO allies and the 
Soviet Union should follow now, just as 
it is easy with the benefit of hindsight to 
agree that the United Kingdom, France, 
the Soviet Union, and the United States 
could have prevented the Second World 
War. The important question about the 
1930s is not what should have been 
done— the answer to that question is 
self-evident— but why Churchill and 
Roosevelt, two towering politicians at 
the height of their powers, failed to per- 
suade their countrymen to follow their 
lead. That, I believe, is the principal 
question on the agenda of Western 
foreign policy today, and it is the issue 
to which I shall devote the remainder of 
this lecture. What are the limits of 
reason in dealing with the issues before 
us? Is there any chance that reason can 
be made to prevail? How do we per- 
suade the Soviet Union that it too 
should obey the rules of the charter, 
give up the dream of empire, and join 
the Western nations in seeing to it that 
the charter rules are generally respected 
throughout the world? Can we hope to 

. . . the Soviet Union 
deploys a new SS-20 
every 5 days. 

persuade the Soviet Union, or only to 
contain it, as George Kennan has con- 
tended, until the benign influence of 
Russian high culture — and of exposure 
to the West — bring about a mellowing of 
Soviet policy? And finally, how can our 
efforts of persuasion be organized and 
carried out by methods compatible with 
the rules of our being? 

The Human Element 

The questions I have posed surely in- 
clude matters of diplomacy and strategy 
which would have been familiar to 

Thucydides or Machiavelli. But their ir 
plications transcend the abstractions o 
political theory or the cool detachment 
of the cynic. The balance of power is n 
all that is at stake in the world crisis 
which has come about through our blir 
ness and negligence. Churchill com- 
mented once that Marlborough and 
Wellington had changed the course of 
history, permitting two centuries of 
British primacy which were hardly con 
pelled by economics or demography. It 
heresy, I know, to ask such a question 
a Churchill lecture, but— issues of na- 
tional loyalty and national pride apart- 
would Western civilization have been 
fundamentally different if Marlborougl 
had lost at Blenheim and Wellington 1 
Waterloo? That kind of speculation car 
hardly arise about the outcome of the 
cold and not-so-cold War. No one can 
contemplate the possibility of nuclear 
war with any feelings but those of hor- 
ror and disgust. And no one could 
describe the architects of the Gulag 
Archipelago as Saint Simon and Nancj 
Mitford describe the denizens of Ver- 
sailles in the day of the Sun King. Witl 
divided and uneasy minds, the nations 
the West have finally embarked on a 
Churchillian effort to prevent war. We 
have taken this step not only to protec 
our national independence and avert 
nuclear devastation but to preserve the 
creed and hope of liberty for ourselves 
and for all who cherish it. Many people 
seem to think that nuclear war could b» 
averted by Western surrender. But tha 
course is unthinkable. Moreover, it 
would not work. 

Many believe that the ideal of in- 
dividual freedom has had its run in the 
bleak chronicle of human history and 
that social pluralism will soon be forcec 
to yield to one version or another of thi 
all-embracing state. 

This every child of the Anglo- 
American culture must deny. The view 
that the state exists to protect individui 
freedom has always been at war with 
the ideology of Leviathan; that war will 
never end. Man yearns for freedom, bu 
freedom is lonely. Man also yearns for 
security and companionship. Sometimes 
he seems willing to pay the price of 
slavery for them. It may be that even ii 
the West some people are willing to ac- 
cept such societies, at least for a time. 

But there is no reason to lose faith 
in our humane ideals. During the last 
generation, behind the shield of collec- 
tive self-defense backed by the America 
nuclear weapon, democracy has enjoyed 
a renaissance in Germany, Japan, and 
many other countries, and its values are 


Department of State Bulletir 


lining ground throughout the world, 
e speak with many voices, as free men 
id women always do. But beneath the 
rbulence of these lively sounds there is 
tiding unity and ample strength. In 
eir vast majorities, the people of the 
est remain loyal to the code of values 
which they have been bred. For the 
nglish-speaking peoples, that tradition 
>es beyond the enlightenment of the 
ith century to the roots of our political 
>erty in the common law and the 
nglish constitution and to the roots of 
ir moral freedom in the heritage of the 
Id and New Testaments and the 
emory of Greece and Rome. In other 
irts of the West, of course, the 
>ncordia of the community includes 
rong elements of the Roman law and 
ie Roman culture in both its ancient 
id its modern manifestations. 

Today that tradition faces the 
lallenge of a new Minotaur. And today, 
ice more, those who love freedom must 
illy to its defense. 

he Threat Today 

ut the threat we face is more than the 
ireat of arms and the challenge of 
leology. Sir Isaiah Berlin uses a simple 
hrase to sum up the most fundamental 
ifference between societies devoted to 
ie freedom of the individual and 
ocieties in which the state manipulates 
tie individual in the name of a greater 
ood: the difference between "Freedom 
com" and "Freedom to." We believe 
nth Sir Isaiah in "Freedom from"; that 
3, we believe in the autonomy of man as 
. good in itself and the most important 
ightful goal of organized society. It 
ollows that we must also believe with 
efferson that "the just powers of 
government derive from the consent of 
he governed." If this is so, high prin- 
iples of ethical responsibility should 
govern the discourse among men and 
vomen which is the source of public 
•pinion and thus the predicate for their 
:onsent. Democracy is impossible unless 
ve speak to each other with civility and 
scrupulous respect for the truth as best 
ve can perceive the truth. 

As George Orwell saw so clearly, the 
nost important distinction between free 
societies and modern tyranny is a totally 
different attitude toward the problem of 
;ruth. This difference is why our efforts 
it propaganda, even in wartime, are so 
different, defensive, and ineffective. 
Everyday we read and hear propositions 
as bizarre as those of Orwell's 
Newspeak. We find it almost impossible 
to offset their impact on our own minds 

or to explain to others why those prop- 
ositions are wrong. We are simply not 
equipped to contest the propaganda of 
Newspeak. In the end, we deal with it as 
if it were the argument of a parliamen- 
tary opposition. That is all we know how 
to do. 

Let me give you an example of cen- 
tral importance to my thesis tonight. We 
are being bombarded at the moment by 
the breathtaking claim that the NATO 
allies, and the United States in par- 
ticular, are seeking to disturb a stable 

The Military Balance 

Or let us look at another aspect of the 
Soviet thesis— the actual state of the 
military balance and especially the 
balance in intermediate range nuclear 
weapons in and near Europe. Year after 
year, the Soviet Union tells us that there 
are roughly 1,000 weapons of this kind 
on each side and that the NATO decision 
to deploy modern nuclear weapons in 
Europe is a destabilizing quest for 
nuclear superiority in preparation for 

The United States may have a slight lead 
in . . . warheads, but the Soviet Union has moved 
ahead in every other measure of the destructive 
power of nuclear weapons and is adding to its 
arsenal at a rapid rate. 

equilibrium of world power, gain 
military superiority over the Soviet 
Union, and start a nuclear war to 
destroy the Soviet regime. Sometimes 
an additional detail is added for Euro- 
pean consumption — that the United 
States is planning to fight the nuclear 
war entirely in Europe and to its last al- 
ly. Soviet spokesmen addressing the 
United States say the opposite— that if 
the Soviet Union is hit by a nuclear 
missile, it will pay no attention to the 
calling card attached to the weapons but 
respond at once with all its missiles 
against the continental United States. 

How can these contentions be 
answered? Can anyone really believe 
that the American people miss Vietnam 
and are looking for an excuse to start 
another such campaign, this time with 
nuclear weapons, or even a third world 
war on a much larger and more exciting 
scale than Vietnam? Can anyone sup- 
pose we are bored because our univer- 
sities are quiet and busy, preoccupied 
with education rather than with antiwar 
protests? Can anyone imagine that an 
American President could contemplate 
the use of force for any reason except 
the most austere sense of duty and 
obligation, knowing that President 
Truman's political career was ruined by 
the Korean war as President Johnson's 
was destroyed by Vietnam and, indeed, 
that every major war and most minor 
wars in American history became 
politically unpopular in the end? 

nuclear war. There is irony in this claim. 
The magic figure remains near 1,000 
although the Soviet Union deploys a new 
SS-20 every 5 days. And the Soviet 
Union has not yet offered a detailed 
statistical table to support its charges, 
although its most recent effort, a 
pamphlet called The Threat to Europe, 
begins to approach that point. 

But Soviet spokesmen have said 
enough to make the statistical fallacies 
of their argument apparent. For exam- 
ple, they count only SS-20 missiles 
deployed in European Russia, although 
many of these missiles located beyond 
the Urals can reach targets in Western 
Europe without difficulty. And they 
count certain American planes in mak- 
ing their calculations but exclude Soviet 
planes of the same type. Mr. Brezhnev's 
proposal, made at Bonn last week, sim- 
ply offers to move some SS-20 missiles 
from European Russia to Siberia— a 
proposal without substance or interest 
to the West. It would hardly increase 
the security of NATO to transfer these 
missiles to locations from which they 
could threaten Japan or the Middle East 
or be returned to their original posi- 
tions. All the studies I have seen con- 
firm the judgment of the International 
Institute of Strategic Studies that Soviet 
superiority in this particularly threaten- 
ing category of nuclear weapons is more 
than 3 to 1, so that even the full deploy- 
ment of the American weapons sched- 
uled for Europe could not produce 
anything like equality, to say nothing of 

: ebruary 1982 



The record is not notably different 
in the field of intercontinental nuclear 
weapons. There, too, the Soviet Union 
claims that parity exists and that 
American plans to restore its deterrent 
capacity are "destabilizing." There, too, 
the Soviet Union is engaged in an active 
program of improvement and expansion 
while the United States has, until 
recently, been passive. The United 
States may still have a slight lead in the 
total number of warheads, but the 
Soviet Union has moved ahead in every 
other measure of the destructive power 
of nuclear weapons and is adding to its 
arsenal at a rapid rate. Unless the 
United States does add to its forces, the 
balance will shift irrevocably against the 

NATO Objectives and Soviet Strategy 

Nevertheless, the charges continue to be 
made. The problems the NATO allies 
face together at this juncture have 
nothing to do with the fantasies of 
Soviet propaganda. We do not have to 
choose between protecting our interests 
and fighting a nuclear war or any other 
kind of war, in Europe or elsewhere. 
That is a false dichotomy. The sole ob- 

The highest objec- 
tive of Soviet strategy is 
to separate Western 
Europe from the United 

ject of U.S. and NATO policy is to pro- 
tect our common interests by restoring 
stability without war. There is no reason 
to doubt our capacity to protect the 
future of liberty in peace, by the 
methods of alliance diplomacy backed by 
deterrent military power. The NATO 
allies, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, 
China and other countries which oppose 
Soviet hegemony have ample power and 
potential power to stop the process of 
Soviet expansion. With Poland in the 
process of undergoing profound social 
changes, this is hardly the time to bend 
our knees to the power and ideology of 
the Soviet Union as the wave of the 

The highest objective of Soviet 
strategy is to separate Western Europe 

from the United States. If Western 
Europe could be brought within the 
Soviet domain, the geopolitical theorists 
of the Soviet Union believe, Japan, 
China, and many other nations would 
draw the necessary conclusions, and the 
United States would be left isolated and 
impotent. The enormous Soviet effort in 
the field of intermediate-range missiles 
is intelligible only in the perspective of 
this Soviet doctrine. In that perspective, 
it is all too intelligible. The objective, as 
always, is to decouple the United States 
from Europe. The scenario would follow 
these lines: the subliminal radiations of 
the Soviet intermediate-range nuclear 
arsenal would induce panic in Europe 
while the growing Soviet long-range 
arsenal would paralyze any possibility of 
an American strategic response. Presto 
and checkmate. The Japanese, Chinese, 
and many other nations would follow 

This was the nightmare which 
started to provoke deep European and 
American concern 5 or 6 years ago. The 
Soviet SS-20s had begun to impinge 
upon our consciousness. Henry Kis- 
singer's Brussels warning in 1977 
dramatized the issue. But the anxiety 
would have been the same if Mr. Kis- 
singer had never spoken. The danger of 
decoupling Europe from the United 
States is implicit in the changing overall 
intercontinental nuclear balance between 
the Soviet Union and the United States, 
weakening the counterweight which has 
kept superior Soviet conventional forces 
at bay since 1945. After a year or two of 
discussion, NATO decided that the 
United States should deploy American 
intermediate-range land-based missiles 
in Europe and at the same time 
negotiate with the Soviet Union about 
removing the threat to Europe arising 
from the existence of these first-strike 
and particularly devastating missiles. 
The reasoning behind the NATO 
decision parallels the argument which 
has persuaded the United States to keep 
large American conventional forces in or 
near Europe. There has been periodic 
political agitation in the United States 
for a reduction of our conventional 
forces in Europe and for exclusive 
reliance on intercontinental nuclear 
weapons to protect Europe against 
Soviet pressures. But proposals of this 
kind have been firmly and repeatedly re- 
jected. The United States wishes not 
only to make the nuclear guaranty clear 
and credible but to be in a position to 
respond appropriately to threats across 
the entire spectrum of threat or attack. 
To remove American forces from 
Europe would escalate every conflict 

there instantly to the nuclear level. As 
President Reagan pointed out on 
November 18, the purpose of deploying 
American intermediate-range nuclear 
weapons on European soil is to remove 
all doubt about the credibility of the 
American intercontinental nuclear 
guaranty to Europe both in Europe and 
in the Soviet Union. As a result, the risl 
of war by miscalculation would be re- 

The problem of the intermediate- 
range nuclear weapons must be exam- 
ined in the SALT context, as the North 
Atlantic Council has declared, because 
the line between intermediate-range and 
intercontinental nuclear forces is not 
clear cut. Intercontinental weapons can 
also be aimed at targets in Europe, 
Japan, or the Middle East. And some 
weapons normally classified as theater 
weapons can be used under certain cir- 
cumstances on intercontinental missions. 
While much could be accomplished by 
successful intermediate-range nuclear 
force talks, both in reducing weapons 
and contributing to crisis stability, the 
ultimate security of the NATO allies will 
continue to rest on the reliability of the 
U.S. strategic guaranty. 

When I was a student at King's, the 
great Alfred Marshall had gone, but the 
young dons still faithfully took their 
texts from his books and lectures. One 
of their favorites, I recall, is appropriate 
to our problem tonight. Marshall liked to 
say, "Trees do not grow to the sky." He 
was talking about firms and trade 
unions and the checks and balances of 
economic life. But his observation ap- 
plies also to empires. 

The Soviet Union is still in the im- 
perial mood which the other imperial 
powers have long since given up with 
relief and conviction. Those nations have 
discovered what Benthan pointed out 
long ago — that the imperial powers had 
no right to govern the peoples they had 
conquered; that they gained nothing 
from their efforts; and, as Sir Norman 
Angell concluded much later, that im- 
perialism is extremely expensive. An 
Italian minister summed up the problem 
of costs in the late 1940s: "Italy has lost 
the war," he said, "but in compensation 
it has lost its empire." The former im- 
perial powers have learned that it is 
more profitable and more satisfactory all 
around to make money, not war. 

If we take the Soviet drive to be the 
Hegelian thesis, it has already 
stimulated a normal antithesis — a coali- 
tion of nations determined to retain 
their independence. In the nature of 


Department of State Bulletin 


igs, the forces of the antithesis are 
md to prevail. Can the Soviet Union 
nowledge that fact and accept the in- 
table gracefully— as gracefully as the 
ited Kingdom or the Netherlands 
Icomed the end of empire after World 
ir II? Will the last surviving tradi- 
lal empire join the other nations in 
king the world order anticipated by 
Charter of the United Nations— a 
rid order based on the equality of 
tes large and small and on the rule 
it no state use force to attack the ter- 
)rial integrity and political in- 
>endence of any other state and on 
pect for the principle of the self- 
^rmination of peoples? 

gotiating With the Soviets 

our view, those are the ultimate ques- 
ns of world politics today. The 
swers to those questions are in the 
5t. All I can tell you tonight is that 
i United States and its allies view the 
)cess of arms control negotiations as a 
ssible key to the riddle of the future, 
ms control negotiations have no 
igic in themselves. Negotiating with 
j Soviet Union is a rough sport, and a 
;isfactory outcome is hardly 
aranteed. But we cannot ignore what 
ly be an opportunity for progress 
vard peace. The Soviet policy of ex- 
nsion, fueled by the extraordinary 
owth of the Soviet armed forces, and 
rticularly of its nuclear forces, has 
oduced a situation of growing tension 
d instability. The efforts of the Soviet 
lion to split the West and to prevent 
estern modernization of its defenses 
11 surely fail. Ever since 1945, the 
lited States has appealed to the Soviet 
lion for cooperation between us — in 
aking the offer of the Marshall plan 
id the Baruch plan and on many other 
casions, too. President Reagan re- 
wed that appeal on November 18 with 
eat force, as the only rational way out 
the nuclear dilemma both camps now 
■nfront. The fruits of SALT I and 
\LT II have turned to ashes in our 
ouths. The decade which began 10 
;ars ago with the high hopes of detente 
;came the worst decade of the entire 
•Id war. The cold war is no longer a 
;ripheral matter of border skirmishes, 
cloud no larger than a man's hand, but 
le dominant problem of world politics. 

We approach the task of negotiation 
stermined not to confuse our hopes 
ith reality. We know that the Soviet 
nion, like most other countries, has at 
ast two cultures — the culture of 
atherine the Great and the culture of 

Ivan the Terrible; the Russian culture of 
inspiring intellectual quality and moral 
distinction; the culture of Tolstoy, 
Turgenev, Chekhov, and their modern 
successors, as well as the culture of 
Oriental despotism now in the ascend- 
ant. From long experience we know that 
a Soviet spokesman was right when he 
said, "We are neither pacifists nor 

But there are positive elements in 
the situation which ought to lead the 
Soviet leaders to choose a policy of 
stability in their relationship with the 
West: the situation in Poland and the 
apparently insoluble problems of the 
Soviet economy, to mention only two. In 
part, Soviet economic problems are the 
result of difficulties which all modern 
economies share— the insatiable and 
astronomic claims of science against the 
defense budget. In part, however, they 

represent factors peculiar to the system 
of Soviet planning. 

I can sum up all I have tried to say 
tonight in four simple propositions. They 
were put very well, early in the nuclear 
age, by a distinguished English social 
scientist. First, the secret is out of the 
laboratory and can never be returned. 
Any industrial country can make nuclear 
weapons. Secondly, it follows for ob- 
vious reasons of prudence that the 
Western nations cannot give up nuclear 
weapons. Third, nuclear war is un- 
thinkably destructive, and the West 
must find ways to protect its freedom 
and security and at the same time pre- 
vent nuclear war. From these three 
propositions we draw a conclusion we 
regard as inescapable, because small 
wars sometimes become big. The goal of 
policy must be not simply the avoidance 
of nuclear war but the elimination of all 
international war. ■ 

Consular Services to U.S. Citizens 

by Diego C. Asencio 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on International Operations of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee on Novem- 
ber b, 1981. Ambassador Asencio is As- 
sistant Secretary for Consular Affairs. 1 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear 
before this body to discuss the services 
provided by the Department of State for 
American citizens abroad. The Bureau of 
Consular Affairs is the "service arm" of 
the Department of State. Most 
American citizens have their only direct 
contact with the Department of State 
through consular activities— meeting a 
foreign friend, student, or businessman 
arriving here by visa; receiving a U.S. 
passport to travel abroad; or seeking our 
assistance for a friend or relative in dif- 
ficulty or crisis abroad. Last year, our 
total of individual services in these fields 
exceeded 13 million. We are gratified by 
the expressions of appreciation our of- 
ficers receive and by the accolade of 
"good job" bestowed recently by the Gen- 
eral Accounting Office. We have made 
progress over the past several years, but 
we are, of course, neither satisfied nor 

Part of our improvement since this 
subcommittee received an assessment of 
our operation about 4 years ago has 
been in organizing ourselves to do the 

Creation of the Office of 
Overseas Citizens Services 

In 1978 we formed a new directorate- 
Overseas Citizens Services (OCS). The 
name and the focused responsibilities 
came about as the result of a reorganiza- 
tion in the bureau. Major elements of 
services to citizens abroad were com- 
bined under a single directorate to pro- 
vide rapid response and centralized 
authority and to more effectively utilize 
available resources. 

Despite some problems, particularly 
at the beginning, the reorganization is a 
success. The "beginning," incidentally, 
took place the weekend before the 
Jonestown, Guyana, catastrophe. 
Everyone was given a baptism of fire 
coping with the enormous public in- 
terest, citizen distress, and attendant 
workload generated by that tragic event. 

In 1977 the subcommittee was ad- 
vised of significant increases that had 
been taking place in all aspects of con- 
sular work, but particularly in the area 
of services to American citizens. Case- 
loads continue to challenge our pro- 
cedures and resources. In FY 1977 our 
Foreign Service posts performed about 
2.1 million citizen services. In FY 1980, 
they performed about 2.9 million such 
services. These included the issuance of 
225,000 passports abroad, approximately 
200,000 welfare and whereabouts ac- 
tions of all kinds (searches/missing per- 

3bruary 1982 



sons, emergency messages, emergency 
money transfers, repatriations, medical 
evacuations, etc.), 12,000 seamen serv- 
ices, 5,800 arrest cases, 987,000 notarial 
services, 25,000 estate/property cases, 
7,200 death cases, and 950,000 "other 
agency" cases (Social Security, Veterans 
Administration, and so forth). It is 
noteworthy that despite the enormous 
caseload increase, work hours expended 
on citizen services abroad increased by 
less than 200,000 (from 1,460,000 to 
1,648,000) in the 1977-80 period. Ob- 
viously our consular personnel are work- 
ing faster and harder. We in the Depart- 
ment have attempted to facilitate and 
expedite their work by giving them 
authority to make their own decisions in 
some cases that previously had required 
referral to Washington for action (lost 
passport cases, for example). 

Statistics can impress. They can also 
bore, so I will briefly touch on some of 
the relatively recent developments in the 
citizen services area that should be of in- 
terest to the subcommittee. 

We are very much aware that, as 
the name implies, OCS is a service 
organization. Our Foreign Service and 
Civil Service officers are public servants. 
The public knows this, and the public, as 
well as their elected representatives, ex- 
pect service. We make an earnest effort 
to meet all needs courteously, with 
understanding and ingenuity. Con- 
straints are the limits of personnel, 
time, statutes, and regulations. Even 
when requests are exaggerated, un- 
reasonable, or occasionally illegal, we try 
to divert or refuse them tactfully. We 
also seek to remove constraints to meet 
old or new needs. 

Emergency Medical 
and Financial Assistance 

For example, with the encouragement 
and support of this subcommittee, we 
obtained statutory authority in 1978 to 
provide emergency medical and financial 
assistance to destitute Americans 
abroad. This was accomplished through 
an amendment of the 1977 statute that 
had enabled us to provide emergency 
medical and dietary assistance to 
Americans imprisoned abroad. Our con- 
sular officers are, thus, now in a position 
to do something when, for example, a 
citizen has not received his monthly 
Social Security check, has no other 
funds and no other means of obtaining 
any. The consular officer can advance 
funds upon signing of a promissory note. 
Persons who need emergency medical 

attention and are without money and 
without any way of getting money need- 
ed to obtain such care can also be given 
a loan for the medical attention. 

Incarcerated Americans 

We have also focused more clearly on 
our responsibilities to Americans im- 
prisoned abroad. Our consular officers 
visit them at regular intervals. The fre- 
quency depends largely on local condi- 
tions. We are concerned that those im- 
prisoned are treated humanely and given 
an adequate diet and any medical assist- 
ance that may be needed. Finally, we at- 
tempt to interest the host government in 
negotiating a prisoner exchange treaty if 
circumstances point to the need for such 
a treaty. In the past several years, we 
have negotiated such treaties with Mex- 
ico, Canada, Bolivia, Peru, Panama, and 
Turkey and are currently negotiating 
with France and Thailand. 

There are now about 1,800 
Americans incarcerated abroad, about 
35% of whom were arrested on drug- 
related charges. There has been a 
decline in the percentage of Americans 
imprisoned on drug charges. We expect 
this has in part been the result of our in- 
tensive public affairs campaigns to sen- 
sitize the traveling public to this prob- 

The negotiations of consular treaties 
has also been given greater attention. 
Although most countries are signatories 
to the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, the convention lacks the 
specificity needed to assure that the 
rights of our citizens will be fully 
respected should they get into difficulties 
abroad. Over the past 3 years we have 
concluded treaties with the German 
Democratic Republic and the People's 
Republic of China. Active negotiations 
are underway with Yugoslavia, the 
United Kingdom, and Italy. 

Travel Advisory Program 

We have also centralized and expanded 
our travel advisory program reflecting, 
in part, the unstable conditions in many 
parts of the world. Hundreds of ad- 
visories have been sent during the past 4 
years. These notices go to Foreign Serv- 
ice posts and passport agencies and to a 
number of travel organizations and 
publications. The advisories concern 
such matters as political or civil unrest 
in certain countries, contagious diseases, 
visa requirements, hotel shortages, and 
other conditions or situations a pro- 
spective traveler should know about 

before traveling. In addition to sendin 
the advisories, we reply to dozens of 
telephone calls every day from person; 
interested in traveling to a particular 
country or countries and wanting to 
know what, if any, advice we can offei 

The Public Program 

In an intense effort to make our servk 
known to the public, we have embarke 
on a broad-ranged public awareness 
"outreach" program. This year we hek 
briefings both in Washington and in 
eight regional cities throughout the 
United States for congressional staffei 
to inform them of our services, how tc 
make use of our various resources anc 
personnel, and to learn of ways in whi 
we can be more responsive to congres 
sional requests for information. This 
public program covers activities rangii 
from seminars with public groups inte 
ested in our services (principally the 
travel industry and academic institu- 
tions) to the dissemination of informa- 
tion through a number of bureau 

We are proud of the fact that one 
our publications, "Your Trip Abroad," 
was recently named by a private orgai 
zation as one of the 25 best publicatioi 
of the U.S. Government. In addition, a 
are also now in the process of develop 
ing a new edition of a publication con- 
cerning arrests and drugs overseas. O 
public service announcements, which e 
phasize careful preparation and self-h< 
prevention of problems by the travelei 
have been distributed to 450 television 
stations and 2,000 radio stations. 

Finally, we take every opportunity 
to explain our services through the da 
requests for information we receive 
from the mass media on specific and 
general consular problems. The consis 
tent underlying themes in our public 
awareness programs are that an in- 
formed public is a better protected 
public and that problem prevention 
directly benefits not only the public bu 
our consular offices and resources. 

At the beginning of my statement 
mentioned Jonestown. While the suick 
and murders there can hardly be char- 
acterized as typical of the work we no 
mally deal with, it does provide an ex- 
ample that we must be prepared to de 
with mass disaster as well as individuz 
tragedy. Since Jonestown, we have re- 
sponded, I believe capably, to many 
disasters on short notice such as the 
very severe Italian earthquake that oc 
curred during Thanksgiving week of h 


Department of State Bulle 


ar and the 1980 Polish airlines crash 
ar Warsaw in which 25 Americans 
>re killed, including the entire national 
lateur boxing team. We participate ac- 
ely in all emergency task forces 
'med within the Department in re- 
onse to major disasters and foreign 
licy crises. We initiate, prod, or de- 
md whenever necessary to insure that 
izen interests, including those here at 
me, are fully considered. We were 
jst recently represented by OCS in the 
ntingency planning in the aftermath of 
e assassination of President Sadat. 

•ivacy Act and FOIA 

lave purposely not elaborated in this 
itement on the 1978 Jonestown 
isode, which I understand the sub- 
mmittee will address later in the hear- 
ts with other Department witnesses, 
awever, in the overall context of these 
arings, I would like to briefly mention 
x continuing review of the effects that 
e Privacy Act and the Freedom of In- 
rmation Act (FOIA) have had on our 

A survey conducted by the Depart- 
ent in 1979 confirmed that most of the 
ivacy Act concerns of our posts were 
the consular area. In a letter to Chair- 
an Zablocki of the Committee on 
)reign Affairs [December 12, 1979], the 
apartment stated that consular officers 
sel that the Act has a chilling effect on 
eir ability to offer opinions, comment 
id analysis which is necessary to ade- 
lately perform their consular functions 
id which is necessary for end users in 
e Department to adequately under- 
and what is happening abroad." 
allowing that letter, the Department 
Ivised all Foreign Service posts of 
ays by which reporting officers could 
«k to meet their obligations to keep 
le Department fully informed without 
dating the FOIA and the Privacy Act. 
s a result of experience with Jones- 
»wn, consular officers are particularly 
ert to their protection and welfare 
isponsibilities toward U.S. citizens in 
roups that could be considered some- 
hat similar to the People's Temple. 

The Privacy Act and the FOIA un- 
mbtedly serve legitimate purposes. At 
mes, they remain inhibiting factors, 
it they are not a severe obstacle to the 
jrformance of our functions. Increasing 
orkloads are far more serious. 

lcreasing Workloads 

Workloads at our consular posts will 
>ntinue to rise. The strengthening of 

No Sale of Advanced Aircraft 
to Taiwan 

JAN. 11, 1982 1 

Since the beginning of this Administra- 
tion, the President has been conscious of 
the need to carry forward the unofficial, 
people-to-people relationship between 
the United States and Taiwan, and he 
has expressed on many occasions his 
personal concern for the continued well- 
being of the people of Taiwan. This Ad- 
ministration has attached a high value to 
fulfilling the longstanding policy of the 
U.S. Government with respect to pro- 
viding such defense articles as may be 
necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain 
a sufficient self-defense capability. 
Concerned agencies of the U.S. 
Government, including the Departments 
of State and Defense and other national 
security elements, have been addressing 
the question of Taiwan's defense needs 
over a period of many months and have 
taken into careful consideration the 
many factors which bear on the 

judgments which must be made in im- 
plementing this policy. On the basis of 
this study, the Administration has 
already taken steps to sell Taiwan items 
necessary for self-defense. We anticipate 
further steps of this sort. 

A judgment has also been reached 
by the concerned agencies on the ques- 
tion of replacement aircraft for Taiwan. 
Their conclusion is that no sale of ad- 
vanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan is re- 
quired because no military need for such 
aircraft exists. Taiwan's defense needs 
can be met as they arise, and for the 
foreseeable future, by replacing aging 
aircraft now in the Taiwan inventory 
with comparable aircraft and by exten- 
sion of the F-5E coproduction line in 
Taiwan. The details have not yet been 
worked out. The President has approved 
these recommendations. 

'Read to news correspondents by acting 
Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■ 

the dollar and lower air fares are serv- 
ing as a stimulant to more foreign 
travel, and this is reflected in recent 
substantial increases in passport work- 
loads. Foreign trade and investment ac- 
tivities are increasingly important and 
geographically diversified. The greater 
the number of Americans traveling or 
living abroad, the greater the American 
service workloads both at home and 

The consular function is no excep- 
tion to the Administration's determina- 
tion to constrain the use of resources, 
including personnel. We are doing our 
part. Our emphasis, in the immediate 
future, will be on initiatives and im- 
provements in consular operations that 
will, in particular, save time and money 
or, at the very least, will not involve 
augmenting the need for increases of 
either. The pending nonimmigrant visa 
waiver bill is a significant step toward 
saving personnel. Among other things it 
would "free up" resources that could be 
used more productively elsewhere. 

Extension of the period of validity of 
U.S. passports to 10 years as recently 
approved by the House would also be a 
time-saver. We are also working on a 
revision of all of the Foreign Affairs 
Manuals used by consular personnel 
abroad. Our objective is to make the 

manuals simple and useful tools that will 
facilitate and expedite the officer's work. 
The irony of the manuals today is that, 
in many respects, they are so cumber- 
some, outdated, and difficult to use that 
they increase work rather than ease it. 
Automation of additional facets of the 
consular operation, here and abroad, is 
one of our highest priorities and should 
permit us to make better use of the 
available resources. 

We are constantly improving our 
training courses at all levels — from first 
tour vice consuls through senior officers. 
We are stressing increased career 
recognition toward those who meet our 
highest standards. 

I am confident that our personnel 
will continue to display those qualities of 
dedication and hard work that our 
citizens have come to expect and that 
have won them accolades in the past. 
Obviously, we do not meet all of our 
standards all of the time. But I assure 
you we try. 

'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 

ibruary 1982 



Auto Parts Industry 

by Robert D. Hormats 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on International Trade of the Senate 
Finance Committee on December 1, 1981. 
Mr. Hormats is Assistant Secretary for 
Economic and Business Affairs. 1 

I would like to thank the subcommittee 
for inviting me to take part in its review 
of the current state of the U.S. auto in- 
dustry and related issues in the area of 
international trade and investment. I 
would like to concentrate my remarks 
on a subject of major interest to the 
U.S. auto industry and to me person- 
ally — recent developments affecting our 
auto parts manufacturers. I have a par- 
ticular interest in this because I was 
directly involved in earlier efforts to 
assist our auto parts companies while 
serving as Deputy Trade Represent- 
ative. I understand that the subcommit- 
tee wishes me to comment on the results 
achieved to date from the perspective of 
that experience. 

The automotive parts and com- 
ponents sector is suffering from the 
depression which has hit the automobile 
industry as a whole. Employment among 
the approximately 2,000 firms in this 
sector has dropped by as much as 
500,000 since January 1979. Sales have 
been soft for the last year and a half, 
and most parts firms are now operating 
below capacity, which is unusual in this 
sector. The auto parts companies conse- 
quently face a familiar financial dilem- 
ma. They want to invest substantial 
capital in efficient, low-cost production 
facilities in order to meet increasingly 
effective foreign competition. Reduced 
sales and high interest rates, however, 
make that investment exceptionally dif- 
ficult to undertake, and Jerry Dempsey, 
President of Borg- Warner, has warned 
that as many as two-thirds of the ex- 
isting parts companies may be gone by 
the next decade. 

In order to help the auto parts in- 
dustry cope with these pressures, two 
trade policy objectives of major impor- 
tance have been pursued by the United 
States over the past few years. First, 

we have sought greater access for 
U.S. -made parts to the Japanese market 
and to the so-called aftermarket for 
replacement parts for Japanese cars sold 
in the United States. Second, we have 
favored economically viable 
Japanese-U.S. joint ventures or Jap- 
anese licensing agreements with U.S. 
parts producers. 

Efforts to Increase Parts Sales 

Efforts by the United States to increase 
sales of auto parts to be used in Jap- 
anese-built cars and as replacement 
parts for Japanese cars in the United 
States date back almost 2 years. In 
April 1980, the United States asked the 
Government of Japan to eliminate im- 
port duties altogether on all automobile 
parts, including original equipment com- 
ponents and replacement parts. After 
extensive negotiations, the Japanese ob- 
tained Diet approval for the elimination 
of tariffs on 38 automotive parts 
categories and for a substantial reduc- 
tion of the tariff on tires and tire cases. 
These reductions — which went into ef- 
fect on April 1, 1981 — were on items 
the U.S. Government, in consultation 
with the U.S. industry, had identified as 
of greatest interest to our firms. Our 
own export data indicate that U.S. ex- 
ports of these products to Japan 
amounted to about $100 million in 1980. 
We were unsuccessful in persuading the 
Japanese to abolish duties on carpeting; 
the Japanese argued that carpeting is a 
product category destined largely for 
nonautomotive consumption. 

In addition to seeking tariff reduc- 
tions, we and the Japanese Government 
sponsored an auto parts purchasing mis- 
sion, which met with U.S. automotive 
parts firms in September 1980 to ex- 
plore the possibilities of negotiating con- 
tracts for auto parts. The results of this 
auto parts mission are being monitored 
by the Trade Facilitation Committee, 
chaired by the U.S. Department of Com- 
merce and the Japanese Ministry of In- 
ternational Trade and Industry (MITI). 

The Japanese forecast last year, in 
conjunction with the auto parts mission, 
that their imports of U.S. auto parts 

would rise to some $300 million in 19J 
They reaffirmed this forecast after a 
Trade Facilitation Committee follow-i; 
meeting last January. 

On balance, however, the results < 
this effort in terms of auto parts expc 
have been extremely disappointing. It 
clear that the $300 million forecast wi 
not be realized and that our parts ex- 
ports to Japan will probably decrease 
comparison with last year. Official dai 
prepared by the Japanese authorities 
dicate that their imports of the produ 
covered by the $300 million forecast 
totaled only $64 million during the fir 
6 months of this year. Even this total 
depends on the inclusion of chemical 
catalysts and cattle leather, of which 
substantial portion probably are destii 
for nonautomotive uses. Similarly, th< 
latest Commerce survey of the U.S. a 
parts firms involved in the parts miss 
indicated that the mission has not 
generated a steady stream of new 
orders. Eighty percent of the firms 
responded to the survey this year and 
only 12% of them felt that the missioi 
had been very productive. We have b< 
able to identify only $5.5 million in ac 
tual new business. This contrasts star 
with a recent report by the Mitsubishi 
Bank that total Japanese auto parts e 
ports reached $3.8 billion in 1980, up 
nearly 30% from 1979, of which abou 
$1.8 billion were to the United States 

In order to understand the difficu 
of penetrating the Japanese parts 
market, it is useful to understand cer- 
tain basic structural problems. These 
elude the high cost of transportation 1 
Japan, the strict — and sometimes ove 
strict — quality standards demanded b 
the Japanese automakers, and the bas 
management relationship between 
Japanese automobile producers and tl 
"family" of parts suppliers. Most 
Japanese auto plants maintain minims 
on-site parts inventories, and supplier 
are expected to make deliveries on tig 
schedules, often several times a day. 
Tariff eliminations alone, as I have 
testified in the past, cannot offset sue 
fundamental problems in expanding a 
cess to the Japanese home market. Ai 
active effort by the Japanese Govern- 


Department of State Bulle 


nt and the Japanese companies— as 
11 as by U.S. parts manufacturers— is 

It is fair to say that the efforts of 
! Japanese Government and the 
)anese private sector to boost imports 
U.S. -made parts have not been 
isfactory. The surveys of U.S. auto 
rts firms suggest that many Japanese 
tns involved in last year's parts mis- 
n may have been more interested in 
Danding their sales here than finding 
!v U.S. suppliers. 

It appears that Japanese automotive 
lustry officials may have come to 
iieve that the Japan's unilateral volun- 
■y restraint on automobiles has re- 
ved the Japanese industry of any need 
pursue seriously opportunities to buy 
to parts here. It would be extremely 
fortunate if they persisted in this 
>w. We have been led to believe that 
; Japanese auto industry was gen- 
lely desirous of helping U.S. industry 
make it through its present crisis. 
ie Japanese export restraint— limited 
it is — cannot comprise the whole ef- 
't to deal with the trade-related 
pects of that crisis. As I testified 
fore this subcommittee last January, 
bstantial increases in Japanese pur- 
ases of U.S. parts would be both 
asonable and appropriate. The Ad- 
inistration will continue to urge the 
panese to accept, and to act on the 
sis of, this point— particularly in the 
eetings of the Trade Facilitation Com- 
ittee which will take place in Tokyo 
;er this month. 

In view of the inherent marketing 
ificulties facing firms trying to export 
rts to Japan, the "aftermarket" for 
S.-made replacement parts for 
panese cars here in the United States 
ay be more important in the near term 
r the U.S. parts companies. It has 
en estimated that the market for such 
;ms as batteries, lights, fan belts, tires, 
arters, and so on could amount to $1.8 
llion over the next 5 years. This 
arket is one in which U.S. firms should 
i able to compete actively and suc- 
ssfully. But it has been very hard for 
merican firms to penetrate this 
arket, and Japanese firms appear 
iluctant to fully cooperate with them, 
hile Japanese parts sell vigorously. The 
ime structural argument to which 
ipan points to explain why U.S. parts 

do not sell well in Japan does not apply 
to the replacement market. 

Because the "aftermarket" looks like 
such a promising area for additional 
U.S. parts sales, it should be given 
priority attention by Japanese firms and 
by the Trade Facilitation Committee. 
Opening up this market to U.S. firms 
can be highly beneficial, and it will help 
to offset the attraction of more restric- 
tive and distortive approaches to the 
automotive industry's troubles. Japan, 
which professes to support an open 
trading system, undermines its credibili- 
ty by failing to take advantage of oppor- 
tunities to permit and actively to help 
U. S.-made parts to compete in both the 
original equipment and replacement part 


We had also hoped that Japanese parts 
firms would consider viable joint ven- 
tures and licensing for parts production 
here in the United States. The Japanese 
Government sponsored a second mission 
last year for Japanese firms interested 
in such possibilities. The major objective 
of that mission was to encourage joint 
production ventures or licensing of parts 
production, to permit our own com- 
panies to prepare more rapidly to pro- 
duce parts for the new generation of 
"world cars" coming onto the market. To 
date, however, the investment mission 
has produced no concrete results in 
terms of new joint ventures or licensing 
involving U.S. firms. My own view is 
that licensing remains a particularly 
promising approach to ensuring U.S. 
firms' access to the aftermarket and is 
one which should be pursued vigorously 
in our discussions with the Japanese in 
the Trade Facilitation Committee and 

The only new investment projects 
we have identified are the opening of a 
new plant in Ohio by Stanley Electric of 
Japan to supply electrical parts to Hon- 
da's new auto assembly plant and other 
automakers and a joint venture by Hon- 
da and two Japanese parts firms to build 
seats and mufflers for the Honda plant. 
The latter project will employ some 200 
workers. Both the Honda auto plant and 
Nissan's truck plant in Tennessee are 
expected to procure initially about 40% 
of their inputs, by value, from U.S. sup- 
pliers, with the possibility of future in- 
creases in such procurement. 


For the last 2 years I have been urging 
that Japan, in its own long-term interest 
and in ours, buy more U.S. parts and 
undertake economic coproduction and 
licensing arrangements with U.S. firms. 
Are we to conclude that Japan believes 
that the short-term actions they have 
taken on auto exports represent a final 
and adequate response on its part, and 
that the mutually beneficial and ex- 
tremely reasonable objectives of increas- 
ing U.S. parts sales to Japan and to the 
replacement market and of promoting 
joint ventures and licensing agreements, 
can now be virtually neglected? If so, 
that is extremely short-sighted. If the 
Japanese want to provide convincing 
evidence that mutually beneficial trade 
in this sector is possible, they have a 
strong interest in providing oppor- 
tunities for U.S. parts producers to com- 
pete in Japan and in the replacement 
market— and assist rather than impede 
their efforts to do so— and to undertake 
economically attractive licensing and 
coproduction here. Japan's new foreign 
minister and MITI minister have both 
stressed the need for a broader opening 
of Japan's market. The above-mentioned 
measures — in conjunction with others in 
the agricultural and manufactured goods 
sectors— would be an excellent begin- 

ir rhe complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 

Jbruary 1982 



The Alliance at a Crossroad 

by Richard R. Burt 

Address before the Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation in Bonn, West Germany, on 
December 2, 1981. Mr. Burt is Director 
of the Bureau of Politico-Military Af- 

Forty-eight hours ago the United States 
and the Soviet Union opened a new and 
important negotiation. A negotiation 
unlike any we or they have embarked 
upon before. As with SALT [Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks], these talks are 
about nuclear weapons. But unlike 
SALT, the United States in this forum 
is seeking limits on weapons which can- 
not strike American territory. The 
Soviet Union, in this new forum, is seek- 
ing limits on prospective American 
weapons which are to be located outside 
the United States. Three decades of 
history have lead to this unique negotia- 
tion and to the unique structure for 
European security which it is designed 
to strengthen. To fully grasp the signifi- 
cance of this negotiation, and to eval- 
uate its prospects, one must go back in- 
to that history. 

Legacy of Postwar Era 

Perhaps the central legacy of the 
postwar era is that in 1981—36 years 
after the conclusion of conflict in 
Europe— there remain here one-quarter 
of a million American troops. These 
American soldiers are still in Europe 
because the experience of the first half 
of this century convinced Americans 
that they would inevitably be drawn into 
any war in Europe and that they, there- 
fore, should act to prevent such a war 
from erupting. These American soldiers 
are still welcomed in Europe because 
that same bitter experience has per- 
suaded thoughtful Europeans that an 
equilibrium cannot be maintained on 
their continent without the engagement 
of American power. 

To those who have lived through the 
postwar era, these truths seem self- 
evident. The present always appears the 
predestined result of an ineluctable past. 
In retrospect, the great landmarks of 
modern European history seem to 
march in one direction: 

1949— The North Atlantic Treaty; 
1951 -The creation of NATO's in- 
tegrated military command; 

1955— The Federal Republic of Ger- 
many's entry into NATO; 

1967— The creation of NATO's 
Nuclear Planning Group and NATO's 
adoption of the strategy of flexible 

1979— NATO's decision to modernize 
its intermediate-range nuclear forces 
and to engage the Soviets in an effort to 
limit such systems; and 

1981-The opening of U.S.-Soviet 
negotiations of intermediate-range 
nuclear forces. 

These moments were not, however, 
the products of blind historical forces. 
They were the work of men of vision. 
These dates are not signposts on a one- 
way street to the present. Rather they 
mark crossroads at which Western na- 
tions chose one path and rejected others. 
Today, we stand at another crossroad. 
Today, men of vision must once again 
chart a course into the unknown, their 
only guide to the future an understand- 
ing of the past. 

In fashioning the institutions and the 
doctrine upon which the defense of 

After the failure of the 
effort to create an in- 
dependent European 
defense, the United 
States reluctantly con- 
cluded that its continued 
military presence in 
Europe was a necessary 
prerequisite to a viable 
collective defense. 

Europe now rests, the Western com- 
munity of nations examined, pursued, 
and ultimately rejected other courses. 
As our peoples reexamine very similar 
alternatives today, it is worth recalling 
what was rejected in the past and why. 
The defense of Europe today rests 
upon three pillars: collective security, 
nuclear deterrence, and American en- 
gagement. When first propounded, each 
of these concepts was revolutionary. To- 
day they are again controversial, not 

because they have failed but because 
they have succeeded so well. Although 
debate in Europe has focused on 
intermediate-range missiles, the effect 
has been to throw into question the 
much more fundamental underpinnings 
of Western security. 

This debate is to be welcomed. The 
concepts upon which the West bases it 
security cannot retain their vitality if 
they are not challenged and revalidate! 
by each successive generation. The in- 
stitutions upon which the West depend 
for its defense cannot retain vitality if 
they are not forced to justify, to those 
who must support them, their continue 

In the early postwar years, before 
the West turned to dependence upon c 
lective defense, Western governments 
sought, in good faith, an accommodatk 
with the Soviet Union, an accommoda- 
tion which would have poured massive 
U.S. economic assistance into Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union, reunifie< 
Germany, left all Europe without the 
presence of foreign troops, and elim- 
inated the need for military alliances. 
The Soviets rejected this accommoda- 
tion. Their behavior in Poland, in their 
occupation zone of Germany, and 
throughout Eastern Europe conclusive 
demonstrated to the Western peoples 
that an unarmed accommodation with 
the Soviet Union could only be had at 
the price of Soviet domination. In the 
wake of the Berlin blockade and of the 
Soviet-engineered coup in Czechoslo- 
vakia, the West turned to collective 
security and concluded the North Atlai 
tic Treaty. 

That treaty ushered in an era of 
American engagement in European 
security. At the conclusion of the war 
1945, the United States had begun the 
massive withdrawal of its forces from 
Europe. Well into the 1950s the Unite< 
States intended to complete this with- 
drawal and to turn the defense of 
Europe over to Europe. In the early 
1950s, the United States encouraged tl 
creation of an independent European c 
fense force. Europe had then, and has 
today, the manpower, wealth, and tale: 
to provide unaided for its own defense 
Yet only the United States proved able 
to provide the catalytic core around 
which an effective alliance force could 
formed. After the failure of the effort 
create an independent European de- 
fense, the United States reluctantly co: 


Department of State Bulleti 


ided that its continued military 
esence in Europe was a necessary 
erequisite to a viable collective 

In the later 1950s and early 1960s, 
bate centered on the place of nuclear 
capons in the alliance's defense and of 
e United States in providing that ele- 
ent of the defense. Here, too, alterna- 
tes were tried, and here, too, fun- 
.mental decisions were made which 
ape the world we live in and the 
bates we are engaged in today. 

Initially it was NATO's intention to 
eate a conventional defense of Europe 
fficient to match Soviet capabilities 
id to counterbalance the Soviet 
:ographic advantages. Such a Western 
rce was designed. Alliance members 
jeed upon goals for its achievement, 
it these goals were not met, and 
thin a short time of their adoption 
ere was general agreement that they 
juld never be. The creation of a 
acetime military establishment fully 
fficient for the conventional defense of 
irope has consistently proved beyond 
e political capacity of democratic, 
uralistic societies. 

In consequence, the alliance turned 
rly on to nuclear weapons to provide 
the deterrent capability which its con- 
ditional forces, by themselves, lacked. 
ily by asserting a willingness to em- 
oy nuclear weapons, if need be, in the 
ifense of Europe, could NATO prevent 
e continued disparity in conventional 
pabilities from inviting aggression or 
cilitating intimidation. 

There was also debate in the 1950s 
id 1960s regarding participation in any 
liance nuclear force. The British and 
e French developed nuclear cap- 
>ilities of their own, and the United 
ates offered Germany and other allies 
irticipation in a multilateral nuclear 
rce. By the end of the 1960s, it was 
:nerally concluded that the U.K. and 
rench systems contributed to Western 
icurity and to the credibility of NATO's 
iterrent posture, but that they were 
)t and could never be an adequate sub- 
itute for a continuing American 
lclear guarantee. 

The West's last great nuclear debate 
us culminated, in 1967, in the creation 
' an institution designed to resolve the 
sue of nuclear participation and to 
anage the alliance's nuclear posture, 
tiis institution was the Nuclear Plan- 
ng Group. That debate also resulted, 
that same year, in the enunciation of 
strategy designed to extend the deter- 
;nt capability of American nuclear 
eapons to Europe while leaving the 

alliance many other alternatives, in 
times of crisis, short of a resort to 
nuclear weapons, that strategy was flex- 
ible response. 

The critical element of this strategy 
is the concept of extended deterrence 
which links the power of the United 
States to the defense of Europe. Ex- 
tended deterrence translates America's 
political commitment to regard an attack 
on Europe as an attack on America into 
military planning and capabilities. As a 
result, American forces are not struc- 
tured or trained solely to protect 
America, nor American nuclear weapons 
designed solely to prevent nuclear attack 
upon America. The mission of American 
forces has been extended to deterrence 
of attacks against the alliance as a whole 
and to deterrence of intimidation or 
threat of force directed against any of 
its members. 

In extending the umbrella of Ameri- 
can power over Europe, a balance had 
to be established between forces in place 
and forces on call. If the United States 
put in Europe the force needed for a 
sustainable defense, the cost would be 
unacceptable to the American people 
and the level of American presence 
unbearable to the European public. If, 
on the other hand, the United States 
limited its commitment to European 
security solely to the promise of as- 
sistance in time of conflict, that commit- 
ment would lack the needed deterrent 

Over three decades an acceptable 
and effective balance between forces in 
place and forces on call has been estab- 
lished. This balance anchors each major 
element of American military power to 
the European Continent. The U.S. Army 
maintains the equivalent of over five 
divisions in Europe. The U.S. Air Force 
has here three tactical air forces. The 
U.S. Navy has two carrier battle groups 
in European waters. U.S. forces in 
Europe are equipped with both conven- 
tional and nuclear capabilities. Thus 
American troops in Europe are much 
more than mere tokens of the U.S. com- 
mitments, while remaining much less 
than the full commitment. 

The Need for a Coherent 
Structure of Defense 

Over the past 30 years the West has cre- 
ated the structure of collective security I 
have described. It has developed the 
military capabilities needed to sustain 
that structure, relying upon a combina- 
tion of extended deterrence and forces 
in place. It has elaborated a strategy ap- 
propriate to that structure and to that 
combination of forces, the strategy of 
flexible response. In debating the con- 
tinued validity of this legacy, one should 
recognize its fundamental unity and the 
interdependence of its elements. If the 
American strategic deterrent does not 
remain Europe's ultimate guarantee, the 
strategy of flexible response is no longer 

Director, Politico-Military Affairs 

Richard R. Burt is the former national securi- 
ty affairs correspondent for The New York 
Times. He covered foreign policy and defense 
issues in Washington, D.C., including the 
State Department, the Pentagon, the Na- 
tional Security Council, the Central In- 
telligence Agency, and Capitol Hill. 

He has also served as a research fellow at 
the Center for Foreign Policy Research, 
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Interna- 
tional Studies, and lectured regularly at 
Georgetown University, the Foreign Service 
Institute, and the National War College. He 
was assistant director of the International In- 
stitute for Strategic Studies in London. 

Mr. Burt is a member of the Council on 
Foreign Relations, the American Council on 
Germany, the Royal Institute for Interna- 
tional Affairs, and the American Committee 
of the International Institute for Strategic 

Mr. Burt's appointment as Director of the 
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs was an- 
nounced February 3, 1981. ■ 


ibruary 1982 




viable. If flexible response is no longer 
viable, the West can no longer confident- 
ly rest its defense upon the structure of 
collective security. 

Should there be any doubt that 
Europe requires, in 1981 as in 1949, a 
coherent structure for defense, one need 
only study the training, the deployment, 
and the military doctrine of Soviet 
forces. Whatever their present inten- 
tions, the Soviets have designed and 
trained a force to attack, not to defend. 
Whatever their ultimate plans, the 
Soviets have deployed their forces to 
seize territory, not to hold it. 

Should there exist any doubt that 
Western Europe, in 1981 as in 1949, 
must be secured not only against attack 
but against intimidation and threat of 
force, one has only to read the daily 
newspapers. Soviet public statements, 
directed to Western European audi- 
ences, consistently emphasize Russia's 
capability to destroy Europe, while, of 
course, promising not to do so unless 
necessary. When Soviet spokesmen, on 
visit to the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, talk about the nuclear destruction 

Whatever their present 
intentions, the Soviets 
have designed and 
trained a force to at- 
tack, not to defend. 

of Hamburg, Cologne, and Bonn, is 
there any mistaking their meaning? If 
the Soviets speak this way at a time 
when they cannot safely attack Western 
Europe, what tone would they adopt in 
other circumstances? 

How, then, is the alliance to respond 
to Soviet behavior? By mirroring it? By 
adopting a nuclear warfighting strategy? 
By restructuring our forces for offensive 
military operations? By engaging in the 
rhetorical bombast of blatant nuclear 
blackmail? This is how the Soviets claim 
we are responding in an effort to trans- 
fer their characteristic attitudes to us. 

Yet despite the provocations of 
Soviet propaganda, and despite the 
steady buildup of Soviet military power, 
the alliance has remained faithful to its 

• NATO remains a defensive alli- 
ance. Western armed forces are de- 
signed to protect our freedom and in- 
dependence, not to expand our influence 
or intimidate our adversaries. 

• NATO will never initiate the use 
of force. No conflict at any level will 
ever be begun by NATO; no interna- 
tional border will ever be violated by 
NATO forces. 

• NATO's strategy is one of deter- 
rence. The purpose of NATO forces is, 
by their existence and known cap- 
abilities, to deny to any potential adver- 
sary the prospect of securing advantage 
through military action at any level. 

• NATO will always negotiate. The 
West will always be willing to relieve 
the causes of tension through negotia- 
tion and to reduce the burden and risks 
of defense through verifiable arms con- 
trol agreements based upon equality of 
rights and limitations. 

Over the past several years the 
alliance has continued to act in accord- 
ance with these principles. Two years 
ago, for example, the alliance decided to 
modernize nuclear forces in Europe 
through the deployment by the United 
States of cruise missiles and the replace- 
ment of the Pershing ballistic missile by 
a new model of longer range. This deci- 
sion was taken in order to reinforce the 
alliance's structure of collective security, 
to maintain the credibility of America's 
extended deterrent, and to support the 
alliance's strategy of flexible response. 
This decision represented continuity, not 

• These deployments would give the 
alliance no capability it did not previous- 
ly have, for as the Soviets never cease 
to remind us, there are other systems in 
Europe which can strike Soviet ter- 

• These deployments would not put 
Soviet strategic forces at risk, for those 
forces are for the most part beyond the 
range of these new systems. 

• These deployments would not in- 
crease the risk of a nuclear war limited 
to Europe but on the contrary serve to 
remind the Soviets that they cannot 
hope to limit a nuclear war to the ter- 
ritory of others. 

• These deployments have not been 
forced upon Europe but were rather ar- 
rived at though a true process of con- 
sultation and in response to a need felt 
at least as keenly on this side of the 
Atlantic as on mine. 

• These deployments have not set 
back the prospects of arms control but, 

on the contrary, have forced the Soviet 
Union to accept, in principle at least, th( 
need to limit its nuclear weapons 
targeted in Europe. 

• These deployments are not de- 
signed to isolate the United States from 
Europe but rather to reinforce the 
strategic unity of the alliance and induct 
the Soviet Union to treat the security of 
Western Europe on equal terms with its 

The decisions made by President 
Reagan this summer on strategic forces 
are equally important for the people of 
Europe. The alliance decision of 1979 is 
designed to more securely link America' 
strategic deterrent to the security of 
Europe. But only through the modern- 
ization of U.S. strategic forces can the 
United States continue to extend a 
credible deterrent over Europe. The 
steps which the United States is under- 
taking at President's Reagan's direc- 
tion—building a new bomber, accel- 
erating the development of a new 
submarine-launched ballistic missile, im- 
proving America's strategic command 
and control system, and modernizing oi; 
land-based missile force with the deploy 
ment of MX missiles— are all designed t 
provide America a secure second-strike 
capability, one which cannot be pre- 
empted or neutralized. It is this secure 
second-strike capability upon which the 
West's defense ultimately rests. 

While moving to sustain the NATO 
system of extended deterrence, Presi- 
dent Reagan has also taken steps to gi\ 
substance to the alliance's commitment 
to meaningful arms control. On Novem 
ber 18 he proposed new negotiations or 
strategic forces, beginning as early as 
possible in the new year. He intends 
that these negotiations build upon the 
accomplishments of the past but also g< 
well beyond them toward the achieve- 
ment of significant reductions in stra- 
tegic arms on both sides. 

President Reagan reemphasized on 
that same occasion the U.S. desire to 
see reductions in conventional force 
levels in Europe, to an equal ceiling for 
both East and West. He reaffirmed oui 
desire to see agreement at the CSCE 
[Conference on Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe] review conference in 
Madrid on the convening of a conferem 
on disarmament in Europe. Most 
significantly, he proposed that the 
United States and the Soviet Union 
agree, in the negotiations on inter- 
mediate-range nuclear forces which ha 1 
just begun, to eliminate the long-range 
Soviet missiles capable of threatening 


Department of State Bulleti 


lurope and to cancel the alliance's plans 
3 deploy long-range American missiles. 
The details of this proposal are now 
eing put to the Soviet Union. The 
oviets for their part will be putting 
leir proposals to us. These we will ex- 
mine seriously and consider upon their 
lerits. We have entered these negotia- 
ons in good faith, as President Reagan 
as emphasized. We hope the Soviet 
saders for their part will consider with 
qual care the offer we have put to 

The substance of the Soviet position 
n this issue, as publicly expressed by 
lem to date, is familiar to you. They 
laintain that they need over 1,100 long- 
inge missile warheads capable of strik- 
ig Europe because the United States 
laintains aircraft in Europe. They do 
3t explain why their own aircraft in 
urope— more numerous than those of 
le United States— do not suffice to 
mnter this threat. They do not explain 
hy they need twice the number of 
lissile warheads in 1981 to counter the 
ime number of American aircraft as 
ere in Europe in 1975. 

The Soviets also argue that they re- 
lire military forces to counter threats 
om other nations. They thus claim the 
ght not to parity with the United 
tates but to parity with every potential 
Iversary combined. To grant them this 
ght would be to legitimize global Soviet 
Jgemony, for, as we know, total securi- 

for any one nation means total in- 
jcurity for all others. 

That the Soviet Union puts forward 
ich implausible argumentation is 
iderstandable, for their case is weak 
id their military buildup is coming 
ider increasing scrutiny around the 
orld. The Soviet Union cannot, how- 
r er, expect to secure at the conference 
ble that military superiority which 
ey have pursued through military pro- 
•ams for the past decade or more. We 
•e hopeful, therefore, that the Soviets 
ill ultimately be induced, both in 
!gotiations on intermediate-range 
issiles and on strategic nuclear forces, 

accept a negotiated balance based 
)on parity between our two countries 

much lower levels of military effort 
id risk. 

I noted in opening that the West to- 
ly stands at another crossroad. In the 
ist, Europe chose collective defense 
r er a one-sided accommodation with 
e Soviet Union. In the past Europe 
tose an Atlantic alliance over a Euro- 

pean defense force. In the past Europe 
chose to rely on a deterrent, rather than 
a warfighting strategy. Today these 
same choices are once again posed. To- 
day men of vision must again lead their 
nations on a course which will maintain 
the peace and preserve freedom. Today 
we must ask ourselves whether the 
choices of another generation remain 
valid for its successors. 

Has the world changed so much that 
the Soviet Union could be trusted not to 
take advantage of its geopolitical situa- 
tion to dominate an undefended Europe? 
I can think of little in recent Soviet be- 
havior—whether in Afghanistan or in 
the tone in which its leaders habitually 
address Western Europe— which sup- 
ports this view. 

Has Western Europe evolved, in its 
quest for unity, to the point where it can 
sustain its own defense unaided? If such 
a movement were to manifest itself in 
Europe, I can assure you that the 
United States would interpose no 
obstacles. America has supported every 
step toward European unification, and it 
has accepted, with equanimity and good 
grace, I think it fair to say, whatever 
diminution of U.S. influence has re- 
sulted. Without denying that the 
American military presence in Europe 
brings with it influence and prestige, I 
can safely say that the American people 
would not sustain these forces here 
1 day beyond that point at which they 
were no longer needed or wanted. 

If America has no desire to outstay 
its welcome in Europe, however, neither 

do we entertain the slightest intention of 
abandoning our commitment to it — a 
commitment which I believe is as vital to 
our common security today as it was in 
1949, when first extended. Neither do I 
believe that the people of Europe, when 
they examine the alternatives, will aban- 
don a structure for European security 
which has given them the longest period 
of peace, prosperity, and freedom in 
their history, and in that of mankind. 

Clearly we cannot take the current 
nuclear debate in Europe lightly. Clearly 
those of us who believe in a structure of 
peace based upon collective security 
must once again make our case. Clearly 
those of us who believe that such a 
structure can only be held together 
through the extension by the United 
States of a nuclear guarantee to Europe, 
must once again contend with the alter- 
natives. Yet when those alternatives are 
examined— a Europe undefended and 
subject to Soviet intimidation or a 
Europe united in its own defense— I can 
only conclude that the first is undesir- 
able and the second, for the present, 
unattainable. Thus, at the risk of once 
again being misinterpreted, let me con- 
clude, as I did on a similar occasion in 
Brussels 2 months ago, that for me, and 
for my government, there is no other 
choice but to sustain the alliance struc- 
ture we have inherited and to maintain 
the alliance strategy which gives it 

Fifth Report on Cyprus 

DEC. 3, 1981 1 

In accordance with the provision of Public 
Law 95-384, I am submitting the following 
report on progress made during the past 60 
days toward reaching a negotiated settlement 
of the Cyprus problem. 

The intercommunal negotiations between 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have 
taken a significant step. Both sides accepted 
presentation of a United Nations "evaluation" 
of the status of the intercommunal talks on 
November 18. The "evaluation," although not 
a formal proposal, embodies ideas and con- 
cepts which may prove useful for the parties 
in their decision of outstanding issues. 

Following the presentation of proposals 
earlier this summer by the Turkish Cypriots 
(August 5) and the Greek Cypriots 
(September 9), the development of the United 

Nations "evaluation" signals continuing prog- 
ress toward a negotiated settlement of the 
Cyprus problem. The United Nations, the 
Special Representative of the Secretary 
General, Ambassador Hugo Gobbi, and the 
participating parties are to be commended for 
their efforts. We hope that both parties will 
seize the opportunity offered by the United 
Nations "evaluation" to devote renewed 
energy to resolving their differences by 
peaceful negotiation in a spirit of com- 


Ronald Reagan 

'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Charles H. Percy, chair- 
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 7, 1981). ■ 

bruary 1982 






Bill of Rights Day, 
Human Rights Day 
and Week, 1981 


On December 15, 1791, our Founding 
Fathers rejoiced in the ratification of the first 
ten amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States— a Bill of Rights which has 
helped guarantee all Americans the liberty 
which we so cherish. 

One hundred and fifty-seven years later, 
on December 10, 1948, the United Nations 
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, an effort aimed at securing basic 
human rights for the people of all nations. 

Each of these great documents was born 
after the bloodshed of a bitter war. We 
remember the great sacrifices Americans 
have made for 200 years, from the Revolu- 
tionary War, in which our ancestors pledged 
"their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred 
honor," to the wars of this century, in which 
hundreds of thousands of young Americans 
and millions of others gave their lives on the 
battlefields of Europe, Asia, and Africa in the 
struggle for freedom. And yet, even today, as 
we celebrate Bill of Rights Day and Human 
Rights Day, we all are only too well aware 
that the individual rights declared in these 
documents are not yet respected in many na- 

We have learned that the lesson our 
Founding Fathers taught is as true today as 
it was two centuries ago — liberty depends 
not upon the state but upon the people. 
Liberty thrives in the free association of 
citizens in free institutions: families, church- 
es, universities, trade unions, and a free 

Mankind's best defense against tyranny 
and want is limited government — a govern- 
ment which empowers its people, not itself, 
and which respects the wit and bravery, the 
initiative, and the generosity of the people. 
For, above all, human rights are rights of in- 
dividuals: rights of conscience, rights of 
choice, rights of association, rights of emigra- 
tion, rights of self-directed action, and the 
right to own property. The concept of a na- 
tion of free men and women linked together 
voluntarily is the genius of the system our 
Founding Fathers established. 

We will continue to strive to respect 
these rights fully in our own country and to 
promote their observance abroad. We could 
have no greater wish for mankind than that 
all people come to enjoy these rights. 

This year, after nearly 20 years of effort, 
the United Nations Human Rights Commis- 
sion and the UN General Assembly have ap- 
proved a declaration of the elimination of all 
forms of discrimination based on religion. It 
begins with words Americans will find 
familiar, "Everyone will have the right to 

freedom of thought, conscience and religion." 
It declares that parents must have the right 
to teach their children to worship God and 
that all religions must have the right to teach 
their faith, to train their clergy, and to 
observe their customs and holidays. 

We in America are blessed with rights 
secured for us by the sacrifices of our 
forefathers, but we yearn for the day when 
all mankind can share in these blessings. 
Never is there any excuse for the violation of 
the fundamental rights of man — not at any 
time or in any place, not in rich countries or 
poor, not under any social, economic or 
political system. 

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, 
President of the United States of America, 
do hereby proclaim December 10, 1981 as 
Human Rights Day and December 15, 1981, 
as Bill of Rights Day, and call on all 

Americans to observe the week beginning 
December 10, 1981 as Human Rights Week. 
During this week, let each of us give special 
thought to the blessings we enjoy as a free 
people and let us dedicate our efforts to mak- 
ing the promise of our Bill of Rights a living 
reality for all Americans and, whenever 
possible, for all mankind. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto 
set my hand this 4th day of December, in the 
year of our Lord nineteen hundred and 
eighty-one, and of the Independence of the 
United States of America the two hundred 
and sixth. 

Ronald Reagan 

'No. 4885 of Dec. 4, 1981 (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Dec. 14). ■ 

International Narcotics 
Control Strategy 

by Joseph H. Linnemann 

Statement before the Permanent Sub- 
committee on Investigations of the Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs on 
November 13, 1981. Mr. Linnemann is 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Interna- 
tional Narcotics Matters. 1 

I am pleased to appear before you today 
to discuss the Department of State's role 
in our efforts to control illicit narcotics. 
Events of the past year, both in the 
United States and abroad, have rein- 
forced our view that international nar- 
cotics control is an integral part of U.S. 
foreign relations. As President Reagan 
emphasized in New Orleans on 
September 28, an attack on drug traf- 
ficking is "one of the single most impor- 
tant steps that can lead to a significant 
reduction in crime." A key element of 
the antinarcotic strategy the President 
outlined was "a foreign policy that 
vigorously seeks to interdict and 
eradicate illicit drugs wherever 
cultivated, processed, or transported." 
Toward this goal, he announced the 
creation of a special council on narcotics 
control to coordinate efforts to stop the 
drug flow into this country. 

Within that context, I welcome this 
opportunity to present the Department's 

overall international narcotics control 
strategy and describe some of our 
specific programs. 


First, let me put it in relative fiscal 
terms. Illicit drug sales in the United 
States are estimated by the Drug En- 
forcement Administration (DEA) to ex- 
ceed $80 billion a year. In contrast, the 
overall Federal budget devoted to the 
suppression of drug abuse is under $1 
billion. Approximately 95% of that 
amount is expended here in the United 
States for law enforcement, demand 
reduction, and addict rehabilitation. The 
remainder is devoted largely to inter- 
national programs planned and imple- 
mented by the Department of State's 
Bureau of International Narcotics Mat- 
ters. For FY 1981, our budget totaled 
$35.9 million. 

The Department's primary goal in 
coordinating our international effort is 
to motivate and assist foreign govern- 
ments in curtailing the production of 
illicit drugs at their sources and to 
immobilize major traffickers who 
smuggle these drugs into the United 
States. Since the appointment of the 
Department's Special Adviser on Nar- 
cotics Matters in 1971, we have placed 
highest priority on those drugs that 


Department of State Bulletir 


e the most serious health, social, and 
nomic consequences; i.e., heroin, co- 
le, and marijuana. 
The bureau follows a three-pronged 
oach in pursuing that goal. It can be 
racterized as: 

• Illicit production control and inter- 
ion through enforcement; 

• Drug income alternatives where 
essary; and 

• Demand reduction and prevention. 

Underpinning these approaches is a 
tained diplomatic effort by the 
)artment and our overseas missions 
iecure the cooperation of producing 
transit countries in the global fight 
inst drug abuse. Unless we insure a 
perative international environment, 
sr U.S. agencies, such as the DEA, 
Customs Service, or the Coast 
ird, could not operate effectively with 
I foreign counterparts. More 
cifically, the Department, through 
ernment-to-government agreements 
appropriate international agencies, 
is to provide the legal and organiza- 
lal framework (for seizure of illicit 
3ts, mutual judicial assistance, ship 
rdings, U.N. drug control conven- 
is, etc.) within which much of our in- 
lational effort operates. 
The principal focus of the bureau's 
>rt, within these three general ap- 
aches, is direct technical assistance. 
FY 1981, it obligated $26.2 million 
country programs. 
I would now like to go into a review 
he environment of illicit drug 
vities in Asia and Latin America and 
/ our individual country programs are 
igned to counter them. 

itheast Asia 

a result of the excellent growing con- 
ons for poppies in 1981, the produc- 
i of opium from the three countries 
he Golden Triangle (Thailand, 
•ma, and Laos 2 ) rose from an esti- 
ted 200 metric tons in 1980 to an 
mated 600 metric tons in 1981. 
less there is a significant climatic 
nge, the 1982 production could equal 
jxceed the 1981 figures. 

Thailand. The Royal Thai Govern- 
nt, however, has promised to carry 

eradication programs in 10 zones in 
them Thailand that, as a result of 
■J. crop substitution programs, are 
igned "opium free." We recognize 
t, in terms of gross amounts, eradica- 
l of poppy fields in these 10 zones is 
5 than ideal. However, if the eradica- 

tion is carried out effectively, it will 
indicate to the poppy growers in other 
villages that their government is serious 
in its commitment ultimately to 
eradicate all opium poppies grown 
within its borders. This could have a 
deterrent effect on poppy planting even 
in areas where economic and social 
development have not yet achieved the 
level deemed necessary for the govern- 
ment to mount similar programs. 

Another aspect of the narcotics 
problem has, over the past 6 months, 
shown marked improvement in the 
Golden Triangle; there has been a 
decline in availability or lack of precur- 
sor chemicals (e.g., acetic anhydride), 
used to refine opium into heroin. 
Reports from northern Thailand indicate 
that as a result of Thai Government 
efforts the amount of acetic anhydride 
reaching the northwest border refineries 
has dropped significantly; the refineries 
are having considerable difficulty con- 
verting the bumper stocks of raw opium 
into heroin. We have encouraged the 
Thai Government to continue restricting 
the illegal use of this chemical. At the 
same time we have encouraged them to 
increase surveillance activity on the 
Thai/Malaysian border to prevent a com- 
pensating increase in the number of 
heroin refineries in that area, since 
precursor chemicals come into Thailand 
across the Malaysian border. The Malay- 
sian Government is also attempting to 
make it more difficult for these 
chemicals to enter th country either 
legally or illegally. 

The Thai Government has made 
repeated promises to arrest the 
notorious "drug warlord" Chang Ch'i-fu, 
leader of the Shan United Army (SUA), 
and has also posted a $25,000 reward 
for his capture. The SUA is estimated to 
control some 70% of Golden Triangle 
heroin refining. Chang Ch'i-fu resides in 
a fortified area with several hundred 
armed guards near a small village in 
northern Thailand. The Thai Govern- 
ment is quite aware of Chang's location 
and activities but has been unable to do 
much about arresting him. 

Burma. In Burma, the bureau's 
assistance programs focus primarily on 
contract maintenance for the fixed wing 
and rotary aircraft provided several 
years ago for narcotics programs. We in 
the bureau, with the Burmese Govern- 
ment, are aware that ultimately long- 
term success in reducing the production 
of opium and heroin in Burma must 
combine rural development and crop 
substitution with enforcement and 

eradication. The recent visit to the 
United States of the Burmese Deputy 
Minister of Agriculture underscores the 
importance the Government of Burma 
places on such programs. 

Large-scale enforcement operations 
against opium refineries have made suc- 
cessful use of aircraft to ferry personnel 
to staging areas. Bureau-funded aircraft 
have also been used in support of poppy 
destruction programs in inaccessible 

U.S. Support Programs. To 

counter the narcotics problem in 
Southeast Asia, the bureau supports 
programs in enforcement, crop substitu- 
tion, and demand reduction. In FY 1981 
it budgeted $7.7 million for Thailand, 
Burma, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The 
majority of the funds go to Thai and 
Burmese programs. In addition, bureau 
funding has encouraged regional en- 
forcement cooperation through funding 
of police training for students from 
ASEAN (Association of South East 
Asian Nations) countries and activities 
of the Colombo plan drug advisory pro- 

In Southeast Asia there are six U.S. 
Government employees in narcotics- 
related positions. Two employees are 
career Foreign Service officers who 
staff the Narcotics Control Unit in 
Bangkok. In addition, in Thailand there 
is a U.S. Customs officer (detailed to the 
bureau), an American electronics 
specialist, an American aviation 
maintenance specialist, and an American 
demand reduction specialist (detailed to 
the bureau). We believe that the com- 

. . . most of the heroin 
now being smuggled into 
the eastern United 
States is from Southwest 

bined efforts of our enforcement, de- 
mand reduction treatment, and crop 
substitution programs have the greatest 
chance of long-term success in reducing 
the growth and refining of opium and 
the trafficking and use of narcotics in 
Southeast Asia. 

ruary 1982 



Local commitments to do something 
about the problem are clearly growing in 
Southeast Asia— but at an uneven pace. 
The Governments of Burma, Thailand, 
and Malaysia all recognize that they 
have a serious narcotics abuse problem 
among their own youth. Indonesia has 
less of a problem and less concern. All 
four countries recognize that they are 
major narcotics trafficking centers and, 
in the cases of Burma and Thailand, 
major growing areas as well. The ac- 
tivities of the four governments vary, 
however. In Thailand our greatest dif- 
ficulty is in encouraging Thai motivation 
and action to follow through on their 
promises. Opium eradication has been 
promised in Thailand for several years. 
This year, if the Thai Government 
fulfills its current commitment to us, 
will be the first year that any significant 
eradication has taken place— albeit in a 
limited area. In Burma the motivation 
exists to do something about the grow- 
ing of opium. However, the Burmese 
Government is unable to exercise effec- 
tive control over most of the opium- 
producing areas. 

Southwest Asia 

Although the focus of this hearing is on 
Southeast Asia and Latin America, I 
would like to make a brief reference to 
Southwest Asia in order to keep the 
other two areas in context. 

The recent arrest here in 
Washington of four Pakistani heroin 
traffickers and their American contact 
points up the fact that most of the 
heroin now being smuggled into the 
eastern United States is from Southwest 
Asia. Because we have no access now to 
the opium growing areas of Afghanistan 
and Iran, we do not have reliable 
estimates either of how much opium is 
being produced in either country or how 
much of the opium produced there 
reaches the United States as heroin. 

Opium production in Pakistan for 
the past 2 years has been in the 100-125 
ton range, down from the record 
700-800 ton 1979 crop. Three factors 
account for this: 1) a government ban on 
poppy cultivation in the "settled" areas, 
which produced 300 tons of the 1979 
crop; 2) farmers' depressed prices 
because of larger stocks remaining from 
the 1979 crop; and 3) adverse weather 

We cannot do anything directly 
about production in Afghanistan and 
Iran, so we are concentrating our cur- 
rent efforts on encouraging enforcement 

of the Government of Pakistan's ban on 
cultivation in additional areas of the 
Northwest Frontier Province and in in- 
terdicting heroin trafficking en route 
from Southwest Asia to the United 
States as it passes through Turkey and 
Western Europe. 

Latin America 

I would like to turn now to the current 
narcotics situation in Latin America. 
Latin Americans, because of their 
geographical proximity and cultural ties, 
are much more attuned to our society 
than the more distant Asians. They are, 
for example, aware of the perceived am- 
bivalent attitude toward drug abuse 
among major elements of our popula- 
tion. This relative familiarity with the 
controversy over drug use here adds a 
unique complication to our programs in 
Latin America. We frequently must seek 
to convince influential private and public 
figures of the bona fides of U.S. motives 
when we urge them to take strong and 
politically difficult measures to control 
illicit production and trafficking to the 
United States— the ready market for 
lucrative exports from their frequently 
weak economies. Otherwise responsible 
Colombian businessmen, for example, 
have charged that our desire to 
eliminate Colombian marijuana produc- 
tion is designed to "protect the U.S. 
marijuana producers' market." 

Latin America's importance as prime 
supplier of illicit cocaine and marijuana 
for the U.S. market has increased as 
production has expanded in Bolivia, 
Peru, and Colombia. The latter is also a 
major trafficking country. Trafficking 
has proven to be a devastating social 
and economic problem for the small 
Caribbean states— Bahamas, Jamaica, 
etc.— through which the bulk of the il- 
licit drug flow passes en route to the 
United States. It is, therefore, a 
bilateral political problem for the United 
States in an area already sensitive 
because of economic and security 
threats. With this in mind, let me give 
you a progress report on our current 
Latin American programs. 

In FY 1981, $17.1 million, or over 
60% of our overall country program 
assistance, was expended for our Latin 
American initiatives. 

Mexico. Mexico historically has 
taken great pride in maintaining its in- 
dependence from the United States and 
traditionally has accepted no U.S. 
economic assistance. However, as the 
magnitude of illegal narcotics production 
grew in Mexico during the 1960s and 

U.S. concern increased, and given the 
Mexican perception that American de- 
mand created the narcotics problem, th 
Mexicans felt that U.S. assistance in 
sharing the costs of the massive contro 
program was appropriate. 

The narcotics eradication program 
which we undertook in cooperation wit 
the Mexican Attorney General's office 
has become our largest international 
narcotics control initiative. Over a 
10-year period, the United States has i 
vested more than $95 million of intern; 
tional narcotics control funds in this 
joint venture. Although we do not hav< 
access to Mexican budgetary figures, v 
estimate that they are currently spend 
ing three to four times as much as we 
are on the program. Our major expens 
has been for aircraft and aviation 
maintenance. No U.S. assistance has 
been needed for crop substitution, sine 
opium growing on a large scale is a re 
cent phenomenon, and the Mexican 
Government does not feel obligated to 
provide aid to growers it puts out of 
business (in marked contrast to the 
situation in traditional producer coun- 

The key to the success of the 
eradication campaign in Mexico was tl 
government's November 1975 decision 
use herbicides. They had never been 
used in a nationwide campaign for nai 
cotics control, but ad hoc manual 
eradication had not been equal to the 
task— even when helicopter logistical 
support in 1975 doubled the amount 
eradicated. In 1975, an estimated 65 
tons of opium was grown, producing ( 
tons of heroin. At the high point in th 
eradication campaign, 1977, some 10,( 
hectares of opium (enough to produce 
tons of heroin) were destroyed. By 19. 
less than one ton of Mexican heroin 
entered the United States. There are, 
however, recent indications that heroi 
production is increasing, as the Mexic 
poppy growers use more and more 
sophisticated means to avoid detectioi 
and thus eradication. 

Colombia. Colombia continues to 
the major processor of cocaine hydro- 
chloride, supplying at least 50% of th< 
U.S. and world markets. (Nearly all o 
the cocaine is, however, produced froi 
coca derivatives originating in Peru a 
Bolivia.) Colombia also provides an 
estimated 70% of the marijuana 
smuggled to the United States. Our c 
tributions to the international narcotit 
control programs in Colombia totaled 
$32 million through 1981. (This total i 
somewhat misleading, however, since 


Department of State Bulle 


iludes a "one-shot" amount of $16 
llion, which Congress mandated for 
ilombia for FY 1980. These funds have 
en apportioned among Colombia's 
ree armed forces, the National Police, 
d the Customs Service, principally to 
3cure narcotics interdiction related 
mmodities.) The FY 1981 program ex- 
ids support at a level of $3.6 million. 

The majority of this new funding 
..7 million) will be used to assist the 
itional Police— since May 1980 the 
mary Colombian Government agency 
■ narcotics enforcement. Since the 
st of January 1981, the National 
lice has deployed more than 1,000 
m throughout the country in new anti- 
rcotics units, launching an increas- 
;ly effective interdiction campaign, 
sser, but still substantial amounts, 
1 support the Customs Service, 
nistry of Justice activities, and the 
torney General's office. 

With regard to marijuana and with 
erence to my earlier remarks, I would 
;e that the single most effective solu- 
i to the massive Colombian export of 
3 narcotic is an eradication effort, 
forcement and interdiction alone 
iply cannot suppress the flow. Our 
imate objective is, therefore, to 
iperate in an eradication program in 
:ombia. However, we are hindered by 
;gal prohibition against working 
rard eradication internationally 
ough herbicidal spraying. Until pro- 
|8 on this front is brought about, we 
I not be able to convince the Colom- 
ns to agree to undertake the most 
entially effective antimarijuana cam- 

Ecuador. The bureau has main- 
led a program in Ecuador because of 
country's importance as a trafficking 
; for coca derivatives and cocaine 
ring from Bolivia and Peru to Colom- 
(and ultimately the United States). 
have provided commodity and train- 
support for narcotics control pro- 
ms to the Customs Military Police 
the National Police. At various 
its from 1974 to 1979, limited fund- 
was also committed to the Ministries 
iealth and Education for drug abuse 
cation programs. In September 1980 
rogram agreement was signed with 
newly formed National Directorate 
the Control of Illicit Narcotics 
NACTIE) in the Attorney General's 
ce. To date these limited funds have 
n dedicated to drug abuse education 
grams. However, the DINACTIE is 
) charged with the investigation of 

major traffickers operating in Ecuador. 
While the group is still in the formative 
stages, there is substantial potential. 
Thus, in FY 1981 the international nar- 
cotics control program modestly sup- 
ports this operational and enforcement 
side of DINACTIE also. 

Peru. Since 1978 the Department 
has been working with the Government 
of Peru to support programs designed to 
reduce the production and trafficking in 
illegal narcotics at their source. The 
U.S. Government has provided a total of 
almost $7 million in assisting the Peru- 
vian narcotics control program. While 
the initial thrust of our support was 
weighted heavily in favor of enforce- 
ment activities, the current trend is 
toward a balanced program of enforce- 
ment, education, and income substitution 
as a more effective strategy to combat 
the problem. 

We have entered into project agree- 
ments with a variety of Peruvian agen- 
cies involved in the narcotics control 
effort. We are especially interested in 
enhancing the operational and in- 
telligence coordination among all Peru- 
vian narcotics enforcement agencies. 
Among these groups, the Peruvian In- 
vestigative Police and the Guardia Civil 
have been the principal recipients of 
U.S. aid. The police have received $1 

million in U.S. financial assistance and 
the Guardia Civil $740,000 over a 3-year 
period (FY 1978-FY 1980). 

Our other programs in Peru include 
assistance to the Guardia Republicana 
and the Peruvian Customs Service. The 
former is involved with border control 
and the latter with normal export/import 
control activities. We have also been 
cooperating with the Ministry of Educa- 
tion in a modest drug abuse education 
and prevention program within Peru. 

As noted, our long-term thrust in 
Peru is a balanced, integrated program. 
In 1981 a major and unique step for- 
ward was made with the inauguration of 
the Upper Huallaga Valley project. This 
area of Peru is the country's largest 
single source of illicit coca production 
and has been the target of pre\aous 
limited bureau-supported eradication 
activities. The recent quantum step for- 
ward is a joint effort by the bureau, AID 
(Agency for International Development), 
and the Government of Peru which tar- 
gets an estimated 17,000 hectares of 
illicit coca cultivation in the valley. This 
5-year agricultural development and 
coca substitution project is the first U.S. 
Government-supported experiment in 
which the long-advocated strategy of 
coordinating the bureau's support for en- 
forcement with AID's development 
assistance will be implemented. The AID 

Anglo-American Cooperation Against 
Drug Trafficking 

The United Kingdom and the United 
States have agreed by an exchange of 
notes to strengthen their cooperation to 
suppress the unlawful importation of 
narcotic drugs into the United States. 
Such international cooperation is 
recognized in the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs of 1961. 

Under the terms of the new agree- 
ment, the authorities of the United 
States may board in the Gulf of Mexico, 
Caribbean Sea, and in the area of up to 
150 miles off the Atlantic coast of the 
United States private vessels flying the 
British flag in instances where they 
reasonably believe that the vessel has on 
board a cargo of drugs for importation 
into the United States in violation of 
U.S. laws. Thereafter, if U.S. authorities 
still consider that a narcotics offense is 
being committed, they are empowered to 
search the vessel. If the search is suc- 
cessful, U.S. authorities may seize the 
vessel and take it to a U.S. port. 

Her Majesty's Government will be 
promptly informed of all actions taken 
by U.S. authorities and has the right, 
within specified periods, to object to the 
further detention of any vessel and to 
the prosecution of any U.K. national. On 
receipt of such an objection U.S. 
authorities have agreed to release the 
vessel or individual concerned. 

Also, compensation may be payable 
for any loss or injury suffered as a result 
of any action taken by the United States 
in contravention of the terms of this 
agreement, or for any other improper or 
unreasonable action taken by the United 
States pursuant to this agreement. 

The two countries have cooperated, 
in the past, to stamp out this trade, but 
both sides considered that such coopera- 
tion should have a more solid basis in 
the future. 

Press release 383 of Nov. 16, 1981. 

ruary 1982 




project, which was signed with the 
Government of Peru on September 15, 
calls for a loan and grant of $18 million 
to finance a program of combined 
agricultural research and extension 
credit, and other developmental ac- 
tivities in the Upper Huallaga. The 
bureau plans, contingent upon annual 
appropriations, to expend $15-20 million 
on enforcement and eradication of illicit 
coca in this and other areas of Peru over 
the same 5-year period. 

Bolivia. U.S. international narcotics 
control assistance to Bolivia began in 
FY 1975 with a small pilot project to in- 
vestigate the potential for a crop 
substitution program. Bilateral 
agreements were subsequently signed in 
1977 for two different areas of activity: 
expanded investigations of alternate 
crops and assistance to the National 
Directorate for the Control of 
Dangerous Substances for narcotics con- 
trol per se. Further agreements were 
signed in 1978 and 1979. 

The long-term goal of both the alter- 
nate crops and control projects was to 
reduce coca production in Bolivia to the 
level required for legal internal use and 
drug manufacture and to severely curtail 
illicit exploitation of coca leaves. 

The experimental and study phase of 
the agricultural development project was 
essentially completed by the end of 
1980. Earlier in the same year, AID had 
prepared a draft project paper for a full- 
scale agricultural diversification project 
in the Chapare region. Consideration of 
this project was suspended after the 
military coup d'etat in Bolivia in July 

The bureau has maintained, how- 
ever, a substantially reduced level of 
assistance to the Bolivian counterpart 
agency, Proyecto de Desarrollo 
"Chapare-Yungas" (PRODES). We have 
sought to maintain PRODES as a viable 
institution in order to have in place an 
organization that could resume a diver- 
sification program quickly should the 
government demonstrate a capacity for 
narcotics enforcement in the future. 

As to the future, the United States 
has, of course, just taken the first step 
toward normalizing relations with 
Bolivia, based, inter alia, on some 
positive signs on the antinarcotics front. 
However, any return to a full bureau 
program is dependent on further 
demonstration that the current Bolivian 
Government is seriously committed to 

erasing the legacy of the past and 
undertaking effective action to combat 
both the production of and trafficking in 

Brazil. Since 1979, Brazil has 
shown evidence of becoming an impor- 
tant cocaine transshipment country and 
the principal source for acetone and 
ether used in cocaine refinement in 
Bolivia. Fairly sophisticated drug 
distribution networks transship cocaine 
from Bolivia through Brazil for ultimate 
sale in the United States and Europe. 
Our goal is to assist Brazilian authorities 
in curtailing the processing and 
transshipment of coca derivatives. 

In September 1981, the United 
States signed a project agreement with 
the Federal Police, which is under the 
Ministry of Justice and is the agency 
within the Brazilian Government with 
primary responsibility for narcotics con- 
trol. Approximately $200,000 will sup- 
port interdiction operations aimed at 
disrupting trafficking at selected spots 
in key border areas. The components of 
this project will be primarily river patrol 
craft and telecommunications equip- 

If the results of this new cooperative 
operation are positive, we plan to con- 
tinue to support the Federal Police in its 
border interdiction program. 

The Caribbean. Trafficking routes 
for at least 70% of the cocaine and mari- 
juana and a major portion of the illicitly 
produced dangerous drugs entering the 
United States pass through the Carib- 
bean. General aviation aircraft and 
marine vessels are the most common 
mode of trafficking, but commercial 
aviation is also used, particularly for 
cocaine. Traffickers often operate from 
bases in countries where they have 
established a working relationship with 
government officials. Many landing and 
refueling operations which are vital to 
the traffickers operate as legitimate 
businesses, or with very transparent 
camouflage. Furthermore, genuine 
shortages of local enforcement resources 
and the innumerable isolated airstrips 
and harbors from which traffickers can 
operate help to produce an environment 
that is truly hostile to interdiction 

The impact of this flow on the 
United States— especially Florida— has 
long been obvious. The Attorney General 
of Florida reportedly has described the 
trade in cocaine, marijuana, and illicit 

Quaaludes as "the biggest retail business 
in our State," amounting to approx- 
imately $7 billion per year. But the 
affected Caribbean countries are only 
now beginning to perceive the serious 
social, political, and economic problems 
for themselves stemming from the traf- 

We are undertaking a Caribbean 
regional narcotics program aimed at 
establishing a basis for better coordina- 
tion between the Caribbean countries, 
particularly Haiti, the Bahamas, the 
Turks and Caicos, and U.S. enforcemen 
agencies (i.e., DEA, Coast Guard, and 
Customs). The main thrust of this fund- 
ing is to improve interdiction results in 
the Caribbean, pursuing eradication 
efforts if deemed feasible, and opera- 
tional support efforts. 

Jamaica has a special place in our 
Caribbean strategy because, in addition 
to being a logistical stopover for transit 
ing traffickers, it is the only significant 
narcotics source country in the area. 
Approximately 10% of the marijuana 
smuggled into the United States is 
grown in Jamaica. 

Marijuana, known as ganja on the 
island, is widely used among Jamaicans 
Complicating the situation, Rastafarian 
and the members of the Ethiopian Zion 
Coptic Church, religious groups native 
to the island, use marijuana in their 

Until recently, Jamaica's economy 
had followed a downward spiral for 
several years. Currently, income from 
marijuana cultivation and trafficking hi 
risen to a point where it may be sur- 
passing that of any one of Jamaica's 
traditional foreign exchange earners. 
Most Jamaicans have benefited eco- 
nomically, at least indirectly, from the 
marijuana trade. As a recent Business 
Week article noted: 

In recent years, local marijuana traders hav 
replaced U.S. tourists as major suppliers of 
dollars for Jamaica's dwindling foreign cur- 
rency reserves. "Washington's crackdown oi 
gaenja is really hurting us," says one 
Kingston merchant. "Some people call it dir 
money, but until the tourist industry is revi? 
ed, many of us can't get along without it." 

We are, of course, prepared to assi 
the Jamaicans in interdicting traffickin 
through and from the island and in con 
trolling the production of marijuana 
surplus to that of Jamaica's own domes 
tic consumption. 


Department of State Bullet 


unctional Activities 

would like to end my discussion of 
lecific geographic areas here and move 
i to a few functional activities which 
uch equally on several areas of the 
orld: narcotics demand reduction, 
tiich I have referred to previously in 
nnection with individual country pro- 
ams, international narcotics control 
aining, and our support for multi- 
teral programs. 

Demand Reduction. In FY 1981, 

e bureau provided $1.5 million to sup- 
>rt programs designed to reduce de- 
and for illicit drugs in countries which 
e involved in the production or transit 
drugs destined for the United States. 
We have found that the existence of 
lemand reduction program enhances 
t awareness of local public leaders of 
e potential or actual threat drug abuse 
ses to the host society. This in turn 
•engthens the government's commit- 
;nt to the production and trafficking 
atrol programs which the bureau 
lphasizes. We have also found, 
rticularly in producing countries, that 
ible populations of illicit drug con- 
fers provided an additional economic 
:entive to illicit producers. These 
diets are a ready local market for 
atively unrefined drugs, like opium, 
d serve as a hedge against fluctua- 
ns of the international drug market, 
lally, large numbers of chronic con- 
fers of illicit drugs may destabilize 
:ieties friendly to the United Staes by 
lucing the availability of effective 
inpower in the workplace; supporting 
•ruption, criminal trafficking ele- 
mts, and other drug-related crime; 
i exacerbating other economic and 
:ial problems. 

International Narcotics Control 

lining. Bureau-funded training activ- 
i are aimed primarily at improving 
: enforcement capability of foreign 
"cotics officials and are designed to in- 
ase professional cooperation between 
3. enforcement authorities and those 
other countries. 

Most of the training is carried out 
DEA and Customs in time- tested 
irses and in special programs de- 
ned to meet specific requirements, 
th agencies conduct advanced courses 

high-level foreign officials in their 
3. training centers, while training for 
J officials is generally offered abroad 
special in-country programs. Begin- 
g in FY 1982, DEA will conduct its 

advanced international narcotics control 
training at the Federal Law Enforce- 
ment Training Center at Glynco, 
Georgia. DEA and Customs also provide 
courses to improve domestic training 
capabilities of responsible agencies in the 
cooperating nations. During FY 1981, 
DEA and Customs provided training to 
over 1,000 foreign participants in 
courses overseas and in the United 

Bureau-funded training also includes 
the executive observation program, 
through which senior foreign govern- 
ment officials involved in narcotics con- 
trol activities visit this country. Besides 
exposing these key visitors to U.S. agen- 

Colombia continues 
to be the major proc- 
essor of cocaine 
hydrochloride, supply- 
ing at least 50% of the 
U.S. and world markets. 

cies and procedures, this program 
develops personal ties of communication 
and cooperation between U.S. and 
foreign government officials. During FY 
1981, the bureau funded the visits of 12 
senior government officials from nine 

Multilateral Programs. So far I 

have spoken mainly of our bilateral nar- 
cotics control efforts. But we also work 
through various multilateral agencies 
and contribute to the U.N. Fund for 
Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC). I 
would like to cite here an important re- 
cent development by which the U.N. 
drug control system will assist us in 
reducing a major form of drug abuse in 
the United States. 

One of the most popular illicit 
pharmaceuticals here is methaqualone, 
most frequently marketed under the 
trade name Quaalude. Hospital emer- 
gency room mentions of methaqualone 
during the first three quarters of 1980 
totaled 3,374, up almost 100% from the 
same period in 1979. Although most of 
the illicit methaqualone has been 
smuggled from Europe to clandestine 
laboratories in Colombia for entab- 
letting, it appears that, in the near 
future, Colombia may no longer be a 
major supplier. 

For some time, we have urged the 
Colombian Government to ratify the 
U.N. Psychotropic Substances Conven- 
tion of 1971, the international agree- 
ment under which the shipment of licit 
raw materials for methaqualone, which 
is later diverted to illicit production, can 
be controlled. The convention has 
serious implications for domestic 
pharmaceutical industries which makes 
ratification a sensitive economic issue. 
As you know, the U.S. Senate did not 
ratify the convention until last year. The 
Colombian legislature did so in 
September 1980, and final ratification is 
expected by the end of 1981. Colombia 
will soon be able to notify the U.N. Com- 
mission on Narcotic Drugs that licit im- 
ports of the raw materials for metha- 
qualone are prohibited. Exporting coun- 
tries, in this case the Federal Republic 
of Germany and Switzerland, would then 
be obliged to halt shipments to Colombia 
and, in doing so, cut off supplies now 
diverted to the clandestine laboratories 
which supply the U.S. market. 

The United Nations own program 
activities to control illicit drugs are 
funded through voluntary contributions 
given to UNFDAC by the United States 
and several other countries. Since its 
establishment in 1971, UNFDAC has 
helped to emphasize the fact that the 
problems of drug abuse know no na- 
tional boundaries and, therefore, require 
worldwide cooperation. UNFDAC has 
also been able to work with countries 
whose cooperation is vital to U.S. nar- 
cotics control interests, but where 
political circumstances inhibit U.S. 
bilateral assistance. 

The bureau hopes to make another 
contribution to the fund in FY 1982. 
UNFDAC's 1982 program will support 
crop substitution projects in countries 
which are the main producers of illegal 
opium, notably Burma, Thailand, Laos, 
and Pakistan. With the support of Con- 
gress, we intend to pursue our efforts to 
suppress illicit narcotics production and 
trafficking as close to the sources of 
illicit narcotics substances as possible. 

'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 

2 Since 1975, the Lao Government has 
limited the size of the U.S. Embassy to a 
small number of people who are prohibited 
from leaving the capital city of Vientiane 
without permission. Therefore, there is no 
U.S. program in Laos at the present time. 

)ruary 1982 


•• • 


Nuclear Cooperation and 
Nonproliferation Strategy 

by James L. Malone 

Address submitted to the annual con- 
ference on the Atomic Industrial Forum 
in San Francisco on December 1, 1981. 
Mr. Malone is Assistant Secretary for 
Oceans and International Environmen- 
tal and Scientific Affairs. 

Today I would like to review for you the 
progress of the Administration's nuclear 
cooperation and nonproliferation policy 
since President Reagan's July 16 general 
statement on this subject. I know that 
most of you are familiar with that docu- 
ment and have followed closely the 
speeches and policy statements of other 
Administration representatives over the 
past several months. Therefore, I felt 
that, after some brief general comments 
on the principles that are guiding our 
approach, it would probably be most 
useful at this point for you to have a 
preliminary report on a number of the 
specific cases with which we have been 
dealing and to hear how the Administra- 
tion believes each individual case fits in- 
to its overall policy framework. 

The past year has been an exciting 
time for those of us who have been in- 
volved in the evolution of a new 
American strategy on nuclear coopera- 
tion and nonproliferation. One result of 
our efforts has been the initiation of a 
heightened level of exchange between 
nuclear industry and the government. 
This is something that we will need to 
pursue and strengthen from both sides. 
For our part, we recognize that national 
and world public opinion about our 
policies will make a decisive contribution 
to their success or failure. Public judg- 
ment will be formed in the first instance 
by a process of debate and discussion 
among those, like you, who have a 
special knowledge of, and involvement 
in, these issues. And we also recognize 
that, for the success of its decision- 
making process, the nuclear industry of 
the United States must be confident that 
it has a solid understanding of the direc- 
tion of its government's nuclear policies. 

Principles Guiding U.S. Approach 

At the outset I want to lay to rest one 
possible misperception, entertained in 
some quarters, of the bottom line on 
U.S. nonproliferation policy. It is, of 

course, true that we intend to enhance 
the international competitiveness of U.S. 
nuclear exports by all appropriate 
means. Assisting U.S. firms to compete 
on a more equal, nondiscriminatory basis 
with nuclear suppliers from other coun- 
tries in meeting peaceful nuclear power 
needs is not only a legitimate activity of 
any U.S. administration, it is one to 
which the present occupant of the White 
House has directed the urgent attention 
of the several agencies involved. 

It is also true that, in contrast to the 
uniform approach that held sway 
previously, our approach will be a more 
differentiated one. It was, perhaps, 
natural that over the years there arose a 
tendency in U.S. nonproliferation and 
nuclear export policy to seek to treat all 
customers alike and to expect that the 
inflexible and nondiscriminatory rule of 
law that guides our affairs at home could 
somehow be universally applied to 
regulate our decisions on nuclear ex- 
ports. Of course, in the real world, it 
turns out that potential customers for 
our nuclear exports are characterized by 
an extreme disparity in their non- 
proliferation merit and run the gamut 
from those countries whose sense of 
responsibility on this issue is no less 
than our own to those with whom we 
could not consider nuclear cooperation 
at all. It is precisely this diversity that 
our new policy is designed to recognize 
in full. 

However, it is most definitely not 
true— and this is a point to which I par- 
ticularly want to draw your atten- 
tion—that the Reagan Administration is 
less concerned than its predecessors 
about the threat of nuclear proliferation. 
There is no more terrifying prospect 
than that nuclear arms might one day be 
in the hands of a government that would 
seek its desperate ends by using them. 
The imperatives of our own security on 
this score are self-evident: For the 
United States there is no alternative to 
a full commitment to preventing the fur- 
ther spread of nuclear weapons. 

In our bilateral discussions on mat- 
ters of nuclear commerce and non- 
proliferation— which I will examine in 
more detail shortly— it has been clear to 
our counterparts from other countries 
that the Reagan Administration's orien- 
tation on this critical issue extends for- 

ward the straight line of American 
policy concern that goes back to the 
beginning of the atomic age. In our 
confidential diplomatic exchanges, the 
concrete direction of our policy is 
necessarily more fully and candidly 
revealed than in public statements by 
government officials. It should be evi- 
dent to those who keep a close watch on 
the public results of such meetings and 
who can read carefully between the lines 
that there is no indication from this 
quarter that the United States may be 
dropping its guard or relaxing its con- 
cern about the need to avert nuclear 
proliferation. Quite the contrary. 

While our concern is in no way 
diminished, our approach, as you know, 
has been significantly altered in several 
regards. A few moments ago, I men- 
tioned our intention to reestablish the 
competitiveness of American nuclear ex 
ports. Maintaining the economic health 
of this major industry is in itself a very 
important objective, both for the 
domestic energy role the industry must 
be in a position to play over the next 
decades and for the overall contribution 
we need it to make to the economy with 
regard to jobs and our balance of trade. 
But the really decisive consideratior 
is the fact that, in order to influence th< 
development of nuclear energy around 
the world, in order to insure that that 
development is proliferation safe, we 
must be a leading participant in it. If w 
are not, not only do we risk the pro- 
gressive atrophy of this country's tech- 
nological capabilities, the loss of jobs at 
home, and the weakening of our 
payments position, we also risk that 
countries will go their own ways in ma1 
ters of nuclear development to the detr 
ment of our nonproliferation objectives 
U.S. leadership has played a key role ir 
raising international awareness about 
nuclear proliferation and in helping to 
create a system that is able to give 
governments a real measure of 
confidence that their neighbors are not 
building nuclear weapons. It is impor- 
tant to realize that the critical factor ir 
enabling the United States to make su< 
a contribution has not in the first in- 
stance been the correctness of our posi 
tion but rather the influence we were 
able to muster by virtue of our role as 
technology and trade leader in interna- 
tional nuclear commerce. 

Unfortunately, there is a recurring 
tendency to turn away from the compl 
and difficult burdens of involvement— 1 
adopt an above-the-battle stance in 
which the United States is more con- 
cerned with insuring that its own hanc 


Department of State Bullet 


i clean than with coping with the 
•eat of proliferation as it exists in an 
;en messy and complex world — but in 
l long run we have inevitably found 
ih an attitude to be unrealistic. The 
agan Administration's nuclear export 
[icy is a return to realism. 
With the foregoing description of 
r policy's conceptual basis in mind, I 
uld now like to turn to a review of 
reral of the specific country-related 
ues that have been prominent on our 
snda over the past months. 

untry-Related Issues 

Japan. A number of years ago the 
)anese — with an eye, no doubt, to 
dr future energy security and in keep- 
; with their desire to be in the fore- 
nt of technological development — de- 
ed to construct a pilot-scale nuclear 
irocessing plant at Tokai-Mura. How- 
:r, before completion of the plant, 
3. views concerning the reprocessing 
spent nuclear fuel had undergone 
nificant change. In 1977, as the Tokai 
irocessing facility was ready to start 
iration, the United States was en- 
fed in a full-scale effort to discourage 
irocessing worldwide. Just at that 
; e the Japanese were seeking U.S. 
isent, in accordance with our agree- 
nt for cooperation, to reprocess 
|. -origin spent fuel in their new 

The result was a sharp disagreement 
ween the two governments. At one 
nt, the then Prime Minister of Japan 
tracterized the Tokai-Mura issue as 

most disturbing element in 
>. -Japanese relations. But, given the 
;rall closeness of U.S. -Japanese in- 
ests and the strength of Japan's non- 
iliferation credentials, a compromise 
s ultimately reached that allowed 
>an to process up to 99 metric tons of 
3. -origin spent fuel over a 2-year 
•iod. This agreement was subsequent- 
extended and augmented to permit 
iration of the plant through the end 
October of this year. The Tokai-Mura 
le was thus one of the first that the 
v Administration had to face. 

In July the President announced 
.t the United States would not seek to 
ibit reprocessing of spent reactor fuel 
countries with advanced nuclear 
ver programs and where it did not 
ate a proliferation risk. With the 
jsident's new policy in mind, we were 
e to negotiate a new arrangement 
h the Japanese before the end of Oc- 
ier. It will enable Japan to operate 
! Tokai facility through the end of 

1984 and to reprocess U.S. -origin spent 
fuel up to the annual design capacity of 
the plant. 

Japan's impeccable nonproliferation 
credentials and the special contribution 
it has made, in cooperation with the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), to developing new techniques 
and instrumentation to advance the safe- 
guardability of reprocessing plants make 
it clear that Japan meets the standards 
set forth by President Reagan. The ar- 
rangements we reached with Japan take 
full account of our proliferation concerns 
while at the same time demonstrating 
that the United States will be a reliable 
partner in its nuclear commerce with na- 
tions which include our most valued 
friends and allies. 

Switzerland. One of the most im- 
portant and illustrative developments of 
the past several months was the decision 
to approve two pending Swiss requests 
to retransfer a total of approximately 40 
metric tons of spent fuel for reprocess- 
ing in France. The handling of these 
"subsequent arrangement" cases is not 
only indicative of our announced inten- 
tion to approve requests like these from 
Switzerland but also of our commitment 
to act expeditiously so that our trading 
partners will be able to make reliable 
long-term plans and projections. 

In this context, where we are 
endeavoring to reestablish an American 

There is no more terrify- 
ing prospect than that 
nuclear arms might one 
day be in the hands of a 
government that would 
seek its desperate ends 
by using them. 

reputation as a predictable and punctual 
contractual partner, we have begun to 
see signs of renewed interest on a 
governmental level in nuclear coopera- 
tion with the United States. With 
Sweden, for example, we hope soon to 
move to reopen discussions on exploring 
a basis for amending the nuclear 
cooperation agreement between the two 
countries. And we expect shortly to sign 
and then submit for congressional con- 
sideration the draft of a similar agree- 
ment that the United States and 
Norway have initialed. 

Mexico. As you know, Mexico is 
currently making great strides in 
economic development and is playing an 
increasingly important role in this hemi- 
sphere and in the world, especially with 
regard to international trade and 
energy. In agriculture, for example, our 
two countries provide each other with 
significant quantities of a number of 
products to the considerable benefit of 
our respective populations. We look 
ahead to the continued development of 
the Mexican economy both as an ex- 
panded market for American products 
and as a supplier of a range of imports 
to the United States. 

It seems to me that U.S. -Mexican 
relations are currently on a particularly 
good footing and are based on a realistic 
respect for each other's accomplishments 
and interests. The close personal rela- 
tionship between President Reagan and 
President Lopez Portillo has been a ma- 
jor element in our improved relationship. 

Last week Secretary Haig was in 
Mexico for talks on a range of bilateral 
topics. The discussions, which included 
matters of nuclear cooperation, con- 
cerned ways in which the United States 
and Mexico could work together to max- 
imize the benefit which we both draw 
from the especially close relationship of 
our two countries. 

In nuclear matters, Mexico has 
established a solid cadre of scientists 
and technicians and maintains very high 
academic and research standards in the 
nuclear field. Moreover, the Mexican 
Government has made a farsighted deci- 
sion to invest a portion of the revenues 
from its abundant petroleum resources 
in the long-range development of nuclear 

For our part, we hope to be able to 
work together with the Mexicans to find 
ways to expand cooperation between our 
countries in the peaceful uses of the 
atom. And given this Administration's 
commitment to domestic energy inde- 
pendence, to removing impediments to 
the long-term expansion of nuclear 
power, and to encouraging the general 
health of the U.S. reactor industry, I 
believe that the United States will be 
perceived as an attractive partner for 
cooperative programs that will stretch 
out to the end of this century. No 
foreign customer of ours is likely to face 
a situation some years down the road in 
which he ends up bearing the expense of 
subsidizing a nuclear industry whose 
modest domestic market has, in the 
meantime, largely dried up. In short, 
there today is ground for optimism that 
the United States and Mexico can look 

ruary 1982 




forward to a significant level of com- 
merce in nuclear technology as well as in 
more traditional areas of trade. 

During his visit there last week, 
Secretary Haig deposited our instrument 
of ratification of Protocol I of the treaty 
of Tlatelolco— a step which had been 
long awaited by the Mexicans and other 
Latin American governments. Our 
ratification had been unanimously ap- 
proved by the Senate in accordance with 
the request the President made in his 
July 16 statement. This action was a 
token of the deep interest we share with 

The United States and Brazil 
entered into a bilateral agreement for 
peaceful nuclear cooperation in 1972. 
Brazil subsequently contracted with 
Westinghouse for the construction of its 
first power reactor, Angra I, and with 
the Atomic Energy Commission (more 
recently the Department of Energy) for 
enrichment of fuel for that reactor. A 
provision of the enrichment services con- 
tract called for a financial penalty if 
Brazil were to turn to another source 
for enrichment during the life of the 

[Mexico] has made a farsighted decision to invest a 
portion of the revenues from its abundant 
petroleum resources in the long-range development 
of nuclear power. 

Mexico in keeping the region free from 
nuclear armaments. 

Mexico has made a strong commit- 
ment to the cause of nonproliferation. 
We have now made an equally strong 
commitment to reestablishing the United 
States as an attractive and reliable com- 
petitor in this field and there thus seems 
to be no reason to prevent our reaching 
mutually satisfactory arrangements with 
the Mexicans that would allow U.S. 
firms a fair chance at participation in 
the Mexican program. 

Although companies from a number 
of other countries are also interested in 
a share in the Mexican nuclear energy 
undertakings, a U.S. Government team 
in which I am participating will shortly 
be in Mexico to discuss nuclear coopera- 
tion matters. We will be able to present 
a strong brief in favor of U.S. involve- 
ment, for with its unequaled academic, 
research, and industrial resources in the 
nuclear area, and its government's com- 
prehensive commitment to support of 
nuclear export initiatives like this one, I 
think the United States will be in a posi- 
tion to compete aggressively. 

Brazil. The case of Brazil casts an 
informative light on the dynamics of the 
flexible approach we have adopted in 
such circumstances. Our objective has 
been to keep options open on both sides 
as we attempt to find equitable ar- 
rangements that would serve our non- 
proliferation goals while establishing a 
framework that would permit nuclear 
cooperation between the two nations. 

In 1979 Brazil applied for an export 
license for the first fuel reload for 
Angra. Since then that license has re- 
mained pending while the two govern- 
ments have been discussing the applica- 
tion of several export criteria estab- 
lished by the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Act of 1978 and, in particular, the re- 
quirement that IAEA safeguards be 
maintained on all Brazilian nuclear ac- 

The requirements of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Act were clearly in- 
tended in the first place to insure that 
exported U.S. materials were not mis- 
used and, beyond that, to encourage 
those who might want our exports to ac- 
cede to a wide-reaching nonproliferation 
commitment. In other words, withhold- 
ing of U.S. nuclear materials, equip- 
ment, and technology was intended as a 
lever to move other nations in our 
desired nuclear nonproliferation direc- 
tions. But there is something important 
to keep in mind with regard to any 
leverage tool, especially when dealing 
with other sovereign nations: In order to 
use it effectively, you must know its 

For example, I have never been con- 
vinced that it is possible to reach a satis- 
factory conclusion to a process of 
negotiation with another country if you 
try to back the other party publicly 
against a wall. This is not to say that it 
is not proper for the United States to 
specify conditions for its exports. But it 
is to say that our export policy can be 

only one, ancillary inducement; there 
must be additional, publicly palatable 
reasons for a country's decision. 

Given Brazil's need for fuel reload 
material on a timely basis to avoid intei 
ruption in the Angra reactor's operatioi 
and Brazil's reluctance, so far, to pro- 
vide safeguards assurances beyond the 
scope of the 1972 bilateral agreement, 
became evident that it would not be 
possible in the available time to resolve 
the complex safeguards issue and othei 
aspects of our statutory requirements. 
At the same time it was judged that fu 
ther efforts on both sides offered a 
worthwhile chance that agreement cou 
eventually be reached between the two 

Under these circumstances the 
Department of State recommended tha 
the prospects of reconciling the positio 
of the two parties would be best serve( 
by preservation of a nonconfrontationa 
environment for our ongoing talks and 
that, therefore, Brazil should be permi 
ted to obtain elsewhere the single fuel 
load now needed for Angra I without 
liability for the termination changes th 
the contract would otherwise have re- 
quired. This decision was conveyed to 
the Government of Brazil by Vice Pres 
dent Bush during his recent visit there 
We feel that it has created conditions 
conducive to continuation of good fait! 
discussions between the two countries 
about the conditions under which a 
mutually beneficial and enduring nucle 
supply relationship could proceed. 

We have been guided in this situa- 
tion by the need to be flexible in pursi 
of our nonproliferation goals and by tl 
conclusion that, in the final analysis, t 
real incentives for a country like Braz 
to accede to a full-scope safeguards 
regime are likely to be similar to thos< 
that would apply to any nation in thes 
concrete circumstances: a recognition 
that halting the spread of nuclear ex- 
plosives and the preservation of Latin 
America as a nuclear-free region are 
squarely in Brazil's own national in- 

Egypt. The recent conclusion of i 
agreement for nuclear cooperation be 
tween Egypt and the United States is 
important for two reasons. First, it w 
open the door to participation by 
American firms in the plans of the 
Egyptian Government for peaceful 
nuclear development. The United Sta 
has a serious and long-term commitm 
to the economic development of Egyp 
Therefore, we welcome the opportuni 
to extend our field of cooperative acti 
ty there to the development of the 


Department of State Bull* 


ian uses of nuclear energy. We 
ignize that nuclear suppliers from 
;r countries will also be competing 
a, share in Egypt's program, but I 
confident that with regard to price, 
nological quality, and financial 
is, U.S. companies will be in a posi- 
to make an attractive offer. 
Second, and perhaps even more im- 
ant, is the fact that this agreement 
cooperation with Egypt demon- 
tes that the strictest nonprolifera- 
arrangements can be adequately ac- 
modated in an agreement that also 
rides fully for peaceful nuclear 
;lopment. The example set by the 
;ed States and Egypt in this regard 
d be extremely important as a model 
relations with other countries in this 
on and beyond. In this, as well as in 
ir matters having significant implica- 
s for peace in the Middle East, the 
ership of Egypt has again demon- 
ted its considerable sense of respon- 

South Africa. The issue of fuel sup- 
for the French-built reactors at 
berg in South Africa has been much 
le press lately. (In this connection, I 
recently reminded that we often 
* what we are predisposed to hear: 
leone, apparently ready to believe 
worst about the South African 
ear situation, was quoting the State 
artment spokesman and printed it as 
ath Africa's covert reactors, instead 
[oeberg reactors.") In any event, I 
Jd like to briefly review the South 
can case and bring you up to date on 

Since 1974 the United States has 
a contract to provide enrichment 
ices for the Koeberg fuel, beginning 
year. However, since 1975, the 
ted States has not authorized nuclear 
exports to South Africa. 
The consistent U.S. position — and it 
le that the Reagan Administration 
reiterated — has been that the 
ted States would not be able to 
age in nuclear cooperation with 
th Africa unless that country 
ered to the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
aty and accepted international 
iguards on all its nuclear facilities. 
Our objective has been to encourage 
th Africa to make a comprehensive 
proliferation commitment. Such a 
elopment would not only serve our 
rail, worldwide nonproliferation 
Is, it would have a specific impact in 
ica. The United States believes that 
international safeguards system of 
IAEA provides the best available 
ins for furnishing verifiable 

assurance that a country's nuclear ac- 
tivities are not being directed to 
weapons purposes. Bringing South 
Africa into such a system would make a 
real contribution to regional stability and 
the cause of nonproliferation. 

Our policy in southern Africa is 
designed, both with regard to regional 
issues like Namibia and issues like the 
nuclear one, to work toward solutions 
that will defuse tensions on all sides and 
lead to a more relaxed perception for all 
parties that their long-term national in- 
terests are secure. 

As part of our efforts, within the 
past several months the United States 
and South Africa have exchanged visits 
of working-level technical teams who 
have carried out an in-depth investiga- 
tion of the application of safeguards to 
enrichment plants. This question has 
been a critical one since the objection to 
comprehensive international safeguards 
that has been most frequently put for- 
ward by the South Africans has been 
that the inspection process would pose a 
danger to the commercial integrity of 
their indigenously developed enrichment 
process. Though the future of our 
overall relationship in nuclear coopera- 
tion matters still remains unresolved at 
this point, good progress has been made 
on this question of safeguarding enrich- 
ment plants, and the United States cer- 
tainly remains ready to proceed in good 
faith to work to resolve remaining prob- 

Pakistan. The case of Pakistan 
touches closely on our nonproliferation 
policy, although the United States, of 
course, does not engage in nuclear 

intended result of dissuading Pakistan 
from its pursuit of a nuclear weapons 

But for the unprovoked Soviet ag- 
gression in Afghanistan, matters might 
have continued as they were, with Paki- 
stan proceeding toward the testing of a 
nuclear device and our two countries 
fundamentally estranged over the issue. 
However, 2 years ago at the time of the 
Soviet invasion, it was immediately 
recognized that the situation had been 
fundamentally altered. It became 
necessary to attempt to address Paki- 
stan's legitimate and urgent security 
concerns, most directly by assisting it to 
improve its conventional military capa- 
bilities. Those who argue that, in any 
event, Pakistan could never hope to 
counter a Soviet move against it, forget 
the lesson of Yugoslavia or, for that 
matter, the lesson of Switzerland in 
World War II. They also ignore the pro- 
found implications for our security of a 
Soviet attack on still another nation in 
this vital region of the world. 

With this in mind the Reagan Ad- 
ministration moved decisively to work 
out an assistance package with the 
Government of Pakistan. We believe 
that this assistance— which is in the 
strategic interest of the United States- 
will make a significant contribution to 
the well-being and security of Pakistan 
and that it will be recognized as such by 
that government. We also believe that, 
for this reason, it offers the best pros- 
pect of deterring the Pakistanis from 
proceeding with the testing or acquisi- 
tion of nuclear explosives. For we have 
left the Pakistanis in no doubt that such 

The consistent U.S. position . . . has been that the 
United States would not be able to engage in 
nuclear cooperation with South Africa unless that 
country adhered to the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty and accepted international safeguards. . . . 

cooperation with that country. As you 
know, the United States terminated all 
assistance, military and economic, to 
this long-time ally as a result of Paki- 
stan's nuclear program — a program that 
was intended to put that country in posi- 
tion to develop nuclear explosives. How- 
ever, our aid cutoff pursuant to the 
Symington amendment did not have the 

a move on their part would necessarily 
and fundamentally alter the premises of 
our new security relationship with them. 

Australia. As many of you know, 
for some years Australia has been con- 
sidering the acquisition of a uranium 
enrichment capability that would enable 
that country to take better advantage of 
its abundant natural uranium deposits. 
Australia is also a close friend and long- 

ruary 1982 





standing ally of the United States and 
has superb nuclear nonproliferation 
credentials. In fact, Australia has played 
an important role in international efforts 
to prevent the spread of nuclear 
weapons and has a very strict nuclear 
export policy. A number of advanced 
nuclear supplier countries are actively 
pursuing participation in this project 
which would, of course, involve sharing 
their enrichment technology with 

In this context and after extensive 
study, the United States last month 
made a decision to offer U.S. enrichment 
technology to Australia if suitable ar- 
rangements can be worked out between 
us. It should be noted that any transfer 
of U.S. technology under such a pro- 
gram would naturally be subject to U.S. 
statutory requirements and safeguards 
and would be consistent with our overall 
nonproliferation policy. 

While questions like the Australian 
one are examined on a case-by-case basis 
and should not be taken as setting a 
precedent applicable to other instances, 
it is nevertheless worth pointing out that 
to have foreclosed the opportunity to 
cooperate with Australia would not only 
have risked the general alienation of one 
of our closest friends and allies, it would 
also have tended to diminish our 
influence and ability to work together 
with the Australians on matters of 
nuclear proliferation concern. 


Time will tell whether our action on 
Australia and in the other examples I 
have just presented will have borne 
fruit. For, even after almost a year in 
office, we must recognize that what we 
have done so far is only a beginning. In- 
deed, it could be argued— and here I 
return to some of the candor I prom- 
ised—that toward its end the Carter Ad- 
ministration was already heading in 
some of the directions which we have 
followed. That, in fact, is entirely true- 
reality is an insistent teacher and even- 
tually brings us all into line, one way or 
another— but I would submit that what 
matters is not only the isolated decision 
in itself but also the whole policy context 
in which it occurs. Often the question is 
not so much the direction indicated in a 
specific decision as the support and em- 
phasis the decision receives from the 
overall orientation and consistency of an 
administration's policies. 

In the wake of India's 1974 detona- 
tion it was understandable that the 
United States was impelled to impose 
strict controls on exports of sensitive 
nuclear materials, equipment, and 
technology. But, as I think most 
observers came to realize, we went too 
far when these restrictions extended to 
our closest allies and industrial partners 
and, as a result, we began slipping in 
terms of our nuclear industry's ability to 
compete at the international level. This 
is now being changed. 

What has not changed is our com- 
mitment to a strict nuclear export policy 
when it comes to countries in unstable 
areas that are real proliferation risks. 
There is simply no alternative here, nor 
would we for a moment consider one. 

But there is another, even more im- 
portant point I have to make in this con- 
nection: At base, proliferation is a politi- 
cal problem. A given country, is not, in 
the first instance, a proliferation threat 
by virtue of advanced industrial and 
nuclear capabilities— by contrast many 
of the advanced industrial nations of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development could acquire nuclear 
weapons in short order if they so 

wished— but rather because its govern- 
ment has made a political decision to 
seek nuclear arms based on its percep- 
tion of the national security situation i 
faces. In other words, it is not possible 
to address the proliferation problem ej 
clusively in terms of seeking to restric 
potential proliferator's capabilities; the 
are just too many nations that, given t 
political will, can hardly be prevented 
from acquiring the necessary technoloj 
cal and industrial wherewithal in the 
long run. 

So, while we will continue to follo\ 
a most restrictive export policy towarc 
potential proliferators, we must add tc 
that a realistic pursuit of similar 
restraint on the part of other nuclear 
supplier nations and, above all, a detei 
mination to address the underlying 
causes of insecurity that may motivate 
some nations to seek a nuclear weapoi 
option in the first place. These latter 
two activities are the proper task of 
diplomacy and will inevitably require t 
patience and persistence to apply a 
strategy that is nonconfrontational, fie 
ible, and often indirect in its means bu 
uncompromising in its objective. ■ 

IAEA Safeguards System 

by Richard T. Kennedy 

Statement before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on December 2, 
1981. Mr. Kennedy is Under Secretary 
for Management. 1 

It is important, at the outset, to under- 
stand what International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) safeguards are and what 
they are not. They are a system of pro- 
cedures including records, reports, and 
inspections by which the IAEA can 
verify that specified material and 
facilities are not being diverted from 
their declared peaceful purposes. IAEA 
safeguards are a critical and indispensa- 
ble component of the worldwide non- 
proliferation effort, but they are not the 
totality of that effort. 

IAEA safeguards are, principally, a 
detection and warning rather than a 
prevention or reaction mechanism. The 
IAEA has no capability to physically 
prevent diversion and has limited en- 
forcement authority. It has no authority 
or capability to search for nuclear ac- 
tivities away from defined locations. 

And IAEA safeguards do not involve 
political judgments by the IAEA as to 
the dependability or sincerity of non- 
proliferation commitments. 

There are clear limitations on how 
the IAEA can fulfill the specific tasks 
with which it is entrusted. The Agency 
does not have power, for example, to 
mand plant shutdowns. The Agency's 
rights on a range of specific questions 
such as designation of inspectors, are 
subject to limitations. Substantial 
amounts of information received or co 
lected by the IAEA are classified and, 
thus, not publicly releaseable by the 

These points have sometimes been 
cited as criticisms of the IAEA. 
However, the general limitations on tl 
Agency's role are simply facts of inter 
national relations, understood from th 
outset by all concerned. The safeguarc 
system entails a unique compromise o: 
sovereign rights by many nations, and 
is certainly no surprise that this com- 
promise is subject to specific limitatioi 
We must assure that these safeguards 
do accomplish their defined role, while 
pursuing other elements of nonprolifei 


Department of State Bulle 


i policy such as intelligence efforts, 
irity relationships, treaty com- 
ments — particularly the NPT — 
clear Nonproliferation Treaty] 
xaint in supply of sensitive nuclear 
«rial and technology, and upgrading 
onal physical protection capabilities 
leal with aspects of the problem not 
ressed by IAEA safeguards. 
With regard to the specific 
■guards rights and activities of the 
IA and to the question of the Agen- 
effectiveness, I do not believe an 
;ract listing of limitations is the best 
roach to analysis or evaluation, 
her, we should ask the following 

• Does the IAEA have an adequate 
,1 basis for application of effective 

• Do the detailed arrangements 
jet an appropriate balance of effec- 
ness of safeguards and protection of 
valid economic, safety, and pro- 
tary interests of the operators? 

• Does the IAEA have the motiva- 
, means, and capabilities to imple- 
it reasonably effective safeguards? 

• Does the political context in which 
A safeguards operate allow the ef- 
ive implementation of its inspection, 
ysis, and reporting functions? 

[ believe the answer to all these 
itions is, generally, yes. But actual 
ie-field application, while improving, 
leven and often falls short of what 
lid, in principle, be done. It has 
E sustained efforts by the United 
es and other interested countries to 
eve the progress, to date, and there 
problems and weaknesses which 
1 further work to improve the Agen- 
effectiveness and to keep pace with 
ear power developments. 

kground and Considerations 

IAEA's task has been rapidly 
iging, both quantitatively and 
iitatively. IAEA safeguards were in- 
ly applied mainly to research react- 
then to an increasing number of 
er reactors. The safeguards task in 
case of research reactors and light 
er moderated power reactors was 
tively straightforward: the counting 
identification of a modest number of 
rete fuel elements. Also, exact 
inical standards for safeguards were 

In recent years, safeguards have 
n applied to a rapidly increasing 
iber of states and facilities. Perhaps, 
'e importantly, some of the 

safeguarded facilities have presented a 
much more complex safeguards problem. 
Large amounts of material in various 
forms are present in or flow through 
"bulk handling" facilities. In particular, 
fuel fabrication, reprocessing, and 
enrichment plants pose substantial 
challenges for safeguards. On-line re- 
fueled power reactors pose more com- 
plex safeguards problems than do other 
types, because of continuous fuel 
movements. The political context of 
safeguards has also, in some ways, 
become more sensitive, particularly with 
the spread of significant nuclear 
facilities to regions of possible prolifera- 
tion risk. 

The U.S. effort in the safeguards 
area has had several main components. 

First, we have engaged in a con- 
certed effort over several years to per- 
suade the Agency to design its 
safeguards approaches to counter 
specific diversion scenarios. We also 
have supported the establishment of 
safeguards detection goals, in terms of 
quantities and times. Only with such 
goals can uniform and effective 
safeguards procedures be established. 
This effort has largely succeeded. The 
IAEA has adopted this diversion- 
scenario orientation and a very demand- 
ing set of goals. These goals are, to 
some degree, arbitrary and are not ac- 
cepted, or even appropriate, as formal 
requirements. Their use, however, 
represents clear progress in the IAEA's 
concept of its task. 

Second, we have pressed for more 
regular and self -critical analysis by the 
Agency Secretariat of Inspection results. 
We believe this is crucial both to iden- 
tification of necessary improvements 
and to informative reporting by the 
IAEA to its Board of Governors. A ma- 
jor step in this connection was the 
establishment, in the last few years, of a 
highly competent internal evaluation 
unit and the preparation of an annual 
safeguards implementation report. This 
report provides extensive information on 
safeguards activities at specific facility 
types, on the degree of achievement of 
objectives, and on improvements needed. 
The Director General has increased his 
specific reporting to the Board of Gover- 
nors on matters of safeguards interest. 

Third, we have supported a sharp 
increase in safeguards resources. The in- 
crease in the safeguards staff has been 
very rapid over the last several years, 
going from 100 in 1976 to 220 in 1981. 
The budget for safeguards has increased 
from $6.4 million to $25 million in that 

period. An extensive U.S. program of 
technical support to the IAEA is now 
paying off in the procurement and field 
use of some 10 types of safeguards in- 
struments, as well as in the application 
of various systems studies, data han- 
dling systems, and standardization ef- 
forts. This support program has helped 
to induce several other countries, in- 
cluding the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Canada, and the Soviet Union, to in- 
stitute similar measures. 

Other elements of our effort have in- 
cluded support for appointment of com- 
petent and highly motivated staff. In 
this connection, we are pleased that the 
IAEA has recently appointed an ex- 
tremely capable Director General, Mr. 
Hans Blix of Sweden, to succeed the 
long-time distinguished Director General 
Dr. Sigvard Eklund. The United States 
also makes diplomatic approaches to en- 
courage other countries to increase their 
support of effective IAEA safeguards. 

Effectiveness of Safeguards 

When cooperation in peaceful nuclear 
power started in a serious way in the 
late 1950s, the United States made ex- 
tensive supply arrangements which pro- 
vided us rights to inspect the supplied 
items to assure that they had not been 
diverted from peaceful purposes. The 
IAEA was established in 1957 and em- 
powered to apply safeguards to items 
supplied through it and in other cases as 
requested. The IAEA's safeguards 
rights and responsibilities are not set 
out in a single worldwide instrument but 
are established under agreements be- 
tween individual states and the IAEA. 
These can be either trilateral 
agreements — a supplier, a recipient, and 
the IAEA — or bilateral agreements, in- 
volving only the inspected state and the 
IAEA. Since the entry into force of the 
nonproliferation treaty, over 100 states 
have concluded bilateral safeguards 
agreements with the IAEA covering all 
nuclear activities in the state. 

Safeguards agreements pursuant to 
the NPT all closely follow an extensively 
negotiated model agreement. It provides 
an adequate basis for safeguards ap- 
plication. It also provides various provi- 
sions which deal with potential concerns 
of operators. The older guidelines for 
non-NPT type agreements are less 
specific on many points such as objec- 
tives of safeguards. These agreements 
do not limit inspection man-days. Some 
early agreements had deficiencies such 
as inadequate provisions with regard to 




duration of the agreement. Such defi- 
ciencies have been corrected in recent 
non-NPT agreements, and we are 
satisified that they, too, provide an ade- 
quate basis for safeguards application. 

Under either type of safeguards 
agreement, more detailed safeguards ar- 
rangements are worked out for in- 
dividual facilities. These, unlike the basic 
agreements, are not public documents. 
Our understanding is that provisions in 
these "facility attachments" have evolved 
and improved over time; for example, 
older ones, in some cases, did not pro- 
vide explicitly for use of safeguards 
equipment such as cameras. Parties to 
these early agreements, however, have 
generally accepted that technical ad- 
vances should be applied under existing 
agreements. Also, these documents can 
be amended by the state and IAEA, and 
the IAEA frequently requests such up- 
dating. We believe that this updating 
has had considerable success. Never- 
theless, improvement of some old ar- 
rangements still is necessary. 

Based on our present understanding, 
recent and updated facility attachments 
are designed to address the relevant 
diversion scenarios and do provide the 
IAEA with adequate rights and means 
to apply safeguards. For example, at 
several bulk handling facilities con- 
tinuous inspection is permitted. 

Criticism of Legal Provisions 

That inspected States must agree to the 
designation of individual inspectors has 
been presented as a major defect. We do 
not believe this is the case. Operators or 
inspected States have a legitimate in- 
terest in being able to avoid the designa- 
tion of individuals objectionable to them, 
for instance, for physical security 
reasons. In fact, the U.S. Senate con- 
sidered this provision to be an important 
protection for the United States under 
our own safeguards agreement with the 

Safeguards agreements also contain 
a provision protecting against overuse of 
the right to refuse designation of an in- 
spector. In practice, designation of in- 
spectors has not been a w 'despread or 
serious problem to the IAEA and has 
not prevented inspections of any State 
or facility. However, the Director 
General has reported to the Board that 
delays in acceptance of inspectors, in 
some instances, have complicated the 
IAEA's task by preventing optimal use 
of manpower. 

Staff and Budget 

With regard to the motivation, re- 
sources, and capability of the IAEA to 
apply effective safeguards, I have out- 
lined the increases in staff and budget. 
A measure of the adequacy of the 
resources available is the comparison of 
inspection provisions in facility at- 
tachments to actual implemented inspec- 
tions. Of those inspection man-days pro- 
vided in the facility attachments, only 
about 50% have been implemented in 
the last year due, in large part, to 
resource limitations. This is a situation 
clearly needing improvement. The IAEA 
projects approximately 70% implementa- 
tion in the next year or two, and we 
strongly support efforts toward that 

The top management of the IAEA is 
highly competent and motivated, and 
there are many excellent and committed 
staff at all levels. But as with any large 
organization, improvements can be made 
to assure against significant mistakes or 
omissions by the staff in conducting in- 
spections and analysis. It is important 
that adequate redundancies and 
crosschecks are built into the system. 
While more remains to be done, the 
IAEA is making progress in this regard. 
The establishment of the evaluation unit 
mentioned earlier is a case in point. We 
expect the new Director General to con- 
tinue the improvements of IAEA effi- 
ciency and effectiveness. 

Political Considerations 

The political context for IAEA 
safeguards also is critical. There are 
many considerations such as degree of 
cooperation from inspected states, any 
vulnerability of individual inspectors to 
political pressure, ability of IAEA 
management to resist possible pressure 
from inspected states on specific points, 
and general support of safeguards func- 
tions by the Board of Governors. De- 
tailed discussion of each of these factors 
is not possible in the time available. The 
overall situation with regard to such fac- 
tors, however, is good. Inspected states, 
generally, are quite cooperative. In those 
cases where a state may not be 
cooperative, the Director General can 
have confidence he will be backed by a 
large majority of the Board of Gover- 
nors. The Board plays a very important 
role in policymaking, and its present size 
and composition allows effective func- 
tioning. The IAEA staff performs well 
in terms of reporting to the Board on 
difficulties encountered. The Secretariat 
also is able to resist pressure to dismiss 

individual inspectors and, thus, to pro- 
vide reasonable job security. 

Differences between the developin 
and developed countries increasingly £ 
evident in the IAEA. The G-77 [Group 
of 77] countries are pressing for expai 
sion of the Board of Governors, in- 
creased technical assistance funded as 
regular budget item, and more hiring 
individuals from developing countries 
positions within the IAEA Secretariat 
Where the developing countries can 
make a reasonable case for change, si 
as in more consideration of qualified i 
dividuals from these countries in Agei 
appointments, we should be responsiv 
But we must also make clear, from th 
start, our opposition to changes whicr 
would weaken the IAEA's ability to p 
form its functions. We have opposed 
changing the current voluntary fundii 
of technical assistance, and we have c 
posed any further expansion of the 

We need to resist the intrusion in 
IAEA matters of extraneous political 
factors, as occurred last September 
when the general conference debated 
whether to suspend Israel from the 
Agency. Such politicization, ultimatel; 
could threaten the ability of the Agen 
to perform its tasks and, especially, 1 
vital safeguards mission. For now, 
however, these disputes have not und 
mined safeguards, and we are guarde 
optimistic that a large majority of IA 
Member States will continue to 
recognize that an effective IAEA is ii 
their own security interest and is an : 
dispensable requirement for the ex- 
panded international nuclear commer 
many of them seek. 


It is sometimes suggested that there 
contradiction between the safeguards 
and "promotional" functions of the 
IAEA. I do not believe this so. The 
Agency is not an operator of activitie 
which it safeguards, nor does it have 
economic interest in them. The "pron 
tional" programs provide basic inforn 
tion in areas such as reactor safety, 
waste management, or reactor siting 
involve relatively modest technical 
assistance projects. These programs 
one way of implementing Article IV 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
which committed the developed coun- 
tries to aid the developing ones in ac- 
quiring the benefits of nuclear energ: 
In the eyes of many of these develop 
countries such participation and 
assistance, therefore, is a necessary 


Department of State Bui 


he broader nonproliferation bargain. 
is, rather than weakening the 
jguards system, so-called promotional 
grams help to maintain the global 
tical support that the system 

President Reagan has made clear 
\ we strongly support the IAEA. We 
it continue to recognize the unique 
ire and contribution of this interna- 
al body. We have taken various 
>s and plan to take still others to 
mgthen the Agency. Very important 
^ress has been made by the IAEA in 
recent past, but, it still confronts im- 
tant problems. Our objective, in sup- 
t of the new Director General, must 
o make it as good and effective an 
anization as possible, recognizing the 
tinual need to do even better. I 
■mly welcome the past and present 
rest of this Committee in IAEA 
(guards and will work closely with 
in the continued support and further 
rovement of this essential element of 
nonproliferation effort. 

'The complete transcript of the hearings 
be published by the committee and will 
vailable from the Superintendent of 
nments, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 

U.S. Interests in 

the Pacific Island Region 

by John H. Holdridge 

Statement before the House Commit- 
tee on Interior and Insular Affairs on 
December 3, 1981. Ambassador 
Holdridge is Assistant Secretary for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 1 

I am pleased to appear before the com- 
mittee today to respond to questions you 
may have on how American territories 
and the Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands (TTPI) relate to our foreign 
policy in the Pacific Island region. 
Before dealing with these concerns, I 
think it is incumbent on me to describe 
the context in which our territories live 
and act. 

The Pacific Island region embraces 
,$n area of some 25 million square 
'miles — about one-sixth of the Earth's 
surface. It ranges some 6,000 miles east 
to west — from French Polynesia to near 
the Philippines — and a little less north 
to south — from Hawaii to the shores of 
New Zealand. It is a region of ocean; its 
land area is slightly less than that of 
Texas; its population is approximately 5 

It is, then, a region of vast dis- 
tances, dotted by islands and atolls. It is 
well-known to us — in myth and in 
memories of the Second World War. 
Neither, however, is sufficient to give an 
accurate picture of the area or its 
aspirations and problems today. 

Change and Development 

The past 20 years have seen the region 
change from one in which colonial 
dependence was the norm to one in 
which independence is the rule. Western 
Samoa attained independence in 1962; 
since then nine sovereign nations and 
two freely associated states have joined 
the community of nations. This process 
has occurred with almost no violence 
and a minimal of turmoil. The United 
States has watched it with sympathy, in- 
terest, and respect. 

The new states face a battery of 
problems, some common to developing 
nations, others peculiar to their 
geography. Distance and isolation insure 
that imports, and especially fuel im- 
ports, are dear. Shipping and com- 
munications are difficult and costly. 

The region is poor in agricultural 
and mineral resources. Except for the 
larger countries, land available for food 
production is limited relative to popula- 
tion. And population is increasing at a 
rapid rate in many of the countries. 

Foreign economic assistance remains 
critical to the islands' well-being. 
Australia and New Zealand provide the 
bulk, with additional inputs from 
multilateral sources and from such 
bilateral sources as the United States, 
the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and 
the Federal Republic of Germany. 

International Actions and Initiatives 

Despite economic constraints, the island 
states have made remarkable strides 
since independence not only to raise 
their national products and to provide 
essential services to their peoples but to 
define their sense of nationhood and to 
act upon it. 

They have successfully set up or 
developed a number of regional 
organizations, wisely realizing that their 
voices would be better heard in concert. 
Three of the most significant are the 
South Pacific Commission, the South 
Pacific Forum, and the Pacific Island 
Development Program. The United 
States, the American territories in the 
Pacific, and the Government of the 
TTPI participate in some of these 

Beyond the region the island nations 
are primarily involved with Western 
countries and Japan — countries which 
have historically played a critical role in 
the area. Foremost among these are 
Australia and New Zealand, by virtue of 
proximity, longstanding ties to many of 
the countries, and trade and aid relation- 
ships. The United Kingdom retains a 
role through the Commonwealth, with 
which all new South Pacific nations are 
affiliated; France through its territories. 
Japan is important as a trading partner 
and a source of investment capital. 

The Soviet Union has not fared well 
in the area; island countries have not 
been receptive to dealings with the 
U.S.S.R., and Soviet presence in the 
region is minimal. 

ruary 1982 





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Department of State Bui 


Five island states — Papua New 
nea, Fiji, Western Samoa, Solomon 
nds, and Vanuatu — have joined the 
ted Nations; others participate in 
I regional and technical organiza- 

I Interests 

j Pacific Island region is important to 
United States in many ways. 
ough it passes the lines of com- 
lication between the United States 
Asia, Australia, and New Zealand, 
as under our jurisdiction — Hawaii, 
im, American Samoa, and the 
3 I— are part of the region. The 
ion's vast ocean area includes major 
i fishing grounds. 
It is in our interest that: 

• The region remain stable, 
:eful, and friendly to the United 
tes and its allies; 

• The region develop politically, 
ally, and economically free of Soviet 
•ther adverse influence; 

• The U.S. territories, the emerging 
es of the TTPI, and Hawaii have 
adly and cooperative relations with 

r Pacific Island neighbors; and 

• The United States have non- 
riminatory access to the region's 
ine resources. 

In light of the far-reaching changes 
:h have taken place in the region, we 
i taken or are taking the following 
| to protect our interests by: 

• Increasing our diplomatic 

• Welcoming an increasing flow of 
id leaders to the United States; 

• Supporting islanders' interests in 
onal cooperation; 

• Coordinating closely with 
tralia and New Zealand; 

• Devising a modest, economical, 
effective Agency for International 
elopment program (with an FY 1981 
jet of $4.2 million); 

• Resolving U.S. claims to 25 small 
ids in the territories of four island 
es, without prejudice to our security 

• Setting up a Peace Corps program 
:omed by island countries; 

• Supporting the ATS-1 satellite to 
5t international communications in 

• Developing an International Com- 
dcation Agency program of ex- 

lge visitors which has had a very 
tive impact on island leaders; 

• Supporting U.S. Navy ship visits 
which have been uniformly well re- 
ceived; and 

• Pursuing resolution of the 
Micronesian status negotiations not only 
to insure that our relations with Palau, 
the Federated States of Micronesia, and 
the Marshall Islands are founded on 
friendship and mutual respect but to in- 
sure that our strategic defense interests 
in the North Pacific are protected in the 
years to come. 

Status of U.S. Relations 

Our relations with the island countries 
have been marked by friendship and 
cooperation. We share a common con- 
cern for liberty, a common dedication to 
democracy. It is not, then, surprising 
that the island nations have joined with 
us in working toward common objec- 

In the United Nations, following the 
brutal Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
island members were forthright in con- 
demning the U.S.S.R. In protest, they 
closed their ports to Soviet vessels, and 
they also supported the boycott of the 
Moscow Olympics. 

One island nation — Fiji — deserves 
special mention for the support it has 
provided to Middle East peacekeeping 
efforts. Since 1978 Fiji has provided an 
infantry battalion to the U.N. force in 
Lebanon. Recently Fiji became the first 
country anywhere in the world to com- 
mit itself to providing a battalion to the 
multinational force and observers which 
we are organizing in the Sinai. 

The island states have also helped to 
smooth the path of political evolution in 
Micronesia by extending the hand of 
friendship to the new Governments of 
the TTPI and welcoming them into 
regional councils. The three govern- 
ments party to the compact have been 
accepted as associate members of the 
South Pacific Commission and one — the 
Federated States of Micronesia — has 
been accorded observer status in the 
South Pacific Forum. 

In closing this section of my 
remarks, I believe it is useful to stress 
not only the good relations we enjoy 
with the Pacific Island region but to 
stress that how we conduct our relations 
with them in the future is of paramount 
importance. It is not just a matter of 
what we do but how we comport 
ourselves in doing it. We must eschew 
any form of condecension — so easy 
when we are 226 million people strong 
and a superpower. We must show that 
we consider their interests in the execu- 

tion of our own political goals in the 
Pacific and consider them thoughtfully 
even when we differ on specific issues. 
We must continue to consult with them 
individually and increasingly through 
regional cooperative organizations. We 
must continue to coordinate our 
assistance with that of other donors, 
although we will pursue that coordina- 
tion in accordance with our own objec- 
tives and with those of island leaders. 
We must avoid creating great power 
rivalry in the area and continue to deny 
our adversaries the opportunity to ex- 
ploit the island region for their own pur- 

American Territories and the TTPI 

Let me turn now to our territories and 
the TTPI and make a few observations 
about how they relate to our interests in 
the region. 

The areas under U.S. jurisdiction 
are part of the region and constitute an 
important reason for us to be concerned 
with the stability and prosperity of the 
new island nations. The security and 
well-being of our territories, the TTPI, 
and of the State of Hawaii are inevitably 
affected by the state of the region as a 

The territories of Guam and 
American Samoa and the four subdivi- 
sions of the TTPI — the Commonwealth 
of the Northern Mariana Islands, the 
Federated States of Micronesia, the 
Marshall Islands, and Palau — are all ac- 
tive participants in regional affairs. 
Their leaders are personally acquainted 
with most of their counterparts in the 
new nations to the south, and, increas- 
ingly, they exchange ideas on issues of 
mutual interest. 

As integral members of the 
American political community, the ter- 
ritories are in a position to play a 
valuable role as links between the 
United States and the island countries. 
As island areas they share many of the 
interests and peculiar development prob- 
lems of the new nations in the South 
Pacific. Their traditional cultures are 
part of the unique heritage of the Pacific 
Island peoples. They can contribute from 
their own experience to the region's ef- 
forts to advance the well-being of the 
island peoples and can, in turn, draw on 
the experience of their neighbors to the 

We have, indeed, already benefited 
from contributions which the territories 
have made to our foreign policy ac- 
tivities in the region. American Samoa 
Governor Peter Coleman and his staff 

'uary 1982 



advised and assisted in the negotiation 
of the four treaties to settle disputed 
U.S. claims to islands in the Pacific. 
Their knowledge of the region and of 
their fellow islanders facilitated working 
out arrangements that were of benefit 
both to the United States and to 
American Samoa itself. Governor Paul 
Calvo of Guam has taken an active in- 
terest in strengthening ties with Guam's 
island neighbors through the organiza- 
tion of the Conference of Pacific Basin 
Chief Executives. Guam, the Northern 
Marianas, and American Samoa have 
joined with Hawaii to form the Pacific 
Basin Development Council, which spon- 
sors programs to further the economic 
advancement of the territories. The 
council's work — in such fields as energy 
and communications — may also provide 
techniques that can be usefully adapted 
by the other island nations. 

With respect to the TTPI, the Ad- 
ministration's interdepartmental group 
on Micronesia earlier this year con- 
ducted an extensive policy review. A 
basic conclusion of that review, which 
the President approved, was to reaffirm 
the position of the last three Administra- 
tions that the trusteeship should be ter- 
minated. After a thorough examination 
of the available political status options in 
light of our political, economic, and 
defense interests in the area, the Presi- 
dent has determined that the status of 
free association best meets our needs 
and the desires of the peoples of 

I should note that the views of the 
Congress were taken into account dur- 
ing the policy review. Furthermore both 
House and Senate staff members attend- 
ed the recent negotiating round at Maui, 
Hawaii, during which we communicated 
the results of the policy review to the 
Micronesian Governments and suc- 
cessfully reestablished the negotiating 

The Compact of Free Association, 
initialed last year, provides for a status 
distinguishable both from independence 
and from an extension of U.S. 
sovereignty. Under the compact, the 
Micronesian Governments would enjoy 
full internal self-government and 
substantial authority in foreign affairs; 
plenary defense rights and respon- 
sibilities would remain vested in the 
United States for a period of 15 years, 
and we would have the rights of 
strategic denial and base rights or op- 
tions for an even longer period. 

While the Administration has ac- 
cepted the compact as the basis for our 
future relationship with Micronesia, we 

still have a series of technical 
agreements to complete, then a rather 
involved approval process in Micronesia 
and before the Congress of the United 
States, and finally an approach to the 
United Nations. 

In order to prepare the Micronesian 
Governments to assume the foreign af- 
fairs responsibilities which they would 
have under the compact, we have 
assisted and encouraged them to become 
more involved in foreign affairs ac- 
titivies which directly concern them. 
This includes participation in interna- 
tional conferences — such as the U.N. 
Conference on the Law of the Sea and 
the World Administration Radio Con- 
ference — and the negotiation of interna- 
tional agreements with foreign govern- 
ments. The Marshall Islands and the 
Federated States of Micronesia, for ex- 
ample, have concluded economic 
assistance agreements with Japan, and 
the Marshall Islands also has a fishery 
agreement with Japan. The United 
States, of course, retains ultimate 
authority over the foreign affairs of the 
TTPI while the trusteeship agreement 
remains in effect, and foreign affairs ac- 
tivities of the Micronesian Governments 
are subject to U.S. review and approval 
on a case-by-case basis. 

With the Micronesian status negotia- 
tions so far advanced, we have also 
given attention to the question of how 
the U.S. Government will manage the 
new relationship contemplated in the 
compact. This was another of the ques- 
tions addressed by the Administration's 
policy review. 

In dealing with this issue, we con- 
sidered several factors. The freely 
associated states will be members of the 
international community in their own 
right. Their sovereignty will be recogniz- 
ed by the compact. They will manage 
their own foreign relations, subject to 
the limitation stemming from the 
defense rights retained by the United 

At the same time, the freely 
associated states will have close and en- 
during ties to the United States. They 
will have a guarantee of U.S. financial 
assistance for a period of at least 15 
years and will benefit from certain U.S. 
Federal programs, otherwise available 
only to areas under U.S. sovereignty 
and will, of course, be defended by the 
United States. 

Weighing these factors carefully, we 
decided an interagency office should be 
created to oversee our post-trusteeship 
relations with Micronesia. The office 

would be located in the Department o 
State, in keeping with the new intern; 
tional status of the Micronesian Govei 
ments, and the Defense and Interior 
Departments, along with other deparl 
ments as necessary, will share with 
State in the management and staffing 
the office in order to provide the 
necessary expertise and direction for 
aspects of the new relationship. The i 
office will report through an interdep 
mental group and the National Securi 
Council to the President. The details 
the proposed arrangement will be the 
subject of further study. We are plan 
ning to consult this committee in the 
course of that study. 

J The complete transcript of the hearir 
will be published by the committee and wi 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 


Department of State Bull 


apulation Growth, Refugees, 
id Immigration 

Richard Elliot Benedick 

Address before the "Houston Media 
ndtable on World Issues of the 1980s" 
iouston on October 23, 1981. 
bassador Benedick is Coordinator of 
ulation Affairs. 

ive been told that one of the most an- 
ing characteristics of a professional 
omat is that his conversation con- 
lally waivers between a cliche and an 
scretion. I hope that my remarks to- 
will not fall into either category, but 
ould like to speak frankly, drawing 
some experience in foreign affairs, 
ut one of the most serious issues of 
time: the growth of world popula- 

Many in this room today are 
ileged to be witness at a unique 
orical phenomenon— one that has 
er occurred before and will never oc- 
again: a doubling and then a 
xibling of the population of this 
let within the span of a single human 
ime. To put this into perspective: 
ween now and the end of this cen- 
f— less than 20 years away— the 
Id's population, barring unforeseen 
tstrophe, will probably increase from 
it 4.5 billion to over 6 billion, an in- 
nent which approximates the total 
illation of the world as recently as 
). This is equivalent to adding 20 
countries of the size of Bangladesh 
about as poor as the people of that 
ltry, for 90% of this population 
vth will occur in the world's low- 
me countries. This means that the 
istrialized north, which as recently as 
) accounted for one-third of the 
Id's population, will fall to about one- 
i in less than two more decades. 
Put another way: In the next 20 
"s, the number of young adults (age 
i9) in the north will grow by 17 
ion— in the south, by 600 million, 
se are the young people who will be 
ing for jobs, be available for military 
ice or the blandishments of ex- 
lists, and who themselves will be 
•ing children. 

Let us be very clear about these 
ibers. They are not the nightmare 
ings of neo-Malthusian doomsayers: 
se young adults are already born, 
the population projections already 

take account of the fertility declines and 
slower growth rates so widely heralded 
in the popular press in recent months- 
reports which have led some to proclaim 
that population growth is no longer a 
major concern. 

In fact, even assuming a continued 
slowing of population growth rates, 
there will be considerably more people 
added to the world's total in 1999 than 
were added last year— because of the 
larger base and because of the little 
understood phenomenon of demographic 
momentum. For tomorrow's parents are 
already born, and even if they have 
fewer children than the current genera- 
tion, their sheer numbers are so great 
that it will take many decades before a 
given country's population ceases to in- 

As an example, the population of 
Mexico, which in 1920 was approximate- 
ly 15 million, has grown to 70 million. 
But this is only the beginning. Mexican 
women currently bear, on the average, 
more than five children during their 
lifetime. Even if this number could 
decline within the next 20 years to an 
average of a little over two children per 
woman (the "replacement level of fertili- 
ty"), the population of Mexico would 
nevertheless continue to grow over the 
following decades and would not level 
off until it reached about 180 million 
around the middle of the next cen- 
tury—from 15 million to 180 million in 
130 years. 

Moreover, if family planning and 
development efforts are less successful 
and if the two-child norm is not reached 
until 2020, the eventual population 
would exceed 250 million. A 20-year 
delay in achieving the two-child average 
translates into an increment of popula- 
tion which is, coincidentally, equal to the 
total current population of Mexico. 
Where the eventual population will fall 
within this range depends on the point 
at which the average of two children per 
woman is reached. Again, let me em- 
phasize that these are not worst-case 
assumptions; as demographers have told 
me, "you may as well argue with a 
multiplication table." 

Flow of Refugees and Immigrants 

Against this background, the current 
worldwide wave of refugees and im- 
migration can be seen as one manifesta- 
tion of the new demographic reality. 
This poses special problems for the 
United States, since we are the pre- 
ferred destination of many of the world's 
displaced. Other potential host countries 
are becoming increasingly less hospitable 
due to concerns about cultural 
divisiveness which may accompany 
newcomers and because of economic 
competition with the domestic labor 

The United States is currently ex- 
periencing a demographic impact from 
immigration comparable to that of the 
great waves of European migration to 
this country in the years preceding 
World World I. Nearly half of our an- 
nual population increase is now ac- 
counted for by immigration. A recent 
demographic study indicates that, if 
total immigration (legal and illegal) con- 
tinues at anywhere near current levels 
(estimated at 750,000 to 1 milllion per 
year), post- 1980 immigrants and their 
descendants could account for 15%-20% 
of our total population by 2030 — or up 
to 40% by 2080. 

I do not mean to imply a facile 
determinism here, particularly with 
respect to the refugee situation; no one 
would argue, for example, that popula- 
tion growth explains the outflow of 
refugees from Indochina or Cuba. There 
is, however, abundant evidence that 
population pressures can add significant- 
ly to the potential for political instabili- 
ty, communal strife, or international 
conflict — conditions that readily 
generate refugees. These demographical- 
ly influenced factors of instability in- 

• Differential growth rates among 
different ethnic or religious groups, 
which can intensify communal frictions; 

• The almost unbelievable urban ex- 
plosion currently underway in the Third 
World, a phenomenon which may bring 
Mexico City to a population of 30 million 
by the year 2000; Rio de Janeiro, Bom- 
bay, and Calcutta to approximately 20 
million; Tehran, Cairo, and Karachi to 
the 14-16 million range; and turn a 
large number of urban areas from small 
towns to mega-cities within a relatively 
short timespan: for example, Baghdad 
and Lima from 600,000 in 1950 to 11-12 
million in 2000, Kinshasa and Lagos 
from 200,000-300,000 to over 9 million; 

uary 1982 



• New jobs will need to be created 
for hundreds of millions of additional en- 
trants to labor markets of developing 
countries; and 

• The proportion of socially volatile 
youth in Third World populations will be 
over 40% , constituting a rapidly growing 
urban proletariat, packed into miserable 
shantytowns close by the gleaming 
skyscrapers and villas of the large cities. 

These factors increase the probabili- 
ty of a growing gap between rich and 
poor— not only on an international scale 
but also, ominously, within countries 
themselves. In northeast India, com- 
munal massacres erupted in the summer 
of 1980 in Assam and Tripura, resulting 
from the influx of aliens from over- 
populated Bengal and Nepal. In Brazil, 
the Minister of Justice has explicitly 
cited excessive population growth as an 
underlying cause of rising urban crime 
and violence especially involving young 
people. And a recent study by a North- 
western University professor postulates 
that major revolutions in Europe from 
1500 to 1900 were preceded by periods 
of rapid population growth, which 
heightened tensions and upset delicate 
political and economic balances. 

Many observers conclude that there 
is an unmistakable connection: Popula- 
tion pressures limit the options to 
governments for providing essential 
services and meeting the expectations of 
their people. The potential for frustra- 
tion and accompanying sociopolitical ten- 
sions, and for creation of refugees, ap- 
pears to be growing. 

Turning to immigration, the 
pressures are primarily economic — 
poverty and the relative attraction of 
economic opportunities in another coun- 
try—and here the link with population 
growth is even more striking. The Inter- 
national Labour Office estimates that, 
within the next 20 years, at least 600 
million new jobs will have to be created 
in the Third World if the new generation 
of young adults is to be employed. This 
is more than the total labor force of the 
industrialized North today and comes on 
top of existing unemployment or 
underemployment of perhaps 30% in the 
Third World. The costs of creating this 
number of new jobs are obviously enor- 
mous, and yet, at the same time, scarce 
capital will have to be diverted from in- 
vestment to consumption just to feed 
and care for the growing numbers. 

Third World economies may not be 
able to grow fast enough to absorb this 
expanding labor surplus. To look again 
at Mexico, the work force there is grow- 
ing by approximately 3.5% annually. 

Demographic Momentum: Possible Paths of Mexican Population Growth 

of Persons 









357 million* 

253 million* 

179 million* 

i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i 1 Year 

1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 

A Year replacement-level fertility is reached. 

After replacement-level fertility is reached, a population continues to ex- 
pand for several decades but eventually stops growing. Replacement- 
level fertility usually equals a little over 2 children per woman. Based on 
1975-80 data, Mexican women are currently bearing, on the average, 
5.2 children per woman. 

* Population size at stabilization. 

Source: Tomas Frejka, The Population Council 

Even assuming some productivity in- 
crease and an annual out-migration of 
250,000, the economy would still have to 
grow in real terms by at least 6.5% per 
year in order to employ the newcomers 
to the labor market. Or the case of 
Haiti: Even if we and others would ac- 
cept 140,000 emigrants per year, this 
would only represent the annual popula- 
tion increase and would not, in itself, 
relieve current underemployment and 

The Need for Increased National an 
Multinational Efforts 

In sum, the unprecedented phenomen 
of rapid population growth in the Thi 
World has implications both for the c< 
tinuation of relative poverty and for 
potential social unrest and political in 
stability — both of which, in turn, in- 
fluence the current and possible futur 
flow of emigrants and refugees. 

The situation is serious, but it is r 
hopeless. Several U.N. and other inte 
national conferences have, in recent 


Department of State Bulle 


"s, reaffirmed the basic human right 
imilies to make informed decisions 
he number and spacing of their 
Iren and the corollary responsibility 
overnments to provide these families 
i the information and the means to 
o. A number of developing coun- 
;— with widely varying religious, 
;ical, and economic backgrounds — 
i made significant progress, through 
ntary family planning programs, in 
ging down birth rates. These include 
1a, Mexico, South Korea, Tunisia, 
mbia, Costa Rica, Indonesia, and 

But much greater efforts are needed 
le future by the individual countries 
:erned as well as by the international 
munity. The problem requires high 
rity political attention and, as our 
ussion of demographic momentum 
:ates, a greater sense of urgency 
i the world's leaders. 
The only effective and humane solu- 
to the conditions underlying the 
sures which create refugees and 
■ants lies in accelerated economic 
vth combined with concerted efforts 
jduce fertility through voluntary 
ly planning. In this context, the 
. system has an indispensable role to 
, both because population is a global 
j and because it is still a subject of 
e political, religious, and cultural 
itivity in some regions. I am sure 
all know about the activities of 
y U.N. agencies which bear on this 
plex of issues: the World Bank, U.N. 
slopment Program, Food and 
culture Organization, International 
)ur Office, World Health Organiza- 

and the U.N. High Commissioner 
lefugees, which just 2 weeks ago 
awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for its 
c. But I would like to direct your at- 
on this morning to another, perhaps 
sr known, institution — one which 
the Nobel Prize this year in what I 
irstand was a close vote: I refer to 
J.N. Fund for Population Activities 
rhis organization, headquartered in 

York, has been in existence only 12 
s, but it has pioneered in over 100 
tries in introducing population and 
ly planning concepts into develop- 
t strategies. Administered by a 
iolic from the Philippines— Dr. 
.el Salas— UNFPA is, from my per- 
1 experience, one of the most effec- 
and in